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J.C.S. 2056/194

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "B")

9 December 1960

Pages 1812 - 1824, incl.

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
20 YEARS BY SAC [Signature] 20 Dec 1980
REVIEW ON [Signature] 12 Dec 1990

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF THE INITIAL NSTL AND SIOP (U)

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 2056/165
 - b. J.C.S. 2056/189
 - c. J.C.S. 2056/191


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Copy No. 284	Document No. 3
Case No. 987018	T.S. No. 98-75-82

1. At the meeting of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands in Omaha, Nebraska, on 2 December 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JCS SIOP-62 and the NSTL. Subsequently, at their meeting on 9 December 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the report by the J-3 in the Enclosure hereto.

2. The memorandum in Appendix "A" was forwarded as JCSCM-560-60, dated 9 December 1960. The message in Appendix "B" was dispatched as JCS 987018, dated 9 December 1960, to the addressees indicated therein.

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

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E N C L O S U R E
REVIEW OF THE INITIAL NSTL AND SIOP (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) submitted by the Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) in compliance with the guidance contained in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP)* and SM-810-60, dated 19 August 1960.**

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix "D".

DISCUSSION

3. For discussion, see Appendix "E".

CONCLUSIONS

4. While review and analysis of the initial NSTL and SIOP and the conclusions therefrom must follow after receipt of those documents, the nature of the planning efforts evident to date and the extent of participation of the representatives of the unified and specified commands in that planning indicate that:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 are satisfactory for the integration of the initial national strategic attack.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62, as submitted by the DSTP should be promulgated to the unified and specified commands and provided to the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as documents approved for use in the preparation of detailed implementing plans and procedures. Promulgation should be in conformance with implementation of established Joint Chiefs of Staff policy on distribution of the NSTL and SIOP.***

* Enclosure "A" to JCS 2056/165

** On File in the Joint Secretariat

*** JCS 2056/191

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Enclosure

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c. 1 April 1961 should be established as the effective date of Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62.

5. Review of Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 should continue directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. These would include methods to be followed in preparation, policy guidance (including bringing the NSTAP and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) into consonance), organization and procedures of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), and recommendations derived from wargaming Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62. These recommendations are desired from each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of unified and specified commands and the Director, Strategic Target Planning, as soon as practicable.)

6. Included in the measures for review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 should be a wargame of the SIOP by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as by the commanders of unified and specified commands for their respective parts of the SIOP. However, the effective date of the SIOP should not be delayed pending receipt of results of that wargame.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approve the conclusions contained in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.

b. Dispatch the memorandum at Appendix "A" to the Secretary of Defense.

c. Dispatch message at Appendix "B".

d. Approve the memorandum promulgating the Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62 at Appendix "C".

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8. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified and specified commands.

9. In consonance with the provisions of J.C.S. Memorandum of Policy No. 83, it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to U.S. officers assigned to NATO activities.

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APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-62)(U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved Joint Chiefs of Staff National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-62) for the integration of the initial national strategic attack. Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 will be promulgated to the commanders of unified and specified commands and provided to the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as documents approved for their use in the preparation of detailed implementing plans and procedures.

2. 1 April 1961 is established as the effective date of Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62.

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Appendix "A"

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APPENDIX "B"

D R A F T

FROM: JCS WASH DC
TO: CHAIRMAN JCS WASH DC
CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY WASH DC
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASH DC
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE WASH DC
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS WASH DC
CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
CINCARIB QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ
CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE
CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII
CINCNELM LONDON ENGLAND
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
DIRECTOR STP, OFFUTT AFB NEBR
USNMR-SHAPE PARIS FRANCE

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From JCS

THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART I: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 for the integration of the initial national strategic attack. JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 will be promulgated to the commanders of unified and specified commands, the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as documents approved for use in the preparation of detailed implementing plans and procedures. PART II: 1 April 1961 is established as the effective date of JCS SIOP-62. PART III: Review of JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 will continue directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. These will include recommendations on methods to be followed in preparation, policy guidance (including bringing the NSTAP and JSCP into consonance),

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organization and procedures of the JSTPS.

These recommendations will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by each member thereof, the commanders of unified and specified commands and the Director, Strategic Target Planning, as soon as practicable. Included in the measures for review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 will be a wargame of the SIOP by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as by the commanders, for their respective portions of the SIOP.

PART IV. This part for CJCS, CSA, CNO, CMC and the DSTP. Following changes in JCS SIOP-62 are directed:

(1) Page 5, para 3b (3), third sentence, change to read:

"Strikes against these defensive targets"

(2) Page 10, change entry for following CINCs to read as follows:

<u>"Agency</u>	<u>Copy Numbers</u>
Commander in Chief, Europe	12 - 13***
Commander in Chief, Atlantic	14 - 15***
Commander in Chief, Pacific	16 - 17***"

(3) Page 10, delete NOTE in its entirety and substitute the following:

- "NOTE: * Complete SIOP.
 ** Complete SIOP, less Apps I, II & VI to Annex "E" & App I, II & III to Annex "F".
 *** Appendices I, II and III to Annex "F" will be distributed according to operational areas of recipients (see Para 5, Annex I.)"

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APPENDIX "C"

2 December 1960

Letter of Promulgation

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25, D.C.

SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN 1962

1. The Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1962 (Short Title: JCS SIOP-62) has been prepared under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is hereby promulgated for planning the initial nuclear strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc and for operations, when directed. Guidance contained herein supersedes any conflicting guidance in currently effective JSCP.

2. JCS SIOP-62 is effective for planning purposes upon receipt. Commanders concerned shall have their forces prepared to execute the Plan by 1 April 1961 and shall reflect the provisions of the Plan in appropriate portions of their general war plans. The Plan shall be effective for execution when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Command, Control and Execution of the JCS SIOP-62 will be in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff concept as outlined in JCS message No. 986489 DTG 292243Z November 1960.

4. Amendments to the Plan will be processed in accordance with Annex "B" to the Plan, should time considerations permit. In the event exigencies of the situation preclude using procedures outlined in Annex "B", commanders concerned shall report changes in accordance with SM 606-60, as revised.

5. Distribution of the Plan shall be as indicated on distribution page of the Plan. Recipients are authorized to extract and reproduce to subordinate echelons on a strict basis of need-to-know. Particular attention is directed to Appendices

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I, II and VI of Annex "E", and Appendices I, II and III, Annex "F". These constitute EXTREMELY SENSITIVE INFORMATION; distribution to subordinate echelons will be (1) partial and extract only, according to operational area of the recipient and on a basis of rigorous and discriminating need-to-know, and (2) only to commanders having responsibilities of command, control and execution under the SIOP.

6. Special Handling of this Plan is directed. The information contained in the Plan will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives, except as may be specifically authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

F. J. BLOUIN
Rear Admiral, USN
Secretary

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Appendix "C"

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APPENDIX "D"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. In accordance with his guidance, the Director, Strategic Planning (DSTP) organized a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) consisting of personnel from the several Services possessing the required skills to perform targeting and planning functions.

2. The Commanders of unified and specified commands committing forces to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) provided permanent senior representation at the headquarters of the DSTP, who participated in the preparation of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the SIOP. In addition, these commanders provided personnel qualified as intelligence and targeting specialists to assist in detailed development of the NSTL and the SIOP.

3. The Commanders in Chief, Atlantic, Pacific, and Strategic Air Command each committed nuclear weapon delivery forces to the attack of targets on the NSTL.

4. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe committed SACEUR forces to participation in the attack of targets on the NSTL on the following basis:

a.

[REDACTED]

b.

[REDACTED]

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5. The organization established by General Power, as DSTP, provided for:

a. Joint consideration of divergent views at all levels of the planning organization.

b. A Policy Committee, chaired by the Deputy Director, composed of permanent representatives of the participating CINCs and Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps members of the Director's staff. This committee considered and resolved all matters of guidance required by the NSTL and SIOP Divisions in performance of their functions. Proceedings of the Policy Committee have been provided to the Joint Staff and the Services.

6. All agencies participating in development of the NSTL and SIOP, plus the Services and the Joint Staff, have had access to all data and methods used in the planning process. Through frequent briefings at Omaha by the JSTPS and in Washington by the DSTP and the JCS Liaison Group, explanation of procedures and bases for planning have been available to interested agencies.

7. The National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB), source document for the NSTL, was developed by representatives of the participating CINCs and the Services. The initial version of the NSTDB included the targets in Study 2009 and other targets in the Strategic Air Command's Target Register. It has been revised by the JSTPS to reflect latest available intelligence, and the current version provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services is dated 19 October 1960.

8. All targeting was accomplished by joint teams composed of personnel qualified in tactics, force capabilities, missile launch data, weapons effects and penetration of enemy defenses. The teams followed jointly agreed procedures which applied

forces in chronological sequence of arrival at the target system, utilizing minimum weapons and applying a "roll back" principle for establishment of corridors through area and perimeter defenses for following sorties. Cross targeting of weapons system, or assignment of different forces and/or weapons systems to a single desired ground zero (DGZ) was employed to optimize probability of arrival at the BRL. As each sortie was selected, its probability of arrival at the BRL was computed, based upon the delivery system's reliability as degraded by enemy defensive capability. As the enemy's defensive airfields were attacked by succeeding sorties, degradation of those defenses was incorporated in computation of the following sortie probability.

9. Material has been furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services as available. To date this has consisted of the NST Data Base, the alert force DGZ list and indirect damage assessment, and the follow-on force DGZ list and indirect damage assessment. The latter was received 21 November and is now being reproduced for analysis. The final version of the NSTL and SIOP and associated over-all damage assessment and final reports required by JCS 2056/165 have not yet been received. Format and content of data provided corresponds to that prescribed in JCS 2056/183, thus facilitating use of the data in the coordination and reporting of atomic operations.

APPENDIX "E"

DISCUSSION

1. Except for a report by the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) of a damage assessment of the Alert Force against industrial floor space, there is not available at this time any significant information derived from analysis and review of the initial NSTL and SIOP additional to that earlier reported in the Director's Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 21 November 1960.* Consequently, material earlier provided is included herein by reference only. The additional Alert Force damage assessment results are described in paragraph 2, below.

2. DASA has made a damage assessment of the Alert Force against industrial floor space [REDACTED] (U.S.S.R. and China). This assessment was made utilizing first, the smallest weapon programmed at each DGZ and second, the largest weapon at each DGZ. The smallest weapon programmed on [REDACTED] has a 90% probability of severely damaging about [REDACTED] of the industrial floor space [REDACTED], and the largest weapon has a 90% probability of severely damaging about [REDACTED] or an average of about 53%. In other words, based on this damage assessment, the JSTPS method of targeting [REDACTED] has resulted, for the Alert Force, in meeting but not excessively exceeding the damage level specified in the guidance.

* JCS 2056/189