April 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT.

Attached is a first (rough) cut of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept of possible targets in North Korea which might be struck in retaliation for the shoot down of our ECM aircraft. General Wheeler realizes this by no means represents a completed tactical command plan.


I have discussed our planned approach with the President this evening and he has approved our moving three carriers north from Vietnam. These will start tonight and are seventy-two hours away.

For tomorrow, General Wheeler will give in very broad terms to the NSC, the various options as we see them. After the NSC, we will be prepared to discuss with the President, Bill Rogers and you specific details and recommendations.

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Talking paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on an item to be discussed at the National Security Council Meeting, 15 April 1969.

Subject: Air Strikes Against North Korean Targets

BACKGROUND - The Assistant for National Security Affairs has requested that an appraisal of an air strike against a North Korean target in response to destruction of the US EC-121 be prepared for consideration by the President on 16 April 1969.

DISCUSSION - An air strike against a North Korean target in response to the shootdown of the US EC-121 could be conducted by either landbased aircraft, carrier aircraft or a combination thereof. Each offers certain advantages/disadvantages. The following plans provide for separate land-based or carrier-based aircraft attacks.

a. Plan for Carrier-based Air Attack

(1) Targets Recommended:

- (a) Wonsan AF (39-09N - 127-29E) - 6,600'/4,000' con-. crete runways. Main structures: control, 2 hangers, 3 admin, 8 maint, 8 warehouses, 14 storages, 50 support, 120 barracks, 3 POL tanks. Jet light bomber/fighter capability. One of three major fighter bases on east coast of North Korea. Southernmost fighter base on the East Coast. 2NM E of Wonsan.
- (b) Son Dong Ni (Sondok AF) (39-44N 127-28E) 6,600 concrete runway. Main structures: control, 5 admin, maint, 14 barracks, 37 support, 19 POL tanks. Jet light bomber/fighter capability. Only fighter base in Hungnam area. 34 NM N of Wonsan.
- 1. Objective. The objective of conducting air strikes against selected significant military targets in North Korea would be to disrupt the military posture of North Korea and to impose a penalty on the communist leadership for its act of aggression against the United States.

2. Advantages:


a. Air strikes against significant military targets in North Korea will indicate to the Communist Bloc that the United States will not tolerate acts of aggression against US forces in international waters and airspace.

> States to an act of aggression will indicate the resolve of the United States to take measured punitive action against an aggressor.

c. Targets are of a military nature and their disruption and destruction would reduce the military capabilities of North Korea to support military operations against US and ROK forces in South Korea.

 \underline{d} . The sudden and sharp impact of air strikes permits a measured response without prolonged engagement with the enemy and emphasizes the punitive nature of the act.

military targets in North Korea will be a deliberate act of war. North Korea may respond by launching attacks against US/ROX forces.







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4. West Coast targets not selected because:

a. Concentration of NK SAMs are on west coast.

b. Higher risk of confrontation with CHICOMS if we operate from Yellow Sea.

c. Task Force operations from Sea of Japan would require undesirable overflight of South Korea.

(2) Forces available:

(a) USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65)

26 F4J 12 A6A 30 A7B

(b) USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-61)

26 F4B 29 A7A 15 A6A/B

(c) USS RANGER (CVA-61)

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(d) USS HORNET (CVS-12)

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(e) Equivalent surface combat and support ships.

(3) Reaction Time:

- (a) USS KITTY HAWK 48 hours
- (b) USS ENTERPRISE 72 hours
 - (c) USS RANGER 72 hours
 - (d) USS HORNET 72 hours
- (e) Surface combat ships will react with CVA's as Attack Carrier Task Force.
- 130-30E in Sea of Japan. Move 3 CVA's to position 35-00%
- (a) Following Courses of Action are keyed to reaction time of naval forces:
- Wonsan AF with 9 $\frac{1.48 \text{ hours}}{A6A/B}$ from KITTY HAWK.
- 2. 48 hours Combined tactical USN/USAF day and night strike against Wonsan AF and Sondok AF for 12 hours.
 - night strikes against Wonsan AF and Sondok AF for 12 hours.

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4. If single strike preferred, recommend single night Navy strike against Wonsan AF.

5. If maximum destruction is preferred, recommend combined tactical USN/USAF day and night strikes against Wonsan AF and Sondok AF for 12 hour period.

(5) Effect on SEA Operations - Redeployment of 3 CVA to a northern position will have minimal immediate effect on SEA operations.

b. Plan for Land-based Air Attack

(1) Target Recommend - Sondok AF - Description and objectives same as b (1) (a) and (b) $\underline{1}$. above.

(2) Advantages:

- (a) Away from any major population center
- (b) Significant NK base

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- (c) Lower SAM/AAA defenses than in western NK
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- hief. Records & Declass Div, WHS (d) On coast: allows low level, over water approach
 - (e) Further north than Wonsan
 - (3) Plan of Attack Alternate I
 - (a) Alternate I

l. Use 60 tactical fighter aircraft (12 F-105; 48 first light. Recovery at Okinawa.

emergency post-strike support.

3. Forces generated from 12 F-105 at Okinawa; 35 Replace 13 F-4s from Korea with F-102/F-106s from Okinawa on a one-for-one basis.

4. Requires 36 hours to prepare and reposition forces prior to launch. Enroute time would be 2 1/2 hours.

(b) Alternate II

1. Use 15-2 B-52 aircraft on hi-lo-hi mission mounted from Guam just prior to first light. Recovery at Guam.

2. Requires one tanker per B-52 for pre-strike refueling support drawn from SEA tanker resources at U-Tapao.

3. Requires hours preparation time prior to launch. Enroute time would be approximately 5 1/2 hours.

(4) Military judgment of effect on SEA Operations:

(a) Alternate I: Except for minimal degradation of tanker support for air operations in BARRELL ROLL/STEEL TIGER, no sea air operations.

in SEA for a 24-hour period, at least

Force: same as para a on b above)

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(2) Advantages:

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(5) Protective Measures in Event of NK Retaliation Against

(a) All US/ROK forces in ROK to be placed on alert, including covert attainment of DEFCON 3 at launch of strike force and overt DEFCON one at TOT.

- (b) Maintain SIOP alert throughout WESTPAC.
- (c) Place AF forces in Japan and Okinawa on DEFCON 3 at TOT.

- A North Korean response, ranging from retaliatory strike against launch carriers/airfields to recpening of hostilities along the DMZ, can be anticipated. The most likely responses are:

- a. Vigorous defense measures against US attack and possible submarine, air and guided missile boat attacks against US surface units.
 - b. Attacks against South Korean airfields.
 - c. Intense actions along the DMZ.

- No direct Chinese Communist interference is expected, but prompt political attacks on the United States are likely.

- Soviet air and naval forces can be expected to maintain close surveillance of US operations. Prompt propaganda attacks against US actions are also likely. Soviet material export to North Korea would probably be increased.
 - US forces must be prepared to take protective measures against retaliatory North Korea strikes. The organic air defense capability of the carrier force is adequate for protection of that force. All US forces in Korea should be placed in readiness for defense against North Korean reopening of hostilities along the DMZ and/or retaliatory attacks against ROK airfields.

RECOMMENDATION - It is recommended that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, use the foregoing in discussing this subject before the National Security Council as appropriate.

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Approved	ру		D:	irector,	J-3	· ~ .
Director,	Joint'	Staff_	 	(Conc	ur)	(Nonconcur)
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Prepared by: Capt W. L. Sheppard, USN Pacific Division, J-3 Ext 77254

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