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CIA DI PIKAC 9742

## PRIORITY ISSUES

## Key Analytic Challenges

A Briefing Book Produced Annually

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This briefing book was prepared by a team of Directorate of Intelligence analysts, graphic designers, cartographers, editors, and statisticians

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
## **North Korea**

The Challenge			
North Korea will remain a serious challenge to regional stability as long as the Stalinist regime endures—and	Koreas: Significant Events in 1997		
we cannot yet predict its downfall. Further complicating this issue, South Korea is more assertive after a	- North Korea		
decade of impressive economic and diplomatic suc-	<u> </u>	Kim Chong-il's birthday	
cess, making cooperation on North Korea more deli-	15 April	Kim Il-Sung's birthday	
Military Threats to US Troops	25 April	Armed Forces Day	
North Korea's military could inflict enormous destruction on South Korea.	— 8 July	Third anniversary of the death of Kim Il-Sung	
<ul> <li>The North's offensive posture along the demilita- rized zone (DMZ) means it could go to war with little or no additional preparation. US troops in South</li> </ul>	= 9 September	Anniversary of the founding of North Korea	
Korea could be involved in intense combat with no more than a few hours of warning.  North Korea's long-range artillery and surface-to-	South Korea 22 February	Secretary of State Albright to visit Seoul	
surface missiles near the DMZ, some of which could deliver chemical warfare agents, could hit forward defenses, US military installations, and Seoul.	16 April	First anniversary of US–South Korea proposal for four-way peace talks	
	August	US-South Korea security con- sultative meeting	
	- December	President Clinton-South	
	<del>-</del>	Korean President Kim Yong-sam sidebar at APEC summit in Canada	
	18 December	South Korean presidential elec- tion	

Key US-North Korea Bilateral Issues

The grounding of a North Korean submarine on South Korea's coast in September disrupted implementation of the Agreed Framework.

Seoul responded by shelving plans to send technicians to North Korea to begin site preparation for light-water reactors and by refusing to sign protocols on the provision of goods and services.



not inject momentum into inter-Korean relationswhich had bogged down even before the incident. The apology provides South Korean President Kim Yongsam an opportunity to be more flexible, but he will be constrained by domestic politics and public opinion.

## **Economic Problems**

The continued deterioration of the North Korean economy is eroding regime stability. Kim Chong-il appears to be firmly in control and can compel obedience from the bulk of the populace, but the recent poor harvest will produce severe food shortages early this year.

- The resulting decline in living conditions is eroding The North then suspended spent-fuel canning and popular faith in the regime, and P'yongyang can no longer shield most military, security, and political elites from this hardship.
  - It cannot reverse its economic fortunes without sweeping reform that would take time to produce results and could unleash destabilizing forces.

threatened to unfreeze its nuclear program. P2yongyang stonewalled on the joint US-South Korean proposal for four-party peace talks.

The North's apology in late December will allow Seoul to reengage P'yongyang on political and economic issues; however, resolution of the incident by itself will

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Agreed Framework and Confidential Minute, 21 October 1994  Under the Agreed Framework and Confidential Minute signed on 21 October 1994, North Korea will:  Freeze graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities under IAEA monitoring.  Remain party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and implement its safeguards obligations.  Dismantle graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities in the future.  Arrange for safe storage and ultimate transfer of	<ul> <li>Provide a Presidential letter of assurance guaranteeing implementation of Light-Water Reactor (LWR) project.</li> <li>Organize an international consortium to provide two LWRs with a total generating capacity of 2,000 megawatts.</li> <li>Provide assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US.</li> </ul>
spent fuel out of country.  Come into full compliance with NPT obligations and permit IAEA access to additional sites and information as required to verify its nuclear declaration and history.  Begin implementing the North-South denuclearization declaration.  Engage in North-South dialogue.	<ul> <li>Provide alternative fuel for heating and electricity to compensate for a freeze on reactors on line and under construction.</li> <li>Phase out trade and investment sanctions.</li> <li>Phase in diplomatic relations, beginning with exchange of liaison offices.</li> </ul>

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