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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: PROG 10/10/83
APPRV: AMB:JDNEGRCPONTE
DRAFTD: AMB:JDNEGRPONTE:
CLEAR: 1074
DISTR: AMB(2) DCM POL

FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 7646
INFO RUESBG / AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1 48
RUEHCV / AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1554
RUEHGT / AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 1157
RUESMC / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 5413
RUEHNP / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1390
RUEHNP / AMEMBASSY PANAMA 2343
RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 8737
RUEHSM / AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 9643
RUEHDT / COMMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1379
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1. O. 12353: RECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OAS, UNSC, X, 10
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER
LONDONO

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

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2. SUMMARY: COLOMBIAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LONDONO SAYS HE FAVORS SIMULTANEOUS, COMPREHENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTADORA OBJECTIVES. HE VISUALIZES ONE TREATY WITH NUMEROUS SEPARATE ANNEXES. HE ALSO FAVORS EARLY TALKS BETWEEN CENTRAL AMERICANS (WITH CONTADORA IN BACKGROUND, FACILITATIVE ROLE). AND HE ADVOCATES FACT-FINDING MISSION BY CONTADORA GROUP TO HONDURAS/NICARAGUA BORDER AS "INCENTIVE" TO NICARAGUA TO STAY IN TALAS. THIS LATTER SUGGESTION IS TROUBLESOME.
END SUMMARY.

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3. I CALLED ON COLOMBIAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER JULIO LONDONO PAREDES AT COLOMBIAN EMBASSY IN TEGUCIGALPA MORNING OCTOBER SEVEN TO DISCUSS CONTADORA PROCESS FROM LOCAL PERSPECTIVE. I HAD FIRST MET LONDONO IN 1979 IN BOGOTA AT A NEGOTIATION CONCERNING EASTERN PACIFIC TUNA.

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1. I OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT THE OBJECTIVES AGREED IN THE CONTADORA DOCUMENT WERE VERY NICE BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THE REAL ISSUE HAD NOT YET BEEN JOINED. NICARAGUA, WHILE AGREEING THAT SOME OF THE ISSUES WERE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MULTILATERAL TREATMENT, STILL PLACES FIRST PRIORITY ON BILATERAL BORDER AGREEMENTS WITH COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS. THE COSTA RICAN, ON THE OTHER HAND (ESPECIALLY HONDURAS), HAD BEEN STRESSING THE COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL APPROACH. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY FAVORED SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED OBJECTIVES. THE ISSUE OF TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION WAS NOT REPT NOT ADDRESSED IN THE STATE-

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MENT OF OBJECTIVES; AND INDEED IT WAS WORDED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE LIABLE TO THE INTERPRETATION THAT DIFFERENT PARTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED AT DIFFERENT TIMES. THIS IMPRESSION WAS STRENGTHENED BY SOME RECENT STATEMENTS (BY THE PANAMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMONG OTHERS) THAT THESE OBJECTIVES COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN ONE COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT.

5. LONDONO REPLIED AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, HE SAID THAT THE NEXT PROCEDURAL STEPS IN CONTADORA HAD NOT BEEN WORKED OUT. HE DID SAY THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS RECENTLY INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS AND THAT LONDONO HIMSELF PLANNED TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR IT PERSONALLY ON HIS BEHALF. THINKING OUT LOUD, LONDONO SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY VISUALIZED ONE COMPREHENSIVE TREATY GOVERNING PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA BUT WITH SEPARATE ANNEXES ADDRESSING THE SEPARATE ISSUES. LONDONO AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUOUS TENSION BETWEEN THE "STEP-BY-STEP" APPROACH FAVORED BY NICARAGUA AND THE "SIMULTANEOUS" APPROACH FAVORED BY THE CORE FOUR; BUT, IN ANY EVENT, LONDONO HIMSELF FAVORED AND WOULD ADVOCATE THE LATTER.

6. ASSESSING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING MOOD, LONDONO SAID HE FELT THAT THE MOMENTUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SEIZED AND THAT IT BEHOVED THE CORE FOUR TO MOVE QUICKLY TO NEGOTIATE WITH NICARAGUA. HE THOUGHT THE NICARAGUANS WERE UNDER PRESSURE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS BUT THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE CASE AFTER THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF ANNOUNCING AGREEMENT ON THE OBJECTIVES HAD WORN OFF. (I CONCEALED MY SKEPTICISM; BUT STRESSED IMPORTANCE THAT THIS BE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN CENTRAL AMERICANS WITH CONTADORA AND OTHERS ONLY PLAYING FACILITATIVE OR SUPPORTIVE ROLE. LONDONO AGREED WITH THIS.)

7. LONDONO DID RAISE ONE ITEM WHICH COULD GIVE HONDURANS SERIOUS PROBLEMS. AT ONE POINT HE SAID HE THOUGHT CONTADORA MOMENTUM COULD BE MAINTAINED IF NICARAGUA WERE GIVEN "INCENTIVE" TO STAY IN PROCESS BY, FOR EXAMPLE, ALLOWING CONTADORA GROUP TO INSPECT HONDURAS BORDER. I RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY

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LINE OF "STEP-BY-STEP" APPROACH HONDURAS WOULD REJECT BECAUSE IT WOULD ADDRESS PRIMARY ISSUE OF CONCERN TO NICARAGUA (E.G., CONTRAS) WITHOUT ADDRESSING ISSUES OF CONCERN TO HONDURAS (E.G., CUBAN ADVISORS, BUILD-UP IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS, FMLN REAR AREAS, ETC.). I ASKED IF CONTADORA GROUP WERE PREPARED TO INSIST ON VISITING CUBAN ADVISORS AND FMLN AREAS IN NICARAGUA AS WELL. HE SAID THEY WERE AND THAT HAD BEEN INTENT OF HIS REMARKS IN THE FIRST PLACE. (IF REALLY SO, IT WASN'T CLEAR WHY HE AT FIRST CHARACTERIZED IDEA AS AN "INCENTIVE" TO NICARAGUA.)

S. COMMENT: LONDONO SEEMED SINCERE IN HIS EXPRESSIONS OF COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE, SIMULTANEOUS AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS NOTION OF AN EARLY CONTADORA FACT-FINDING TOUR TO THE HONDURAS/NICARAGUA BORDER WAS TROUBLESOME AND SEEMED A PLOY BENEFICIAL TO NICARAGUAN INTERESTS. NEGROPONTE

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