IINCLASSIFIED

## DECAPTIONED

July 11, 1975

TO:

ARA:Mr. William D. Rogers

APA: Ambassador Hewson Ryan

FROM: ARA/PLC: Richard J. Bloomfield

SUBJ: Ambassador Popper's Policy Paper.

The Ambassador characterizes our present stance as one of "disapproval" (p. 20 and p. 21). But the image is otherwise, at least as far as the Executive Branch is concerned:

- -- We are solicitous about Chile's debt problem and deploy our diplomacy to promote a debt rescheduling.
- -- We use our influence in the IFIS to assure that Chilean loans are not held up.
- -- We vote against or abstain on resolutions in international organizations that condemn the GOC's human rights record.
- -- We assure the GOC that we want to sell it arms and that we regret Congressional restrictions.

How would the Junta ever get the impression that the USG "disapproves"? As the old saying goes, actions speak louder than words.

The Ambassador says that any stronger signs of our (read Executive Branch) disapproval would not improve the human rights situation (which I am willing to concede). Conclusion: We must provide economic and military assistance; in fact by page 25, we are worrying about our responsibilities for making the Junta's economic program a success. Why? Because "preventing the re-emergence of a Chilean Government essentially hostile to us (p. 22) is our chief interest and the human rights problem is secondary."

This argument overlooks the possibility that the human rights problem in Chile may not be "secondary" but may be a major U.S. interest in the present domestic and international context. In the minds of the world at



-2-

large, we are closely associated with this junta, ergo with fascists and torturers. This is the way it is perceived by a vocal and increasingly numerous element in Congress whose support we need for other aspects of our Latin American policy (e.g. Panama) and, indeed, for our foreign policy in general. It is one more reason why much of the youth of the country is alienated from their government and its foreign policy. Chile is just the latest example for a lot of people in this country of the United States not being true to its values.

This is not the emotionalism of a bleeding heart. The Secretary himself has said that no foreign policy will be successful if it is carried in the minds of a few and the hearts of none. Our current Chile policy comes perilously close to fitting that description.

The need to "live with" the absence of human rights in Chile in order to prevent the re-emergence of a hostile government is, to my mind, a distinctly secondary consideration. We survived a hostile government in Chile in the recent past. It is really a bizarre world when the globe's greatest superpower has to worry about the hostility of the dagger-pointed-at-the-heart-of-Antartica.

The specific objectives in human rights that Ambassador Popper sets out on page 21 are fine. The problem is that we will not achieve them without turning the screws harder and taking the risks that entails.

cc: Ambassador Popper c/o Mr. Karkashian:ARA/BC

ARA/PLC:RJBloomfield/ahm 7/11/75:x29492

