On this 40th anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident it is appropriate
to recall an affair that has much history wound around it, a watershed
in the U.S. move toward full-scale war in Vietnam. At the time,
in August 1964, the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson
used the incident as a pretext to seek from Congress a joint resolution
approving the use of force in Southeast Asia, which it then relied
upon as legal justification for all-out war. The episode opened
the way for an American military commitment that ultimately peaked
in March 1969 with 548,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam plus additional
supporting forces in Thailand. Some 59,000 Americans and several
million Vietnamese died in the conflict.
More recently, the Tonkin Gulf incident has regularly been invoked
in connection with the lead-up to the war in Iraq, where the administration
of President George W. Bush also cited threats to the United States
to obtain congressional approval for the use of force. Those claims,
too, proved to be based largely on seriously flawed intelligence
and possibly, according to some critics, manipulated. The parallels
to Tonkin make it all the more worthwhile to re-examine the events
of 40 years ago on the basis of newly acquired evidence.
The particulars of the incidents of early August 1964, as reported
by the Johnson administration, were crucial to gaining the legislative
authority President Johnson sought, which came in the form of
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. At the time and for some years afterward,
the United States government took the position that it had done
nothing to provoke a naval engagement in the Tonkin Gulf between
North Vietnamese and U.S. warships. The Johnson administration
also maintained that it had acted with restraint, refusing to
respond to an initial North Vietnamese attack on August 2, 1964,
and reacting only after North Vietnam made a second naval attack
two nights later. Both of these assertions turned out to be misleading.
In fact the United States at the time was carrying out a program
of covert naval commando attacks against North Vietnam and had
been engaged in this effort since its approval by Johnson in January
1964. (For documentation of this program, carried out under Operations
Plan (OPLAN) 34-A, see the Tonkin Gulf subset of the National
Security Archive's microfiche collection, U.S. Policy in the
Vietnam War, I: 1954-1968.) A fresh addition to the declassified
record is the intelligence estimate included in this briefing
book, Special National Intelligence Estimate 50-2-64. Published
in May 1964, the estimate again demonstrates that the United States
purposefully directed OPLAN 34-A to pressure North Vietnam, to
the extent of attempting to anticipate Hanoi's reaction. It wrongly
concluded that North Vietnam, while taking precautionary measures,
"might reduce the level of the insurrections for the moment."
(Note 1) In fact Hanoi decided instead to commit
its regular army forces to the fighting in South Vietnam.
The Johnson administration's characterization of the specifics
of the Tonkin Gulf incident has proven to be inaccurate. Administration
officials contended that the U.S. warship simply happened to be
cruising in the Gulf to exert a U.S. presence -- engaged in "innocent
passage" under international law. The naval battle between
the destroyer USS Maddox and several North Vietnamese
torpedo boats occurred on August 2, 1964, in the immediate aftermath
of a series of 34-A maritime raids on North Vietnamese coastal
targets. Among the targets were two offshore islands, Hon Me and
Hon Ngu, which were closely approached by the Maddox
prior to the August 2 engagement. The American destroyer was in
international waters when the battle itself took place but the
North Vietnamese made the logical connection that the 34-A raids
and the destroyer's appearance were related. In fact the mission
of the Maddox was specifically to record North Vietnamese
radar and other electronic emissions which could be expected to
spike after a 34-A raid.
Senior administration officials were well aware of the connection
between the 34-A raids and the destroyer's intelligence cruise,
called a "DeSoto Patrol." Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara, in his very first telephone conversation with President
Johnson about the battle, at 10:30 a.m. Washington time on August
3, raised the issue. LBJ wanted McNamara to hold a private briefing
for congressional leaders on Capitol Hill. McNamara replied, "I
think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President,
explain this OPLAN 34-A. There's no question but what that had
bearing on." (Note 2) McNamara went on to
describe the 34-A mission, including mention of the two islands,
the number of attack boats participating, their ammunition expenditures,
and other details.
Appearing before the legislators, Secretary McNamara did mention
the 34-A raids but asserted they were South Vietnamese
naval missions and had nothing to do with the United States. In
fact the 34-A missions were unilaterally controlled by the U.S.,
using boats procured and maintained by the U.S. Navy, attacking
targets selected by the CIA, in an operation paid for by the United
States. The only South Vietnamese aspect of 34-A was the administrative
responsibility borne by that government's special forces for their
nationals recruited as the commandos for the missions, commandos
who were nevertheless led by Americans. Some accounts by Americans
who participated in such missions actually maintain that Americans
were present aboard the attack boats during the raids of August
2. (Note 3)
Secretary McNamara not only advanced the fiction of 34-A as a
South Vietnamese enterprise in a private meeting with congressmen,
he repeated it at congressional hearings on the administration's
requested use of force resolution. At an executive session hearing
held on August 6, McNamara declared, "Our Navy played absolutely
no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of, any South
Vietnamese actions, if there were any." (Note
4) Controversy over Johnson administration claims regarding
the Gulf of Tonkin incident began not long after the events themselves
and grew over time, leading to an unusual review of the events
in a new set of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in February 1968. Secretary McNamara again served as the administration's
lead witness and claimed that the issue of provocation had been
"fully explored" at the 1964 hearings. Specifically,
McNamara declared that Congress had investigated whether the attacks
"were in any way provoked by or related to certain South
Vietnamese naval activity." McNamara later reasserted that
the 34-A missions were "countermeasures being taken by the
South Vietnamese in response to North Vietnamese aggression."
(Note 5) These administration assertions were
highly misleading as the declassified documentary record of OPLAN
34-A makes abundantly clear.
The leading edge of doubt which ultimately forced the February
1968 review of the Gulf of Tonkin incident arose over whether
a second attack on U.S. warships had occurred on the night of
August 4. Following the initial naval battle of August 2, President
Johnson ordered a second U.S. destroyer, the USS C. Turner
Joy, to join the Maddox, after which both ships
sailed back up the Gulf of Tonkin. On the night of August 4, both
ships thought they had come under attack again and sent messages
reporting enemy contacts, torpedoes in the water, and so on, while
directing a good deal of fire at the supposed adversary. Following
this supposed repeat challenge to "innocent passage,"
President Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing against North Vietnam
and asked for the congressional resolution with which he prosecuted
the Vietnam war.
But the certainty of the "second attack" would never
be so clear as the first. The initial battle took place in daylight.
There were photographs of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats engaged
in a fire-fight with the Maddox, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
retained a dud shell from one of the Vietnamese vessels as a souvenir,
and numerous Maddox sailors confirmed sighting at least
three torpedoes. However, there was no physical evidence at all
for the August 4 attack claims. The supposed surface action took
place at night and in poor weather. The skipper and four seamen
aboard the C. Turner Joy variously claimed having seen
a searchlight, boat cockpit lights, smoke at a location where
they claimed their gunfire had hit a Vietnamese vessel in the
water, and one, or perhaps two, torpedo wakes. The Navy further
claimed their vessels had sunk two attacking torpedo boats. But
there was no wreckage, nor bodies of dead sailors. No photographs
or other physical evidence existed. Radar and sonar sightings
provided an exceedingly confusing set of data at best. (Note
American pilots from the carrier USS Ticonderoga sent
to help defend the destroyers from their supposed attackers told
the same story. Commander James B. Stockdale, who led this flight
of jets, spotted no enemy, and at one point saw the Turner
Joy pointing her guns at the Maddox. As Stockdale,
who retired an admiral after a distinguished career that included
being shot down and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese, later
wrote: "There was absolutely no gunfire except our own, no
PT boat wakes, not a candle light let alone a burning ship. None
could have been there and not have been seen on such a black night."
(Note 7) In his memoir, Stockdale also remarked
on the situation: "I had the best seat in the house from
which to detect boats-if there were any. I didn't have to look
through surface haze and spray like the destroyers did, and yet
I could see the destroyers' every move vividly." (Note
8) These comments reinforce the dispatches from the Navy's
on-scene commander, Captain John Herrick, who after filing various
reports of attacks sent a cable that questioned them all. A Top
Secret August 28, 1964 chronology prepared for President Johnson
summarized Herrick's report, sent at 1:27 p.m. Washington time
on August 4, as follows: "a review of the action makes many
reported contacts and torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful'. 'Freak
weather effects' on radar, and 'over-eager' sonarmen may have
accounted for many reports. 'No visual sightings' have been reported
by the Maddox, and the Commander suggests that a 'complete
evaluation' be undertaken before any further action." But
Washington had already decided to strike North Vietnam.
Stockdale's commentaries came after America's Vietnam war had
ended, but questions regarding the "second attack" were
already strong enough by 1968 to force renewed congressional attention.
Secretary McNamara pulled out a trump card during the 1968 hearings
to silence doubters. The trump was a set of communications intercepts
made by the Naval Security Group detachment on the destroyer Maddox,
the very unit whose presence defined this cruise as a DeSoto Patrol.
As McNamara described the intercepts in his testimony: "Intelligence
reports from a highly classified and unimpeachable source reported
that North Vietnam was making preparations to attack our destroyers
with two Swatow [patrol] boats and one PT boat if the PT could
be made ready in time. The same source reported, while the engagement
was in progress on August 4, that the attack was underway. Immediately
after the attack ended, the source reported that the North Vietnamese
lost two ships in the engagement." (Note 9)
Secretary McNamara played the intercepts very close to his chest.
Describing them only in general terms, he refused to leave copies
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Staff member J. Norvill
Jones later recalled that McNamara cited the staff's lack of proper
clearances as a reason, but also notes that McNamara's Pentagon
had stalled the Committee's investigation of Tonkin Gulf since
1965, and had furnished some requested documents only after the
intercession of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the powerful
chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a close friend of
Lyndon Johnson's. Years later, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
J. William Fulbright was finally able to arrange with the Nixon
administration for Jones and staff director Carl Marcy to actually
view the intercepts. Jones' reaction is important to record:
Of the several messages we were allowed to scan, only one was
from August 4. The others clearly related to the incident on
My reading of the Aug. 4 intercept was that it was a boastful
summary of the attack on August 2. Even the NSA [National Security
Agency] officials could not say that it definitely related to
the Aug. 4 action. In addition the time sequence of the intercept
and the reported action from the U.S. destroyers did not jibe.
Curiously, NSA could not find the original of the Aug. 4 intercept,
although it did have originals of the others. (Note
A 1980s investigation of these events by reporters for U.S.
News and World Report found intelligence officers who agreed
with Jones' reading of the Tonkin Gulf intercepts. They quoted
Ray S. Cline, who at the time headed the CIA's Intelligence Directorate
and would later become chief of the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research: "I began to see that the [intercepts]
which were being received at the time of the second attack almost
certainly could not have referred to the second attack because
of the time differences involved. Things were being referred to
which, although they might have been taking place at that time,
could not have been reported back so quickly." (Note
11) Also suspect was the fact that intercepts from August
2 had been recorded widely by NSA stations as well as the Maddox
while those of the 4th reportedly were recorded only by a listening
post at Phu Bai in South Vietnam. Louis Tordella, long-serving
deputy director of the National Security Agency, was among those
intelligence officers who discount the validity of the August
Now, forty years later, Americans for the first time have the
opportunity to make up their own minds on the Tonkin Gulf intercepts.
After repeated requests using the Mandatory Declassification Review
process, this analyst was able to get them declassified in March
The cables included here are the relevant NSA intercepts.
In the immediate aftermath of the "crisis," the White
House asked for the intercepted radio traffic and it
was sent over. A cover note for National Security Adviser McGeorge
Bundy on August 8 reads: "Last night the White House Situation
Room relayed a request from Mr. Bundy for all intercepts which
preceded and related to the second attack on the Maddox
and Turner Joy. The attached messages were selected by
CIA and NSA." (Note 12) The note covered
a list that contained the exact items reproduced here, including
the five (out of eight) which have been declassified as of this
A review of the documents will make clear that the cables were
not raw intercepts of North Vietnamese radio traffic
but rather reports from the intercepting units on the
Maddox and elsewhere which summarize the contents
of the raw intercepts. This point is important because it means
that the infamous intercepts could not have been simultaneously
passed along to the Hawaii headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief
Pacific or to Washington. Radio intelligence units had to perform
three activities before the information could be passed
up the chain of command: the intercepts themselves had to be recorded,
the North Vietnamese communications had to be decoded and translated,
and a message had to be assembled using the new information. Of
course, those messages themselves had then to be coded and encrypted
in U.S. systems before being transmitted on American radio nets.
All this is crucial to bear in mind because claims as to the unimpeachability
of the intelligence advanced by the Johnson administration turn
on comparisons of the time these messages were sent versus the
times that Captain Herrick and his destroyers reported various
actions supposedly taking place in the Tonkin Gulf.
Since time is literally of the essence here, the reader should
understand how to interpret the times printed on these messages.
All United States military traffic is sent using "Zulu"
time, or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), and each message contains
a "date/time group" that identifies the time of transmission.
Messages are frequently referred to by their date/time groups
in official commentaries and in references in subsequent message
traffic. A date/time group is composed first of two numbers identifying
a day, then of four numbers that show the hour and minute (using
a twenty-four hour clock). Sometimes messages also list the month
and the year, the latter indicated by two final numbers. Thus
"03/1211Z Aug" refers to 12:11 p.m. GMT on August 3,
1964. Local time in the Tonkin Gulf is seven hours ahead of GMT,
and twelve hours ahead of Washington, DC. The date/time above
therefore equates to 7:11 p.m. on August 3 in the Tonkin Gulf,
and 7:11 a.m. on August 3 in Washington. Keep these time differences
in mind when examining the message traffic below.
Not mentioned thus far in regard to possible U.S. provocation
is the fact that 34-A forces carried out another raid
on North Vietnam during the night of August 3/4, when the U.S.
destroyers were beginning their run back up the Tonkin Gulf. If
Hanoi was responding to the first raid, a second one furnished
an equivalent reason to act against the reinforced DeSoto Patrol.
Yet, it appears Hanoi decided not to act. North Vietnamese officials,
including Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap, explained at
a retrospective international conference in 1997 that their August
2 response had been ordered by a local naval command, not the
Hanoi leadership. (Note 13) The Vietnamese said
they had mounted no naval sortie on the 4th. This is consistent.
Concerned at the severity of the U.S. reaction to the August 2
engagement, the Hanoi leadership could very well have made sure
not to mount a subsequent operation, even in the face of a
second 34-A coastal raid.
Congressional staffer Jones and others are quite right to observe
that a number of the intercepts describe the naval action of August
2. In that battle there were shootouts between North
Vietnamese torpedo boats and U.S. aircraft, and two of the North
Vietnamese boats were sunk, as described in one of the messages.
Another message describes a sighting of "two enemy assault
vessels" east of the island of Hon Me. The time of day reported
in the message, 8:28 p.m. local (message 03/1328Z), actually corresponds
very closely to the time, 9:35 p.m., when the Maddox
had been in this position on August 1, prior to the initial
naval engagement. That time is recorded on track charts of the
Maddox's position in the official U.S. Navy history for
this period of the Vietnam war. (Note 14) The
two destroyers traveling together were near Hon Me only in mid-afternoon
of August 4. Hon Me had been one of the targets of the initial
34-A maritime operation, which had hit at half past midnight,
July 31 -- a rather close connection. The North Vietnamese message
had included orders to naval officers to shadow the Americans.
The next message in the series (04/1140Z) reports a preparatory
order to two North Vietnamese patrol boats to prepare for operations
and informs them that a torpedo boat, the T-333, may join them
if it can be made ready in time. Three minutes later there was
a sighting report for a U.S. destroyer. This sounds like possible
support for the hypothesis that the North Vietnamese fought Americans
again on August 4, but only until the American side is also examined.
Captain Herrick's destroyers first reported radar sightings in
a message with the date/time group 04/1240Z. The base for the
North Vietnamese Swatow patrol vessels referenced in these messages
was at Quang Khe, near Dong Hoi, roughly 110 nautical miles from
Hon Me. Not even a well-maintained and fully fuelled Swatow able
to sustain its maximum speed of over 40 knots could cover that
distance from Quang Khe in the time interval between the intercepts
and the U.S. message.
Meanwhile, in Washington, at 9:43 a.m. on August 4, Secretary
McNamara had another conversation with President Johnson. Their
discussion reflects McNamara's knowledge of the intercepts where
he says, referring to the U.S. destroyer (McNamara uses the singular),
"this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight."
(Note 15) McNamara and the president went on
to discuss what retaliation they could carry out for the attack
(that had not happened), including bombing targets in North Vietnam
or undertaking more 34-A maritime assaults. An hour later, when
McNamara called in the first report that the alleged attack had
begun, he was already prepared with a list of options.
Much of the supposed action of August 4 occurred between the
U.S. message just mentioned and another from Captain Herrick at
04/1602Z, in which the destroyers reported having evaded torpedoes
and to having "sunk" at least one attacking surface
craft. It was during this time that the wild melee of radar and
sonar observations and heavy gunfire occurred, and that Commander
Stockdale's aircraft saw nothing. The next of the NSA intercepts
is recorded at 04/1630Z. It summarized the North Vietnamese reporting
about having shot at aircraft and observing one fall into the
sea, with "an enemy vessel perhaps wounded." An amplification
message followed at 04/1644Z admitting "we sacrificed two
comrades," and specifying they had fired at two aircraft.
That matched the events of August 2, when there had been exchanges
between the Vietnamese torpedo boats and U.S. planes, and when
the Maddox had been hit by at least some small-caliber
cannon shells from the North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The reports
did not match the facts of August 4, when no boats had
passed beneath the U.S. planes to shoot at them. The history of
U.S. destroyers carried on the Navy's official website no longer
contains any reference to a naval engagement having occurred on
The last two messages in this set (05/0438Z, 05/0627Z) show the
North Vietnamese Swatow boats to have regrouped at Hon Me
island with a couple of torpedo boats and to have received orders
for some action to be carried out in the northern Gulf of Tonkin
in the afternoon of August 5. By that time Captain Herrick's DeSoto
Patrol had cleared the Gulf and was no longer a factor.
An equally plausible construction of the events pictured in these
intercepts is that the North Vietnamese, in the face of the 34-A
maritime raids and sudden appearance of a heavy U.S. warship,
ordered their Swatow patrol boats to rendezvous at Hon Me with
surviving torpedo boats in preparation for defensive action against
the U.S. destroyers, by then gone. It is not probable that the
North Vietnamese, who knew from official U.S. statements that
Captain Herrick had been reinforced, would have sent their Swatow
boats, with no armament capable of sinking a destroyer (machineguns
and light cannon only, no torpedoes), against the strengthened
U.S. destroyer force. The intercepts themselves confirm that the
torpedo boat T-333, the only survivor of the August 2 battle,
was not ready to sail at the critical moment on August 4, when
Hanoi could have set up a battle for that day.
Among the most prophetic and disturbing statements in the declassified
record are those by national security adviser McGeorge Bundy,
at the White House staff meeting at 8 a.m. on August 5, 1964.
Bundy told the staff, according to the memorandum for the record
drafted by military aide William Y. Smith: "On the first
attack, the evidence would be pretty good. On the second one the
amount of evidence we have today is less than we had yesterday.
This resulted primarily from correlating bits and pieces of information
eliminating double counting and mistaken signals. This much seemed
certain: There was an attack. How many PT boats were involved,
how many torpedoes were fired, etc. - all this was still somewhat
uncertain. This matter may be of some importance since Hanoi has
denied making the second attack." We now know this denial
was accurate and Washington's claims were not, and that senior
officials knew of the "double counting and mistaken signals."
But when new staffer Douglass Cater - attending his first morning
meeting on August 5, 1964 - questioned the need for a Congressional
resolution, "Bundy, in reply, jokingly told him perhaps the
matter should not be thought through too far. For his own part,
he welcomed the recent events as justification for a resolution
the Administration had wanted for some time."
Change a few of the words in these quotes - perhaps substitute
"weapons of mass destruction" for "PT boats"
and "torpedoes," and "Baghdad" for "Hanoi"
- and the parallels with today become all too apt.
This new evidence permits us to view more accurately the internal
deliberations of the Johnson administration. Especially in combination
with LBJ's telephone conversations with McNamara, recently made
available to the public with transcriptions, the material clearly
shows Washington rushing to a judgment on events in the Tonkin
Gulf, which it seized upon as evidence in support of its predetermined
intention to escalate the conflict in Vietnam. Those who questioned
the veracity of the Johnson administration's description of the
Gulf of Tonkin incident at the time were right to do so. The manipulation
of this international situation for the administration's political
purpose of obtaining a congressional authorization for the use
of force bears considerable similarity to the manner in which
the Bush administration manipulated intelligence regarding the
possibility that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction to
gain its own legislative approval for war against that country.
(Note 16) In both cases, truth became the first
casualty. In both cases, the consequences far outweighed anything
anticipated by the presidents involved.
1. CIA, SNIE 50-2-64, "Probable Consequences
of Certain US Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos,"
May 25, 1964 (declassified June 8, 2004). Source: Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library (LBJL): Lyndon Baines Johnson Papers (LBJP): National
Security File: Country File Vietnam, b. 89, folder: "Vietnam
3S: CIA Assesses Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, 5/64-1/68."
2. Johnson-McNamara Telephone conversation, 10:30
AM, August 3, 1964, in John Prados, ed. The White House Tapes.
New York: The New Press, 2003, p. 185.
3. Michael Lee Lanning and Ray W. Stubbe. Inside
Force Recon: Recon Marines in Vietnam. New York: Ballantine,
4. U.S. Congress (88th Congress, 2nd Session)
Foreign Relations Committee. Executive Sessions of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Historical Series, v. XVI. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 293.
5. McNamara Opening Statement, February 20, 1968.
Reprinted, The New York Times, February 21, 1968, p.
6. The best survey of the data is in Edwin E.
Moise. The Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Also see
Anthony Austin, The President's War: The Story of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution and How the Nation was Trapped in Vietnam.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971; and Eugene C Windchy, Tonkin
Gulf. Garden City (NY): Doubleday, 1971.
7. Admiral James B. Stockdale, "Another
Gulf, Other Blips on a Screen," The Washington Post,
August 7, 1988, p. B7.
8. James B. Stockdale, In Love and War.
New York: Bantam Books, 1985, p. 17.
9. McNamara Testimony Excerpts Gathered for President
Johnson, February 20, 1968. LBJL: LBJP: National Security File
(NSF): NSC Histories series, box 39, folder: "Gulf of Tonkin,
v. III (Tabs 23-31)."
10. J. Norvill Jones, Letter to the Editor,
Washington Post, November 23, 1995, p. A22.
11. "The Phantom Battle that Led to War:
Can It Happen Again?" U.S. News and World Report,
July 23, 1984, quoted p. 63.
12. CIA Cover Note, August 8, 1964. LBJL"LBJP:NSF:
Country File Vietnam, box 77, Folder: "Vietnam 3(A)3 Gulf
of Tonkin, 8/64 [3 of 3]."
13. The author was a member of the U.S. delegation
to the conference, and personally witnessed General Giap make
this statement to Robert McNamara. The conference, "Missed
Opportunities? Former U.S. and Vietnamese Reexamine the Vietnam
War, 1961-1968," was held in Hanoi, June 20-23, 1997. It
was sponsored by Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute
for International Studies and the Institute for International
Relations (Hanoi). The National Security Archive provided the
documentary base, along with other support, for the conference.
14. Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald,
The United States Navy in the Vietnam Conflict, II: From Military
Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965. Washiington: Naval Historical
Center, 1986, map p. 412.
15. Telephone Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson-Robert
S. McNamara, August 4, 1964, 9:43 AM. Prados, ed. The White
House Tapes, p. 193.
16. Readers interested in a detailed treatment
of the Bush administration and Iraq may refer to John Prados,
Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush sold Us a War.
New York: The New Press, 2004.