INDICATE COLLECT CHARGE TO

FROM

CLASSIFICATION

AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA

E.O. 1X1652X TAGS:

GDS 3/3/88 12065: PINT, NU, HO

(SHAW, DAVID C-)

CN: 1748

SUBJECT: ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC - IMMEDIATE

INFO:

AMEMBASSY MANAGUA - AMEMBASSY BOGOTA AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

SANDINISTAS SEEKING BILATERALS WITH GOH

AMEMBASSY MEXICO AMEMBASSY PANAMA

1748

DIST: AMB DCM POL

CHRON

SECRETARY NO SECURITION OF THE SECOND

- Entire text.

Minister of the Presidency Carlos Flores told PolOff March 1 that the Nicaraguans were pressing the GOH for bilateral meetings at the Armed Forces Chief of Staff level to treat @ border Flores assumed that GRN reps would use con occasion to formalize standing proposal for joint units to patrol the border. Nicaraguan Ambassador Suarez Rivas had been in to push this line earlier in the day, and Foreign Minister D'Escoto has requested an early date to meet here with Honduran counterpart, apparently on the same topic.

Flores indicated that GCH's negative view of the jointpatrol proposal remained unchanged -- it was why they have been

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CLEARANCES

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Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P, Grafeld, Dir. (Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify Exemption

Classification

avoiding this meeting ever since first proposed by the

Sandinistas almost a year ago. He said he had replied

to Suarez that problems affecting the two countries

could not be successfully handled bilaterally but, rather,

needed to be addressed in a regional context. Salvador,

for example, was a complicating factor, one which affected

Honduras (through the refugees) as well as Nicaragua

(because of its "revolutionary sympathies" for the guerrillas).

These were problems which were part of a regional context and

could only be solved jointly and simultaneously.

- 4. Flores said these arguments were obviously not going to turn the Sandinistas aside and he feared that Nicaragua would score an excessive number of propaganda points if Honduras held out indefinitely against Managua's proposal to dialog. Eventually, Flores believed, Honduras would have to meet with the GRN if it wanted to escape being painted internationally as the stumbling block to better relations.
- 5. He was/persimestic about the proposed CADC arms race declaration being a sufficient and timely counterweight to the current Sandinista diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Paz Barnica had just returned from San Jose where he had seen the PLN's Monge and Volio. He reported finding both "reserved" about the CADC, with Monge complaining about the "mechanics" of the organization and urging that no important initiative be taken by CADC until Carazo leaves




office. Flores wound up wondering just how committed the new Costa Rican team would be to the CADC concept and, thus, how useful the latter would be in countering the Sandinistas.

- 6. COMMENT: Doubt as to solidity of (especially) Monge's acceptance of and willingness to use the CADC has more than once been raised by Flores, and by his boss President 1411.)

 Suazo. (See, for example, TGU: We have no way of the validity proceeding of this perception measuring/Mixes from here and question whether the Honduran analysis percentage. We wonder, for example, whether much of this may not come from Paz Barnica, who is an old but who acquaintance of Volio/and may be interpreting PLN reactions through his own personal filter.
- 7. Meanwhile, Embassy recommends we be authorized to gently discourage Suazo from either direct response to Sandinista initiative or meeting at ministerial level at this time.

 Preferable course of action in our view would be continued development of CADC arms limitation statement along encouraging lines reported San Jose 1491, followed by CADC plus three in Bogota which Paz Barnica advised us evening March second this continues to be contemplated for sometime during this month. After such meeting and issuance of arms limitation statement, then we believe Hondurans and others would be in much better position to cope with self-serving Sandinista initiative.



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- 8. Foregoing conversation with Flores, combined with Embassy San Jose speculation that Carazo quite likely to accept FSLN proposal (SAN JOSE 1334) suggests urgency of refocussing CADC on strength of its own position and desireability of at least some steps to maintain CADC momentum. While recognizing reluctance of lame duck Costa Rican government to be too active during transition period, we are fearful that the very existence of CADC could unravel if individual member countries go off on uncoordinated bilateral taxue tangents with Nicaragua between now and Monge's inauguration.
- 9. Would welcome Department's reactions to foregoing thoughts and advice as to how we should approach this idea issue with GOH.

NEGROPONTE

