OPENING

(GRACE NOTES AND THEMES)

- President Clinton was very pleased, as am I, that I have the opportunity to come to North Korea the DPRK.

- I hope and believe that in years to come the US and the DPRK will view this visit of an American presidential envoy to your country as historic, and as the start of a process of adaption by both sides to the quickening pace of change in the modern world.

- Our welcome has been warm, and I extend my thanks to Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan and his staff for their consideration and hard work in making our arrangements.

- Comment on sights in Pyongyang (including the morning visit to Mangyōngdae, better understand the significance of Kim Il Sung and the feelings the people have for him.)

- Have great respect for, interest in, Korean people.

HISTORY

- I have not come for a discussion of where the relations between our two countries have been, or of opportunities missed by either side. As a practical matter, I understand that we cannot escape history, nor should we seek to avoid the responsibilities history has placed on us.

- My experience has taught that history is not an unseen, uncontrollable force, but instead that our own choices and actions can change history. Now we are faced with new choices and decisions which allow us to change history for the better. I do not intend to dodge history nor to lay blame. Where we can learn from history and avoid past mistakes, I am prepared to listen carefully and respond frankly to your views, in accordance to my understanding of events, especially those in which I was involved directly.

- I am not here to apologize for any actions by the United States. I seek no apologies from the DPRK. I do expect that, over time, a full and frank exchange of views between our two people on past events will help heal the wounds that to this day deeply haunt our relations.
INTRODUCTION TO WJR AND THE NKPR

- As you may know, I stepped down as Secretary of Defense in 1997 after four years of service to President Clinton and leadership of the Pentagon.

- By training I am not a diplomat. I began my career as a mathematician and technologist, developing weapons and technology during the Cold War. I served as chief of the Pentagon’s technology and weapons development office for President Jimmy Carter from 1977-1981, initiating many advanced technical programs designed to deal with the challenges of the Cold War.

- When President Clinton asked me to return to the Pentagon in 1993, the Cold War had ended, and I found myself dealing with an entirely different set of challenges and responsibilities, namely, inaugurating new and peaceful relationships with countries that had long been adversaries and, frankly, were potential targets of the weapons I had previously helped design.

- In particular, I began working with these former enemies to inaugurate new security relationships and to eliminate nuclear, missile, and other weapons of the Cold War. Thus, as Secretary of Defense I became something of a diplomat after all—the changed world required a changed role.

- When I left Washington in 1997 to return to California as a Professor at Stanford University, I looked forward to spending time writing about what I had learned and teaching a new generation about the new era’s opportunities for peace and security. I also looked forward to spending more time with my family.

- Thus, it came as a surprise to me when, last October, President Clinton asked me to undertake a thorough review of US policy towards North Korea.

- I told the President that I was honored to be asked, but I wanted to think about it before accepting. I recognized it was a complex and difficult task.

- As I made my decision, I thought back to 1994, when the US and DPRK came perilously close to a serious crisis. Indeed, I spent much of the spring of 1994 in the Pentagon thinking about how we could avoid a destructive war on the Korean Peninsula. At that time, while I was confident that our ability to deter and thus prevent war was exceedingly strong, I believed that a war resulting from miscalculation would be a disaster for all concerned.

- Fortunately, through decisions taken by leaders on both sides, crisis was averted and the Agreed Framework negotiated.

- The Agreed Framework was an achievement for all. Despite some critics in the US and problems in implementation, the Agreed Framework has been overall a success. Our team’s visit to Kumchang-ri showed that both sides remain committed to the
Agreed Framework and can be flexible in seeking solutions that arise in the course of its implementation.

The Agreed Framework was not simply to avert a crisis, but to open a door as well—a door into an era of decisively improved relations between the US and the DPRK.

- I think it is fair to say that the two sides have not passed through this door. It seems to me that the work begun between our two countries in 1994 was not yet finished.

- I believed, more generally, that the issue involved was central to the safety and security of the United States, now and for the future. I felt that the United States has a role to play, and a responsibility to help shape an equitable and enduring resolution to the Korean issue.

- Finally, I believed that some of my experience as Secretary of Defense, building new security relationships with former enemies, might be useful in approaching the Korean issue.

- I therefore knew I could not refuse President Clinton's request.

PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT.

- My review of US policy toward your country has lasted six months so far.

- We have reexamined every assumption that has underpinned our policy for decades, and studied a variety of paths into the future.

- I have consulted with all Cabinet Departments and agencies of the USG, and met frequently with President Clinton, Secretaries Albright and Cohen, National Security Advisor Berger and senior members of our military.

- I have consulted with leading members of our Congress from both parties and have their support for this mission.

- I have met with scholars and experts on Korea, with representatives of non-governmental groups that have worked with your country, and with people who have visited your country and know its people.

- I have also consulted closely with U.S. allies in Asia and elsewhere, especially with the ROK South Korea and Japan.

- And I have consulted with the governments of China and Russia, and with the European Union.
After careful thought and reflection, I have told President Clinton I believe that the US should make a fundamental change in its policy toward the DPRK, and I have come here today to convey the outlines of this policy.

- I also told the President that consistent with the goals and central security requirements of the United States of America, we should take this path with our allies and in full cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

However, before completing my Review and making my final recommendations, I advised the President that it was crucial that I seek an invitation to visit the DPRK on his behalf, and to have an exchange of perspectives with its highest leaders. A thorough and fundamental policy review would be impossible without hearing and learning firsthand the views and perspectives of your country.

- I therefore come at the instruction of President Clinton to describe the circumstances in which the United States of America would be prepared to move decisively and unambiguously to an entirely new and improved relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and to exchange views about that historic possibility.

**US STRATEGIC VIEW**

- The review and my recommendations are anchored in long understood, carefully examined, and historically tested US views about its true interests in Asia. These ideas reflect the views of both political parties in my country. They represent the distillation of experience, some of it costly, some of it bitter.

- I believe it is important that during my visit I discuss with you this US strategic view of our role in Asia and to hear your views.

- The US is a Pacific power, with legitimate security interests in Asia. History has demonstrated to us, and experience continues to show, that the political, economic, and military interests of the United States are intimately bound up in developments in Asia.

- Over a hundred years ago, events occurred and decisions made in capitals in Asia that decisively and tragically influenced the course of the 20th century. It is important that decisions made now not repeat the same mistakes or doom the peoples of Asia and the Pacific to similar tragedies for the next 100 years.

- Since the end of World War II, US policy in Asia -- reflected in our military presence in the region -- has been to prevent a repetition of what occurred before 1945 -- when one power or another sought to take control of the region.

- Our role and our military presence is not directed at anyone or against any power; nor do we seek any territorial or other claims in the area.
Our Asian policy reflects this underlying belief: That peace and stability are most secure when countries are free to develop as they see fit, and none feels threatened by its neighbors.

- After World War II, a key part of our Asian policy was to defend ourselves and our allies from the threat of attack by the Soviet Union or its allies. We took the defense commitments we made to our allies under the circumstances of those years seriously. In retrospect, there is no doubt in my mind that these US commitments were a key to preserving peace in the region for over three decades. Many others, even former adversaries, have acknowledged this point.

- Since the fall of the Soviet Union, we have worked with our allies to keep our security relations strong. These alliance relationships are no longer fundamentally pointed at any single threat or specific country. They are intended to enhance our own security, the security of our treaty partners, and the overall security of Asia. These alliances are important to us, and we will preserve them.

- Nevertheless, we realize that there have been great changes in the world, especially in Asia. The structures and patterns of diplomacy that emerged in the aftermath of World War II and evolved in the Cold War are no longer completely suited to the current situation, and will become increasingly less suitable as the years pass.

For example, although we have deep, historical ties to the ROK, which we will not abandon, these ties do not preclude creating new, constructive, and sustained ties with the DPRK.

- The United States believes that peace and stability in Northeast Asia can be sustained through a stable pattern of normal, equal relations among the countries involved, as well as through continued economic growth shared in by all of those in the region.

- We believe that there is active role for the DPRK in preserving stability in Asia, for its own benefit and for the benefit of the entire region.

- The DPRK, as does every country, has its own strategic perspectives and legitimate defense concerns. We are fully prepared to consider those.

- In turn, we expect that the DPRK will consider the defense concerns of other countries, including the United States.

- This process, in short, will be reciprocal.
• I believe, as well, that after we have had a chance to discuss these matters more fully, you will agree that the US strategic view is not incompatible with DPRK interests.

In fact, Korea's position will be enhanced by strong, constructive relations with a non-Asian power. Surrounded by strong states on its borders, Korea can benefit from friendship with the U.S., whose interests are in a prosperous, independent country.

On the question of reunification, I think you already understand the U.S. position quite well. We believe reunification is a necessary element of longer term peace and stability in Northeast Asia. We also believe it is an inevitability—Korea is one nation and its division is a tragic accident of history. We also strongly believe (in this case) that the means of achieving reunification are as important as the ends. For that reason, we have opposed, and will continue to oppose, any efforts at forceful reunification.

As for the specific proposals on the means for peaceful, and gradual reunification, that question is not part of my recommendations to the President—because U.S. policy cannot decide—nor should it—something that ultimately must be left to the Korean people themselves.

We support and have supported—through deeds as well as words— the peaceful, sustained, and dynamic interaction of the two governments and two systems on the peninsula, encouraging gradual reintegration of the economies and systems while preserving stability and the security interests of each party.

I understand that although the issue of reunification is ultimately one for the Korean people, other countries have their own roles to play, as well.

The U.S. role is to help create the environment in which the two Koreas can take practical steps to lessen tensions and increase opportunity for reconciliation, non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation. Normal, wide-ranging US-DPRK relations are necessary for such an environment. We wish to establish normal relations with the DPRK not merely out of U.S. security interests, but also because of its positive influence on stability.

Clearly there is a relationship between US policies toward the two parts of Korea. Just as clearly, there is a relationship between North Korean policies toward the US and toward the South. These policies are inextricably linked. There is no sense in ignoring those links or maneuvering around them. I believe all parties equally should recognize the links and fashion policies to take them into account.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND MUTUAL THREAT REDUCTION

Just a moment ago, I said that if the region is secure, all countries can develop as they see fit, according to their own unique beliefs, traditions, and systems.
This is such an important principle that I wanted to repeat it.

Indeed, it is a principle that underlies my Review and the recommendations I am considering making to the President.

After a long period in which they were almost completely cut off from each other, our two peoples have begun to have contact. When we look at the DPRK, we see a system very different from that of the U.S. But different systems need not stand in the way of better relations; nor should close ties with the ROK or the unresolved issue of reunification prevent the U.S. and the DPRK from improving relations.

The huge concentration of conventional forces on the DMZ is unsatisfactory and dangerous. War would be a tragedy for all, and all sides realize it. Therefore, we all agreed to initiate the Four Party Talks to replace the armistice with a more stable peace structure. But until we have arrived at a stable peace, we need to reduce the risk of war so we can live together peacefully.

I intend to recommend strongly to the President that he seek negotiations with the DPRK to reduce those threats that stand in the way of better relations.

If successful, these negotiations would result in agreed steps that would be reciprocal and nearly simultaneous, with the result of mutual threat reduction and greatly improved relations in all dimensions.

With the threat reduced, peaceful coexistence and greatly improved relations should be possible for both the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, permitting us to live together peacefully.

I am firmly convinced, as is the President, that a withdrawal of US forces would not contribute to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region, quite the contrary, and therefore, I will not recommend to the President that he withdraw US forces from Korea.

Nor do I believe such a change would enhance the security of the DPRK, given the geopolitics of this region.

As I have already mentioned, I believe that, surrounded by larger states, Korea can benefit from a positive relationship with a power across the Pacific that has a keen interest in its independence and no interest in its territory or its subjugation.
STATUS QUO UNSTABLE: U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR TALKS

- Despite the possibilities for greatly improved relations through talks aimed at reducing mutual threat, I will also tell the President that the current state of affairs is, in my judgment, unstable.

In my view, the continued development by the DPRK of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them represents a clear and present danger and should not continue. This threat to the US and its allies and interest must be eliminated. In my view, threat and fi:

- My review of the facts and my discussions with allies have convinced me that the current situation could deteriorate rapidly if our two sides do not work together to remedy it.

Thus, we have a situation where there is a real prospect of either dramatic improvement, or dramatic deterioration, in our relations.

- This is not a situation that anyone wishes for. It is simply a reality that we all face.

- I will tell the President that we need to be ready for both possibilities, but that we need to work urgently toward mutual threat reduction.

- Specifically, DPRK nuclear weapons are incompatible with these goals because:
  - On the Korean peninsula they might lead to a weakening of deterrence of war.
  - In the region, other powers would likely react, causing an arms race in the region.
  - Around the world, the cause of nonproliferation would be damaged, affecting other US interests.
  - With the Agreed Framework, the DPRK made an important statement to the world and to the US. The AF froze the nuclear activities at Yongbyon and began a process of eliminating them and bringing the DPRK back into full compliance with the NPT. This has been a success, and something that we can build upon.
Pages 9-17 are withheld in full pursuant to Exemption 1.