ANNEX XI

Chairman's Statement

ON THE OPENNESS AND ACCESS TO THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS MENTIONED IN THE VIENNA CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

The practices of openness and access to CSCE meetings based on the relevant provisions of the Final Act and applied by host countries, have evolved in a positive way. These practices relate, *inter alia*, to access to the host State, to the venue and to open sessions of CSCE meetings for representatives of the media, representatives of non-governmental organizations or religious groups and private individuals, both nationals and foreigners; unimpeded contacts between delegates or visitors and citizens of the host State; respect for CSCE-related activities, including the holding of peaceful gatherings; and for the freedom of journalists to report without hindrance as well as to pursue their professional activity in conformity with CSCE commitments. In the light of that experience, all participating States understand that governments of host countries for the CSCE Follow-up Meeting mentioned in the Vienna Concluding Document will follow and build upon these practices as they were most recently applied at the Vienna Meeting.

SECRETARY'S ADDRESS, JAN. 17, 1989[1]

Today, the Vienna conference is added to the series of meetings that began with Helsinki. At Helsinki our governments first pledged to honor commitments to each other and toward our peoples—commitments aimed at creating an ever more free, prosperous, and secure Europe. Fortunately for us all, our citizens—through times of tension, discord, and disappointment—have held fast to the brighter vision of the future promised in Helsinki. And by doing so, they have turned that promise into a positive force for change. This process has helped to shape Europe's future.

The document that we have adopted here in Vienna gives the most complete expression to date of the principles set forth in Helsinki. It adds a new dimension to what President Reagan called in his speech in Finlandia Hall last spring "a map through the wilderness of mutual hostility." Yet there is still a great distance to go. CSCE can succeed only if we deal with the realities that have brought us to Helsinki and Belgrade and Madrid and Vienna.

We are still living with the legacy of the cold war. It was no mirage. It was the product of attempts to impose political systems on the peoples of Eastern Europe by force; to close borders; to close economies; to restrict the flow of information; to deny freedom of choice. The results of these policies are still with us: the social and political division of Europe, the militarization of East-West relations, the pursuit of two dramatically different economic models, and the emergence of two fundamentally distinct kinds of political and social organization—one in which the citizen is dominated by the state, the other in which the citizen defines and guides state power.

Yet the world is entering a period of great promise, one in which we can lessen the dangers of war through an end to expansionism and by processes of arms reduction and control; one of opportunity for those countries prepared to support and expand an open international economic system; one in which international cooperation is essential to tackle common threats, such as the spread of chemical weapons, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. And most important, we are entering a period in which respect for human rights is gaining ground—in which it is becoming clear to all that the preeminence of the individual and respect for his fundamental freedoms are the hallmarks of successful societies.

Vienna's Legacy of Openness

The way forward in East-West relations is through deeds not words, performance not promises. That is why from the outset, the United States has stressed in CSCE the central importance of implementation. And if the implementation is at the heart of the whole Helsinki process, then openness is its lifeblood.

The European Continent, across its length and breadth, is much more open today than it was when we first assembled in Vienna in November 1986. In the 2 years of the Vienna meeting, the picture in the Soviet Union and some countries of Eastern Europe has brightened in significant respects. But dark areas remain where the light of openness has yet to reach.

- The jamming of radio broadcasts has stopped. Now all of our citizens can hear competing views and decide for themselves what is the truth. Our concluding document commits all to the continued openness of the airwaves. Why not now go further and dismantle all existing jamming devices?
- In the Soviet Union, the prison gates have opened for more than 600 prisoners of conscience, including the remaining Helsinki monitors; minorities, dissidents, and religious believers are freer to assert their rights and in some cases are gaining ground. Yet others continue to suffer repression or remain unjustly imprisoned for acting upon their rights. We cannot forget them.
- There is new openness in the greater freedom of expression and assembly in countries where these basic rights have been denied. We welcome progress to date in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union and hope to see more. Yet we regret the timidity of the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in not taking similar steps.

• Only Sunday, but 1 hour after the adoption of the Vienna concluding document and in direct violation of the commitments just solemnly given by the Government of Czechoslovakia, riot police trained rubber truncheons, tear gas, and water cannon on participants in peaceful demonstrations in Prague. Reportedly, 91 demonstrators were detained.

And the same day—the day the Vienna concluding document was adopted—we were told the authorities of the German Democratic Republic detained 190 human rights activists demonstrating in Leipzig. As in Prague, most appear to have been released, but late last night some remained in custody—in glaring contradiction to the solemn international commitment being made at almost the same hour.

• In Romania the economic and social conditions as well as the political and civil rights of all citizens are being eroded at a discouraging rate. And in both Romania and Bulgaria, minorities have been particularly hard hit by government policies of recent years.

• There is greater openness in the freer movement of peoples. Last year more than 7 million East Germans visited the West, and more than 5 million West Germans visited the German Democratic Republic—record numbers in both directions. Moreover last year, according to the information we now have, approximately 77,000 people emigrated from the Soviet Union, and many more—including Andrey Sakharov—were allowed to visit abroad. Yet we still look for full recognition of the right to freedom of movement throughout the Eastern signatory states.

• Full implementation of the commitments we have made to guarantee the right of everyone "to leave his country" will lead to a more open Europe in the years ahead. We have agreed here to reasonable time limits on decisions on applications for foreign travel. And the signatory states have agreed to reduce the frequency and capriciousness of refusing travel on security grounds.

• We expect greater openness to be encouraged by implementation of the Vienna commitments regarding the "rapid and unhindered" delivery of mail as well as those concerning respect for the privacy and integrity of postal and telephone communications.

• And the openness of the Vienna meeting itself—a tribute to our Austrian hosts as well as to the CSCE process—has been set as the precedent for the conduct of future meetings. The Vienna document commits all host countries—France, Denmark, the Soviet Union, Malta, Poland, the United Kingdom, Spain, Bulgaria, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland—to provide access for foreign journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals and to allow their own citizens unimpeded contacts with delegates and visitors.

In sum the steadfast call for compliance and openness that we sounded so clearly and strongly here in Vienna has accelerated and consolidated changes for the better, changes that will tangibly affect the daily lives of millions of people—their hopes, their rights, their future. The Vienna concluding document, which each of our governments has committed itself to publish in its entirety, can be an engine for continuing change, as, indeed, was the Helsinki Final Act.

A Beginning, Not an End

Thus, the Vienna meeting marks not the end of our journey from Helsinki but a new beginning. The great American poet Robert Frost could just as well have been describing the scenery around Vienna as his native New England:

> The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
> but we have promises to keep,
> and miles to go before we sleep,
> and miles to go before we sleep.

We have a long way to go to achieve real peace in Europe—a lasting peace based on the rights of man, the rule of law, and the integrity of free and self-determining states. It is a challenge to us to go that distance. What we have done here in Vienna shows that we want and intend to meet that challenge. The comprehensive human rights agenda recognized at Vienna is a major aspect of our new beginning.

Vienna marks another new beginning as well—the beginning of major conventional arms control negotiations. In a few weeks, the 35-nation follow-on negotiation on confidence- and security-building measures will extend the work of the Stockholm conference, which pioneered the concept of openness in the military sphere. Also 23 of our states will launch an autonomous negotiation in the framework of the CSCE process aimed at achieving stability in conventional armed forces in Europe.

Between Vienna and Helsinki in 1992, there will be a number of meetings which can illuminate areas of East-West cooperation—or continuing difficulty: information, economics, the environment, the Mediterranean, culture, peaceful settlement of disputes, and—most important—human rights. The Vienna meeting has created a mechanism permitting any country to raise any human rights issue with any other country at any time. This mechanism, coupled with the Paris, Copenhagen, and Moscow meetings, will give us a continuous process of human rights review.

Moreover, the Helsinki process will continue to play an important part in reflecting and shaping the European condition. Individual initiative, ingenuity, the free flow of information, ideas, and people are the qualities that best equip nations to meet the challenges and opportunities of the future. These are the ideals of the Helsinki Final Act. The success of the Helsinki process will be measured by how well those ideals are woven into the fabric of international life.

We are already witnessing movement in the right direction. Today, we find broader acceptance of the proposition that in our increasingly interdependent world, national security cannot be fully measured or even really achieved through military means alone. Military might can secure a kind of peace, but it is peace without peace of mind. And overwhelming military strength brings no lasting security if it comes at the terrible expense of international tension and great cost to national growth. Only weeks ago, we heard President Gorbachev say at the United Nations that "one-sided reliance on military power ultimately weakens other components of national security."

Moreover, the realization has increasingly dawned that the freeing of market forces and human creativity is the real basis for sustained prosperity and national success. Our own confidence in the vitality of free societies and open markets is strong and firmly based on our own experience and our observation of the experience of others.

The Continuing Challenge of Compliance

I came to Europe for the first time as Secretary of State more than 6 years ago. I came as a friend of Europe, a believer in the greatness of Europe. I will go home to California after this, my final official visit, more convinced than ever of that view.

Sons and daughters of Europe founded my country and built a society on ideas derived from Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. In fact America has never been far from Europe, and never closer than we are today. History, language, and traditions form a common strand—a strand that links every country here to all the rest. But, above all, it is the power of the democratic ideas—ideas which reverberated on both sides of the Atlantic 200 years ago and turned the world upside down—that continue to unite our peoples and give direction to Europe's destiny.

When I addressed the opening session of this meeting in 1986, I looked ahead to the day when all the peoples in the CSCE community would share in a spirit of openness and creativity—the day when we all could participate in a release of intellectual and social energy. Through the work of this meeting, I believe that we have come closer to the day I described—not through the mere passage of time but because we have narrowed the distance between promise and performance, word and deed. But a great distance still remains to be bridged.

I would recall again for you the famous words of Pushkin, who wrote that in 1703 Peter the Great "broke a window through to Europe." This image fits the work of Vienna. The Helsinki process has helped to open windows and doors of understanding and helpful lines of communication. And, for many men and women, it has helped to open the gates of freedom. We must keep this process of openness going in both directions. We know that many more barriers between East and West have yet to be broken through—whether they be physical barriers like the Berlin Wall, inflexible economic systems, daunting bureaucratic impediments to freedom of movement and expression, or rigid habits of thinking.

May I leave you with a personal thought about CSCE? During my tenure as Secretary of State, I have come to these meetings and have met with colleagues on their periphery. And wherever else I have gone—to the United Nations or elsewhere in the world, not just Europe—I have rubbed elbows with people who in one way or another are involved and interested in this process. Those with whom I have met did not always share my country's views on the issues of the day. Often, absent the tie with CSCE, there would have been no occasion for us to meet in the first place. Nor would there have been much common ground on which to base a discussion. Yet CSCE provided that first link that eased the conversation along.

This certainly was the case when [Soviet] Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I met for the first time. As you may remember, we got acquainted during the Helsinki 10th anniversary commemoration. My wife and I decided we must get to know the Shevardnadzes as human beings, whatever our political differences might be. They must have taken the same view. We have done so, and each have met the other's children and grandchildren—in other words, our common future. This human contact is in many respects the very essence of the CSCE process. So CSCE helped us to get the ball rolling and get down to constructive work. Since that day, we haven't always agreed, but we have always engaged. I am sure that all of you here have had similar experiences. And I believe that the opportunities CSCE offers for that unique kind of human contact is another important reason why this process is so useful.

During the course of the Vienna meeting, the people and Government of Austria have given us all many reasons to feel welcome. Their hospitality has afforded us many opportunities to work together and get to know one another in an atmosphere of special warmth. On behalf of the American people and President Reagan, I wish to thank the people and Government of Austria most sincerely.

Now, as we face the new challenges we have set for ourselves in Vienna, my government is in a period of democratic transition and renewal. Yet I can assure you all here today that President-elect Bush, his government, and the American people will be playing an active and constructive role in this process in the years ahead. As we have from the beginning, the United States will continue to work for the day when at last that great objective of the Helsinki process is realized—the day when Europe is free, secure, open, and whole.

SECRETARY'S NEWS CONFERENCE, JAN. 17, 1989[5]

Q. Would you tell us, please, about your meeting with German Foreign Minister Genscher, particularly whether you had anything to say about the way the Germans have slowly admitted what they seem to have known a long time ago about the Libyan chemical weapons plant?

A. That subject didn't come up in our conversation. We talked about other things, so I don't have any comment on that.

Q. Do you think there can be any real freedom here in Europe so long as the Berlin Wall exists, and do you see any progress toward getting it removed?

A. There has been tremendous progress in Europe, but the Berlin Wall remains the symbol of the division of Europe, an inhumane structure and something that functionally separates people. In the end, that's the sort of thing that has to come down. Nevertheless, though it's still there, great progress has been made, and I tried to detail that in my talk just now.

Q. Concerning the U.S. decision to agree to a Moscow follow-up meeting in 1991, could you tell us first of all, under what circumstances, if any, the United States should consider not going in 1991, and secondly, whether in the course of making the decision, if you agreed to it, have you consulted with members of the new Washington Administration and obtained their viewpoints?

A. First of all, on the decision to agree to the conference, we felt the considerations we had set out for people to look at had been well taken into account. We had seen performance, and we also were assured of continuing performance; not just a lack of rhetoric but continuing performance. Of course, we will be watching for that, and we think the Moscow human rights conference is an opportunity, and we expect to go there, and we expect it to be operated in the same manner as all the other conferences.

Nongovernmental organizations, individuals, will be able to go, and they will have access, Soviet people will have access to them, and I think that's a good thing. We have been counseled [inaudible] by Mr. Sakharov [Soviet dissident] to take this view. I think it is a good decision, obviously, and we said

this to the Soviet Government. If there is a retrogression of some sort or a lack of real progress, then no doubt the American Government won't send a delegation. But we expect to go, because we expect to see continued progress.

Q. Did you consult with members of the Bush Administration [on the Moscow decision]?

A. We tried to keep them posted on all these things, of course, but President-elect Bush is also Vice President Bush. He's a member of this Administration, and so he is well informed about what is going on, but I don't want, in any way, to seem to speak for them.

Q. You were just very critical of the Prague police [for recent crackdowns on demonstrators]. Does it undermine the credibility, in your opinion, of the Vienna document itself for them to have behaved the way they did last Sunday?

A. It would if we didn't speak up about it. And the whole problem here from the beginning is this: Is it worthwhile to set up a standard and get people to associate themselves with it by signing? And our answer to that question in Helsinki in 1975 was "yes." Our answer in Madrid was "yes." Our answer here is "yes." Why? Because we think you put that standard up there, here's the performance; there has been a long distance between the diplomacy and the performance and now you have to bring that reality up to the promise.

If you measure where we are today with where we were in 1975, I think you see a big improvement. In fact, I think if you measure where we are today with where we were when this conference started, you see a big improvement. But you also see that promise is still way ahead of reality, and that's what we have to keep in mind in quoting that wonderful poem by Robert Frost—"we have promises to keep and miles to go before we sleep". We have made progress, but we have a long distance to go before we can have the kind of stable and secure and whole Europe we all desire.

Q. You said you had discussed the Libyan plant with Foreign Minister Genscher. From what you could tell us, the German Government has acknowledged so far only that it has seen indications of West German companies' participation in building this plant. Given the detailed information that the American Government says it has, how long do you expect it will take the German Government to get more than just indications of such participation in building this plant?

A. We have been assured by the key people in the German Government—the Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, and most recently the Finance Minister—of the seriousness with which the German Government takes this issue. They are investigating it carefully; if they find their legal structure is such that undesirable things are happening without an ability of the government to do anything about it, they will try to change those laws. They have given us assurances of their seriousness of purpose here, and I take those assurances very seriously.

Q. Do you think that prosecution in this case is the only thing that will send a message to companies?

A. I don't want to comment on the internal German judicial processes and how they're going to go about this issue. But we believe in the United States as we've said, and I believe, having reviewed our evidence, there is no question whatever that Qadhafi is trying to equip himself with a major chemical weapons production facility. And he hasn't quite got there yet. He needs aid from the outside in order to get there. We're trying to do everything we can to throw every conceivable monkey wrench we can find into his machinery. And in doing so, I think we're acting on your behalf as well as my behalf. I don't want poison gas dumped on me. Do you? And I don't want Qadhafi to have it or to have the ability to give it to some terrorists. That's why we're struggling so hard at this issue.

Furthermore, it's an important element in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons. We had a very productive and impressive conference in Paris. I might say the French did a beautiful job of running it. And, of course, when people consider this issue, we dwell on the difficulty of verification, and it is difficult to verify certain things. You can drive yourself crazy looking at things people could do that would deceive you.

But, the fact is that the intelligence agencies around the world know a great deal about who is producing chemical weapons, where they're producing the chemical weapons. We even know when people have tried to do it in a very deceptive manner, and we have been able to trace through the different front companies and all of that. So you can find out about the deception.

Now what we have to say is, verification is difficult, but when you have something that's verifiable and identifiable, then the next question is, will you do something about it? And so we are engaged here in a consciousness-raising operation on something I think is very important. And don't forget; it's not only chemical weapons, it's biological weapons. These things are terrible as far as mankind is concerned.

Q. In your speech just now, did you you speak up about Romanian refusal to implement certain parts of the [CSCE] final document? Is the United States letting Romania get away with it?

A. No, I speak up about everything I can lay my hands on to speak up about. And if there's something I missed, I'm glad to have it inserted in the record.

But within the framework of a short speech, I think we rang all the changes. But you've got to take this both ways. There has been very great progress, but there is still a long distance to go. The progress is uneven, and it's much more in some countries than in others. I tried to differentiate that out—who is plus and who is minus and who is still at the starting gate.

Q. But a refusal to observe commitments is something else—

A. Yes, I think it has to be racked up. I think they have been changing their mind as to what they will openly say. But anyway, you have to keep calling these things as you see them, and that's exactly what we try to do.

Q. Are you planning to make use of the new mechanism [of monitoring implementation of CSCE commitments]?

A. The new mechanism gives us a right and others a right to call attention and work on any human rights issue in any country at any time, plus the three human rights conferences. Those things taken together give us—us meaning all of us together—an important way of continuing the hard work that we all have been doing on this subject for all these years.

Q. Would you please explain some kind of contradictions which are the common will of disarmament [sic] on the lower level in Europe,

where it's going on in NATO countries about the reconstruction of arms in Europe? Can't you see the contradiction between those two lines of thinking?

A. No, I don't, and I notice as I look across at the other side, that people who have military capability and feel they need it want it to be up to date. We do. At the same time, we want to find ourselves in a forum where we can really bring the levels of armaments down. Since the force levels on key offensive kinds of arms are so heavily disproportionately higher in the Warsaw Pact countries than they are in NATO, obviously there's going to have to be a deep asymmetry in those cuts. So let's get at it. But in the meantime, we're going to keep the armaments we have up to date.

Q. As you look back at your public office, what kind of assessment would you give of the impact that Mr. Gorbachev has made on East-West relations?

A. I think there has been a flow of events that has clearly improved matters greatly. There are many factors involved, and I give the strong and steadfast policies of President Reagan and the coherence of the NATO allies and others around the world who have carried the banner of freedom great credit for continuing that battle steadily.

Mr. Gorbachev has been a very strong creative person in this. And so we have welcomed the moves he has made and the changes he is bringing about inside the Soviet Union. He has made his contribution so, yes, I'm ready to say there's a good thing there.

Q. What concrete accomplishments can be expected as a result of this conference in the relations between the blocs, between the states, and for the lives of the people?

A. First of all, the CSCE process has a kind of implicit agenda underneath it of wanting to eliminate bloc thinking, of wanting people to interact together freely. As I said earlier, if you compare now with 1975, there is distinct improvement in that regard. We just discussed a response to a question I did on the conventional arms negotiations. If in the bloc-to-bloc negotiations we can see a reduction in conventional arms, that will be good for security, good for peace of mind; it will reduce the expense of the armaments. That will be a positive development if it can be brought about.

Now the human rights, obviously, cuts across all the countries, not just the two blocs, and so I'll just refer to the comment I made earlier. We also see addressed problems of culture, problems of environment, the Mediterranean, economic matters; in other words things that are cross-cut matters that affect the bloc countries but others as well.

Q. What makes you believe that the conventional stability talks that will begin in March of this year will be a "greater success" than MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions]?

A. I suppose a flip answer would be that they don't have to be very successful to be more successful. But I think the MBFR talks, with all of the difficulty they had, they have been in the end rather illuminating and have caused people to think about what will work and what doesn't seem to work very well as an approach to these issues. So I have some genuine optimism about the prospects of the new conventional arms talks, with all due respect to the problems involved and the uncertainties involved, because I think we have all learned something from MBFR.

The units of account are different. The geographic concept is different and more inclusive. The countries are different. And we and NATO will approach this with, I think, a very interesting and creative proposal. We're ready.

So that shows there is a wheel to engage and try to do something about this. I think the conditions are a little different, the concept is different, the units of account are more easy to work with. I think the prospects are much better, even though I would readily acknowledge any of these negotiations is tough, and it takes a long, hard way and nobody should expect some immediate result. But it does look a little better.

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[1]It is understood that the invitation to UNEP includes ROCC (Regional Oil Combating Center) and MAP (Mediterranean Action Plan) [text in original].

[2]Conventional Armed Forces include conventional armaments and equipment [text in original].

[3]The participants will be guided by the language on non-circumvention as set out in the section on Objectives and Methods [text in original].

[4]Press release 5.

[5]Press release 6.■