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INFO: MEXICO, MEXICO/CCA, MEXICALI

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FROM : Amconsul TIJUANA

DATE: September 24, 1962

SUBJECT: Recent Developments - Garzón and the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional

REF : Our A-7, August 24, 1962, and our A-2, July 19, 1962.

Although local elections in Baja California came off on August 5, 1962, without overt disturbances, there were apparently a variety of undercover maneuvers by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional and Federal officials in the State with accompanying stresses and strains on all concerned. While I have not yet been able to find out just exactly what went on, I have been able to obtain some information worth reporting.

Garzón's sudden withdrawal from active politicking almost on the eve of elections was apparently due to multiple factors. Various knowledgeable local sources report that a combination of the carrot and the stick was used to dissuade Garzón from going through with his announced plans to raise a serious issue with the PRI over the elections. Although I have no confirmed information about the "carrot" portion of this operation, I have been informed by a highly reliable source in a position to know, concerning the "stick" aspect of the matter. This source states that a very high ranking Mexican military officer was dispatched to Mexicali only a few days prior to August 5 to "reason" with Garzón. Federal troops in sufficient strength to back this officer up were dispersed in the Mexicali Valley prior to a confrontation with Garzón. My source, who was present at the confrontation, states that Garzón was given a choice of: (1) either quieting down and fading into the background or (2) becoming a national figure in Mexico, along with Rubén JARAMILLO. Garzón chose the first alternative, after some hesitation, being persuaded by the assurance that in his case, he would be martyred by hanging rather than simply being shot.

Although I do not know what inducement was used to quell the fervor of the MLN, the organization's enthusiasm has unquestionably been dampened, at least for the time being. After stating that he could not give me

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Drafted by: KMGrockett:lje

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
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From Tijuana

details concerning methods, an excellent source in a position to know assured me that a program to contain the MLN in Baja California had been evolved, and orders for its execution had been given directly from Los Pinos to appropriate military authorities in this area. When I inquired whether the Mexican Military could be counted on to execute any drastic program against General Lázaro Cárdenas' party, I was informed that there could be no question about this. He mentioned that just to be on the safe side, however, a national program of screening the Mexican armed forces for MLN sympathizers was already well underway, and some MLN elements within the armed forces in this area had already been removed from the rolls. I do not know whether he referred to officer or enlisted personnel.



Kennedy M. Crockett
 Consul General

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