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Nuclear Stockpile Data Exchange with the Russian Federation

- During their discussions in June, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to have a working group explore the possibility of exchanging, on a reciprocal and confidential basis, data on stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.
- Reciprocal exchange of nuclear weapons stockpile information would enhance transparency, build confidence, and promote stability in our mutual security relationship, and provide a basis for cooperative efforts to maintain control and accountability over nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.
- This topic would be an appropriate element of our proposed exchange between the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense on nuclear security and arms control issues. As we noted in our recent cable on issues for the Strategic Stability Working Group, we would like to begin a confidential exchange of information on our weapons stockpiles and plans.
- As you are aware, U.S. nuclear weapons information is classified in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Until recently, the Act allowed the exchange of this information for mutual defense purposes only under Agreements for Cooperation concluded with other nations; however, legislation passed by the U.S. Congress, and which was just enacted into law, broaden the purposes for which the United States may enter into Agreements for Cooperation. These amendments to the Act allow us to share stockpile information with other nations in support of a program for the control and accounting of atomic weapons, fissile material, and other weapons material.
- There are security precautions related to Agreements for Cooperation. The cooperating nation must make certain guarantees concerning the protection of U.S. information communicated or exchanged; in particular, that such information will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or be transferred beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating nation without U.S. consent.
- We are in the process of drafting an Agreement for Cooperation that would permit a reciprocal exchange of stockpile information between the United States and the Russian Federation. We hope to be able to work with you on this agreement shortly, after it is agreed within the U.S. Government.
- Even though we do not yet have an Agreement for Cooperation, we can discuss with you the elements that it would include, and the general categories of information of concern to the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense which we would propose to exchange.
- An Agreement for Cooperation would include the following elements:
 1. An appropriate preamble;
 2. A General Provision protecting the defense and security interests of the two sides;

3. A statement of the nature of the types of information to be exchanged under the Agreement;
4. A statement on the responsibilities associated with use of the information;
5. The conditions under which cooperation would be carried out;
6. A statement on security requirements for protection of sensitive information;
7. A discussion of the restriction on the dissemination of information;
8. A section on definitions;
9. A discussion of entry into force and duration provisions;
10. One or more Technical Annexes specifying the details of the information to be exchanged;
11. A Security Annex outlining detailed security provisions to be observed by the Parties.

-- With respect to the categories of information that we could exchange on our respective nuclear stockpiles, we would propose the following:

- Nuclear warheads incorporated into the DoD/MoD stockpile each year, by number and type of associated weapon system, up to the present

- Nuclear warheads contained in the DoD/MoD stockpile, by number, type of associated weapon system, and year, up to the present

- Nuclear warheads currently in retired status and identified for dismantlement (but not yet dismantled), by number, type of associated weapon system, and location (to include both storage and dismantlement sites)

- Nuclear warheads already dismantled, by number, type of associated weapon system, and year dismantled, since 1989

- Projected yearly dismantlement schedules, by number of warheads and type of associated weapon system

-- Associated weapon systems might include the following categories: (1) Intercontinental ballistic missiles; (2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles; (3) air-launched cruise missiles; (4) air-to-surface missiles; (5) air-to-air missiles; (6) air-delivered bombs; (7) land-based surface-to-surface missiles; (8) land-based surface-to-air missiles; (9) nuclear artillery shells; (10) nuclear mines; (11) nuclear torpedoes; (12) sea-launched cruise missiles; (13) sea-based surface-to-surface missiles; (14) sea-based surface-to-air missiles; (15) sea-based anti-submarine weapons; and (16) anti-ballistic missile interceptors.

-- We could also exchange information on weapons-grade fissile material in a non-weaponized status under the control of MoD and DoD. For the United States, this would consist of naval reactor fuel for our nuclear ships and submarines; fuel for space-based reactors; and weapons-grade fissionable material in research reactors. We would propose to exchange information on total quantities by material type (e.g, highly enriched uranium, Pu-239) and amount.

- An example of the types of information that we could exchange is attached.
- Exchange of information on each of these proposed topics could occur on an annual basis, perhaps at sessions of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, after our governments conclude an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation.
- We would appreciate your views on the suitability of an exchange of information on nuclear weapons and fissionable material under MoD and DoD control, and on the potential topics for exchange which we have identified.

Examples of Data Proposed for Exchange with Russian Federation

(Note: These examples are provided only to illustrate the types of data that might be exchanged reciprocally by the United States and the Russian Federation. They do not reflect the actual weapon systems that would be associated with each category of information. Actual information would be exchanged under an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation between the two parties.)

1. Nuclear Warheads Incorporated Into the Stockpile

- In 1985, ____ nuclear warheads were incorporated into the U.S. stockpile. Of these, ____ were associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles; ____ with submarine launched ballistic missiles; ____ with sea-launched cruise missiles; ____ with air-launched cruise missiles; ____ with nuclear artillery; ____ with land-based surface-to-surface missiles; and ____ with air-launched cruise missiles.

2. Nuclear Warheads Contained in the Stockpile

- In 1985, there were _____ nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile. Of these, _____ were associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles; ____ with sea-launched ballistic missiles; etc.

3. Nuclear Warheads in Retired Status and Identified for Dismantlement:

- There are currently ____ U.S. nuclear warheads identified for dismantlement but not yet dismantled. Of these, _____ are in DoD custody and ____ in DoE custody. Of the _____ DoD warheads, there are ____ for air-delivered bombs at Kirtland Air Force Base, NM; ____ for air-delivered bombs at Nellis Air Force Base, NV; etc. All of the ____ warheads in DoE custody are located at the Pantex plant in Amarillo, TX; they include ____ for nuclear artillery; ____ for air-delivered bombs; etc.

4. Nuclear Warheads Already Dismantled

- In 1992, the United States dismantled ____ nuclear warheads. These included ____ for nuclear artillery; ____ for land-based surface-to-surface missiles; etc.

5. Projected Dismantlement Schedules

- In 1995, the United States plans to dismantle ____ nuclear warheads, if technical problems do not interfere with these operations. These include ____ warheads for air-delivered bombs; ____ for submarine-launched ballistic missiles; etc.

6. Fissile Material Under DoD Control

- There are ___ metric tons of HEU under DoD control. This includes the following:

- o ___ metric tons of HEU for naval reactor fuel either ready for ships, on board ships, or returned from ships, associated with the following locations in the eastern United States: New London, CT; Portsmouth, NH; Charleston, SC; and Norfolk, VA.

- o ___ metric tons of HEU for fuel for space-based reactors.

- o ___ metric tons of HEU in research reactors under DoD control located at Bethesda, MD; Aberdeen, MD; White Sands, NM; and McClellan AFB, CA.