

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

28 August 2006

Mr. Thomas S. Blanton
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Reference: EO-2006-00597 (Archive #20061164CIA154)

Dear Mr. Blanton:

This is a final response to your facsimile of 19 July 2006 requesting an Executive Order 12958 mandatory declassification review of "The 30 October 1987 CIA Study entitled "The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment."

We have completed our review of the document responsive to your request and have determined that it may be released in sanitized form. We have deleted information that must remain classified on the basis of Sections 1.4(c)(d) and 6.2(c). Enclosed is a copy of the document showing our redactions and citing the exemptions. Blank pages are not included for Pages 18-165 that are denied in their entirety.

You may appeal this decision by addressing your appeal to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter, in my care. Should you choose to do this, please explain the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Scott Koch".

Scott Koch
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

EO-2006-00597
FOR REQUESTER

EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs
EO 12958 6.2(c)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2006

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]
Washington, D.C. 20505

30 October 1987

THE JONATHAN JAY POLLARD ESPIONAGE CASE:
A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT [redacted]

Study Director: [redacted]

~~WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED~~

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Preface

This study, undertaken by [redacted]

[redacted] at the direction of the Director of

Central Intelligence, [redacted]

[redacted] as a result of Jonathan Pollard's espionage on behalf of

Israel [redacted]

The Study Director gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of contributors from throughout the Intelligence Community to the project. [redacted]

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D.C. 20505

The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case:

A Damage Assessment [redacted]

Executive Summary

1. Jonathan Pollard's [redacted]

[redacted] He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage on 5 June 1986 and was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 March 1987. Following his guilty plea, which arose from a plea bargain, Pollard [redacted]

[redacted] tended to confirm that his cooperation with US authorities was bona fide. [redacted]

Personal History and Espionage Career

2. Although Pollard was regarded by his former college professors and colleagues in naval intelligence as a capable--if eccentric--scholar and intelligence analyst, his personal and employment history is replete with incidents of irresponsible behavior that point to significant emotional instability. For

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example, although Pollard earned a 3.5 grade point average as a Stanford undergraduate from 1972-76, former student acquaintances told investigators that he bragged about his role as a Mossad agent and, on one occasion, waved a pistol in the air and screamed that everyone was out to get him. Pollard's fantasies regarding

continued during his employment with US naval intelligence

3. Another factor in Pollard's background was his persistent and growing determination to assist Israel, either by emigrating to that country or by other means, which eventually meant espionage. In his first Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing following his arrest and guilty plea, Pollard claimed that he had begun dreaming about future emigration to Israel at age 12 when that country won a dramatic victory in the six-day war of June 1967. According to Pollard, another influence was his attendance in the summer of 1971 at a three-month science camp in Israel, which featured strong encouragement to emigrate. During the pre-espionage period of Pollard's employment with naval intelligence, he claimed he developed a strong perception of anti-Israeli attitudes among his colleagues and of inadequate US intelligence support for Israel.

4. Despite his emotional and behavioral difficulties, Pollard managed to gain the respect of most of his superiors, as evidenced by his achievement of promotions from GS-07 to GS-12 over a six-year period. Pollard's success rested upon an academic background that included graduate study at the Fletcher School of Law and

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Diplomacy, Tufts University, upon his considerable skills as an analyst, and upon deficiencies in administrative procedures and record-keeping--since rectified--


5. According to Pollard's

he eagerly seized an opportunity to volunteer his services to Israeli intelligence in late June 1984. At that time, Pollard met his initial Israeli handler, Col. Aviem Sella--a noted fighter pilot on study leave in the United States--through a pro-Israeli activist, who was an old friend of the Pollard family. Pollard passed classified material to Sella concerning military developments in several Arab countries during at least three meetings, June-August 1984.

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
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7.

Pollard shifted his espionage


into high gear. Beginning in



Pollard's monthly

salary was raised to \$2,500 in February 1985 in appreciation for

his productivity; and he



8. By the fall of 1985, Pollard's Navy supervisor had become suspicious of his activities because Pollard seemed



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[REDACTED]

An investigation ensued [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] arrested on 21 November after an unsuccessful effort to gain asylum at the Israeli Embassy. [REDACTED]

9. During post-arrest debriefings, Pollard said that if his espionage had remained undetected, he would have been inclined to seek a job with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research because [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] major intelligence products were readily available there. He also indicated he could have assumed a less risky role as an agent of influence at State. [REDACTED]

Israeli Espionage Motives and Classified Materials Received

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
11. According to Pollard, the Israelis submitted the following collection requirements, in descending order of priority, to Pollard:



12. We believe that Pollard

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
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Israeli Intelligence Gains


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
14. In our view, Pollard's stolen material,



Losses and vulnerabilities:



15. The unauthorized disclosure to the Israelis of such a large and varied body of classified material poses risks of several kinds to US intelligence sources and methods, analytical capabilities and intelligence exchanges, and foreign-policy interests, including the possibility of extended compromise of some of Pollard's material to third countries,




--Sources and Methods.




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


--Analytical Capabilities and Intelligence Exchanges.




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
--Foreign Policy Interests.



--Extended Compromise of Pollard's material to third countries.

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


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
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16. Pollard's espionage has put at risk



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
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Lessons Learned


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