

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

<<<<. >>>>  
PTQ3798

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3798

PAGE 01 STATE 291940 220409Z  
ORIGIN SA-01

INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	SMI-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	INLB-01	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-00	SP-00	SS-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/024R					

DRAFTED BY: SA/PAB: LOCOLDREN, RLCHEW  
APPROVED BY: SA: RLRAPHEL  
EUR/RUS:KFORDER NEA/NGA:GSIBLEY IO/UNP: PMOON  
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:  
SA, NEA, IO, EUR, P

-----0B23A1 220412Z /38

O R 220407Z DEC 95  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT  
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE  
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
AMEMBASSY KIEV  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

FOIPA/PA	Mandatory Review
( ) Release	( ) Declassify
( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ) Excise	( ) Declassify in Part
( ) Deny	( ) Class. Ret/Renew

Exemptions B1  
ARP Action Cert DRP Date 8-31-04

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 1

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 2  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

PAGE 02 STATE 291940 220409Z  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY ALMATY  
CIA WASHDC 0000  
SECDEF WASHDC 0000  
NSC WASHDC 0000  
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0000  
DIRNSA FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 291940

LONDON FOR TUELLER, PARIS FOR ALLEGRONE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/05  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UN, SA, RS, PK, IR, AF  
SUBJECT: DISCUSSING AFGHAN POLICY WITH THE PAKISTANIS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY LEE O. COLDREN, SA/PAB DIRECTOR,  
REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. THE PAST YEAR HAS SEEN SEVERAL DRAMATIC REVERSALS OF FORTUNE FOR THE ARMED FACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AS WELL AS CONCURRENT CHANGES OR HARDENING OF THE AFGHAN POLICIES OF RUSSIA, IRAN, INDIA AND, NOT LEAST, PAKISTAN. THE EFFECTS TO DATE OF THESE CHANGES HAVE BEEN TO LESSEN THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF THE UN MEDIATION PROCESS, INJECT GREATER ELEMENTS OF PROXY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 291940 220409Z  
BATTLES INTO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT, AND CONTINUE THE AGONY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. PAKISTAN HAS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE TALIBAN AND ATTEMPTING TO FORGE A MILITARY

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940


Page: 3  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

AND POLITICAL ALLIANCE AMONG THE KABUL REGIME'S OPPONENTS. THE GOP APPEARS AMBIVALENT, AT BEST, ABOUT WHETHER RABBANI AND MASOOD SHOULD HAVE ANY PLACE IN TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AIMED AT CREATING A STABLE AND LEGITIMATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

3. (C) PAKISTAN HAS BEEN NO MORE INTERVENTIONIST THAN OTHER PLAYERS. WE SHARE PAKISTAN'S GOAL OF A STABLE, LEGITIMATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT NOT BEHOLDEN TO FOREIGN

LEGITIMATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT NOT BEHOLDEN TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHETHER OTHER INTERVENING POWERS HAVE THAT SAME OBJECTIVE. HOWEVER, WE QUESTION WHETHER PAKISTAN'S CURRENT POLICIES ARE SERVING THAT GOAL. CURRENTLY IT SEEMS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THAT PAKISTAN CAN BROKER AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND OTHER RABBANI OPPONENTS. THE TALIBAN'S ABILITY TO OUST RABBANI AND MASOOD FROM KABUL ALSO SEEMS PROBLEMATIC.



B1

4. (C) GIVEN BELOW IS THE VIEW OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 291940 220409Z  
SEEN FROM WASHINGTON AS WELL AS SOME SUMMARY TALKING POINTS. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD IS REQUESTED TO DRAW ON THESE MATERIALS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH GOP AFGHAN POLICY MAKERS. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

MAJOR REVERSALS IN 1995: TALIBAN REDUX

5. (C) THERE WERE TWO DRAMATIC REVERSALS OF THE MILITARY

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 4  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IN 1995, BOTH INVOLVING THE TALIBAN. IN MARCH, THE TALIBAN WERE THROWN BACK FROM KABUL AS WAS THE IRANIAN-SUPPORTED WAHDAT PARTY. WITH KABUL ITSELF FREE OF FIGHTING FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THREE YEARS, THE NOMINAL RABBANI GOVERNMENT MOUNTED AN AGGRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BE RECOGNIZED AS THE DE JURE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN, A CLAIM WHICH HAD EXPIRED IN 1994. AFTER PROLONGED FIGHTING IN THE WEST THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER, BY LATE AUGUST THE TALIBAN'S CAMPAIGN APPEARED DESTINED FOR FAILURE AS THE FORCES OF RABBANI ALLY ISMAEL KHAN PUSHED THE TALIBAN TO GIRISHK NEAR THEIR HOME BASE AT KANDAHAR. BY THIS POINT MOST OBSERVERS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE TALL BAN WERE A REGIONAL PHENOMENON LIMITED TO THE PASHTUN MAJORITY AREAS OF SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN. THEN IN A STUNNING REVERSAL, THE TALIBAN ROLLED UP ISMAEL KHAN'S TROOPS, TOOK SHINDAND AIRBASE AND ENTERED HERAT WITHOUT A BATTLE HAVING COVERED SOME 450 KILOMETERS IN 5 DAYS.

IRAN SWITCHES SIDES

6. (C) THESE SHIFTS IN THE FORTUNES OF WAR BROUGHT ABOUT CHANGES IN POLICY BY COUNTRIES WHICH BACK FACTIONS IN  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 291940 220409Z  
AFGHANISTAN TO FORWARD THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING CHANGES WAS IN IRANIAN POLICY. UNTIL MARCH, TEHERAN SUPPORTED WAHDAT, THE SHIA CONGLOMERATE IT HAD CREATED, IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE RABBANI/MASOOD REGIME. HOWEVER, APPARENTLY THE MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (MOIS) SUPPLANTED THE MFA ON AFGHAN POLICY AND BEGAN TO SUPPORT RATHER THAN ATTACK RABBANI. THE MOTIVATION WAS FEAR OF THE TALIBAN WHICH WAS VIEWED AS SUNNI FUNDAMENTALIST, ANTI-IRANIAN, AND PASHTUN CHAUVINIST. MOREOVER, TEHRAN, IN A MIXTURE OF PROPAGANDA AND CONVICTION, IS CLAIMING THAT THE TALIBAN ARE THE CREATION AND TOOL NOT ONLY OF PAKISTAN, BUT OF ITS ARCH ENEMY, THE UNITED STATES. AFTER THE FALL OF HERAT AND THE FLIGHT OF ISMAEL KHAN TO IRAN, TEHERAN'S FEAR OF THE TALIBAN INTENSIFIED AND TEHERAN BEGAN PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 5

Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

MATERIAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO KABUL, ACCORDING TO VARIOUS REPORTS.

RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR RABBANI HARDENS

7. (C) RUSSIA HAS MORE THAN ONE AFGHAN POLICY. IT IS INFLUENCED AT TIMES BY SEVERAL ACTORS, INCLUDING THE DUMA, THE ARMY, AND RUSSIAN BORDER GUARDS, AS WELL AS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR DURING ASSISTANT SECRETARY RAPHEL'S NOVEMBER VISIT TO MOSCOW THAT DE FACTO RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR RABBANI HAS HARDENED CONSIDERABLY AND THAT THE REASON WAS EXTREME DISTRUST AND DISLIKE OF THE TALIBAN. THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE RUSSIAN AIRCREW OF A PLANE SEIZED BY THE TALIBAN WHILE TRANSPORTING AMMUNITION TO KABUL HAS FUELED ANTI-TALIBAN SENTIMENT IN MOSCOW. [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 291940 220409Z

[REDACTED] WHILE MOSCOW IS STILL PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO THE UN MEDIATION PROCESS, ITS INCREASED CLOSENESS TO THE RABBANI REGIME IS EVIDENT EVEN AT THE UN. A DRAFT STATEMENT RUSSIA RECENTLY URGED ON THE P-8 CALLS FOR CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATION, BUT DOES NOT MENTION THE UN. MOSCOW'S MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE RABBANI REGIME HAS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY IN RESPONSE TO THE FALL OF HERAT AND TALIBAN PRESSURE ON KABUL. FROM WASHINGTON'S PERSPECTIVE, MOSCOW APPEARS MORE COMMITTED TO KEEPING RABBANI IN KABUL AND, NECESSARILY, LESS COMMITTED TO A UN BROKERED TRANSFER OF POWER.

INDIAN SUPPORT FOR RABBANI CONTINUES

8. (C) DURING THE RABBANI CAMPAIGN TO SECURE RECOGNITION AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, NEW DELHI REOPENED ITS EMBASSY IN KABUL. IN FACT, THIS REPRESENTED NO CHANGE IN

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 6  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

POLICY AS INDIA HAS ALWAYS RECOGNIZED WHOMEVER HELD KABUL AND HAS LONG SUPPORTED THE RABBANI/MASOOD REGIME. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE SINCE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE, NEW DELHI'S PRIMARY FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN IS TO COUNTER PAKISTAN. AS WAS EVIDENT DURING A/S RAPHEL'S VISIT, THE GOL SHARES TEHRAN'S DISTASTE FOR THE TALIBAN AND BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. AS WELL AS PAKISTAN IS BEHIND THE TALIBAN. WHILE THERE HAS PROBABLY BEEN SOME INCREASE IN INDIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE RABBANI/MASOOD REGIME, THAT ASSISTANCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN MARGINAL. MORE IMPORTANT HAS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 291940 220409Z  
BEEN THE GALVANIZING EFFECT ON ISLAMABAD OF INDIA'S MORE OPEN SUPPORT OF THE KABUL REGIME.

PAKISTAN BECOMES OPENLY ANTI-RABBANI

9. (C) THE GOP ADOPTED A MORE OPENLY ANTI-RABBANI STANCE IN 1995 AND IS GENERALLY SEEN AS FOLLOWING A "RABBANI MUST GO AT ANY PRICE" POLICY, A PRICE INCLUDING A TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF KABUL. DURING THE SUMMER ASSEF ALL TOLD US EXPLICITLY THAT THE GOP WOULD TRY TO UNITE ALL PARTIES OPPOSING RABBANI. A MAJOR MOTIVATION WAS PAKISTAN'S FEAR OF AN EMERGING "TEHRAN-MOSCOW-NEW DELHI AXIS" SUPPORTING KABUL AND OPPOSING THE TALIBAN. PAKISTAN'S AVERSION TO THE RABBANI REGIME UNDERSTANDABLY INTENSIFIED AFTER A MURDEROUS MOB ATTACK FOLLOWING THE FALL OF HERAT ON THE PAKISTANI EMBASSY AND PERSONNEL IN KABUL WHICH COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHOUT ACTIVE REGIME INVOLVEMENT. HOWEVER, PAKISTAN'S WELL-KNOWN ATTEMPTS TO BRING ABOUT A MILITARY AND POLITICAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TALIBAN, DOSTAM, HEKMATYAR AND MINOR SCC (SUPREME COORDINATION COUNCIL) MEMBERS HAVE SERVED TO FURTHER HARDEN MOSCOW'S AND TEHRAN'S SUPPORT OF RABBANI.

GOP ATTEMPTS TO UNITE OPPOSITION UNFRUITFUL,  
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 7  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

10. (C) AFTER THE FALL OF HERAT, THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SIGNS THAT ANY REAL AGREEMENT IS NEAR AMONG RABBANI'S OPPONENTS AND THE TALIBAN. DOSTAM WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC DURING HIS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 291940 220409Z  
EARLY NOVEMBER MEETING WITH A/S RAPHEL. THE TALIBAN

EARLY NOVEMBER MEETING WITH A/S RAPHEL. THE TALIBAN CONSIDER DOSTAM, LIKE OTHER FACTION LEADERS, AS PART OF THE PROBLEM AND SEE NO ROOM FOR "PRIVATE ARMIES" AFTER THEY TAKE KABUL. MOREOVER, PASHTUNS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN HAVE STRONG MEMORIES OF DOS TAM DURING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION. CONVERSELY, DOSTAM APPEARS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE UNSOPHISTICATED TALIBAN AND THEIR RELIGIOUS IDEAS. THERE ARE ALSO RECENT SIGNS THAT HEKMATYAR MAY BE COOPERATING WITH THE KABUL AUTHORITIES. WE CONSIDER IT INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY THAT PAKISTAN WILL BE ABLE TO CEMENT TOGETHER RABBANI'S FOES. PAKISTAN'S CONTINUING EFFORTS ARE HAVING THE EFFECT OF ENCOURAGING FURTHER INVOLVEMENT WITH RABBANI BY MOSCOW, TEHRAN AND NEW DELHI, EVEN THOUGH ISLAMABAD POINTS TO THIS INVOLVEMENT AS REASON TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS.

WHAT IF THE TALIBAN TAKE KABUL

11. (C) ISLAMABAD APPARENTLY BELIEVES THE TALIBAN CAN STILL DISLodge RABBANI AND MASOOD FROM KABUL, BUT WE DOUBT THE TALIBAN CAN SINGLE-HANDEDLY TRIUMPH MILITARILY OVER MASOOD'S FORCES. IF DOSTAM WERE TO JOIN IN A MILITARY CAMPAIGN, THERE WOULD LIKELY BE UNACCEPTABLE FURTHER CARNAGE VISITED ON THE POPULATION OF KABUL.

FURTHER, WE WOULD SEE LITTLE MOVEMENT TOWARD AN END OF THE AFGHAN CONFLICT IF A TALIBAN VICTORY RESULTED IN MASOOD AND

CONFIDENTIAL

B1

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 7

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 8  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

CONFIDENTIAL

//PAGE 09 STATE 291940 220409Z

HIS TROOPS RETREATING TO THE PANJSHIR TO RETURN AND FIGHT FOR KABUL ANOTHER DAY.

B1

// WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THE TALIBAN WOULD BE WILLING TO TRANSFER POWER TO A TRANSITIONAL BODY ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER AFGHAN POWERS. IF SO, THEN AN UNREPRESENTATIVE TAJIK REGIME IN KABUL WILL HAVE BEEN TRADED FOR AN UNREPRESENTATIVE PASHTUN AUTHORITY. ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN HAS REPORTEDLY ASSURED TEHRAN AND TASHKENT THAT IT CAN CONTROL THE TALIBAN, WE REMAIN UNCONVINCED. PAKISTAN SURELY HAS SOME INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN, BUT IT FALLS SHORT OF BEING ABLE TO CALL THE SHOTS.

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 8

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED


Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 9  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

PAGE 10 STATE 291940 220409Z

13. (C) THE GOP DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE SPECIAL MISSION MAY ALSO REFLECT UNHAPPINESS WITH PAKISTAN'S LIMITED ABILITY TO AFFECT THE UN PROCESS. IN HIS NOVEMBER 16 PRESS CONFERENCE CRITICIZING MESTIRI'S PLAN, FONMIN ASSEF ALL COMPLAINED THAT PAKISTAN HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED. SIMILARLY,



PAKISTAN'S MANEUVERS UNDERCUT U.S. CREDIBILITY

14. (C) AS NOTED, TEHRAN, MOSCOW AND NEW DELHI ASSUME INCORRECTLY THAT THE U.S. IS PARTY TO PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN AND SHARES ITS ANTIPATHY FOR RABBANI AND MASOOD. AS WAS PLAIN DURING A/S RAPHEL'S MEETING WITH MASOOD ON OCTOBER 30, THE KABUL AUTHORITIES CLEARLY FEEL ALIENATED FROM THE U.S. MOREOVER, AS PARTISAN SUPPORT IS CONTRARY TO THE PRECEPTS OF THE UN MISSION, PAKISTANI POLICY HAS UNDERMINED THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE UN SPECIAL MISSION.

TALKING POINTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 291940 220409Z

15. (C) GIVEN BELOW ARE TALKING POINTS WHICH, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, MAY SERVE TO RE ENGAGE PAKISTAN IN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE ON AFGHAN POLICY. AS SEEN FROM WASHINGTON, ISLAMABAD HAS PURSUED A RISKY POLICY

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 9

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 10  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

AND APPEARS TO HAVE NO EXIT STRATEGY SHOULD THE TALIBAN FAIL TO TAKE KABUL. WE WOULD LIKE TO ENGAGE THE GOP

CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE UN SPECIAL MISSION WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF THE GOP CANNOT MODERATE ITS ANTI-RABBANI POLICY OR FORESEE ANY ROLE FOR RABBANI AND MASOOD IN FUTURE GOVERNING ARRANGEMENTS. THE EMBASSY HAS MADE MANY OF THESE POINTS PERSUASIVELY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. A/S RAPHEL TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OF THEM IN A DISCUSSION WITH PAK PERMREP KAMAL DECEMBER 19 (SEPTEL). HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER ITERATION IS NEEDED.

-- WE SHARE PAKISTAN'S CONCERN OVER THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS HOPES THAT PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED ON MOVING FORWARDS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

-- WE CAN APPRECIATE PAKISTAN'S FRUSTRATION WITH THE RECENT ACTIONS OF THE MESTIRI MISSION, BUT PUBLIC CRITICISM OF MESTIRI'S LATEST PLAN WAS NOT HELPFUL. ALL CONCERNED PARTIES MUST WORK WITH MESTIRI RATHER THAN AGAINST HIM TO ACHIEVE A PEACE.

-- WE WISH TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO HELP THE UN MISSION ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT PAKISTAN HAS LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONTINUING CONFLICT AS DO AFGHANISTAN'S OTHER  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 291940 220409Z  
NEIGHBORS. PAKISTAN NEEDS TO REALIZE THAT THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT IS AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO MANY OF AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS AND THEREFORE MORE FRIGHTENING THAN THE STATUS QUO. WHATEVER INFLUENCE PAKISTAN HAS WITH THE TALIBAN SHOULD BE USED TO INFLUENCE THEM TO ACT IN RESPONSIBLE WAYS SUCH AS FREEING THE RUSSIAN PLANE CREW AND OBSERVING BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT PAKISTAN FACES A DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL BARRAGE OF CRITICISM FROM THE KABUL AUTHORITIES.

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 10

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL  
Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1995STATE291940

Page: 11  
Channel: n/a

Case Number: 200104110

NONETHELESS, EVERYONE MUST WORK TOWARDS AN END GAME FOR AFGHANISTAN THAT ENVISIONS THE FUTURE FOR THE COUNTRY BEYOND THE TIME WHEN RABBANI AND MASOOD LEAVE KABUL.

-- WE HAVE NOTED FOREIGN MINISTER ASSEF ALL'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS ON AFGHAN PEACE EFFORTS. WE VIEW THE JOINT DECLARATION AS INDICATING BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND PAKISTAN HOPE THAT MESTIRI WOULD FOCUS ON OTHER ELEMENTS BESIDES THE INTERIM COUNCIL, SUCH AS DEMILITARIZING KABUL AND CREATING THE NEUTRAL SECURITY FORCE.

-- MESTIRI IS AT THIS POINT PURSUING A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. ACCORDING TO THE UN RESOLUTION WHICH ESTABLISHED

THE MANDATE FOR MESTIRI'S MISSION, IT IS THE INTERIM COUNCIL WHICH HE IS TRYING TO ESTABLISH THAT WILL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE A TRANSFER OF POWER AND A CEASEFIRE, AND TO CREATE A NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE WHICH WOULD COLLECT HEAVY WEAPONS. ONE WAY TO BRIDGE THE GAP IS TO DEFINE THE INTERIM COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY CONCURRENTLY WITH PROPOSING  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 291940 220409Z  
MEMBERS FOR THE COUNCIL.

-- WE VIEWED MESTIRI'S LIST OF 28 NAMES FOR AN INTERIM COUNCIL AS A PROPOSAL, NOT A FINAL LIST. WE WOULD ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO CONSIDER THE LIST AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, RATHER THAN A LIST THEY EITHER HAD TO ACCEPT OR REJECT. ALL PARTIES SHOULD FEEL THAT THEY CAN DISCUSS ADDING NEW NAMES AND DELETING THOSE NOT GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE.

-- IN ANY CASE, WE WISH TO CONTINUE TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND POSITIVELY WITH PAKISTAN TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN.  
TALBOTT

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 11

UNCLASSIFIED