

E46

NSSM-63

13204



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

J
D
C

SECRET

August 29, 1969

TO: The Under Secretary
Through S/S
FROM: S/PC - Miriam Camps

SUBJECT: NSSM 63 - Meeting with Consultants

A small group of outside consultants met with us in S/PC on August 28 to consider the Interagency Working Group draft on NSSM 63 - U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences. Doak Barnett (formerly at Columbia University) and Ralph Clough, both of whom are now at Brookings, and Fred Greene of Williams College represented expert knowledge of China and Asia; Marshall Shulman of Columbia University, the Soviet side of the picture. Llewellyn Thompson was unable to make the meeting but provided preliminary comments in writing. Dick Davies, Joe Neubert and I were present for S/PC.

I think it is fair to say that all of the consultants agreed broadly with both the analysis and prescription in the paper. But the following comments are worth noting.

1. Marshall Shulman made the point that, in the context of rising difficulties with China, the Soviets seem to be pursuing two different lines of policy at the same time. One of these, which he felt was correctly stressed in the paper, was reflected in Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet last month -- a desire for improved relations with the West and with the United States. The other, evident in the proceedings of the International Communist Conference in June, was to express militancy in the struggle with "imperialism." Marshall felt that this latter aspect of Soviet policy might well be stronger than the "Gromyko line." In any case, Soviet interest in improved relations with the U.S. needed careful definition. He felt, and the

Lot # 80D212, Box 5

SECRET

other consultants generally shared his view, that all Moscow was really interested in was SALT and stabilizing the status quo in Eastern Europe. The Soviets were not, in his view, interested in a "detente." The paper generally seemed to him and to some of the others to be rather too optimistic about the chances of doing business with the Russians.

2. The Asian experts were unanimous in judging that any fragmentation of China as a result of Soviet political or military activities was unlikely in the extreme. They felt that any Soviet punitive strike at China or an effort to take out Chinese nuclear facilities would result in strengthening Chinese nationalism and unity, and would solidify Mao's position.

3. All the consultants at the meeting felt the paper underemphasized the dangers in a Soviet preemptive strike. They felt that even a non-nuclear Soviet strike would have a vast destabilizing effect in Japan, elsewhere in Asia, and in Western Europe.

4. Stemming from the foregoing, and from some feeling that the Russians might be deluding themselves about the political repercussions of a move against the Chinese nuclear facilities, Doak Barnett, Marshall Shulman and Fred Greene all urged (1) that the US Government make it clear publicly that we were against any escalation of the hostilities and (2) that we talk privately with the Soviets about our estimate of the likely consequences of any move by them against the Chinese installations, i.e., that it would simply solidify China behind Mao, and that it would have an adverse effect, from a Soviet viewpoint, in Asia and Europe, strengthening fears of the Soviet Union and spelling the end of any chance that Japan and the Federal Republic might sign the NPT. Apart from its effect on the USSR, it was also felt that a clearer US public position against any escalation of the conflict would be welcomed in Japan and Western Europe.

5. Fred Greene felt strongly that our silence on the dispute would be interpreted by the Chinese as collusion

with the USSR, that we should make clear to the Chinese that we were not colluding with the Soviets, and that if we talked to the Russians along the lines of paragraph five we should tell the Chinese we had done so. Others agreed generally with Fred that it was important to avoid - by action or inaction - any whiff of collusion. There was also some feeling that we had overemphasized the inflexibility in the Chinese position and that a clearer US position of obviously seeking to damp down any Soviet temptations would have an impact on the Chinese.

6. Ambassador Thompson, in his written comments on the paper, took issue with the judgment that, if we relieved Soviet worries that we might side with Peking, this could make Moscow more difficult to deal with. He felt that, at least in the short run, the Soviets would have a strong interest in the continuance of our policy favoring them and that they would think that we would expect at least some pay-off.

cc: S/S - Mr. Eliot
EUR - Mr. Hillenbrand
EA - Mr. Green
INR - Mr. Denney