

RELEASE IN FULL

Sunday, January 2, 1994

Chris:

Welcome home.

This missive is an experiment. If you would find it useful, I'd like, from time to time, to send you such compilations of miscellaneous notes. I do not know how much true one-on-one time Liz & the World will grant us. These notes from me to you will impose on me the discipline of putting my thoughts to paper, and they will give you an additional way to know where my mind is headed. That way, if there's something going on in my head that strikes you as misguided, you'll have a way of blowing the whistle.

Very useful

The reason for the wide right margin is so that you can write comments and instructions back to me.

This expedient will serve its purpose, it seems to me, only if it's entirely confidential, truly just between the two of us. I will express myself here in a way that assumes I am writing for your eyes only (and will of course treat any replies from you accordingly). I will not share this with anyone, even on my own staff. That way I'd like to give new, and real!, meaning to the phrase "not for the system." (I express this desire with a certain wistfulness, for Today's New York Times leads its paper with a reasonably detailed account of a supposedly not-for-the-system memo that I wrote you in October on NATO expansion. Live and learn.)

- I will keep them that way.

The last thing I want to do is add to the burden of paperwork you already have. So if this device is anything other than welcome and helpful, simply make your first comment read, "No thanks," and this first document will be the last of its kind.

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-- "Lunching with the enemy": In preparation for the summit and in an attempt to get our P4P message out and around the foreign-policy community, I've had in for sandwiches or coffee a variety of critics, skeptics, and Republican movers-and-thinkers. These sessions are also useful to me in thinking about the bigger picture of what lies beyond the summit. So far, the guest list has included Paul Wolfowitz, Zbig Brzezinski and Dimitri Simes. Each in his own way was really very constructive. Paul had some good advice on the mission and various historical models for S/P (he headed the staff under Shultz for a while); Simes always comes bearing political intelligence and useful analysis on Russia.

Zbig will always doubt, and challenge, the premise of our FSU policy, given his fundamental view of Russia as incorrigible, but I think if we consult him from time to time, he'll reciprocate by giving us the benefit of that doubt at least in the tone of his public commentary.

Tony had what I gather from both was a good breakfast with Zbig a few days before. Zbig said that Tony had gone a long way toward satisfying him that P4P is more than just a consolation prize to the disappointed East Europeans and that it has some real promise.

-- **He's Back!**: Pres. Nixon called on Thursday; he's going to the FSU in late Feb. or early March. We agreed to get together before and perhaps after his trip. How much of that pleasure have you had? How much would you like to have? If you have any inclination at all, I think you'd find it a fascinating encounter.

Good

*P.W. & John Bolton
have critical piece
in new F.A.s.*

*- Strikes me as
a little like having
a Ford V-P review
the new GM*

*product line -
but there is
much in P.W.'s
piece I agree
with, - and
it is moderate,
& impersonal in
Tone.*

*I will write Wolfowitz
in some day for lunch.*

*would like
to join you.*

-- **Sam Lewis's departure:** Several people -- including Wolfowitz and Mike Mandelbaum -- have registered strong protests over the way they feel that Sam's departure is being portrayed by anonymous Administration officials who have backgrounded reporters. I saw only one piece, a Dan Williams article in the Post I think, that did convey an insinuation Sam was being blamed for us being blindsided by Somalia, etc. Paul and Mike talk as though there's some sort of smear campaign going on, or at least that there's scuttlebutt around town to the same invidious effect. Wolfowitz and Mandelbaum expressed real outrage over this. They see it as scapegoating of the worst sort; and they point out tartly that Sam has many, many friends -- including in constituencies that are already feeling suspicious if not hostile toward us (read: neocons and the Jewish community).

Perhaps there is something that can be done to counter the impression that we're being ungracious and unfair, and to undo the damage. Possibilities: a high-tone send-off for Sam; consultation with him on the future of S/P; continuing to draw on him for ME advice (this is already intended, right?); perhaps use of him for a special mission or two. I've mentioned this to Tom Donilon, who was aware of the problem.

-- **Europe, Peter and me:** I sense the slightest divergence between Peter and me on how my policy responsibilities/activities will apply to Europe.

If you agree, I will treat it as my No. 1 job, at least initially, to work with Peter, Steve, Lynn, Joan and others to integrate our FSU policy with our West and East European policies. That means persuading the Europeans that we have a single policy toward the Continent, and it takes full account of all their security interests.

*Must be White House - everyone here knows better.**

Part of problem is that Sam "leaked" his own departure & set off the thumb-suckers

I am dismayed about it - but this is a city where nothing is taken at face value - so you & I can argue about your nomination.

I have worked hard on the Jewish Community and feel I have their trust. I could call Steve Frossman or Lester Pollock.

I would like to arrange this - perhaps a swearing-out ceremony?

In our first year in office, we inadvertently created the impression that our Russia/FSU policy in some sense stood alone -- and was even in competition with our European policy. Add to that the (mis)impression that we were somehow downgrading Europe and that what Europe policy we had could be summarized in two words, Bosnia and GATT -- and the rap that we've let Russia "veto" initiatives intended to benefit the East Europeans (perpetuated, and probably intensified, by the Times lede today) -- and we've got a problem that needs to be fixed.

I think it's important symbolically and operationally that I be part of the fix. If, in moving to D, I were to cling stubbornly to the FSU brief but remain aloof from Europe policy, it would feed the suspicion that we were compounding the mistake of the first year. I'd go from being seen as a 500-pound gorilla to an 800-pound beast in the eyes of those who see us as Russo-centrics or Russia-firsters.

This is not just a personal consideration. My assignment, or mandate, as your deputy will be seen as an indication of your own priorities and scope of strongest interest. It should be clear that you've asked me to participate directly in redressing whatever imbalance has arisen -- and certainly not to perpetuate that imbalance from a loftier post.

I'll this argues for me having quite a hands-on involvement in our Europe policy as a whole.

Now for my sense of where Peter is coming from (or where he is heading): He has said on several occasions to me and to others that he thinks I'm going to have my hands full with the FSU, and that we're going to need other resources and other delegations of authority from you to deal with Europe (including his own increased involvement, and travel, there). Without disagreeing with the second half of that proposi-

Good

*we need to
have your vision be
much broader.*

tion, I strongly resist the first for the reasons already stated.

When we were going through our recent (frustrating) round of discussions with Mort Abramowitz, Peter urged giving Mort, as an ambassador-at-large, special responsibility for Eastern Europe. I see that as an attempt to duplicate for Eastern Europe the kind of geographically restricted charter I had for the FSU. That would only deepen the impression of division rather than integration between the two areas.

I have not put before Peter or anyone else my contrary view, but I did want to share it with you. To summarize...

Keeping our FSU policy on track is crucial to our global task/opportunity, which is building a post-Cold War world order. But crucial to having a wise, sustainable FSU policy is the need to put it into a broader context, and that means moving Europe from the margins to the center of our strategy.

As for my own part in this, by no means do I intend to shoulder Peter or anyone else aside. Rather, I'd work closely -- and visibly (including in my own travel) -- with him, and of course with Steve and EUR.

Fine

-- Where, and Who, Next for S/P: Tom mentioned that you wanted to have lunch on this subject Monday. This presents a fairly major scheduling problem for me. I've got the Ukrainian Deputy PM and Mamedov and their delegations here Monday and Tuesday for what we hope will be the climactic round of trilateral negotiations on the Uke-nukes, and I'm hosting a lunch for them Monday.

) Sorry - didn't know.

Let me just recap my thinking on S/P...

As an Administration and as a Department, we've got a problem with the vision thing. It has become a part of the conventional wisdom that

Yes, I know. I am planning to lunch with Meg Greenfield who has this view. Suggestions will be gratefully received. In Bosnia, I

will be difficult (though not impossible) to dislodge that we don't really have a worldview; that we're reactive, intellectually timid; that we have a bunch of policies and objectives, but they don't hang together as part of a single Grand Design, at least not one deserving of capitalization.

It's a bum rap, but an understandable one.

I'm seized of this issue now because I spent much of the trip back and forth to LA last week reviewing the latest version of the op-ed and the Foreign Affairs article that the system has prepared for you. They are pedestrian, laundry-listy, forgettable, unfocused, written in desk-officer-ese.

You know all this, and I know it's painful to hear again. Moreover, you've got a good comeback -- echoed eloquently by George Kennan over dinner! -- to the effect that the post-Cold War world doesn't lend itself to bumper-sticker slogans as easily as the old world did. (Indeed, one might add, bumper-stickerism got us into a certain amount of trouble in the old days. Kennan would certainly echo that, too.)

But the fact remains that an important part of the practice of foreign policy, both on the home front and on the diplomatic high road, is conveying a sense of overarching purpose -- of knowing what we're about in grand terms, even if it means erring sometimes on the side of the grandiose. Statesmanship necessarily entails an ingredient of showmanship, especially in the TV age.

This is not something we should feel embarrassed about. In its foreign policy, the United States is, by definition, in the business of shaping the future of the whole world. That's a pretty big deal, pretty exciting stuff, and we've got to do a better job of getting our public excited about it.

Let me, at this point, be really very personal. As I hope I've made clear, I value very highly in-

deed not only what you've done as Secretary of State but how you've done it. I'm on record with a couple of friends predicting that before we're done, there's going to be a whole new wave of "Christopher chic," and it won't be a reference to your sartorial style. In fact, I've even picked up a hint of that shift in the conventional wisdom in some recent, quite positive articles about you, especially one in USA Today last week.

I do not think you should spend a lot of time honing your delivery skills. I've seen some examples of politicians who have let others try to remake their public persona, and the result was artificial if not a bit goofy. I'm thinking particularly of George Bush rabbit-chopping away at the air during his speeches. (I'm not, however putting down Michael Sheehan in this regard: he's very good, and worth working with, since his technique is to encourage people to develop their strengths.)

Where I do really think we should put more energy is in the formulation of integrative concepts for our policies and in the presentation of those concepts in a way that will capture public imagination and solidify public support.

In one draft of something that's been written for you recently, it was suggested that you close by quoting someone -- Acheson? -- as comparing the job of Secretary of State to that of a gardener, watering and clipping and tending the flowers. I hate this image. It's much too modest and passive. It conjures up in my mind the scene of a pensioner in a sleepy English town tottering around in an apron and rubber boots. The Secretary of State is a combination landscape architect, master engineer, irrigation expert and dam-builder -- just short of a rainmaker.

It's not that we, as an Administration or as a foreign-policy team, are devoid of the necessary ideas. You, Tony, the President and others have

I agree, and frankly think that Sheehan helped me on the interview shows.

Set speeches doc, and probably will remain, a real weakness

I got sandbagged by Doyle McManus who mangled the Acheson quote; I corrected it, and then he attributed it to me!

got them, and you've expressed them. But you need more help in assembling them, amplifying them with the best mind-work that's available in the government, in putting them together in a package that has some clear and inspiring labeling, in mixing some poetry into the prose, and presenting the result to the public in speeches, articles and testimony.

agree.

That is an important part of the mission for S/P as I see it. And it's a mission that should serve you: this is not a function that should be delegated to me or anyone else. That's really very important. I'll do everything I can in my new capacity to help on all things. But I think it would be a mistake for me to become your surrogate in the public articulation, or selling, of our policy. I'll back you up; I'll work within the building, with Tom and others, to make sure you have the best possible scripts, talkers, drafts and pre-briefs, but the out-front role should remain yours.

I think I once quoted to you Henry Grunwald, who said that good writing is good thinking. By the same token, an S/P that came up with bold, broad, compelling formulations of our objectives would also influence the substance of policy, since good policy is also good thinking.

I reflected this concept on about two generations of young lawyers - often in submitting the idea that poor writing didn't reveal poor thinking - it usually does.

(We should also find a way to integrate S/P's efforts in this regard more with Jeremy Rosner's at the NSC.)

Now, the tough next question is, of course, who. I continue to feel that the directorship of S/P is a fulltime job. For that reason, as well as the others I've mentioned, I don't think it's right for Tom. He's your counselor; "C" was invented for him. If he takes on S/P, he'll do justice to neither function. But a phone conversation I had with him on Saturday (one of many over the last week!) gave me the impression that Tom now agrees S/P doesn't make sense for him. So I think that issue has faded.

Hope so. C is right.

Among the names that continue to rattle around in my head are -- not necessarily for the directorship but for the staff -- are: Jessica Matthews, John Newhouse, John Hannah, Ron Asmus (the RAND fellow who was one of the co-authors of the Foreign Affairs article promoting NATO expansion).

I had a very preliminary, carefully caveated conversation with Newhouse, just to see if he'd be interested in joining our team in some fashion. The answer is he would be. He and the new management at The New Yorker are drifting away from each other. He'd like very much to get involved in a policy job -- not just a speech-writing one. I've suggested to Tom that we might go back to John and ask him to take on, as a confidential commission, a rewrite of your Foreign Affairs article. I'm convinced we need outside help there. This would give us a chance to see how good he really is.

I also think it would be worth your while having a lunch with him, just to see what the chemistry (dare I say comfort level?) is there.

-- S/NIS: I'm meeting with Wendy Sherman on Monday afternoon, primarily to discuss my confirmation, but I also want to raise with her my thoughts on the future of S/NIS. As I think I've mentioned to you, and I've certainly discussed with Peter, my hope is to use my departure from the office as a triggering event to seek the necessary legislation to create a new regional bureau for NIS. The experience of the last year has, I believe, totally vindicated the wisdom of your decision to hive NIS off from EUR, and we should now formalize and institutionalize that. I realize that there are other matters ahead of this one in the legislative queue -- the creation of the G Under Secretaryship being just one -- but I think that, at least internally, we should grasp this nettle now rather than later.

but the two blend.

good

good - I admire & like him, on brief contact, - so it is promising.

-- **D/P&R:** Marc has briefed me a bit about the discussions between you and Craig Johnstone (sp?) and the possibility that D/P&R might become a free-standing bureau. This strikes me as having a lot of merit. I'll need some guidance from you on how you want me to help you in the critical area of reconciling policy priorities to resource allocation. At some point this week, I'll be sitting down with Dick Moose to get a better sense of his views on all this.

is a Bureau attached loosely to S? Maybe we need a Combined office of S+D, to attach such bureaus to.

-- **The D Committee:** This is a part of my assignment that I particularly look forward to. I think there's a lot we can do to improve the process whereby we find the best possible chiefs of mission. One quite specific idea: to add Joan Spero to the D Committee, as proof that we're serious about taking more account of our new economic and commercial priorities in the selection of ambassadors.

Good.

-- **"G" and Tim Wirth:** I had dinner Saturday night with John Deutch, an old and good friend. He told me that he and Tim have been in discussion about a very bold plan to take several billion dollars in defense money and reallocate it to "global issue" programs like population control, on the theory that a penny spent now for such causes might save a dollar later required for peacekeeping or, for that matter, warmaking. Without knowing more, I can see both the attraction and the risks of this plan; it combines an admirable degree of boldness and new-think with more than a dollop of snicker factor (I can see the op-ed headline now: "Beating Artillery Shells into Condoms"). Is this something you've focused on? *No - just worried about.*

In light of Congressional news, (e.g. Nunn + Dole), I am apprehensive about a "hollow Army" charge here. Is Deutch speaking for the Secretary? I doubt it.

It will drive the "Hell" up the "wall"

-- **Bosnia, Etc.:** In general, I'm not going to begin preparation for my new job until I get past the

summit. However, I'm making one exception, and that is on the most dreadful ongoing foreign-policy issue we face, which of course is the former-Yugoslavia. I don't think there's anyway I can stay out of that one, for all sorts of obvious reasons (including that it figures so fundamentally, and troublesomely, in the question of a post-Cold War security order for Europe).

Therefore I'm going to start doing some serious reading and talking on the subject, even this week if other things permit. I've talked to Peter and Tom about this and gotten the drift of their current thinking. Perhaps at some point on the trip, you and I can spend a little time on this subject, so I'll have your guidance clearly in mind as I work my way toward a more developed sense of the situation, the pitfalls and (if there are any) the opportunities.

-- Tony: As I've indicated before, I see it as one of my major responsibilities to try to encourage smoother relations among DoD, NSC and State. In particular, I want to try to build on my existing relationship with Tony and Sandy to the benefit of our Department and, of course, of the Administration as a whole. This is already tricky, and it's going to become more so. There is, alas, already a certain degree of mutual apprehension, bordering on mistrust, in the air. I think your own recent approaches to Tony have helped, but he does not disguise his feelings about Tom, whom he sees almost as a Svengali (if not a Iago). On substance, the biggest, most dangerous outstanding issue is the aforementioned Bosnia: he sees you and the Department as determined still to "change the subject," while his strong inclination is to return to that subject with a vengeance.

He and I have had a small, gentlemanly tussle of our own. Instigated in no small measure by Nancy Soderberg (who tends to be very zero-

Yes - we need a good talk about this - the sooner the better - Hence I have asked Beth to look for a time - maybe as early as December ??
Just (1/3)
There is some history here I have never shared.

This isn't just a policy issue with Tony; it's about him.
As long as it isn't just rhetorical, I am not resistant. I don't want no cracks in the headlines without a follow through, but would welcome a real

sum, us-versus-them in her attitude toward State-NSC relations), Tony has made three runs in the past week or so at knocking me out of Presidential events on Russia policy: the recent Clinton-Yeltsin phone call, the Monday pre-summit briefing, and the one-on-one Clinton-Yeltsin session in Moscow (I'd been the notetaker for the first such meeting in Vancouver). In all cases, he was clearly ambivalent, and thanks to his better instincts, encouraged by Nick Burns's splendid handling of a difficult situation, everything remains on track, I think.

I fully recognize that as Deputy Secretary, I cannot and should not try to be ubiquitous when the President engages on Russia/FSU matters. This isn't just a matter of respecting Tony's prerogatives as national security adviser; it's also a matter of being sensitive to your prerogatives as Secretary. I fully intend to delegate a lot of what I'm going now to Jim Collins and Nick Burns. But, at the same time, my sense is that the President wants me to remain, in some appropriate but very real sense, at hand when he tackles these subjects.

On this subject, as on others, I'm confident that we'll get it right. State-NSC relations are like a garden that I will spend a lot of time tending and watering and weeding, while you move mountains, build dams and seed the clouds with rain.

