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National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting  
January 18, 1985, 11:00 a.m.-12:00 noon  
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Response to Threat to Lebanon Hostages (TS)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:  
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

White House:  
Edwin Meese, III  
VADM John M. Poindexter

State:  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Under Secretary Michael H. Armacost

NSC:  
Donald R. Fortier  
James R. Stark

OSD:  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary William H. Taft, IV

CIA:  
Director William J. Casey

JCS:  
General Charles A. Gabriel  
Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt

Minutes

VADM Poindexter: The terrorist group known as Islamic Jihad has held three U.S. hostages for a year. Recently they have taken two more hostages, the latest only last week. This past Monday, the Islamic Jihad stated that they intended to try the American hostages as spies and then give them "the punishment they deserve." On Tuesday, you authorized strong demarches to the Government of Iran informing them that the U.S. held Iran responsible for the safety of the hostages and stating that if the hostages are harmed, the U.S. will respond with all appropriate measures. (S)

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By LOJ, NARA, Date 7/14/04

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
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VADM Poindexter: (continued) The purpose of this meeting is to review what actions we will take if Islamic Jihad puts the hostages on trial and then executes one or more of them. We want to cover three specific areas:

- first, our contingency plans for the region;
- second, the readiness of our forces to execute these plans, including whether we need to begin movement of forces now to have them in the area; and
- finally, which specific actions we should take against terrorists in Lebanon, [REDACTED] if the hostages are tried or harmed. (TS)

I would like to ask Director Casey to bring us up to date on the intelligence situation. (U)

Director Casey: [REDACTED]



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Director Casey: [REDACTED]

VADM Poindexter: I would like to ask George Shultz to review the diplomatic situation. (U)

Secretary Shultz: Bill Casey has already covered very well the basic situation. We have sent demarches not only to the Iranian Government, but also to various nations in the region as well as the Summit Seven. I would like to make two points:

-- First, if we take some form of action, State should be involved in advance in order to formulate both a strategy to use with Congress and an international diplomatic strategy to explain our actions to the world.

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-- [REDACTED]

Mike Armacost and Jack Chain will be the State Department points of contact on this. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: As you know, we in Defense agreed to sending the demarches and also to ensuring that we have the military options to back them up. As you will see, we have reviewed previous contingency plans and will also present some new options. (TS)

The strike portions of the plans are primarily designed to be carried out at night, but could also be flown as daylight strikes. The first two of these could be carried out on 24 hour notice. (TS)

General Gabriel will [REDACTED]

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General Gabriel: We are currently well positioned to execute any strike. We have two carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean and one in the Eastern Mediterranean. (TS)

The first strike would be against the

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
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General Gabriel: (continued)



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
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
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Vice President Bush: I think the American people would be very supportive. (U)

Secretary Shultz: We actually need to prepare several strategies:

- a public strategy,
- a Hill strategy, and
- a strategy to use with our friends and allies. (S)

We will draft something on each of these and have it on the shelf in case we need it. (U)

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VADM Poindexter: I believe that covers the agenda. I recommend we adjourn. We've now agreed that if the hostages are harmed

(TS)

President: (snapping fingers) "Like that." (S)

VADM Poindexter: Don't you think we should reconvene the NSPG to make the final decision? (S)

President: Only if it doesn't delay the strikes. In summary then, if any hostage is harmed, we will

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