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MEMORANDUM

January 12, 1994

TO: Tony Lake  
FROM: Strobe Talbott  
SUBJECT: Kozyrev's "European Security Plan"

You recently conveyed President Clinton's interest in Kozyrev's "new ideas" on European security and our analysis of them. In a German newspaper over the weekend, Kozyrev laid out a five-step approach, which he called the "Partnership for a United Europe," that calls for placing NATO, the WEU, and the CIS under the coordinating authority of the NACC and the CSCE. It also would include a system of bilateral security guarantees, international funding for Russian peacekeeping efforts and incentives to limit nuclear proliferation. Kozyrev also used the occasion to reiterate Moscow's opposition to adding the Visegrad 4 to NATO, arguing that such a move would encourage Russian nationalists to see it as an "attack from the West."

Essentially what Kozyrev is trying to do with his plan is dilute the primacy of NATO (to which Russia does not belong), create a new governing structure that includes the 52-member CSCE and NACC (in which Russia prominently does belong), and thereby underscore the moral and political equality of CIS and NATO. The result would be cumbersome in the extreme -- and probably self-paralyzing. Either that, or it would recreate blocs under a vague and ineffectual umbrella. Kozyrev's plan is clearly designed to give Russia a bigger piece of the action in European peacekeeping and to create a mantle of international legitimacy plus Western funding for CIS peacekeeping, but it would also severely hamstring NATO's ability to act.

On P4P, Kozyrev is generally supportive of Russian membership, if only to ensure that the East Europeans do not get ahead of Russia in security arrangements with NATO. In what Moscow would see as a perfect world, Kozyrev -- and indeed many of Russia's foreign policy elite -- would much prefer for Russia to be the architect and engineer, along with the U.S., of a completely new European security order. It sticks in their craw that NATO appears poised to dictate the terms of the new order and Russia has no choice but to accept a late invitation to a table that has been pre-set by Washington for 45 years. At bottom, even our most

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Declassification Authority: Geoffrey W. Chapman, Senior Reviewer, A/GIS/IPS  
9/29/2020

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enlightened colleagues in Russia have not fully adjusted to the loss of their status as a supposedly co-equal superpower.

This sense of following, rather than leading, in the building of a new security order has led to other instances of unhelpful behavior by Kozyrev recently. Quite simply and bluntly, Kozyrev has become part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Toby Gati recently circulated a rather alarming report on her private talk with Kozyrev last month in Moscow; I had a 1-on-1 lunch with him at the same time in which he sounded some of the same themes, albeit in more muted tones.

Basically, Kozyrev seems to have concluded that both his own personal political interests and Russia's require from him a tougher, more nationalistic line. The new Kozyrev is likely to push policies that will evoke a stern response from us and that will certainly make it harder for us to carry out our strategy of fostering Russia's integration into the West.

This is a puzzling, disturbing development. During the long, difficult period that the Soviet Union and the Soviet system were expiring, Kozyrev was not just a constructive force but quite a heroic one. He championed the USSR's, then Russia's, aspiration to be a modern, civilized state. He risked a lot and suffered a lot during that period.

I, for one, don't understand what has caused him to shift positions in such a basic way, but I can guess. It is certainly connected with the backlash against reform and the West that were so evident in the Dec. 12 elections and will no doubt be evident in the new Parliament. It also has to do with Kozyrev's decision to run for the Duma from a constituency -- Murmansk -- that has a large military population. (It's a consummate irony that Kozyrev and Zhirinovskiy would be the big winners in that district. Zhirinovskiy has publicly threatened to hang Kozyrev in front of the Foreign Ministry.) And it also stems from his feeling of continuing vulnerability to the conservatives, who will never trust or forgive him no matter how hardline his positions.

In any event, beyond the psychodrama that is playing out here, there are very real, and quite disturbing, implications for policy, since Kozyrev still has a lot of influence on Yeltsin. When the Vice President was in Moscow, we saw a vivid example of how Kozyrev can obstruct desirable developments

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and spin Yeltsin in the wrong direction. Kozyrev tried his best to block my suggestion of taking Mamedov to Kiev for what turned out to be a key trilateral meeting (fortunately, Chernomyrdin overruled him on the spot); and he then got to Yeltsin just before the VP came to the Kremlin. Kozyrev got Yeltsin to open the meeting with a blast -- in front of the TV cameras -- at the Ukrainians for the perfidy and at the Americans for their naivete (that word again!). It was hardly a helpful prelude to the Kiev expedition. We've got some reason to believe that Kozyrev has not been helpful this week as we've moved to closure on the trilateral deal.

Anyway, there are severe limits on what we can do about all this, but Chris will try to use his meeting with Kozyrev tomorrow to sound some soothing themes and try to reassure him on our plans for Europe. Among Chris' points will be:

- o The underlying premise of our policy toward Russia remains firm: we think the overall trends are favorable; reform will prevail; and that is a credit to President Yeltsin and the key members of his team, Kozyrev prominently included.

- o We hope it is apparent how resolute we are in our determination to work with Russia toward its full integration into the community of democratic nations.

- One dramatic piece of evidence: President Clinton's Partnership for Peace proposal, which -- in the face of considerable pressure in another direction -- opens the door wide to Russia and preserves the principle of inclusiveness.

- Another example: In his meeting with President Yeltsin, President Clinton is right now laying out some proposals that we are making to the G-7 in order to make the international financial institutions more responsive to the social dimension of Russian reform.

- o So we're on course, Andrei, but the seas are rough, and they could get rougher. We are particularly concerned about the danger that forces mistrustful of the U.S. and the West in your political environment are on the rise -- and that those mistrustful of Russia are on the rise in ours.

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o We've got a troublesome interaction developing -- indeed, a potential vicious cycle. During the Cold War, you and I both saw examples of how hardliners in the US and USSR played off of each other.

-- That was unhelpful when our countries were on opposite sides of a great geopolitical and ideological struggle; it would be downright tragic if it were to happen again now that we're essentially on the same side.

o We've got to work together to deprive both these groups of ammunition.