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RECORD
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Head of American experts – Paul Nitze

Nitze: Good evening. I hope that today we will be able to make real progress in the questions we will be discussing.

I propose to begin with discussion of strategic offensive weapons and medium-range missiles. Then, I think, we will talk about the issue of nuclear testing, the problem of risk reduction, and finally about the ABM. Does this suit you?

Akhromeev: If you don't mind, we would do it this way: we would discuss the issue of strategic weapons, then the medium-range missiles problem. The third question could be the ABM Treaty and banning nuclear testing; and afterwards we could discuss the issue, which you named the problem of risk reduction, in other words—the problem of reducing the danger of a nuclear war outbreak.

Nitze: Very well, let us examine these questions in the order you propose.

Akhromeev: The General Secretary sent the President a draft document—directives to the Soviet and US foreign ministers for the preparation of an agreement in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. Perhaps we could consider the contents of this document at the same time as we consider the above-mentioned issues so that we could—as far as I understand, and we received such orders—have a document that we could report to the General Secretary and the President as the result of our work.

Nitze: We would also like to develop a document, which we could present to the General Secretary and the President. In order to clear the way for such a document, we wanted to make sure that we understood your last propositions correctly. This would reduce the number of possible disagreements on both sides. I would like to begin with your proposition on strategic weapons. If you notice that we understand your proposals incorrectly, please correct us. The first point: both sides attach a paramount importance to deep reductions of strategic weapons. The second point: both sides have as their goal the reduction of strategic weapons by 50%. The third point: both sides are willing to reduce the number of warheads. This is the most serious problem in the issue of strategic weapons and must be central in our discussions.

Both sides are in agreement that neither the medium range weapons, nor the forward-based systems are included in the 50% reductions limits.

Both sides are in agreement that there will be an overall ceiling on warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs. Provisions will also be made for limiting air-based cruise missiles. The sea-based cruise missiles will be limited by a separate level. Because both sides may have differing approaches to the question of ceilings, we would allow for concessions. Under this condition we expect the Soviet side to accept substantial reductions in its heavy ICBMs.

Both sides are also in agreement that an effective system of control measures is necessary, and that suitable effective control procedures should be developed in the course of these talks.

And finally, both sides should agree to a level of 1600 units for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

Consequently, this is the list of the points, which we should discuss.

Akhromeev: Presently we have an understanding on many questions, but there are some issues we should discuss. We have different views on these issues.

If we follow the order of your presentation, then we are in agreement that the issue of strategic weapons is the most important one, and is indeed given priority by you and by us. The goal we set for ourselves is the goal of substantial

reduction of these arms—reduction by 50%. We have discussed at length and saw it fit not to include the question of the US medium-range missiles and forward-based systems in this discussion. This does not mean that in general we aren't taking into account the forward-based systems, but in the present case we will take this question out of the preparation of this agreement.

We agree that sea-based cruise missiles should be limited, this is right, but the method of limiting them should be sought outside the boundaries of the triad, i.e. the ICBM, the SLBMs, and the heavy bombers. But an agreement should be found, limitations on this type of arms must be included in the agreement we are preparing.

We agree that control is a very important question and should be reflected in the prepared document.

Two questions remain: the first—about the ceiling. We believe that the ceiling must be one for all three types of strategic weapons, i.e. for the ICBM, the SLBMs, and the heavy bombers. In our opinion, we should not take the heavy bombers, or the cruise missiles they are equipped with, out of the agreement's limits. This triad should be considered as a package.

And finally: you spoke of the most important issue in considering this problem—the reduction of the number of warheads and determining the number left on both sides. At the same time you spoke of 1600 carrier units. Today during a talk with the President, the General Secretary proposed reducing strategic weapons by 50%; every kind of arms, i.e. ICBMs by 50% of the existing level, SLBMs by 50% of the existing level, and heavy bombers, carriers as well as warheads and cruise missiles, by 50% of the existing level. I would ask you to state your position on this proposal.

Nitze: We do not agree with this proposal. The President said today that a significant difference exists between the ammunition of bombers and cruise missiles, and that until we reach an understanding on this question we will not come to an agreement. As far as I understand, the General Secretary regarded this with understanding.

A proposal was presented to establish a single ceiling for warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, ammunition on heavy bombers, as well as for carriers. We will have difficulties with this question as well. I propose to discuss the questions on which we have no disagreements, and select the problems on which we have noted divergences for more detailed discussion.

Akhromeev: Yes, we really do have divergences on the question you have just brought up. We do not think heavy bombers with cruise missiles on board are particularly different, or that these means are less destabilizing than others. As far as we know, the General Secretary held to this point of view during the talk with the President, and our point of view remains the same. These three types of strategic weapons must be considered together and their reduction must be carried out along uniform principles.

Nitze: I have noted the questions on which we are in disagreement. We think that air-based cruise missiles must be limited. But we do not agree with the implementation of limits for bombs on aircraft. Since the 1970s we adhere to the policy that bombers must be armed with means capable of overcoming the enemy's anti-aircraft defense.

Akhromeev: We agree that the approach to heavy bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles and heavy bombers armed with bombs or anti-aircraft defense missiles may be different. I think that we can state that in the document we are preparing today. It seems we can use different parameters to count and identify them; but both must be taken into consideration. A heavy bomber is a heavy bomber.

Our opinion is that in the document being prepared we can state that the approach to counting these armaments can be different and the two sides could definitively determine this question through negotiations.

Nitze: From our side we are ready to establish sublevels for heavy bombers. Presently, we could go on to other questions.

Akhromeev: But I would ask you, Mr. Nitze, to come back to this question. If you speak of some sublevel, then can we take it the heavy bombers, which will make up this level, for example [bombers] with long-range cruise missiles on board, will be included in the general count of strategic weapons; but heavy bombers armed with bombs and anti-aircraft defense will not be included. Or do you think that they could be included in the general count, but the count would be different; not the same as for bombers with cruise missiles.

Nitze: We are proposing to create one ceiling of 1600 units for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We would be prepared to establish a sublevel, lets say 350 units, for heavy bombers within the general 1600 strategic weapon units level. As you can see, we are proposing substantial reductions of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. But we do not propose a 50% reduction within each of the strategic weapon categories. Perhaps we could discuss the sublevel question in detail right now?

Akhromeev: A difficulty arises here, and it lies in the fact that the way you said it right now, you still separate heavy bombers from ICBMs and SLBMs. We cannot agree to that. This is a triad, and has been fixed as such at negotiations between the US and USSR. We regard it as one whole, which we call strategic weapons. As a result, when we say that we place a certain limit on the number of carriers, on the number of warheads, it means that all three types of strategic nuclear forces—the ICBMs, the SLBMs, and the heavy bombers—must be included in that number.

Nitze: We have nothing against reducing all three types of strategic weapons. But there are differences among the types of strategic weapons. As I understand, the President and the General Secretary agreed that there indeed are differences among the different strategic weapons types. That is why the ammunition of heavy bombers cannot be equated with warheads on strategic missiles, for example on SS-18 type missiles.

Akhromeev: I doubt the General Secretary could have expressed something like that during talks with the President. We really do see a difference between a strategic

bomber with cruise missiles on board and a heavy bomber with bombs and anti-aircraft defense missiles on board. But both of them are heavy bombers; they must be included in the general count; but their count can be differing. If you agree to this, we could record it in the document being prepared.

Nitze: We have no objections to counting all heavy bombers under the total strategic weapons level, but we object to including bombs on aircraft and anti-aircraft defense missiles on heavy bombers.

Akhromeev: As I understand, you propose to have a level of 350 bombers with cruise missiles on board and they must be included in the general count, and all the other bombers with bombs and SRAM rockets will not be included in the count. Is that what you are saying?

Nitze: We are proposing to include all heavy bombers in the total level for all strategic weapons, regardless of the ammunitions installed on board. If we have around 550 heavy bombers right now, then after the agreed upon reductions there will be 350. A certain number of these bombers will be armed with cruise missiles. The remaining heavy bombers in this 350-unit level will have bombs on aircraft and SRAM missiles.

Akhromeev: In this way, all the bombers outside this level would be liquidated?

Nitze: Exactly.

Akhromeev: And one more question. Does each side have to have 350 bombers? Or is one of the sides free to substitute the bombers with some other type of strategic weapon?

The USSR has no intention of building 350 bombers for certain reasons. We believe if we have fewer bombers, then we should have the right to have more ICBMs or SLBMs to make up the difference; naturally within the framework of the general limits set by this agreement.

Nitze: Right. We could adjust this issue through various approaches. But the agreement should make a provision for a sublevel of 350 units for heavy bombers.

Akhromeev: No. 350 is the highest possible number. Each side could have this number. But the side that has less than 350 bombers retains the right to have that number or less. In any case, if it has less than 350 bombers it has the right to have

different types of strategic weapons on while the total number to 1600 units. Does the American side agree with this?

Nitze: It does.

Akhromeev: Now [let us speak] in relation to the nuclear warheads. You have not given a number, which you would have after reducing your forces by 50%.

Nitze: As I have said, we object to counting bombs on aircraft and SRAM missiles. However, we are prepared to limit the number of cruise missiles for both sides. We propose to limit the number of such cruise missiles on heavy bombers.

Akhromeev: Mr. Nitze, if you agree to each side having a maximum of 350 bombers, but possibly less if it deems so necessary, it follows from this that there will not be a strict limit on the number of cruise missiles on bombers. One side will have more cruise missiles on bombers, and the other less, depending on the number of bombers. But in this case, the side that has fewer bombers and cruise missiles, will have more warheads on other carriers: ICBMs and SLBMs. That is, within the framework of a certain number of warheads, which we will agree upon, each side would set the number of warheads on ICBMs, on SLBMs, or cruise missiles on bombers.

Nitze: Let us suppose that we have 350 bombers, and you have a smaller number of bombers, for example 200 units. Then you would be allowed to have, for example, 150 units more of ICBMs. In this way you would receive a suitable compensation, including compensation in warheads.

Akhromeev: I agree. But within the single level of warheads in strategic weapons types, these numbers, i.e. how many warheads to have on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, would be determined independently by each side.

Nitze: On the whole, that is correct. But you would be allowed to have, say, 1500 warheads on SLBMs and on cruise missiles. We could have 1500 cruise missiles on our 350 bombers, and you could have 1500 cruise missiles on your 200 bombers.

Akhromeev: I will be more frank. The Soviet side has no intentions of having a large number of bombers. This number will be significantly lower than 350. Hence, the number of warheads on these bombers will be less than on the US side, if it will

have 350 bombers. But then we would have to accordingly have more warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.

Nitze: It is quite evident that the USSR has much more ICBMs than the US. The anti-aircraft defense system is significantly stronger. Today, our leaders exchanged views regarding a possible approach to the elimination of these differences, which are related to the different structures of strategic powers of each side. Today we propose solutions that are the most fair in our view, and which consider the singularities of both sides.

Akhromeev: If we discuss the anti-aircraft defense system in detail, it will take us too far. A heavy bomber with 2500 km range cruise missiles on board can strike while outside of the enemy's anti-aircraft defense zone. That is why its fighting capabilities are no lower than ICBMs' or SLBMs'.

Nitze: That is precisely why we agreed to the cruise missiles sublevel.

Akhromeev: I think we should not do that. All the same, within the agreed single limit on warheads, each side should decide for itself how many warheads or cruise missiles to have in this or that type of weapons.

Nitze: I would like to pose another question. How do you propose to limit heavy ICBMs.

Akhromeev: Today, the General Secretary expressed our position clearly during the talk with the President. He stated, that in this case heavy missiles would be substantially limited.

Nitze: How? Through establishing a sublevel for warheads on heavy ICBMs? Or through limiting the total throw weight for these missiles? Or by way of concrete limitation of the number of heavy missiles?

Akhromeev: We think the number of heavy missiles will be substantially reduced, consequently the number of warheads will also be reduced.

Perhaps we could begin with the wording, starting with the first section? Or would you rather discuss all the issues first, and then look through and formulate the document?

Nitze: The content of your proposals is not entirely clear. Maybe we should consider the strategic weapons issue more carefully?

Akhromeev: We are prepared to hear your position once again. I hope we will be able to definitively specify our points of view on this problem.

Nitze: On the issue of strategic weapons, both sides confirm their commitment to a speedy realization of the 50% reduction principle on an equal and controlled basis of existing strategic weapons.

As the first step, the two sides are prepared to carry out the following:

Both sides would reduce the total number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers (HBs) to a level not exceeding 1600 units. Within this level, both sides would limit the number of deployed heavy bombers to a number not exceeding 350 units. At the same time, either you or we could have a smaller number of heavy bombers.

Both sides would reduce the total number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and the number of long-range cruise missiles on deployed heavy bombers to a level not exceeding 6000 units.

I draw your attention to the fact that we are limiting not only warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, but cruise missiles as well. They would all be limited by one total level.

Both sides would limit the total number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs by a level not exceeding 4500 units.

Both sides would limit the number of warheads on ICBMs by a level not exceeding 3000 units. Moreover, within the limits of this level, both sides would limit the total number of warheads on ICBMs, excluding light and medium ICBMs with six or less warheads, by a level not exceeding 1500 units.

Both sides would agree that the Soviet ICBMs' throw weight would be reduced by 50% from the existing level, and that a new ceiling would be established, which neither side would exceed. Both sides should come to an agreement to an order and timetable for these reductions, which would not exceed five years.

As soon as such reductions are implemented, within a six-month period both sides would enter new negotiations on further strategic weapons reductions with the goal of total liquidation of nuclear weapons.

Such is our understanding of this issue. I think we could put off the formulation of this proposal for a little while, until we discuss medium-range weapons.

Akhromeev: Yes, but we have new questions, Mr. Nitze. Right now, after you've expounded everything, new questions arose, which did not come up during our talk.

I would ask you to answer several questions. The first: what would we do with heavy bombers equipped with SRAM missiles and bombs? Would they be counted in the 1600 unit level, or not?

Nitze: Yes, they would be.

Akhromeev: I see, very well. Now, as I understand, if one side has fewer than 1500 cruise missiles on a heavy bomber, then it has the right to make up the difference in warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.

Nitze: I misspoke there. This is not so. The number of heavy bombers could be compensated through the number of ICBMs or SLBMs. The total level would be 1600 units. If each side had 350 units of heavy bombers, then 1250 units remain for ICBMs and SLBMs. If you had 200 heavy bombers, then you could have 1400 units of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Akhromeev: As I understood, either side may not exceed the total number of 4500 units in warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Is that so?

Nitze: I spoke only of the number of heavy bombers, and the number of ICBMs and SLBMs.

As for the warheads and cruise missiles, we propose to make a sublevel of 4500 units for warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, and a sublevel of 1500 units for cruise missiles.

Akhromeev: We cannot agree to that. We believe that after both sides agree to have 6000 warheads and cruise missiles, each side should determine for itself where these 6000 will be placed.

Nitze: We do not agree with that.

Akhromeev: Yes, we should record specifically that our opinions differ on this question.

Nitze: Maybe we could try to liquidate this difference of opinion? You know we propose a sublevel of 1500 units within the total level of 6000 units.

Akhromeey: We do not think sublevels on the number of warheads are necessary here. The sides have agreed to reduce the number of warheads and cruise missiles to 6000; each side will further decide for itself, how many warheads to have on ICBMs, SLBMs, and how many cruise missiles on heavy bombers.

Nitze: I thought you would agree to establish a sublevel for warheads on ICBMs.

Akhromeey: No. We have stated our position clearly enough. Each side is free to decide how many warheads to have on which carriers.

The General Secretary proposed a good option: to reduce the number of presently existing strategic weapons by 50% in each type. Such a proposal was presented today.

Nitze: I think the President did not accept this proposal.

Akhromeey: The General Secretary did not report that to us.

Karpov: In any case, in our opinion, the President did not reject it.

Falin: The President said the American side would consider this proposal.

Akhromeey: In any case, the General Secretary placed the proposal before the President, and a rejection of the proposal did not follow. Whether you will agree to this proposal is a different matter. The General Secretary did not tell us that you agreed with this proposal. He also did not say that the American side expressed disagreement with the proposal in the course of the talk.

Nitze: I will advise not to agree with this proposal.

Akhromeey: Then, as I understand, we are left with this disagreement about the cruise missile level. We think such a level should not be established.

We also think that levels within the framework of ICBMs and SLBMs should not be established. If we determine 6000, then each side should further decide where to have what number of warheads, while taking into consideration the fact that heavy ICBMs would be reduced in substantial numbers. A definitive scale of these reductions could be agreed upon in the course of negotiations. For now, we could note that this scale would be substantial.

Nitze: Allow me to specify one issue. You propose to also establish a total level of 6000 units for warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and for cruise missiles on heavy bombers. Within the limit of these 6000 units, each side would determine for itself where to station the warheads and how many cruise missiles to have on the bombers. Did I understand you correctly?

Akhromeev: You understood our proposal correctly. I would like to say, Mr. Nitze, that we came to work in our group here with the General Secretary's specific instructions to consider our position on reducing each side's strategic nuclear power by 50%. The ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers would be reduced by 50%, and in this case we would be prepared for a 50% reduction in heavy missiles. But, as I understood, the American side does not agree to this. That means everything we have discussed and will discuss in the future, will have to be reported to the General Secretary.

It seemed they had basically agreed with the President that today we would consider exactly this proposal.

Nitze: And we are considering this proposal. I am asking questions in order to clearly understand your position. Your proposal of the 6000 level is not acceptable to our side.

Akhromeev: We understood you. Then right now we could either try to formulate a text of directives to the USSR foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State on the issue of strategic weapons, or move on to the question of medium-range missiles, so as to then formulate the entire document. What do you think?

Nitze: I think we should similarly discuss the issue of medium-range missiles.

Akhromeev: We have no objection.

Oh, excuse me, do you think we could discuss the problem of sea-based cruise missiles now? Otherwise this question is laid aside.

Nitze: I can say that in the course of subsequent talks we could discuss limits for sea-based cruise missiles; also, they must not be included in the 6000-unit number, which we discussed earlier.

Akhromeev: As I understand, we shall state that in the course of subsequent talks a solution will be found to this problem, which would satisfy both sides.

Nitze: Correct. But we will have serious difficulties with the sea-based cruise missiles, related to controlling the observance of this cruise missile level, which will be established. This is a very difficult question, which will have to be discussed at length later on.

Akhromeev: I agree that this question is not simple. On the other hand, the issue cannot be resolved in a way where one type of carrier is reduced by 50%, while other types multiply infinitely. This is not a solution. That is why a solution for the problem of sea-based cruise missiles must be found. Both sides should agree to this and show goodwill in resolving this issue.

Nitze: We understand and assure you, we will do everything within our power to find a solution to this question.

Akhromeev: That means we can move on to the issue of medium-range missiles.

Nitze: During an earlier discussion of this question with Mr. Karpov in Washington, we agreed on two fundamental points.

The first point: for cruise missiles in Europe, it appears possible to establish a ceiling, which would be above "0".

The second point: it appears possible to reach an agreement on an equal global level for warheads on medium-range missiles; the Soviet side would have these warheads in the Asian part of the USSR, and the American side—on US territory.

In accordance with our long established position, proclaimed in 1981, we, of course, speak in favor of establishing a global "0" for cruise missiles and medium-range missiles. We support complete liquidation of this type of weapon. But, as I understand, this is not in your plans.

Akhromeev: What you said about your conversations with Karpov in Washington is a stage of the past. Today, a meeting between the General Secretary and the President took place. At this meeting, the General Secretary presented a proposal for the complete liquidation of Soviet and US medium-range missiles in Europe, not taking into account French and English weapons. You have been involved with this issue for a long time and you know what a concession the Soviet Union is making in this case. As far as we know, the General Secretary stated directly

that for the sake of the mutual interest in reaching an agreement on this question, the Soviet Union made a concession. At the same time, we stated our agreement on the existence of a problem with lower medium-range (less than 1000 km) missiles, and the Soviet Union is willing to start negotiations about this issue. It was also stated that we are prepared to start negotiations on the questions of medium-range weapons in the East. As I understand, to this the President did not respond with full agreement, but it was recorded as a promising proposal, which could be considered and on the basis of which an agreement could be reached. In essence, I have now only repeated what the General Secretary stated at the talks today. This proposal was today brought forward for our discussion.

Nitze: I understand the General Secretary set this forth before the President today. Recalling the history of Soviet-American negotiations on these issues, I would like firstly to understand, on which questions we have reached an agreement, and on which we have not. We must have a clear conception of the final solution to this problem. We know you are prepared to enter into an agreement, not taking into account the weapons of England and France. These questions were also discussed during talks between the Secretary of State and Mr. Shevarnadze. It was then stated that we are prepared to accept a global zero solution on these weapons; however, you spoke against such a solution. We also stated in Washington that we are willing to accept a decision that would leave some number medium-range weapons for both sides. Mr. Karpov then offered for 100 units would be allowed for each side. We agreed to this under the condition that the same weapons would be accordingly reduced in Asia. We were then discussing a proportionate reduction in Europe and Asia of higher medium-range weapons. Lower medium-range weapons were not discussed in full detail. We believe the main difficulty in reaching a solution to this question lies in determining a number of medium-range weapons in Asia that would be acceptable to both sides. On this issue, we have not heard a concrete number proposal from you, which would presuppose a substantial reduction of medium-range weapons. A solution in which the European zone would be secured the zero-level option, but you would keep around 500-600 warheads in Asia, is

unacceptable to our allies and us. Furthermore, the problem of a correlation agreement for American "Pershing II" missiles and cruise missiles in Europe still exists.

Akhromeev: Mr. Nitze, today we are authorized to discuss the proposals presented by the General Secretary. What was before him, really took place. But that is all in the past. I repeat—today, the General Secretary proposed to liquidate Soviet and American missiles in Europe, without taking into account weapons of England and France. We believe this is such a move forward from the Soviet Side that the American side should respond positively. We are starting our negotiations on missiles with a range of less than 1000 km. We could also start negotiations on missiles in the East. We believe that the American side should respond to our move toward your wishes.

Nitze: We would have to respond and we are responding. I can only repeat that we are willing to accept for a global zero-level option, but not willing to have a "0" in Europe while a substantial number of missiles remains in Asia. We insist on a significant reduction of missiles in Asia. We also insist on working out an agreement on limiting missiles with a range of less than 1000 km. As you can see, there is a considerable difference between our positions.

Akhromeev: I understood that, in essence, we still have differing approaches to the problem of medium-range missiles in Asia. If these differences are resolved here today, then perhaps the General Secretary and the President can discuss them tomorrow. Right now we can only record that in the issue of medium-range missiles we have left this question of missiles in Asia.

Nitze: Perhaps we could try to draw nearer our positions on this question? Perhaps it would be possible to limit the medium-range missiles in a particular time frame, and in the future another agreement could be worked out, which would provide for a total liquidation of medium-range missiles.

Akhromeev: I think we really have one stumbling block left—the missiles in Asia. Perhaps we will report this to our superiors and they will try to resolve this issue tomorrow.

Nitze: We think that today we could come to an agreement on limiting missiles with a range of less than 1000 km, which are not subject to any limitation in the medium-range weapons agreement under preparation. I think we should not put off this question for subsequent negotiations. A possible solution of this issue could be the freezing of missiles with a range of less than 1000 km at the existing Soviet level. In other words, the existing quantitative level of Soviet missiles of this type would be the ceiling for both sides. In the future, negotiations on reducing these missiles on both sides could be started.

Akhromeev: We think that if we reach an agreement on the medium-range missile problem in Europe, then we will consent to freeze the lower medium-range (less than 1000 km) missiles at the existing levels of both sides, and immediately begin negotiations of this question.

Nitze: But we would like to know what you propose to do with the missiles in Asia.

Akhromeev: About missiles in Asia: I think if we report it to our superiors, they will attempt to resolve this question.

Nitze: All right.

Akhromeev: Then let us move on to consider the proposals on the ABM Treaty. I will repeat the essence of what the General Secretary said to the President on this issue. With the aim of strengthening the conditions of the **NO END** 1972 Treaty on limiting ABM systems, he proposed to make an agreement for the US and the Soviet Union not to use their right of withdrawal from this Treaty for 10 years; to adhere strictly to all its terms during this period; to ban the testing of all space-based elements of the ABM in space, except for research and testing conducted in laboratories. This would not entail a ban on testing stationary ground-based systems and their components allowed in the Treaty. In the course of the next several years after the 10-year period, the two sides would have to find further mutually acceptable solutions in this area through negotiations.

The General Secretary also called upon you to put additional effort into reaching mutually acceptable agreements on banning anti-satellite systems in the

future. This proposition, Mr. Nitze, was set forth before the President today, and we have instructions to discuss it with you.

Nitze: I ask you to please clarify your proposal on several aspects. As I understand, you named a period of 10 years; let us designate it by the letter "X". You also spoke of a period, following the 10 years, for negotiations. Let us designate the following period by the letter "Y". During this negotiations period, you said, the sides would have to develop further mutually acceptable solutions. Could you explain your position on this aspect of the issue in more detail?

Akhromeev: With today's development of science and weapons systems, 10 years is a considerable period of time. It is difficult to say right now what we will be facing in 10 years, but you know our position. In our opinion, the best solution would be the non-deployment of this system, but as we understood, the American system is not prepared to do that; therefore we offer this concession.

Nitze: In other words, your formulation of the proposition allows the deployment of ABM elements upon the expiry of the 10-year period.

Akhromeev: After the 10-year period, as we understand, the sides would have to find mutually acceptable solutions on how to proceed further.

Nitze: We have one more question; it has to do with the ban on non-laboratory testing. You said that research and tests are allowed only in laboratories, but not outside of them. On the other hand, you call upon us to adhere strictly to the ABM Treaty's positions. But, as I remember, there is nothing in the text of the ABM Treaty about prohibiting research.

Akhromeev: I think the ABM Treaty specifies quite clearly that it is possible to test stationary ground-based ABM systems and their components allowed in the Treaty. And this, indeed, the Treaty allows. As to the space-based weapons, Article 5 clearly states that each side pledges to neither create, nor test and deploy, sea-based, air-based, space-based, or ground-based mobile ABM systems and components. It states clearly here, that the Treaty prohibits testing space-based systems. We think, it must be quite clearly stated that for the duration of 10 years, the sides should not withdraw from the Treaty and should adhere to it strictly, including to Article 5, which I just read.

Nitze: How do you interpret the agreed upon declaration “D”, which is considered an integral part of the Treaty?

Akhromeev: I think, the agreed upon declaration in no way cancels Article 5.

Nitze: If we recall the history of ABM negotiations as applied to Article 5, we can find that our side originally offered its own version of paragraph 3 in Article 5. It proposed a ban on equipment, which could replace components of the ABM system. But your side rejected this paragraph. For many months we made efforts to attain your agreement with our version of paragraph 3. Originally it was paragraph 3 in Article 6. For a long time both sides debated the question of which components would be limited. We were of the persuasion that there is no point in limiting subcomponents, that we should place a ban on the creation of major components: ABM missiles, ABM radars. It was decided not to create new ABM systems based on known technologies. The “D” declaration was developed and agreed upon in order to resolve the argument over placing a ban on the creation of new systems, based on new principles. We do not agree that the ABM Treaty unequivocally prohibits the testing of new components in ground-based stationary units or in space. The Treaty unequivocally allows testing in ground-based stationary objects. These questions have been discussed for a long time both in negotiations, and in the PCC. So far they have not been solved, but, we believe, in the presence of goodwill it would be possible to resolve them. Undoubtedly, we are in favor of preserving and executing the Treaty, under the conditions that some corrections are made, which would aid the strengthening of the Treaty and eliminate unclear wordings.

Karpov: I think we must proceed from the assumption that the agreed declaration “D” relates to the observance of the ABM Treaty’s Article 3. This is clearly stated in the text. This means it can in no way cancel Article 5 and Article 1 of the Treaty. Therefore all considerations about being allowed to test ABM space-based weapons are deprived of any substance. This in no way follows from the Treaty. We can only test weapons, which are based on new physical principles, if they—in observance of Article 3 provisions—are used to replace antimissile launchers,

antimissiles themselves, or ABM radars stationed by permission of Article 3. Nothing else is permitted.

I think this theoretical argument is quite unnecessary right now. We are proposing a concrete form to you, in order to eliminate any differences between us: so both sides would know precisely the limits to go by, with view of strengthening the ABM Treaty. So let us discuss precisely this.

Nitze: Nevertheless we should specify what was originally incorporated in the content of the Treaty. We propose to define more precisely the clauses of the Treaty, which were expressed unclearly. Article 3 defines what can be deployed of the ABM components. We should strengthen the Article 3 regime. Instead of the word “created” in Article 3 it would be better to write: “developed and tested, but not deployed”. There are significant differences between us in this question; therefore we need complete clarity here. We should propose corrections to the Treaty, if it is in the interest of our work. The text of the Treaty must be interpreted in the same way by both sides.

Karpov: Mr. Nitze, you know very well that, for example, the term “tested in view of the ABM” was also not defined. Yet, on your initiative—I mean the American side here—it was discussed in the framework of the PCC and a mutually acceptable definition of “tested in view of the ABM” was found. This is an analogous situation, absolutely analogous—to define what is meant in the Treaty. So we are proposing concrete definitions. What are your objections? Why are you refusing to discuss this proposal in the way, in which we are proposing it? We are proposing a concrete formula, so let us discuss specifically it.

Akhromeev: I can also add that such a situation is forming, in which we, regretfully, do not have a single agreement about the Treaty. In our opinion, the Treaty firmly and indefinitely prohibits testing space-based systems. It turns out you have a different interpretation. Then, we think, we should come to an agreement on the basis we are proposing now: for 10 years both sides would not use the right of withdrawal from the Treaty, and during the subsequent years both sides would look for a solution to the problem. We are presenting a concrete proposal, since

for a fairly long period of time we have not been able to reach a common view on this issue.

Nitze: During the development of the ABM Treaty we never did agree on a single definition for the term “tested in view of the ABM”. In preparation for this meeting, we carefully studied the course of negotiations on developing the ABM Treaty. Not all the questions of wording were removed. I remember, you yourself asked us to specify what exactly was meant by the term “tested in view of the ABM”. We were then mostly discussing the flight trajectories of antimissiles. I think a review of negotiations on developing the ABM Treaty would help us to eliminate the present difficulties and remove some questions.

Kampelman: It will be quite difficult to come to a resolution of the Treaty text definitions question. It is evident we have a differing understanding of what took place during the Treaty’s development, and differing ideas about what we should do. We are willing to discuss these differences. I am not sure we will make progress discussing these differences, nevertheless, we are prepared to discuss them.

I would like to find out, whether the Marshal is offering that we leave aside these differences and agree to observe the ABM Treaty clauses for “X” years without resolving the issues of our differences, which come down to what it means to observe the ABM Treaty clauses in the understanding of each side? That is precisely how I understood you. If this is so, then let us consider your proposition in the order any proposition should be considered.

Akhromeev: The fact is, this argument is not theoretical. It is assuming a purely practical character. If it took place in the 70s, when neither you nor we had any plans on deploying a space-based ABM echelon, then we could calmly accept the fact that there is some discrepancy in our interpretation of this or that point of the Article. Right now this question has acquired the nature of a concrete opposition between us. The question is not how we understand it, but in that we do not exclude the possibility that you could start testing space-based components and systems in space. We would consider that a gross violation of the Treaty, with all the following consequences. That is why we are troubled, and for a long time

have been trying to reach a common interpretation. We did not succeed in doing that, so now we present a different proposal. We would ask to discuss specifically this proposal. What about it does not suit you?

Kampelman: If you consider the new proposal you invite us to discuss, as limiting your and our activity to the framework of laboratory research work, with the exception of perfecting stationary ground-based systems discussed in the ABM Treaty, then—as we have let you know—we will see these limitations as prohibiting actions that, in our belief, are not prohibited by the Treaty. Therefore we will not agree to such limitations to actions, which we consider legitimate. Is that clear to you?

Akhromeev: Yes, that is clear. We believe that it is stated quite firmly in our proposal that research and tests conducted in the laboratory, including the aspects related to the space elements of ABM, would be allowed. Outside of the laboratory such research would be prohibited.

Kampelman: And as you heard, that is not acceptable to us.

Nitze: I would ask you to specify, what exactly is meant in the formulation: “neither side will use the right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty”. Does that mean that neither side would use this right under any circumstances? But the situation could change and higher interests of state security could demand extraordinary decisions. I would like to have this formulation defined more exactly in your proposal.

Akhromeev: I think the Treaty records rather clearly that an agreement is reached, in which the USSR and the US commit themselves not to use the right of withdrawal from the Treaty for 10 years, and during this time to observe all its clauses. If something demands explanation here, I am ready to provide these explanations.

Arbatov: I would like to say that we are not abstractly working out a question about the ABM Treaty and its interpretation. This is a package. We propose radical reductions of offensive weapons; in order to do this we are offering precautionary measures that are only natural. We offer to limit specific future actions here. In response to this, weapons that have been created, tested, and stationed, would be liquidated. That is why it seems to me that a purely legalistic approach to the

question of what was meant then is not quite appropriate in this case, although it is also important and I do not exclude it. We are proposing a way out of the difficulties developed in negotiations. We tried to understand your interests and the President's intentions. We would like you not to reject our proposals, but to study them thoroughly and at the same time allow us to undertake radical reductions in our offensive weapons.

Nitze: But the radical reductions in offensive weapons concern both sides.

Arbatov: ABM limitations also concern both sides.

Kampelman: I would not like for the question put forth by Mr. Nitze to remain without discussion. We would like for you to correctly understand our concern. I will touch upon your proposal on non-withdrawal from the Treaty for a specific amount of time in relation to Article 15. Article 15 pertains to situations, in which extraordinary circumstances threaten the highest national security interests. Each of our sides can suppose that during the considerable specified amount of time something extraordinary could happen—not necessarily related to strategic weapons of either side—which would threaten the national security interests of our country, or possibly your country. Upon reading your proposal, one comes to the conclusion that regardless of what happens, the sides would not have an opportunity to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

We do not suggest developing such a formulation of the ABM Treaty proposals that would protect the sovereign rights of both sides in case of emergency situations, which we cannot foresee right now. I, for example, would have to explain to members of the US Senate and Congress that for a considerable period of time we have tied our hands regardless of any unforeseeable emergency situations in the future. That is why I suggest developing a formulation not characterized by a total ban on the right to withdrawal from the Treaty. Let us suppose that one of our sides finds out that the other side is violating the ABM Treaty clauses. What should the side honorably observing the Treaty do in such a case? Go on observing it?

Akhromeev: We are considering this problem from a practical aspect. We are forced to do this by the situation in the relations between our countries, which arose in

negotiations. It has so worked out that even though the Treaty is written very clearly and unambiguously, it is interpreted differently by the USSR and the US. We have come to an impasse. We are trying to find a way out, which would allow us to further develop relations between our countries and to move forward in the sphere of disarmament. In the present state of affairs, the exact observance of the ABM Treaty has become the key question in our relations. In and outside of negotiations you and your leaders have time and again said that we cannot base negotiations and agreements on trust, that we must structure them on the basis of control and checks. This is right. But then it is necessary that each side have a corresponding guarantee of security. The way it works out is that we are making agreements about reducing strategic weapons by 50%, and at the same time the other side—in our opinion—is preparing to deploy ABM of the country with all the following security threats to the USSR. How can we agree to reduce strategic weapons by 50%, carry out this reduction, and at the same time watch the US create an ABM system with aims threatening to the USSR. That is why we would like to guarantee that this threat would not loom over us for the next 10 years. The point of view that some third side could create a threat to the US and USSR, is, of course, possible in some area; but in the sphere of ABM and strategic weapons neither you nor we see anyone who could within 10 years, and probably even more, create a threat to you or us.

I repeat once again: we are approaching this issue from a practical aspect; wishing to resolve all the other questions, revive trust not only in negotiations, but in the lives of our countries and peoples. And here, the central question has become the exact observance of the ABM Treaty. Such is the situation.

Karpov: Right now the situation is such that the US is openly pursuing the goal of reevaluation or revocation of the ABM Treaty. And let us speak frankly: if the US is moving in this direction, then you tell us directly that you are leading matters to this. Take full responsibility for it then; otherwise our negotiations on reducing strategic weapons become fiction. Either we work toward reducing strategic weapons and accordingly secure the necessary conditions for that, or the US consciously steers toward continuing the arms race. This is the alternative

before us right now. Let us speak about it specifically then. We are offering you an alternative: strengthening the ABM Treaty regime as we propose it here, and we propose deep 50% reductions of strategic weapons. If you agree to such an approach, then let us discuss it specifically. If you do not agree to it, then say so directly, then we have nothing to speak of. But then you take upon yourself the responsibility for not agreeing to deep reductions in strategic weapons, on which we agreed, by the way, on the highest level on November 21st of last year.

Nitze: In order to simplify this issue we could divide it into two parts.

The first: would the US be allowed to withdraw from Treaty and deploy ABM systems prohibited by the ABM Treaty?

The second: until the US is ready to deploy its ABM system, does it have to strictly adhere to the ABM Treaty clauses? As it pertains to the second question, we sincerely wish for both sides to act in full accordance with the ABM Treaty's requirements. As you know, we do not think that the USSR fulfills all the ABM Treaty clauses. On our part, we do not violate the Treaty and have no intention of violating it.

We also think that after a certain term both sides will be allowed to deploy new ABM systems. These are the two issues, which—in our view—should stand in the center of attention.

Akhromeev: I think we are stepping onto a path, which was, unfortunately, already taken in the Geneva talks. In the present case there is our proposal, and we would like to know if you have some specific corrections for it, which we could consider and arrive at a common agreement, or whether it does not suit you entirely. Then there would be clarity. After all, we are limited by the framework of our superiors' negotiations: we cannot move the decision of this question to tomorrow or the day after. We have to solve this problem today. The Soviet leader, the General Secretary, has brought such a proposition before the President. That means we have to consider it; if some parts are not acceptable to the American side, then we have to try to find common formulations, in a word—to find a common solution. If the proposal basically does not suit you, then both you and we must have clarity. I would like to say the same as Mr. Karpov. In this case

everything we are trying to build today crumbles, including the agreement on strategic weapons we tried to discuss. One side cannot disarm, reduce strategic weapons, and watch how its country is subjected to threat and the threat is created for it. The USSR will never accept that, even though it is very willing to reach an agreement on all the issues, and it puts forward its proposal. Our esteemed opponents have been working for many years on the questions we are discussing today. You can see what a step forward we are taking with strategic weapons, and with medium-range missiles. You see this. But if cannot reach a certain guarantee, particularly in the question of strict observance of the ABM Treaty, then most likely no agreement will work out. We must understand this clearly. That is why I would ask that after discussing all questions in general, you would offer your corrections to our proposals. In the absence of common formulations, the differences on every proposal must be recorded.

Nitze: We also have a proposal. We propose to record that “both sides are willing to work toward the creation of a more stable and safe world. Together with the US, the USSR will create a mechanism to strengthen the reliability of each side’s defense systems. This mechanism would not be aimed at liquidating the ABM Treaty; rather it would propose an addition of necessary new clauses to the Treaty. This mechanism would include reliable means of control over the observance of equal security and stability in the offensive and defensive strategic weapons reduction process, which would conclude with complete liquidation of strategic offensive missiles. The liquidation of ballistic missiles would strengthen the stability and reliability of both sides’ defense systems. This mechanism would propose the possibility of agreement on the transfer of new technologies in creating strategic defense systems, in conjunction with the complete strategic offensive missile liquidation. With the liquidation of all strategic offensive systems, the defense systems would be coordinated with both sides’ interests. Both sides will examine the order of transition to strategic defense on an equal basis and with the observance of the equal security principle”.

Akhromeev: I see. This is a different proposal. And, as I understand, these two proposals are far from each other. Is there anything else on this issue?

Nitze: I suggest a ten-minute break.

Akhromeev: Of course.

B r e a k

Akhromeev: Mr. Nitze, I would like to spend a few minutes on the ABM problem, in order to let you know the Soviet military leadership's opinion on this question.

Of course, we do not dismiss the danger the US ABM system poses to the USSR. A possibility of an unpunished nuclear attack on the USSR territory is created. There may be a danger that a country, which has deployed a national ABM system, could use it to its benefit. Here both realities and illusions may take place. You understand that the process of creating such a system is a long one, and if the US decides on creating this kind of a system, it will take a fairly long time. This worries us, and against our will we look and think, along which directions we could respond to the creation of such a system. You know the General Secretary Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev's statement that we will find a response and it would be adequate, although not analogous, to what is being done in the US. And it is in fact so. There are many ways of finding a response. If the ABM system is deployed, then the strategic weapons will not be reduced. In fact, they will be deployed, built up, and perfected. There are also possibilities of going around the ABM. That is what we wanted to say to you: it is your business, whether to create it or not, and if you do then in what way; just as it is our business to decide how to respond if you do begin creating it. But in the present case, just as we are worried about a real military danger, we are no less worried about an uncontrollable arms race, which would draw out for many decades. Who then, when, and where would begin the weapons limitation and reduction process only God—as they say—knows. That is why, in our opinion, we are at such a historical boundary, where we can either come to an agreement, or later our countries will have to work toward agreement under completely different conditions. That is what I wanted to say.

Nitze: Thank you. We shall take your remarks into consideration.

I think right now we should move on to the issue of banning nuclear testing. I hope that on this question we will be able to contribute a useful,

constructive proposal. Allow me to proceed directly to the text of our proposal, with which—I hope—both sides could agree. Allow me to read it.

“The US and the USSR will begin negotiations about the nuclear testing ban issue. In the course of these negotiations the remaining questions about control over observance of existing treaties will be resolved. Upon resolving these questions, the US and the USSR will immediately begin the reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons, alongside with subsequent step-by-step limitations on nuclear testing, which will eventually conclude with complete liquidation of nuclear testing”.

I hope this formulation takes your interests into account as well.

Akhromeev: We propose to begin negotiations about a full ban on nuclear testing. Your proposal mentions nuclear testing.

Nitze: We propose a step-by-step process for limiting nuclear testing, which will eventually lead to a complete cessation of testing.

Arbatov: In a 100 years.

Akhromeev: I think there are questions here on which we can find common formulations. But we hold firmly to the view that negotiations must start as negotiations for a complete ban on nuclear testing. They can, indeed, proceed as step-by-step negotiations. And perhaps their first stage could be the 1974 and 1976 Treaties. I think we could find common formulations on this question.

Nitze: We hoped that our formulations would be acceptable to you. But if you propose to set them aside for further discussion, we do not object.

Akhromeev: We have one more question: risk reduction. We could move on to this question.

Nitze: Our proposal is: “without delay, both sides begin negotiations aiming at reaching an agreement on creating centers of nuclear war outbreak risk reduction”.

Akhromeev: Very well. Basically, this formulation could also be discussed.

Then we should come back to the first question about strategic weapons and try to formulate a common view. We propose to assume as the basis the

material the General Secretary presented to the President, and we are prepared to hear your comments about point I.

Nitze: In our view, the directives to our Secretary of State and your foreign Minister must be more detailed.

Akhromeev: All right. What proposals do you have? We are prepared to hear them.

Nitze: Our proposal is in the typing office right now. We will have to wait for a little while.

Karpov: Mr. Nitze, the document the General Secretary presented to the President today is drawn up with the consideration that it would reflect precisely our sides' coinciding positions. If we undertake the task of solving all the details in this document, it will prove unsolvable within the amount of time we have. Precisely for this reason we tried to formulate this document in a way to reflect the basic, main, key elements; the specific details and realization of these basic clauses are left to negotiations. I imagine this approach does not, evidently, raise doubts in you. That is why the detailed elaboration, which can be included in the proposal, must reflect precisely the concurrences.

Akhromeev: But at the same time, the principally different positions must be reflected in the directives' texts. The details, undoubtedly, are the subject for further negotiations between the Secretary of State and our foreign Minister. There definitely are some disagreements about details between us, which we will not be able to bring to agreement; and, most importantly, we have to leave at least some work to the ministers.

Nitze: We are of a different opinion. We would like to have a precise idea of where we disagree with you and where we do not. To limit ourselves to general statements and directives would be wrong.

Akhromeev: We are prepared to hear your proposals. We have expressed our views, but are also willing to go your way. Give us concrete proposals.

Nitze: Evidently the text is being printed in a different building. Allow me to make some specifications on the medium-range missiles question. We are proposing to stipulate in the text specific control measures, which would include:

1 – full and precise exchange of data before the start of reductions and after their realization;

2 – control at the site of missile destruction until the agreed levels are reached;

3 – effective control of allowed higher medium-range missiles and related objects, including inspection at the site.

During the conversation with the President, the General Secretary spoke of the control issue's seriousness and importance in a period of arms reduction.

Akhromeev: Absolutely right. But I think we do not need to record right now the question of control as applied to only medium-range missiles. It seems it should be related to strategic weapons, medium-range missiles, as well as other questions. We could probably coordinate this formulation. I think we could write it this way: "in addition to the presently existing control, the national technical means could and should work out other control measures, information exchange among other things". Let us see what can be recorded on other types of control, including inspections. We will work out this point right now. I think we will find a solution. We are just as interested in this as you are.

For now let us start with the first point and work up to the control question.

Nitze: We agree with you entirely that besides the medium-range missiles, the issue of control is directly related to strategic weapons, and other questions. The control principles should be unified for all types of arms.

Akhromeev: I would like to say that the exchange of information in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons, which passed between the two sides in the period of Treaty preparation, was so detailed and exhaustive that a certain level of trust developed between our sides.

Nitze: As we already said, the control issue can be divided into three parts:

- 1 – exchange of information;
- 2 – thorough control of the coordinated arms reduction progress;
- 3 – effective control of allowed higher medium-range missiles and related objects.

Akhromeev: We have no objections, although it is a different matter as to how we will formulate and record this. But basically we agree with this.

Nitze: Directives to the Secretary of State and foreign Minister could read like this: "The US and the USSR will strive for a prompt agreement on the following directions:

1 – in strategic weapons – the agreement would include 50% reductions of strategic weapons;

2 – both sides assign priority status to the reduction of warheads on ballistic missiles;

3 – a total level of 1600 units would be established for bombers and ballistic missiles;

4 – both sides will work to achieve deep reductions of warheads on ballistic missiles to a level within the limits of the Soviet proposal (6000) and the American proposal (4500), which must be provided within the next 5 years;

5 – reductions in warheads will lead to the establishment of a 1500 unit level for warheads in Soviet ICBMs SS-18 and other heavy ICBMs;

6 – corresponding reductions will be implemented for both sides' ballistic missiles, including the US' SLBMs;

7 – levels for warheads on ballistic missiles will be established. No more than 1500 warheads will be on ICBMs, except for silo-based ICBMs with 6 warheads or less;

8 – separate levels for sea-based cruise missiles will be established;

9 – effective control is important for both sides. Negotiations on control must take place parallel with measures on limiting and reducing the sides' arsenals;

10 – the sides will develop detailed agreements on these issues in the near future.

Akhromeev: Mr. Nitze, we would like for you to give us your text. Whether it is good or bad, it is most importantly precise. In order to begin some kind of work or coordination we need to study your text.

Nitze: We can present our text to you tomorrow morning.

Akhromeev: The General Secretary and President are meeting at 10 a.m. tomorrow. By this time they must examine and analyze our materials.

With the aim of reducing time, you could take the Soviet text as a basis with any kind of your corrections; it seems to me we would reach our goal sooner. Excuse me, I see your work and, as I understand, you have not formed a finalized text yet.

Nitze: We would like to discuss this a little to specify some details.

B r e a k

Akhromeev: Mr. Nitze, we would like to find out how your position differs from the proposals your country presented in Geneva this September of this year.

Nitze: I think our position is stated quite precisely.

Akhromeev: At the talks with the President, the General Secretary put forth proposals for reducing strategic weapons by 50%. Moreover, the Soviet Union took down its former proposal for including American medium-range missiles and forward based systems reaching USSR territory in the 50% reductions. We consider this a principally new proposal. You respond by repeating your old proposals, which were put forth in September at the Geneva talks. We agreed to substantially reduce the numbers of heavy missiles. We agreed to substantially reduce heavy missiles. In other words, we do consider it possible to put together any kind of joint proposal on strategic weapons.

Nitze: But we supposed that a new formulation would be worked out on the basis of our text.

Akhromeev: Yes, but that would be called working out an agreement on American terms. The Soviet side will not agree to that.

Nitze: How do you suggest to alter out proposal?

Akhromeev: This text is not beyond any alteration, because it deals with a different subject and goals. At the meeting with the President yesterday, the General Secretary offered new solutions, which really would reduce the strategic weapons of both sides by 50% in all categories and warheads. In your proposal, the reductions under the 50% description are far from a 50% reduction. If we take the existing level of American strategic carriers (about 2200 units) and reduce it to

1600, a question arises: where is the 50% reduction. So a completely different proposal is discussed here, a proposal we are familiar with—one presented by you on September 18th of this year. This proposal cannot be considered as the American side's constructive response to a new and far-reaching official Soviet proposal, which the General Secretary stated to the President yesterday. Therefore it does not seem possible to combine our text with yours, or to add corresponding corrections to your text, in order to put together common guidelines for the Secretary of State and the foreign Minister regarding the agreement for 50% strategic weapons.

Kampelman: I have a simple question for you. We began our talks yesterday at 8 p.m. And we are conducting a discussion. As I understand, both sides have been and are discussing the total level of 1600 units. That is why we prepared corresponding proposals, which would lean on this total level. You never named a different total level. If you would like to propose a different level, please, we are listening.

Akhromeev: I presented a proposal in the beginning of the talks. It was stated yesterday at negotiations. You know it well already.

Your proposition did not respond to the proposition put forth by the General Secretary.

Kampelman: Let us discuss the sublevels with which you do not agree. Or propose your sublevels.

Karpov: We clearly proposed to reduce the carriers and warheads by 50% from your and our existing levels. Go ahead and count how many carriers you should have left, and accordingly how many warheads on them. You should know these numbers well.

Kampelman: Which numbers exactly do you have it in mind within the 50%?

Akhromeev: If the US has 1018-1020 ICMBs, then 50% would be about 510 units. If the USSR has 1398 ICBMs, then this number would be reduced in half. By the way, the General Secretary has given the strategic weapons composition to the President.

Kampelman: If we measure these levels in units, you propose unequal levels for both sides.

Akhromeev: Absolutely right. We propose 50% reductions for both sides.

Nitze: We are not willing to discuss levels, which would be different for both sides. As I understand, today we were supposed to come to an agreement on how we intend to reach equal quantitative levels for both sides. That is why we proceeded from the quantitative levels that were named here.

Akhromeev: It seems that for now we will have to consider medium-range missiles. Thus, allow us to see your proposals for medium-range nuclear weapons.

Allow me to ask a question on medium-range nuclear weapons. Yesterday during the talks between the General Secretary and the President was proposed the total liquidation of US and Soviet medium-range missiles in the European zone, while the nuclear potential of England and France would not be taken into account. We proposed to start negotiations at the same time, or possibly sooner, on the Soviet and American medium-range weapons in Asia; as well as to start negotiations on the missiles with range lower than 1000 km, which both sides have in Europe. We proposed to formulate this position, to report it to the General Secretary and the President, in order to have a coordinated position except for one question of the number of missiles in Asia. This question we would leave for them to resolve. As I understand, the American side does not agree to this proposal.

Nitze: We agree to a zero-level option for the European zone under the condition of a global zero level.

Akhromeev: I see. Then allow us to see your proposals further.

But, Mr. Nitze, here I do not see anything in your proposals that would be related to the ABM Treaty. No proposals. Or perhaps this is a mistake?

We will report that you do not have any more material.

Right now I suggest we take a break.

B r e a k

Akhromeev: We reported to our superiors the US position that came into view during today's negotiations, as well as the position we presented. As the result of our

report, we specify one question in part pertinent to an agreement we proposed for strategic weapons reduction. It consists of the following: we offer to prepare an agreement for the 50% reduction of US and Soviet strategic weapons to an equal number of carriers and warheads for both sides, considering the historically developed features of the strategic powers' structures of both sides. At the same time we state as a matter of fact that the American side did not respond to any of our far-reaching proposals presented yesterday at the talks between the General Secretary and the President, to almost any of the questions discussed (strategic weapons, ABM Treaty, total ban on nuclear testing); rather it repeated the propositions presented earlier in Geneva, or in the correspondence between our leaders, the General Secretary and the President. We had hoped that as the result of our presentation of new proposals, corresponding proposals would come forth from the American side. But this did not happen. This is what I wanted to say.

Nitze: The first part of your new proposal differs to some extent from what we discussed before the break, and we welcome that. Does that mean you are prepared to discuss specific levels for carriers and warheads with regard to cruise missiles? These levels would be around 1600 and 6000 units accordingly.

Akhromeev: Yes, we are proposing to specify through negotiations an equal number of carriers and warheads for both sides under the 50% reduction condition.

Nitze: This is important, because it may enter the text of directive instructions to our foreign ministers.

Akhromeev: Indeed, if we had acceptable possible agreements on other issues, then it seems we could move forward here as well. But we are offering a zero-level option for medium-range weapons in Europe without taking into account the weapons of England and France, and negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in the East, as well as negotiations on missiles with a range of less than 1000 km under the condition of freezing each side's existing levels, but you do not agree to this. As we understood, we have fundamental differences on the ABM Treaty issue. We regard this problem differently, just as the issue of a full ban on nuclear testing. We should here call your attention to our formulation of the very subject of negotiations. We say: on the complete ban on nuclear testing.

Your side proposes to conduct negotiations on nuclear testing. We believe that here the approach is also fundamentally different.

Nitze: Allow us to once again return to the strategic weapons question. Are you willing to specify in our proposals text the 1600 and 6000 unit levels?

Akhromeev: We believe that this number must be discussed at negotiations in order to be somewhat like this. This is a topic for negotiations.

Nitze: We have differences pertaining to medium-range missiles. As I said earlier, in principle we do not have objections to 100 missiles in Europe and 100 missiles in Asia for each side, we do not have objections to "0" in Europe and "0" in Asia, but we object to "0" in Europe while keeping missiles in Asia. The main question is how many missiles will be left in Europe, and how many in Asia. I think we could coordinate this question.

As for missiles with a range of less than 1000 km, I do not see any objections to your proposal.

Perhaps right now we could work out a common formulation on the question of levels for medium-range missiles in Europe and Asia?

Akhromeev: Then it would be preferable to go back and consider the issues starting with strategic weapons. An impediment is created by the fact that even now, when we are trying to outline the framework of the problem and to give our recommendations to the ministers, you enter a series of limitations, a line of thresholds. We are offering you to view our questions more broadly and determine the principles, which could be used as the basis for developing specific agreements. If we approached the issue this way, I think we could try to work out these principles even today, supposing we take as a basis what we are offering and considering the American side's remarks and wishes. But if we now begin to discuss all the numbers you mentioned, we will simply not be able to do anything, because we have fairly major differences in the quantitative aspects, which we already discussed today and I would not like to repeat them.

Nitze: It seems to me our differences on strategic weapons are not so great, just as on medium-range weapons, if we do not consider the one question of medium-

range missiles. This problem comes down to establishing analogous levels for Europe and Asia.

Akhromeev: We could report this issue once more to the General Secretary and the President. They could also discuss this question at the next meeting. For us, there is the issue of strategic weapons. Are you willing to determine a principle approach to solving this problem in a way similar to our formulation, considering your wishes, without determining specific numbers (1600, 6000) right now?

Nitze: We have always had this kind of difficulty in all negotiations. In my opinion, a document says very little about a principle if it does not point to the way this principle will be used in the future. At the same time, I do not insist on indicating a large amount of numerical information in a document. However, the basic, essentially important levels should be indicated for the ICBMs, the SLBMs, for heavy bombers with cruise missiles, and for heavy ICBMs.

Akhromeev: See right here, we have specific limits on SS-18 ICBMs indicated, with which we cannot agree right now. You also raise the question of throw weight, but we cannot agree to your proposal right now. Therefore it just does not seem possible to coordinate these specific sublevels today, and should we? If we coordinate the basic approaches in roughly the extent we propose, then—in our opinion—the amount of difficulties faced by delegates in Geneva will be reduced significantly. It would already be easier for ministers to resolve this question. But we are not prepared to conduct negotiations in the form you propose, and it seems we will not agree. We can once again discuss the issue of throw weight and sublevels, but we will not bring these questions to agreement today. Before the break you correctly pointed out that it is physically impossible to prepare an agreement in one night. And if we take the quantitative indicators you proposed, it would mean the greater part of the agreement is done.

Nitze: I change my earlier proposal. I propose to write “no more than 1600 ICBM, SLBM, and cruise missile units, and no more than 6000 warheads on these carriers”. This should make the development of a common document easier.

Akhromeev: I think, Mr. Nitze, if we removed the remaining numbers, then we could try to come to an agreement on this right now.

It could be indicated in the agreement that there would be no more than 1600 carriers and no more than 6000 warheads. If we remove the remaining numbers, we could attempt to formulate our document.

Nitze: But these additional sublevels would have to be developed in the course of subsequent negotiations.

I would like to clarify one preliminary question: what do you mean when you speak of taking into account historically developed features of the strategic powers' structures of both sides?

Akhromeev: We mean the two sides will not strive to break the developed proportions in the strategic nuclear powers of both sides; that, if we agree on this, within the number of roughly 6000 warheads and 1600 carriers, each side would decide the proportions of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers it should have, considering that both sides would assume the responsibility for reducing the number of heavy missiles substantially. Roughly similar reductions would be carried out in each element of the triad.

Nitze: The negotiating parties would have to decide the sublevels question. This will be a fairly difficult question for them. Allow me to bring to your attention a part of the directives text to our ministers: "The parties agreed to concentrate the attention of their delegations on negotiations of 50% strategic weapons (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) reductions for the US and the USSR, with consideration for the historically developed features of the strategic powers' structures of both sides. In this approach, all categories of nuclear powers are subject to reduction, and the total level of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers should not exceed 1600, and the number of warheads and cruise missiles on them should not exceed the general 6000 level. The level of heavy ICMBs is reduced by 50%. In addition, the sublevels for carriers and warheads to be agreed upon in the future, will aim at reducing the nuclear powers' destruction potential.

Akhromeev: I listened to you with hope. We were close to agreement, but then you brought in the sublevels. I believe that if we are going for 50% reductions, the parties will further decide for themselves in what proportions to have warheads on

each kind of nuclear weapon. Sublevels are not needed if the number of heavy missiles is limited. This is out position.

If the question of sublevels was removed, then the formulation we are proposing could satisfy both sides. Here it is: "In the sphere of strategic weapons we offer to prepare an agreement on reducing the Soviet and US strategic weapons by 50% to an equal number (about 1600 carrier units, and no more than 6000 warheads for each side), with consideration for the historically developed features of the strategic powers' structures of both sides. At the same time, all types of strategic offensive weapons would be reduced within the indicated framework, including a substantial reduction of heavy missiles. A solution would also be found for the issue of limiting and deploying long-range sea-based cruise missiles".

Nitze: Allow me to draw your attention to your formulation's last phrase, where you spoke of sea-based cruise missiles. We could write about these weapons, "the parties will strive to find a solution, which would limit long-range sea-based cruise missiles under the condition of reliable control over the permitted level". We are not sure how this would be implemented, but it is necessary to try to find a solution for this problem.

Akhromeev: We believe there is no purpose to doing that. We are assuming the responsibility to reduce the number of warheads by 50% and this commitment is absolutely specific and binding. At the same time, under formulation you are proposing we might not find a solution for sea-based cruise missiles, which could result in creating a possibility for deployment in great quantities. The question is, what would this 50% reduction be worth then. I think the commitments on sea-based cruise missiles must be just as binding as for strategic weapons, otherwise there is not a basis for an agreement.

Mr. Nitze, this is not a question of form. It is a question of substance. Will the parties assume the task of solving the cruise missile problem, or won't they?

Nitze: I can only repeat, that "the parties will seek a solution for the substantial reduction of long-range sea-based cruise missiles to the controlled level". We do not have such a solution right now.

Akhromeev: No, we cannot agree to that. We are definitely assuming the responsibility of reducing by 50%; but you frame the question of limiting cruise missiles as a wish, not the obligation of both parties. We cannot agree to that.

Nitze: But we must first agree on measures of control for this issue.

Arbatov: You have to find a solution to the question of control.

Akhromeev: Experience shows that when it was necessary we solved the most difficult problems. We found ways of considering each other's interests. I remember how we were seeking agreement on accounting for MIRV missiles. It was a most complex problem and we worked out its solution in the SALT-2 Treaty. It was no less difficult than this one. We are talking about equal security here; therefore the formulation must be just as binding on reducing strategic weapons by 50% as on finding a solution to the limitation of sea-based missile deployment question.

Pearl: This issue is clear to us and ways of finding a solution do not present any difficulties. But the point is that the sea-based cruise missile launchers do not in any way differ from launchers for other ship combat weapons. We would have to dismantle all the ship's launchers—the launchers for nuclear-armed cruise missiles as well as launchers for the cruise missiles with standard equipment. I do not think it would be realistic to demand that we dismantle all our Naval Forces. So it is not so easy to find a solution for this issue. And we repeat: the solution on this issue should be controllable [by inspection].

Akhromeev: I did not want to get into detailed consideration of this issue, but it is so important that it seems we will have to. This is not the first time such a problem comes before us. We had a no less difficult question in deciding how to count heavy bombers with long-range cruise bombers and heavy bombers with bombs and SRAM missiles. This was a most complex problem on which we worked for more than a year. We found a solution. And I could give many such examples. With a wish and some goodwill we find solutions to the most difficult issues.

Yes, we say our agreements should be based on control. But a certain level of trusts also exists. The very signing of agreements already implies some level of trust and we cannot avoid that. If we accept a binding formulation on the sea-based cruise missile question, then we will have to select a type of "above-water"

ship on which these missiles would be deployed, and here the rule of “type” should operate. A number of other control measures will be thought through. Inspection will have the same role here as it does in the control of other powers and weapons. If a solution to this problem is not found we will not have an agreement. This is a major issue.

Arbatov: The arms race will just shift to a different dimension.

Falin: If I understood Mr. Pearl correctly, the American side does not yet see a real solution for this issue. Then allow us to raise a question, gentlemen. How can you offer a formulation on this question, which has not real meaning and would have no material force?

Akhromeey: I sensed a shade of dictate in Mr. Pearl’s reply. If there is no control there will be no limitation of sea-based cruise missiles, so to say.

This is an issue of vital importance to us. We cannot reduce one type of weapons by 50% and deploy other types unlimitedly. This does not suit us.

Nitze: What if the parties exchange declarations indicating their long-term plans regarding the deployment of nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles? I can imagine how difficult it would be to work out such declarations. Nevertheless, an exchange of such declarations could be a way out of this difficult situation.

Akhromeey: We believe that the number of these missiles must be determined. The parties must bind themselves to deploy a strictly appointed quantity on strictly appointed types of combatant ships. Sea-based nuclear missiles should not be deployed on other types of ships. The parties must undertake this commitment.

Arbatov: What are these difficulties worth when compared to 50% reduction in strategic weapons? Where are our priorities in considering issues? Which problem are we prioritizing after all? Because of a difficulty in the control of one, by far not the most important, type of nuclear weapon we jeopardize the entire agreement. This is not a constructive approach; it is a catch, designed to prevent agreement. This is not a real concern for security.

Nitze: Our problem with this issue can be explained by the fact that we have a substantial number of sea-based cruise missiles deployed in standard combat

equipment. We are ready to specify the level for nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles, which both sides would commit not to exceed.

It is very difficult to distinguish between launchers for regular and nuclear sea-based cruise missiles. They are identical. This explains the problem of control reliability as applied to this type of weapon. The Soviet side would have to rely on the American side's statements, and this is insufficient.

Akhromeev: In this case, both you and we are equally committing ourselves. The control measures are also determined mutually. Therefore, the USSR does not seek any advantage for itself. These nuclear weapons must undoubtedly be limited, and limited by a modest number. Because we cannot, let's suppose, limit strategic weapons to 6000 warheads and at the same time allow, let's say, 2000 nuclear sea-based cruise missiles. This must be a modest number. We shall have to agree on it in negotiations, as well as about control measures. We have to make this commitment.

Pearl: We have absolutely no objection to sharply limiting the number of these cruise missiles. We have no disagreement on this question. The question is in how to control nuclear cruise missiles on combatant ships under the conditions in which we already deployed a substantial number of regular missiles, which launch from standard launchers. As to the quantitative limitations for nuclear sea-based cruise missiles, there is no difficulty for the controlling side. We acquire only the amount of arms in all categories authorized by the US Congress, and these data are unclassified. So we could exchange statements that the quantity of nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles would not exceed an agreed upon level.

Akhromeev: We respect the US Congress, but the number authorized by the Congress cannot be the obligatory one for the USSR. We believe this number should enter the agreement we are preparing, but as to control, that needs to be solved. We need to look into the control procedures and control each other. There is no other way. We have been conducting arms reductions negotiations for 20 almost years. We have sought and found solutions to the most complex problems. We will find a solution for control here as well.

Pearl: The US is ready to limit the number of nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles. Of course we do not think that financial program data from the US Congress can serve as your only basis for controlling the cruise-missile level, but at the same time we believe these data could help and serve as a kind of reference-point in the control process. It stands to reason that we will have to agree on mutually acceptable control measures, but it will not be easy in the case of sea-based cruise missiles.

Akhromeev: I think that not only the USSR, but the USSR and US together will have to look for control measures for this agreement on a certain number of nuclear sea-based cruise missiles on specific types of combatant ships. This is decided by both sides and must be carried out by both.

This is a difficult question for you. But we have had many difficult questions, which we finally resolved successfully. For us, the question of not taking into account the nuclear weapons of England and France was very difficult, a very difficult question for the USSR security. Nevertheless, for the sake of reaching an agreement we considered it possible to take this step. The US does not want to place itself in a position similar to the one we place ourselves in, in order to come to an agreement.

Nitze: Believe us, we are doing everything possible to find a solution for this problem. Considering your concern, in the future as well we shall not spare ourselves in order to resolve this problem. Right now the difficulty is in distinguishing the launchers for regular cruise missiles and nuclear cruise missiles on above-water ships. We propose the exchange of declarations stating the existing number of nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles as a possible solution to this question. But we are not going to destroy regular cruise missiles for the sake of effective control over nuclear cruise missiles.

Akhromeev: The question is not raised in order to destroy something. The question is raised so the parties would strictly limit the ships allowed carry nuclear missiles. If a ship has cruise missile installations and only regular cruise missiles, evidently this would not be prohibited. A right to control exists; a party may inspect whether there is nuclear ammunition or not. There would be inspections, we are

agreeing on this. If one side has doubts, the other would have to grant a right to inspect whether the given ship has nuclear weapons or not. We understand this is inconvenient. However, for the sake of agreement we are accepting these inconveniences. Your ships and ours would be controlled equally. We also have cruise missiles, Mr. Pearl.

Falin: As Mr. Nitze and Pearl are stating, the American side has a great desire to find a solution for this question. Let us record just this: both you and we have a desire to find a solution for this issue. The model of the solution will be determined in the future. Let our ministers take this statement and arrange exactly how they will control this commitment's execution.

Akhromeev: We should record: "Both sides will find a solution of this question".

Pearl: We are ready to look for a solution to this issue. However, the control organization problem remains very serious.

Akhromeev: We should find a solution together with you; we should have some functional data, which would allow us to distinguish between a nuclear cruise missile launcher and a non-nuclear cruise missile launcher. We have to find a solution. We found such a solution for heavy bombers. Each side has the right to control. This, Mr. Pearl, is not a whim, not a wish to make things difficult. A solution to this issue must be found if we are making such a major reduction as 50%.

Pearl: The solution for heavy bombers was possible and easily realized. The planes were given a certain configuration for the installation of the corresponding weapons before their deployment. In the present case with sea-based cruise missiles we are late. The cruise missiles have already been deployed. It is already impossible to give distinctive features to nuclear cruise missile launchers. We have already missed the stage when it was easy to do.

Akhromeev: Evidently some modernization will be needed, and evidently we will do that.

You say the heavy ICBMs present a particular threat to you, and you ask us to destroy them. There is nothing pleasant in that for us. Nevertheless, we accept and respond to this concern. In the present case you say that you cannot

respond to our concern. This is unequal judgment. We are sitting at a table as equals and let's work out the difficulties together—you work out yours and we will ours—but we must find solutions. That means we must not only understand, but also find a solution.

Nitze: Right now we are trying to work out a mutually acceptable formulation, which would allow us to resolve this problem. I propose the following formulation: “Both sides will strive to find a solution for the problem of limiting nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles”.

Akhromeev: This formulation is not obligatory. It is a wish. In the present case it does not work. We need to agree on a commitment to finding a solution for this problem, and this must be recorded. We propose the following formulation: “The parties will find a solution for this problem.”

Nitze: Very well, let us record: “Will look for and find a solution for this problem...”.

Akhromeev: Let's leave this question without agreement. We have reported on this issue more than once and it is not just our personal understanding, it is the Soviet position.

Well, then we could accept the formulation I read. If necessary, I could repeat it once again.

In the sphere of strategic weapons an agreement will be prepared on reducing the Soviet and US strategic weapons by 50% and to the equal number of carriers (around 1600 units) and warheads (around 6000 units for each side), considering the historically developed features of the strategic powers' structures of both sides. At the same time, all types of strategic weapons—including a substantial number of heavy missiles—will be subject to reductions within the indicated framework.

(A solution will also be found for the issue of limiting deployment of nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles).

For all aspects concerning the strategic weapons issue, the parties will conduct negotiations considering mutual interests, concerns, and showing a political will for agreement.

Nitze: Allow me to get a clarification of one question. As we understand, the 6000 level in your formulation includes ICBM, SLBM, and long-range cruise missile warheads, but does not include SRAM missiles and bombs on aircraft.

Akhromeev: Our formulation does not include SRAM missiles and bombs in the 6000 level, but bombers with SRAM and missiles are included in the 1600 level, and each counts as a carrier with a monoblock warhead.

You see what kind of difficult decisions we are accepting. We have to do this mutually.

Nitze: But the level, which would not exceed 6000, includes only ICBM, SLBM, and air-based cruise missile warheads. Is that right? This is all?

Karpov: As well as heavy bombers armed with SRAM missiles and bombs.

Nitze: They are not included in the 6000 level.

Akhromeev: Each bomber equipped with SRAM and bombs will be counted as a monoblock carrier. Accordingly, it will be included in the 1600 number as a bomber and in the 6000 number as one warhead. Let's record this specifically.

Nitze: This circumstance changes things. We are not ready to equate one air-based cruise missile to bombs and SRAM missiles on a heavy bomber.

Akhromeev: Let's reason this way: you have a missile "Minuteman I", which is a monoblock missile. We count it as one carrier in the total number of carriers and at the same time its warhead is counted as one warhead in the total warheads number. In the same way a heavy bomber with SRAM missiles and bombs would be counted as one carrier and one warhead.

Nitze: This still does not clear up the situation. Suppose we have 100 bombers armed with cruise missiles, as well as SRAM missiles and bombs. In this case it would be counted as 1 unit in both levels. Is that right?

Akhromeev: I will explain: a heavy bomber with SRAM missiles and bombs on board counts as one carrier. But at the same time it counts as one warhead in the 6000 number, if we agree on this. If we take your hypothetical situation and add a long-range cruise missile to this bomber, it will then count as one carrier, but two warheads.

Nitze: Since we are discussing details we should reflect them in the agreement side by side with the 50% reductions, even though the equation with the bomber ammunition is not absolutely fair.

Akhromeev: All is clear here. A bomber counts as a carrier. This is logical, isn't it? It carries weapons. And since the range of these weapons—SRAM missiles and bombs—is limited, we count them as one warhead.

Nitze: Very well. We should specifically record this in the text.

Akhromeev: Why should we do that? We are not formulating an agreement right now Mr. Nitze. We are not signing an agreement. You had a question, we cleared it up for you. An agreement will be formulated in the future and this will be recorded there.

And one last thing: if doubts arise about the final phrase about the sea-based cruise missiles, let's write, "a solution will also be found for the question of limiting the nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missile deployment". And let us take this entire phrase.

Nitze: Our text will have in parenthesis: ("will strive to find a solution"), and further as in your text.

Akhromeev: No, then I take down my specification and we return to the starting position. Let our superiors decide this question then.

Can we move on and discuss the section on medium-range missiles?

Nitze: Not yet. Here we would like to write: "other sublevels will be established, the same for both sides".

Akhromeev: I think we should not write that. The ministers will be able to discuss these questions, but we should not record this formulation here.

The issue is already resolved, in that the general quantity of carriers and warheads has been determined, it is mentioned that everything must be done with consideration of the historical development of both sides' powers, the level of heavy missiles is determined. Enough is recorded to enable the parties to further make the decisions themselves.

Nitze: The more we discuss this the more convinced I become of the necessity to limit the sublevels.

Akhromeev: I think not, because by doing so we will be creating a loophole through which people will try to break the sides' strategic nuclear powers structure. We are against it.

Nitze: Without indicating strategic weapons sublevels our instructions will be weak and incomplete. I do not understand how establishing sublevels could break the structure of your strategic weapons.

Akhromeev: We have considered your concerns. I think that is quite sufficient. We see no need for additional sublevels. We have enough restrictions already. I think we should move on to other questions.

Nitze: Let's move on. I see we do not have enough time to discuss strategic weapons sublevels. I only ask you to clarify the strategic weapons formulation one more time. I think we should include: "a mutually acceptable solution will be found".

Akhromeev: Sure, we could write: "a mutually acceptable solution will also be found for the question on..." and further according to the text.

In relation to sublevels, as we agreed, we will not record anything here, but during subsequent negotiations each side could raise its questions.

Mr. Nitze, allow me to get clarification on one question. We need some kind of a preamble for the document. Would the preamble we proposed be suitable?

Nitze: I would include several changes. No, actually only one change: you have written, "texts of arrangements and agreements." That is very unclear to us. We usually write "texts of documents, based on...". Maybe you would accept our correction?

Akhromeev: You propose: "texts of documents, based on the key positions stated below". Let's write it like that.

Very well. Allow me to now move on to medium-range missiles.

We offer the following: (the text of the Soviet proposal is read).

As I understand, we have not agreed on the question of missiles in Asia.

We are leaving it for our superiors.

Nitze: We did not resolve either problem: neither what to do with your missiles in Europe, nor what to do with the missiles in Asia.

Akhromeev: No, as I understood, we have this written about Europe: "negotiations will be started on both sides' existing missiles with a range of less than 1000 km in Europe".

Allow me to express myself in more detail, in order to explain how we understood our previous work. I understood that there are no objections to a complete liquidation of US and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, when the nuclear potentials of England and France are not affected and not taken into account. But this raises the question of how to solve the problem of medium-range missiles in Asia. We put the proposition on medium-range missiles in Asia in parenthesis and propose to leave this question to be decided by the General Secretary and the President.

Nitze: We do not agree to this. We proposed a global zero-level option, not a zero-level option only for Europe.

Akhromeev: Then we take the entire medium-range missile issue into parenthesis. The next question is about the ABM Treaty. You have our corresponding formulations on this question.

Nitze: Here is our proposal for this issue. (He reads the text in English. The text is translated into Russian and handed over to the Russian experts.)

Akhromeev: We will not be able to agree to this proposal mainly for the following reasons: when considering the strategic weapons reductions question we have absolutely specifically agreed on reducing these weapons by 50%, and evidently upon the conclusion of negotiations the ministers will decide on a specific timetable for this reduction. We have always said that in this case we need a provision of reliability of the sides observing the ABM Treaty. For this reason we propose for the US and USSR to reach an agreement on not using the right of withdrawal from this Treaty for 10 years, and during this time to strictly observe the its stipulations. This would entail a ban on testing any space-based elements of the ABM in space, except for research and tests conducted in laboratories. We would

ask for understanding of our concern and the unbreakable relation of the position I just expressed with the 50% strategic weapons reduction.

Nitze: Our formulation takes into account the entire situation and supposes to remove your concern: with the reduction and following liquidation of strategic weapons, the sides will not only discuss questions of strategic defense, but also share new technologies and discoveries in this sphere. In the future a timetable for a joint transition to strategic defense would be discussed. We really intend to remove your concern about this question.

Akhromeev: We view such a resolution of this question in which the US would share new military technology with us skeptically. You do not want to share even civil industry technologies with us.

Therefore we consider your proposal unrealistic and not much needed. We believe there is no need of creating an ABM above the limits designated in the ABM Treaty.

At the same time we believe it to be necessary obtain security for ourselves and strengthen the ABM Treaty.

Nitze: But we will be ready to share achievements in new military technologies in the sphere of strategic defense and this position would be coordinated in an amendment to the Treaty.

Akhromeev: If the testing of nuclear weapons begins, any possibility and likelihood of preventing a space-based arms race will disappear. Because of this we expressed our concern on this issue to the US.

We painstakingly offer our proposals on this question.

Nitze: We are exchanging views on this issue and in no way are thrusting our position on you. Regretfully, we have few common points on this question.

Akhromeev: Your proposals are inequitable and once again are not obligatory in character. On such a basis there will be no agreement.

We should not allow the testing of space-based ABM elements in space; the ABM Treaty prohibits this unequivocally.

Arbatov: We have serious disagreements about this question. You are well aware that we will not sign an agreement about substantial reductions in strategic

weapons if you develop your ABM in violation of the existing ABM Treaty. You offer to simultaneously reduce strategic weapons and create new strategic defense systems. These two things cannot be synchronized. What you are offering calls for an exceptional level of trust.

We cannot accept your position.

Nitze: Our proposition on this question could not have contained any obligatory stipulations. These are directives for ministers. They will decide which stipulations should be made obligatory, and which should not.

Akhromeev: We ask you to take into account our position as well. The propositions on strategic weapons reductions and on the ABM will have an obligatory character in our directives to the ministers.

Nitze: We should find such a means for solving the existing disagreements on the question of the ABM, which would not contradict the interests of both sides. We believe that the ABM will contribute to stability in our relations. With the liquidation of strategic weapons the stability in our relations will guarantee the stability of relations in the whole world. Furthermore, we cannot stop development in this stage.

Akhromeev: ABM research is conducted in the USSR, as well as work on perfecting the ABM of one region. But we are not working on the creation of space-based ABM elements, and we consider the fact that such work is conducted in the US a violation of the Treaty. Let us work on reducing strategic weapons; this is the right way for both sides. The ABM Treaty was signed as having unlimited term, and we should strengthen it. I repeat, fundamental scientific research and testing in this area can be conducted only in laboratories.

Nitze: The SDI does not violate the ABM Treaty's stipulations in any way. At the beginning of our meeting we stated in detail our opinion on this question, referring to Articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty, as well as the agreed upon declaration "D".

Akhromeev: You do not violate the Treaty in the part concerning the ground-based echelon of your ABM system. But in the part concerning the creation of a space-based echelon you have no grounds to cover yourself with the ABM Treaty's

stipulations. This would be a violation of the Treaty. A realization of the SDI would inevitably bring withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I think both you and we should strengthen the Treaty's regime, not destroy it.

Nitze: Nevertheless, we intend to liquidate the disagreements about this issue. This requires goodwill and a desire.

Rauny: While there are offensive weapons systems, there will also be defensive weapons systems. Defense is necessary under all circumstances, even if you do not have weapons.

Nitze: Perhaps we could go back to the medium-range missiles question? (Reads his proposals).

Akhromeev: We should report that during the consideration of medium-range missiles, the problem of medium-range missiles in the East remained unresolved. We should record: "the sides agree that this problem will be solved".

Nitze: We do not object.

Karpov: What should we do about the ABM?

Nitze: Two differing position remain.

Akhromeev: Please read your position once again.

Nitze: (Reads position).

Akhromeev: (Studies the text translation stating the American position). Thus, we will consider that we did not come to an agreement on this question.

Let us move on to the next question on banning nuclear testing. (The sides study texts stating the sides' positions).

Karpov: I see that something does not suit you in our formulation.

Nitze: No. It is just that our formulation seems more acceptable to us. It proposes step-by-step limitations on conducting nuclear testing.

Karpov: Your proposal is ambiguous.

Nitze: We do not think so.

Karpov: You have neither a subject, nor a goal for the negotiations. We propose a wide spectrum of questions, which—after they are considered—could lead to a full ban on nuclear testing.

Nitze: We tie in the discussion of nuclear testing to the reduction of strategic weapons.

Akhromeev: We invite you to follow our example. We believe we are taking the bull by the horns. And we are ready to assume additional responsibilities. We have not conducted nuclear testing in over a year.

We offer to come to an agreement on banning nuclear testing step-by-step. At the first stage we could finally resolve the question of threshold nuclear explosions. The goal would not be legalizing nuclear testing, but banning it. Ideas about the beginning of negotiations and the goals should be clearly formulated in your version of the directives.

Nitze: We clearly proposed to start these negotiations immediately. The subject of negotiations is known—nuclear testing. This would be a step-by-step process.

Akhromeev: We propose to record: “negotiations on a complete ban of nuclear testing”.
About antimissiles. We propose to record: “the sides agree to undertake mutual efforts with the goal of prohibiting ACAT antimissiles”.

Nitze: We cannot agree to that.

Akhromeev: We brought closer our positions on strategic weapons quite well, but completely disagreed on the ABM. This makes strategic weapons reductions impossible.

Karpov: The proposals for negotiations on creating nuclear war outbreak risk reduction centers are absolutely clear.

Akhromeev: These negotiations will go more successfully than others.
Yes, regretfully our work today did not lead to big results.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Until next time.

Talks were recorded by Colonel Popov, October 20th, 1986.