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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached letter dated 6 October 1997, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"... I am pleased on this occasion to reaffirm once again the obligations of the Republic of Iraq without limitation or condition under the NPT and full compliance with the agreement signed with the IAEA on the safeguards regime."

Summary

39. The IAEA continues with implementation of its OMV plan and has embarked upon a programme to update the technology used in its monitoring activities. This has already resulted in the implementation of sub-surface sensing techniques and the further development of routine aerial and land-based radiometric surveys. Work in other areas of technology is being actively pursued with the help of member States.

40. In the course of discussions, the Iraqi counterpart has provided a response to IAEA questions but, from the IAEA perspective, the questions were often construed as narrowly as possible and responses addressed only inaccuracies or omissions that the IAEA had specifically identified in the text. This minimalist approach has resulted in the expenditure of considerable additional time and effort, for all concerned, to produce improvements to FFCD-F. More detailed consideration of the matters reported in paragraphs 11 to 31 above are included in part two of this report and summarised in paragraphs 73 to 83.

41. In response to IAEA requests, the Iraqi counterpart has invested considerable effort in the provision of equipment and personnel resources to support IAEA search and excavation activities to locate and verify the status of materials and equipment declared by Iraq to have been destroyed, either as a result of the Gulf War bombardment or by Iraq's unilateral actions. Also, with the co-operation of the Iraqi counterpart, further progress has been made, in the content and accuracy of Iraq's six-monthly declarations under the OMV. In particular, the July 1997 declarations include supplementary information, requested by the IAEA, on current activities at certain sites involved in the production of materials, equipment and components, as well as sites involved in design and in research and development work. The IAEA is evaluating the most recent declarations and will identify requirements for further improvements.

42. The 1 May 1997 letter from Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs resulting from his discussion with the Director General is understood by the IAEA to reflect not only Iraq's unconditional reaffirmation of its obligations under the NPT, but its acceptance of its obligations, as interpreted by the IAEA, under Iraq's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

43. The IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification activities carried out since April 1997 have not revealed indications of the existence in Iraq of prohibited materials or activities. As regards prohibited equipment, the Iraqi counterpart has handed over to the IAEA a number of pieces of weaponisation-related equipment which it had located in response to repeated requests by the IAEA. This equipment is being removed from Iraq.

44. In carrying out its activities in Iraq, the IAEA has benefited from the assistance and co-operation of the United Nations Special Commission and, in particular, from the generous support of certain IAEA member States which have

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States. The results of the IAEA's investigation have over many years yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.

77. Although certain documentary evidence is missing and some gaps in knowledge remain, the following can be stated with regard to Iraq's clandestine programme:

- There are no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalisation of a workable design for its nuclear weapons is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available programme documentation. However, no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of the weapon design when the programme was interrupted.
- Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon.
- There are no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes, all of which has been removed from Iraq.
- There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapon-usable nuclear material.
- All of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its "crash programme", was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.
- There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

78. Iraq's description of its development of the single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available documentation and the status of the related facilities. Although little documentation is available, it is clear that Iraq had intentions to exploit the information in its possession regarding multi-cylinder, super-critical centrifuge machines. It will be necessary to gain access to Iraq's foreign source of information in order to have the opportunity to verify Iraq's explanation that only limited exploratory design-work had been undertaken.

79. There are no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which has evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in Iraq's FFCD-F issued on 7 September 1996, as supplemented by the written revisions and additions provided by Iraq since that time. However, taking into account the possibility, albeit remote, of undetected duplicate facilities or the existence of anomalous activities or facilities outside this technically coherent picture, no absolute assurances can be given with regard to the completeness of Iraq's FFCD. Some uncertainty is

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