

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON



Information and Privacy Coordinator  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

January 7, 1997

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(b) (6)

Dear Sirs:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act as amended (5 U.S.C. 522).

I write to request a copy of the CIA response to NSDD 112 (attached, with relevant portion marked).

The FOIA provides that if only portions of a record are exempted from release, the remainder must be released. I therefore request that I be provided with all nonexempt portions which are reasonably segregable. I particularly request that it be kept in mind that there may exist reasonably segregable portions of classified paragraphs. I also request that any present classified material be considered for declassification.

To permit an intelligent, informed decision as to whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denial decision, I also request that you describe in detail the withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the logical and factual basis for exemption claims. See Mead Data v. Department of the Air Force 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

I also request a fee waiver. The fee waiver provisions under section 552 (a) (4) (A) of the FOIA, as amended on April 25, 1987, rewrote section 552 (a) (4) (A) to create categories of requesters entitled to fee waivers. Under those provisions, I qualify for exemption from fees in the "news media" category. In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit unanimously held that for FOIA fee waiver purposes "representatives of the news media" includes any individuals who regularly publish or disseminate information to the public. (See National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense, No. 88-5217 (D.C. Circuit, July 28, 1989). I easily meet this criteria as a result of my books (The U.S. Intelligence Community (Ballinger 1983, 2nd ed. 1985); SWORD AND SHIELD: The Soviet Intelligence and Espionage Apparatus (Washington, 1989); AMERICAN ESPIONAGE and the Soviet Target (New York, 1987); Foreign Intelligence

Organizations (Ballinger, 1988); America's Secret Eyes in Space (Harper & Row 1990) and newspaper and magazine articles. (A vita is available upon request). The information in the documents I request is to be incorporated into similar publications that will further public knowledge and understanding of activities in the area of national security.

I also qualify for favored treatment under the "all other requesters" category because my work has and is highly likely to continue to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations and activities of the government. For example, The U.S. Intelligence Community is used in numerous university courses throughout the United States (including at the Air Force Academy) as well as being used by newspaper reporters as a reference guide to the U.S. intelligence community.

My intended use of the material request above, in light of my extensive publication record, clearly meets the criteria established by statute and case law for preferred fee status under the FOIA as a representative of the news media. As such a representative I am entitled to have search and review fees waived. And given the contribution of my work to enhancing public understanding of the government operations I request that you also waive reproduction fees.

If fees are to be assessed in excess of \$25, please contact me.

The FOIA requires a response within a 10-day time period. With respect to this request, I WAIVE THIS REQUIREMENT.

If you have any questions about this request or any other matters, please contact me at the above address

Sincerely,

Jeffrey T. Richelson

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1983


National Security Decision  
Directive Number 112PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION OF DOCUMENTS  
ACQUIRED BY US FORCES IN GRENADA (S)

The documents acquired by US Forces in Grenada represent a unique resource, which is of significant potential value to US national security interests. It is vital that this resource be protected and carefully utilized to obtain maximum benefit.

Initial assessment of the quality and quantity of the documents suggest that they will add substantially to our detailed understanding of the anatomy of the creation of a Soviet/Cuban third world proxy. It is imperative that we ensure serious, dedicated, and well supported exploitation of this material in order to fully develop that understanding. In addition, it appears that there is a significant amount of intelligence information available in a variety of related areas. Finally, public disclosure of certain of these documents could add to public and allied understanding of this phenomena of Soviet/Cuban foreign policy. Furthermore, it is likely that full understanding of what is contained in this archive will not be known until after dedicated analysis of the material. This long term analysis by the intelligence community could take considerable time.

It is imperative that measures be taken now to ensure full exploitation of all aspects and implications of this material. Therefore, I direct the following actions: (S)

1. The immediate protection of all documents obtained in Grenada. Each document will be copied, indexed, and cataloged. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), shall ensure the assignment of appropriate control procedures, and sufficient resources to accomplish this task expeditiously. (S)

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2/20/89

Partially Declassified/Released on 2/20/89  
under provisions of E.O. 12368-  
by S. TRZ, National Security Council

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3. Within the next three weeks the intelligence community will produce an all source analysis of information obtained from Grenada on two topics: (a) the methods and institutions used by the Grenadan regime to control the population of Grenada from March 13, 1979 to October 24, 1983; and, (b) the methods and organizations used by each of the Soviet Bloc countries, Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and any other non-Grenadan Marxist/Leninist groups to obtain influence in Grenada and use Grenada for the export of subversion. This analysis will be seen as a first look and will provide insight for the larger indepth analysis to be described below. (S)

4. An interagency mechanism for intelligence exploitation shall be established. The DCI, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and in particular the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, who has custody of these documents, shall develop a plan for the immediate and long term interdisciplinary and intergeographic intelligence analysis of this material. This review of the archive shall address at a minimum the following considerations, topics, and issue: (S)

- Soviet/Cuban and Bloc modus operandi in developing Grenada as a potential political and military base against US interests. (S)

- Detailed examination of the anatomy of the development of a Soviet/Cuban proxy in the context of lessons for US policy. (S)

- Examination of how the New Jewel movement and the government of Grenada worked together to discredit the US, as well as governments, parties, and individuals friendly to the US in Europe and Central America. (S)

- Full counterintelligence examination of these documents as they relate to the hostile intelligence threat. (S)

- Exploitation of cryptographic materials. (S)

[REDACTED]

- Determination of which Central and Latin American, European, and US organizations and persons had been penetrated, controlled or influenced by Soviet/Cuban/Bloc and Grenada. (S)

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Determination of the extent of Grenadian involvement in international drug trafficking. (S)

5. An interagency committee for public disclosure and information shall be established under the Secretary of State. It shall develop plans for the short and long term exploitation for public information and political action. This shall include plans to: (S)

- Build broad international understanding and support for the concerns of the Eastern Caribbean countries and use this to project a better understanding for US supportive actions. (S)

- Expose the degree of Soviet/Cuban and Bloc involvement in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. (S)

- Expose the use of Grenada as a base for political action and subversion in the region. (S)

- Demonstrate communist use of Grenada as a means to subvert and manipulate political and regional movements, including the Socialist parties and Socialist International. (S)

- Demonstrate the human rights violations of the Grenada regime and the concomitant Cuban role. (S)

- Develop measures to ensure the credibility of the documents, including access for US scholars and journalists. (S)

6. Copies of all documents identified as having potential value for public exploitation shall be made available to this interagency committee. In accordance with the action plans described above, this committee shall determine which documents should be disclosed and how disclosure should be made, and shall cause necessary implementing actions to be taken. Disclosures shall be coordinated insofar as possible with cooperating regional states (e.g., OECS members, Barbados, Jamaica). (S)

7. The Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, respectively shall provide interim reports on implementation of the NSDD to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not later than January 1, 1984, and periodically thereafter. (U)

Ronald Reagan