"MAGIC"—DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY

NOTE: No one, without express permission from the proper authorities, may disseminate the information reported in this Summary or communicate it to any other person.

Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.

No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy.

The enemy knows that we attempt to exploit these sources. He does not know, and must not be permitted to learn, either the degree of our success or the particular sources with which we have been successful.

MILITARY

1. Tokyo again says no unconditional surrender; Sato pleads for peace: On 19 July Ambassador Sato forwarded to Tokyo a letter from Vice Commissar Lozovsky which stated that since "the mission of Prince Konoye, the Special Envoy, is in no way made clear" the Russian Government could not give a "definite reply" to the Japanese proposal (DS 20 Jul 45).
In a message of 31 July, Foreign Minister Togo has now replied as follows:

"Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government. In this regard he will set forth positive intentions, and he will also negotiate details concerning the establishment of a co-operative relationship between Japan and Russia which will form the basis of Imperial diplomacy both during and after the war.

"Please make the above representations to the Russians and work to obtain their concurrence in the sending of the Special Envoy.

"Please understand especially my next wire."

Togo's "next wire", sent the same day, reads as follows:

"With regard to unconditional surrender (I have been informed of your 18 July message) we

*In that message Sato advocated unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House was preserved (DS 20 Jul 45).*
are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much more bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace which is not so-called unconditional surrender through the good offices of Russia. It is necessary that we exert ourselves so that this idea will be finally driven home to the Americans and the British.

"Therefore, it is not only impossible for us to request the Russians to lend their good offices in obtaining a peace without conditions, but it would also be both disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms. Consequently, we hope to deal with the British and Americans after first having Prince Konoye transmit to the Russians our concrete intentions as expressed by the Imperial Will and holding conversations with the Russians in the light of
their demands in regard to East Asia.

"In view of the fact that this is a grave matter which will decide the fate of the nation, please ask the Russians to give a full explanation of their reply, as contained in Lozovsky's letter, so as to make sure that we grasp its real meaning.

"The Government's sole responsibility in this case is limited to advising the Emperor that a Special Envoy should be sent. The Envoy will be sent as a special emissary representing the Imperial Will as it is directed toward mundane affairs in particular. Please make both these points clear to the Russians, if necessary. Please also bear in mind the necessity of sufficiently impressing them with the fact that Prince Konoye enjoys the confidence of the Imperial Court and holds an outstanding position in the political circles of our country.

"Since it is not absolutely necessary, please avoid stating in writing what was said in my preceding message."

Togo concluded by saying that he had read a long message of 20 July from Sato, but that the decision
he was communicating had been made by the Cabinet and that Sato should proceed accordingly.

The long message of 20 July from Sato to which Togo was referring is set forth in full as TAB A.* It constitutes an impassioned plea to the Japanese Government to surrender to the Allies with the sole reservation that Japan's "national structure"—i.e., the Imperial House—be preserved. Speaking as he himself says entirely "without reserve", Sato includes in his argument such extraordinary statements as the following:

a. "Since the Manchurian incident Japan has followed a policy of expediency. When it came to the East Asia war, we finally plunged into a great world war which was beyond our strength."

b. "Ever since the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 our foreign policy has been a complete failure."

c. "While it is a good thing to be loyal to the obligations of honor up to the very end of the Greater East Asia war, it is meaningless to

*A portion of this message dealing with the danger of Allied air attacks on Japanese crops was contained in yesterday's Summary.
prove one's devotion by wrecking the State."

a. "I think that we have the inescapable and fundamental obligation to resolve as quickly as possible to lay down our arms and save the State and its people."

b. "Our people will have to pant for a long time under the heavy yoke of the enemy ... but after some decades we shall be able to flourish as before."

c. "Immediately after the war ends, we must carry out thoroughgoing reforms everywhere within the country. By placing our Government on a more democratic basis and by destroying the despotic bureaucracy, we must try to raise up again the real unity between the Emperor and his people."
1. Czechoslovakia's relations with Russia and Poland: In a radio address of 2 July, Czechoslovak Premier Fierlinger commented on the results of his visit to Moscow in the course of which he had signed the agreement ceding the Carpatho-Ukraine to Russia and had discussed the Teschen problem with Polish delegates. A circular from the Czechoslovak Government in Prague (forwarded from London to Czechoslovak representatives abroad on 9 July), described as a supplement to Fierlinger's speech, includes the following ideas:

2. "The agreement ceding the Carpatho-Ukraine was of great importance to Moscow because of the strengthening of Ukrainian nationalism since the war. We took the initiative in negotiating the agreement at this precise moment in order to improve our tactical position in Moscow with regard to our negotiations with the Poles who have ceded large territories to Russia in the east."

3. "Poland cannot use the cession of the Carpatho-Ukraine as a precedent for the"
TOP SECRET

ULTRA

teschen case since: (1) We have always main-
tained that we held the Carpatho-Ukraine only
in trusteeship until it could be reunited with
the rest of the Ukraine. (2) The principle of
self-determination has Already been applied in
teschen by the verdict of the arbiter An Allied
Commission in 1920, which—chiefly at the request
of Poland—took the place of a plebiscite. If
there are minority groups in the area, that pro-
blem must be solved by the exchange of populations
. . . When mere ethnic fragments are involved,
boundaries of a state cannot be drawn only accord-
ing to ethnical considerations and without regard
for economic and transport needs . . . In Teschen
the 1920 boundaries were set with the maximum
possible consideration for the ethnical situation.

3. "During the Moscow negotiations we
submitted the above arguments in reply to Poland's
insistence that it was necessary to apply the prin-
ciple of self-determination to Teschen. * * *
The Poles insisted that . . . it was necessary to
revise the existing situation. They pointed out
TOP SECRET

ULTRA

that they could revise it by forceful means, but
that they were giving precedence to agreement."

2. More Japanese trouble with the Annamese: Soon after the Japanese ousted the French administration in Indo-China last March, they ran into difficulty with the native independence movement because certain nationalist elements felt that they had been ignored and objected to the fact that a number of Frenchmen were staying in government offices (DS 30 Mar, 6 Apr 45). Late in April the Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, brought some of the dissident elements into a new cabinet, and the Japanese believed that the political situation had been stabilized.

Now available and set forth in substance as TAB B are two messages from Japanese Minister Takamoto in Hanoi—dated 9 June and 9 July—which disclose among other things that (a) the Annamese Government has shown some tendency to resist the control of the Japanese Governor General of Indo-China, (b) at the insistence of the Annamese most of the French officials remaining in Tonking have been dismissed, (c) the grant to the Annamese Government of the important cities of Hanoi, Haiphong and Tourane (announced on 21 July) came after

TOP SECRET

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strong Annamese demands for their immediate transfer, and (d) as of 9 July a plan to give Cochinchina to Annam was encountering difficulties because of the claims of Cambodia to part of the same colony.

Another problem facing the Japanese has been that of what to do with Prince Cuong De, the uncle of Emperor Bao Dai, who has been living in exile in Japan for many years. The Japanese appear to have sidetracked Cuong De’s ambitions to become Emperor of Annam and have been afraid that his return home would produce "unrest" (DS 4 Jun 45). In a second report of 9 July, Minister Tsukamoto has advised Tokyo that (a) in mid-June Bao Dai and the Annamese Government agreed to have Cuong De return to Indo-China, but wanted to give him a position such as "President of the Privy Council" rather than have him established as "successor to Bao Dai," (b) a representative of Cuong De in Huế "offered no objections," and (c) since "Cuong De has relinquished the throne," Bao Dai apparently will welcome his return to Annam, where his "participation in any activity using Japan's support can be prevented."
MISCELLANEOUS

1. Pneumonic plague stopped: It has been noted that in May there was a serious outbreak of pneumonic plague (almost always fatal) among a group of North China workers in Hokkaido (DS 27 May 46). On 3 July the G.S.A. Ministry advised Peking as follows:

"The Hokkaido pneumonic plague was subsequently completely stamped out. Although we cannot announce now where the origin of this was, it has become clear that it was not on the continent."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

-11-
TOP SECRET
ULTRA

Total pages—4

22 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY
PART II

1. Latest report from Japanese naval official (JN=5 9519-G CRN) in Berne concerning peace negotiations: Captain Nishihara, the Japanese Naval Counselor in Berne, has been advising Tokyo of developments following the alleged proposal made by OSS representative Allen Dulles in the latter part of May for a "discussion" between Japan and the United States (DS 9, 13, 14 Jun, 19 Jul 45). In a 16 July message— noted yesterday—he described a conversation which his go-between had had with Gero von Gaevernitz, an associate of Dulles. According to Nishihara, von Gaevernitz stated that (a) "the United States leaders are of the opinion that the Japanese national structure is not to be upset" in the event of surrender, and (b) "if Japan has any request to make [Dulles] can return to Switzerland [from Germany] at once."

As he had indicated that he would, Nishihara has now sent to Tokyo his "opinions" concerning the conversation with von Gaevernitz; his message, dated the 17th, reads substantially as follows:

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TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET

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"Since I did not participate directly, I could not perceive the atmosphere of the conversation, but apparently the other party was straightforward, and during the conversation von Gaevernitz boldly set forth the American views, such as the following:

a. Putting to one side the question of future Russian-American relations, for the time being the United States finds it advantageous to cooperate with Russia and is fully confident that Russia will hold fast to the United States.

b. If things progress in their present fashion, Japan will ultimately be torn asunder just as Germany is now. The populace will probably be reduced by half as a result of the difficult struggle for life and of food shortages.

c. American military and business men have complete self-confidence about the war against Japan and the people are cheerfully supporting the government policy in a sporting frame of mind. Among the politicians many are

-2-

TOP SECRET

ULTRA
of the opinion that the outcome of the war against Japan is already evident and the earlier it ends the better.

"Dulles, who is cognizant of such circumstances, has the instance of the surrender of German forces in northern Italy to his credit. It is his desire, if possible, to establish a liaison channel between Japan and the United States and to bring about peace quickly.

"There is no information to indicate that the proposal is a stratagem of the United States. I believe rather from such points as the other party's telegraphic request for the permission of his Government that the thing was started in a casual "i.e. unofficial" fashion by individuals."

"Consequently, I believe that, without breaking off our liaison along the present line, it is absolutely

Nishihara had previously reported that "on or about 20 May . . . Dulles asked Washington for instructions as to the advisability of trying to get in touch with the Japanese naval officials in Switzerland," and that "about 10 June"—after the alleged proposal for "discussion" had been made to a member of Nishihara's staff—Washington replied that "in principle it approves; no objections." (DS 20 Jul 45).

-3-
necessary for the sake of Japan to open—no matter how the war situation develops—a new channel. I would like to know your opinion. One plan might be to furnish them information on American prisoners of war in Japan and they in turn might give us information on the status of our military leaders who were in the Philippines; in that way secret liaison could be maintained insofar as it was not deleterious to state policy and military operations. I am fully aware of the delicate aspects this matter involves at home. I would like to do something about this, but only in accordance with your instructions, so please reply immediately.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
A. G. of S., OFD
A. G. of S., G-2

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Ref. Do Item MIL-1

Ambassador Sato's 20 July Message to Foreign Minister Togo

After careful reflection I am transmitting my views without reserve.

1. It is reported that since 14 July the American task force, which has become active in northern waters, has approached and shelled the Kamalshi, Muroran, and Mito areas and that carrier planes have been preventing communication [by rail ferry] between Hokkaido and the mainland [Honshu] and have also sunk a number of ships. In contrast—according to enemy reports—countermeasures taken by both our Air Force and Navy have approached the nonexistent. I think that this unfortunately demonstrates clearly the decline of our fighting power, and, if the same tendency continues, the activity of the enemy fleet will become [even more bold as time goes on]. The enemy has publicly thrown down the gauntlet to the Japanese Navy and indeed has even gone so far as to broadcast boldly the names of the powerful ships in the raiding task force and of their commanders.

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2. Moreover, enemy air raids from bases in the Marianas, Okinawa, and Iwo are already reaching every part of the Japanese mainland almost daily. The great cities have been reduced to ruins. In addition to attacks on munitions plants, storehouses, etc., they have begun bombing even medium and small cities which are being wiped out one after another.

In addition, it has become clear that our air defenses have declined in effectiveness since the start of the B-29 raids, and it must be concluded that the enemy has gained mastery of the air.

3. It is clear that, once control of the air has fallen into enemy hands, our war situation will deteriorate at an accelerated pace. That control, once lost, is almost impossible to regain in the absence of outside aid. Therefore, there will be no means of rescue and only increasing trouble for Japan except as she may hope for the production of a large number of planes in Manchukuo. It is, however, difficult to believe that Manchukuo's industries can avoid heavy bombing, especially since the enemy is planning even now to send heavy planes from Okinawa against this area in the near future.

-A2-

TOP SECRET
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4. I naturally do not know whether there will be an enemy landing on the Japanese mainland, but I would not want to go so far as to say that this will not occur. Judging from the thoroughness of the enemy’s landing operations on Leyte, I believe that—even though geographical conditions are different—we must indeed be ready for an invasion.

Just as we can assume that the enemy will one day attempt a landing, it is also clear what Russia will do after our fighting strength has been destroyed.

The enemy, in order to accomplish the destruction of our fighting strength, will not only concentrate as far as possible on smashing our military installations and productive facilities, bombarding our shores, etc., but will also attempt to deprive our people of the very means of subsistence. The enemy must already be fully aware of the food difficulties in our country and of the importance of this autumn’s harvest to the maintenance of our war strength. Consequently, we cannot overlook the possibility that attempts will be made to destroy our crops when the time comes for their harvest. For example, the enemy may well ascertain when the

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET
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rice fields throughout Japan are dry in preparation for harvest and devise a scheme for reducing these fields to ashes at one fell swoop. He will naturally regard this as one of our weak points of which he can take advantage.

If we lose this autumn's harvest, we will be confronted with absolute famine and will be unable to continue the war. Furthermore, the Empire stripped of its airpower will be able to do nothing in the face of the situation and will be at the enemy's mercy.

5. In my message of 8 June, I pointed out that it would be unthinkable for us to continue the war once our fighting strength had been destroyed (DS 11 Jun 45). In the absence of Supreme Orders, our Imperial Army and the people as a whole will not, of course, lay down their arms until the last mile has literally been reached. Nevertheless, all our officers, soldiers, and civilians—who have already lost their fighting strength because of the absolutely superior incendiary bombing of the enemy—cannot save the Imperial House by dying a glorious death on the field of battle. When we consider how the Emperor's mind must be disturbed because

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TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET

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70 million people are withering away, we must recognize that the point of view of the individual, the honor of the Army and our pride as a people must be subordinated to the wishes of the Imperial House. I have therefore come to the conclusion that there is nothing else for us to do but strengthen our determination to make peace as quickly as possible and suffer curtailment.

6. As for the making of peace proposals, I myself had felt that the best way to do this would be to send a Special Envoy to Moscow as you have already stated. Unfortunately, however, this idea has met with the disapproval of the Russian authorities and we are therefore faced with the necessity of finding some other expedient.

Once we decide to make peace, we must resign ourselves to severe peace terms and have an armistice treaty concluded as quickly as possible by the military representatives of both sides; any sacrifices beyond that will also have to be accepted.

The one condition we must insist upon in concluding a peace treaty is the safeguarding of our national structure i.e., maintenance of the Imperial
House. As I said in my message of 10 July, 68 Jul, 457 we must impress very strongly upon the enemy that this is an absolute requirement on our part. One possible course of procedure is to exclude this issue from the peace terms on the ground that it is a domestic problem. In that case, however, we would have to convolve something like a constitutional assembly in order to make a show of consulting the voice of the people—and in such an assembly we could hardly expect complete absence of persons—such as the extreme leftists—who would openly oppose the maintenance of the national structure. Moreover, the convocation of such an assembly would in itself conflict with our own Constitution, but, as we are about to run into a catastrophic situation, we will have to furnish some proper solution to the problem of expression of adverse opinion.

On the other hand, it is difficult to predict whether the enemy would agree to the foregoing procedure. If, however, it were decided—because of the suffering of the people—to give up the Imperial Family, our national structure would have undergone a grave change in the eyes of the world.

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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7. The peace proposal which I advocate means the acceptance of the enemy's conditions, provided our national structure is maintained. So long as we keep our national structure, we will have preserved a minimum of honor as well as existence for the State, and this I think would be consistent with the ideas expressed in your message of 17 July. That there could be no peace "unless the Anglo-Americans were to have regard for Japan's honor and existence"--DS 18 Jul 45.

8. Japan may be said to be standing literally at the crossroads of destiny and--though the people who have continued the fight can close their eyes in good conscience having given of their patriotism in full measure--our country is on the verge of ruin. While it is a good thing to be loyal to the obligations of honor up to the very end of the Greater East Asia war, it is meaningless to prove one's devotion by wrecking the State. I must therefore insist that we are required to bear every sacrifice for the existence of the State.

Since the Manchurian incident Japan has followed a policy of expediency. When it came to the East Asia war, we finally plunged into a great world war which was beyond our strength. As a result, we have now
TOP SECRET

ULTRA

reached the point where we have no assured production and are confronted with the danger that even Honshu will be trampled under foot. I think that we have the inescapable and fundamental obligation to resolve as quickly as possible to lay down our arms and save the State and its people.

We may surmise what the peace conditions will be by looking at the example of Germany; our people will have to part for a long time under the heavy yoke of the enemy. Nevertheless, the fate of the State is dependent upon this, and after some decades we shall be able to flourish as before. The Government will surely choose this road, and I pray ceaselessly that the solicitude of His Imperial Majesty may be put at rest even one day sooner.

Immediately after the war ends, we must carry out thorough-going reforms everywhere within the country. By placing our Government on a more democratic basis and by destroying the despotic bureaucracy, we must try to raise up again the real unity between the Emperor and his people. We must also recognize that another cause for the evils we have drawn upon ourselves today lies in the fact that even before the Manchurian incident.
there were those who showed contempt for diplomacy and indifference toward international relations.

Moreover, since postwar Japan will be buffeted by the waves of the usual international relationships and will experience difficulty in extricating herself from adverse situations, I believe that in the future we must so realign our political structure as to give greater attention to foreign affairs.

Ever since the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, our foreign policy has been a complete failure. The whole trouble was that, once we had aligned ourselves with Nazism, the world was divided into two camps—pro-Axis and anti-Axis. It is therefore essential that this mistake be recognized in the future and that there be a fundamental reorientation in our foreign policy.

9. After the Imperial Rescript containing a declaration of war was promulgated, it was naturally the duty of the whole country to devote itself to the prosecution of our war objectives, and I too have simply put forth my humble efforts as required. However, since we have been reduced to the situation which now confronts us, I think it necessary that we weigh the sacrifices which the continuation of the war must involve.
TOP SECRET

ULTRA

We should, however, give a fair hearing to the argument that "if the enemy actually carries out a landing, we will concentrate all our strength on a counterattack and will thus bring about his disillusionment." I understand from your 17 July message that the Government and the Military are convinced that we will still be able to give the enemy a considerable shock with our war strength. I too would find it possible to hope for this if we had not completely lost control of the air and of the sea. Unfortunately we have now fallen into such a state that we cannot repulse the raids carried on day after day by the enemy fleet and air force, and our production installations are being destroyed one by one. Now that we are being scorched with fire, I think it becomes necessary to act with all the more speed.

Even though our Army should take control over the people and their possessions, that would in no way correct the disparity of military strength between the two sides and, as far as the volunteer units are concerned, it is clear that they will be unable to _______ (word missing) in the face of modern weapons. Thus if we were to fight for every foot of ground after

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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the enemy’s invasion of the Japanese mainland and reaffirm our fighting spirit, we would inevitably be forced to yield the sword at the end and by that time the whole Imperial Domain would have been overrun by the enemy army. The fact that sovereignty of the state will pass to the hands of the occupying nation has been indicated by the example of Germany.

I have no longer any hope of attaining our original objectives. Our ability to take advantage of the momentum of the past to continue our resistance even to a slight degree has suddenly come to an end, and we are already in a position where we are not the equal of the enemy. To preserve the life of hundreds of thousands of people who are about to go to their death needlessly, to save 70,000,000 of my comrades from the misery that is facing them, and to preserve the existence of our nation, I have no other desire than to drink the bitter cup of this decision to prevent annihilation of our State.

I am presenting these statements, fully aware that they are not in accord with the treasured communication from His Majesty. I confess that my offense is tremendously great, but I have taken such a stand because

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TOP SECRET

ULTRA
I believe that this is the only way to save our country. If I am criticized as an advocate of defeatism, I will just have to put up with it, and I will gladly face any other accusations.

The above are my views which I have given without reserve. To say anything more would be mere repetition. I beg you to understand that it was only my patriotic convictions that caused me to speak in this way of my own free will. My unceasing prayer is that you will not conclude that what I have said has resulted from an excessive concern.