

Finance, based upon the applications of the Ministry of Security. However, the border troops of the Pskov and Leningrad detachments have not confirmed the receipt of these allocations. The border units of the Pskov Operative Group have not received compensation for the real property left behind in the Baltic (military settlements, officers staff quarters, basing of ships, etc.).

The lack of social-domestic development has had a negative effect on the moral-psychological state of the military servicemen and members of their families. Young officers file requests for dismissal, while sergeants do not re-enlist. For example, the control checkpoint of Pytalovo is less than half staffed with officers. The number of violations of military discipline among military servicemen of all categories is increasing.

It is not surprising that up to one-third of the officers are ready to retire from the forces in the near future. Only one (1) percent of the draftees would like to prolong their service by contract. "Does Russia need us?", ask the border guards. When one learns of the amount of contraband detained by them and about the legal violations which they have prevented, the answer to this question is simple: Of course, they are needed! But when we become more closely acquainted with the everyday life and conditions of work of the defenders of our borders, it turns out that the border guards' question may also have a different answer.

#### Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks: Part 4

93WC0112A MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 8, Aug 93 [Signed to press 05 Jul 93] pp 68-78

[Transcript: "From the Gorbachev Archive (M. S. Gorbachev's Talks with R. Reagan in Reykjavik, 11-12 October 1986). Fourth Conversation (Afternoon of 12 October 1986)"]

[Text] G. Shultz and E. A. Shevardnadze were present during the talks

**Gorbachev.** Concerning the ABM Treaty. I would like to make a proposal which combines your approach and our approach, shows the two sides' firm commitment to the ABM Treaty, and links the process of strengthening the ABM regime to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Our formula is as follows:

"The USSR and the U.S. would pledge not to exercise their right to withdraw from the unlimited ABM Treaty for 10 years, and to comply strictly with all its provisions during that period. Testing of all space components of ABM defense in space shall be prohibited except for laboratory research and testing.

"During the first five years of this 10-year period (until 1991 inclusive), the strategic offensive weapons of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent.

"During the following five years of this period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides' strategic offensive weapons shall be reduced.

"In this way, by the end of 1996 all the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the U.S. will have been eliminated."

This formula clearly reflects the chief aspect of our position. We want to reaffirm the two sides' commitment to the ABM Treaty, enhance the treaty's regime, and link it to the process of eliminating strategic weapons.

**Reagan.** Our position offers a somewhat different formulation. I hope that we can eliminate the difference in the course of our talks. Here is our formula:

"The two sides agree to limit themselves to research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years until 1991 inclusive, during which time a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals will be carried out. After that, both sides will continue to reduce the remaining offensive ballistic missiles at the same rate with the aim of completely eliminating offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five-year period. The same restrictions in connection with the ABM Treaty will remain in force while the reductions continue at the corresponding rates. At the end of this period, the two sides shall have the right to deploy defensive systems."

**Gorbachev.** I repeat, our proposal is consistent with the task of strengthening the ABM Treaty in linkage with reductions of nuclear arsenals. Your formula, as I see it, fails to meet our position halfway. The main aspect of the Soviet Union's approach is that in the period during which the USSR and the U.S. are carrying out deep reductions in nuclear weapons we ought to reinforce instead of impairing or undermining the ABM Treaty. We are asking the American side once more to consider our completely substantiated line, our proposal, which, we are convinced, is in keeping with the aim of strengthening the ABM Treaty and emphasizes the two sides' obligation to comply with its provisions, not to exercise their right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years. What we are talking about primarily is the renunciation of testing any space components of ABM defense in space—that is, refraining from any steps which would in effect pave the way to the deployment of such systems. I want to emphasize once more that what is prohibited according to our formula does not affect laboratory testing and leaves open the possibility for the American side, like the Soviet side, to conduct any laboratory research relating to space, including SDI research. We are not undermining your idea of SDI; we are permitting that kind of activity, which is already being conducted by the United States and which is impossible to monitor anyway. We are only placing the system in the framework of laboratory research. I think the U.S. could go along with this, especially considering the major steps the Soviet Union has made.

**Reagan.** But still that doesn't remove the question of what we are to do after 10 years if we should want to create a defense against ballistic missiles. I just don't understand why you object so much to SDI. As for what

the ABM Treaty prohibits and what it permits, the two sides have differences of interpretation here.

**Gorbachev.** If you want to anticipate the situation for the period after 10 years, we also had a formulation on that score. If you want, we can append it to the text we have offered. This formulation is from the draft of the directives which I gave to you yesterday. It says there, you probably recall, that after the 10-year period the two sides will, over the course of several years, work out through negotiations further mutually acceptable decisions in this sphere. As you see, we are offering a broad formula of what we can do after the 10 years. If you should deem it essential to continue SDI, we can discuss that. And so why deal with the question in advance, right now? And why force us to sign SDI? Perhaps we might have other interests?

**Reagan.** We want right now to provide for the possibility of defense in case, 10 years from now, when we no longer have missiles, someone should decide to re-create nuclear missiles.

**Gorbachev.** Our point of view is that we will eliminate strategic nuclear forces in these 10 years. That's why we are proposing to strengthen the ABM regime in that very crucial period. Under these conditions, we will be able to accomplish the historic task of eliminating strategic offensive weapons. Why complicate things with other problems which we are uncertain about, the consequences of which are unclear? It would only undermine one side's confidence in whether it was acting correctly by reducing its nuclear forces under conditions where the other side is taking steps which could have aggravating consequences for the entire process. You have to agree that it would be more difficult for us to go along with this if you tie us down with aggravating weights. That is why we are proposing that we come to an agreement regarding the 10-year period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty; to carry out research only in laboratories during that period, and then after the period is over and strategic weapons have been eliminated, discuss what to do next. And, moreover, the scientific-technical aspect of SDI could still continue, your capability in that sphere, and the decision would by no means sound the death knell for your SDI program.

**Reagan.** You asked that the ABM Treaty be complied with for 10 years. We are offering you ten and a half years. At the end of the 10-year period the two sides would in fact have the right to give six months' notice and at the end of the six-month period to begin deployment. But notice this: we are only proposing such research, development, and testing as are permitted by the ABM Treaty. And if, after the 10-year period, we do give notice that we are withdrawing from the treaty (and I suggest that that will happen), what can be the objection against deployment—if, of course, you do not intend to re-create nuclear weapons or drag them out from concealment somewhere. We are ready to turn over the results of the research to your disposal.

And so, we have met you halfway with respect to the 10-year period. And anyway, if you are so resolutely committed to the necessity of strengthening the ABM Treaty, what are we to make of the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station? Especially considering that we are complying with the ABM Treaty and have not even created everything that it permits.

**Gorbachev.** I still wish you would carefully examine our proposal. It encompasses elements of both your and our proposals. If it is acceptable, I am ready to sign it.

**Shultz.** Would you please give us this formula in printed form in English so that we can examine it carefully?

**Gorbachev.** All right.

Let me add that we do not object to adding a codicil to our proposal regarding the possibility that after the 10-year period the two sides will try over a period of several years to find, through negotiations, some mutually acceptable solution to the problem. You are proposing SDI. To us, that option is unacceptable. We want to keep the possibility of finding something different. Hence, our formula makes it possible to take account of the situation in the future, after the 10 years. Summing up our proposal, let me emphasize that the two sides will strictly comply with the ABM Treaty for 10 years and will pledge not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty. Simultaneously, they will continue laboratory research. After the 10-year period, under conditions of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the two sides will get together and decide what to do next and come to an agreement. I don't understand what bothers you about that.

**Reagan.** If we have eliminated all nuclear weapons, why should you be worried by the desire by one of the sides to make itself safe—just in case—from weapons which neither of us has anymore? Someone else could create missiles, and extra guarantees would be appropriate. Your side and our side are completely eliminating our weapons. I can imagine both of us in 10 years getting together again in Iceland to destroy the last Soviet and American missiles under triumphant circumstances. By then I'll be so old that you won't even recognize me. And you will ask in surprise, "Hey, Ron, is that really you? What are you doing here?" And we'll have a big celebration over it.

**Gorbachev.** I don't know whether I'll live till that time.

**Reagan.** Well I'm certain I will.

**Gorbachev.** Sure you will. You've passed the dangerous age for men, and now you have smooth sailing to be a hundred. But these dangers still lie ahead for me, for a man they come by the age of 60 and besides, I still have to meet with President Reagan, who I can see really hates to give in. President Reagan wants to be the winner. But in this case, on these matters, there can be no one winner—either we both win or we both lose. We're in the same boat.

**Reagan.** I know I won't live to be a hundred if I have to live in fear of these damned missiles.

**Gorbachev.** Well, let's reduce and eliminate them.

**Reagan.** This is a rather strange situation. We have both put forth specific demands. You are in favor of a 10-year period. I have said that I will not give up SDI. But both of us, obviously, can say that the most important thing is to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

**Gorbachev.** But you wouldn't have to give up SDI, because laboratory research and testing would not be prohibited. And so you could continue activities within the framework of the SDI program. Your opponents won't even be able to open their mouth, especially under conditions where we have eliminated nuclear weapons.

Anyway, I am categorically against any situation where our meeting results in one winner and one loser. Even if this did happen now, in the next stage, in the process of preparing the text of agreements, it would make itself felt, and the loser would act in such a manner that everything would end up destroyed. Therefore, equality is essential both at the present stage and in the next. After all, considerable time will pass between the achievement of agreement and the final ratification of the agreements. And only if the document accommodates both the interests of the U.S. and the interests of the USSR will it merit ratification and support. By the way, you yourself have said more than once that in previous negotiations the accords did not always take account of the interests of both sides.

**Reagan.** Perhaps we can resolve the matter this way: the question of what research, development, and testing are permitted by the ABM Treaty should remain for discussion and negotiation at the meeting in the course of your visit. We will come to an agreement regarding the 10-year period and breaking it down into two five-year periods, in the course of which nuclear weapons will be eliminated, while everything having to do with testing, laboratory research, and the provisions of the ABM Treaty and so on are things we can discuss at the summit meeting.

**Gorbachev.** But without that there's no package. All of these issues are interconnected. If we come to an agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons, we will have to have assurance, guarantees, that the ABM Treaty will not only be complied with but also strengthened in the course of this crucial period, this historic period when strategic offensive weapons will be eliminated. I repeat, this period is too crucial, it is dangerous to improvise. I am convinced that preserving the ABM Treaty is also consistent with the interests of the U.S.

**Reagan.** It looks like we're not getting anywhere. But I simply cannot understand why you object on the basis of fears of what will happen in ten and a half years, when there will be no ballistic missiles. Perhaps we ought to take another look at what we disagree about?

**Gorbachev.** I can offer the following option: add another proposal to the text we have offered. It was in our

proposals, but for some reason the American side did not accept it. I think this amendment will make it possible to solve the problem.

**Shultz.** It seems to me there are two differences between us. First, what to consider to be permissible research in the course of the 10-year period. Second, it seems to me, the Soviet side has in mind an indefinitely long period during which we will not be able to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. We have in mind 10 years.

**Gorbachev.** No; we need absolute clarity here. We believe that in the stage in which we are undertaking actual reductions in nuclear weapons the ABM Treaty needs to be strengthened and made stronger, not made weaker. Over the period of 10 years the two sides will refrain from exercising the right to withdraw from the treaty; after those ten years, we will see. Perhaps we will continue to comply with the treaty, perhaps some new elements will emerge. But for the period of 10 years the treaty must be preserved, in fact made stronger.

**Shultz.** In other words, for 10 years the two sides will not exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty; after the 10 years this aspect will be gone. Then the sides can exercise that right.

**Shevradnadze.** Let me remind you, moreover, that research will not be restricted, but it can only be conducted in the laboratory.

**Gorbachev.** Mr President, I remember how things went in Geneva. You and I were sitting in a room drinking coffee, we were in a good mood, and we thought we were going to succeed. Secretary of State Shultz came in and told us how things stood. He said that the Soviet delegation would not give its consent to an agreement with respect to certain questions. And then you said to me, Pound the table and order your people to come to an agreement! I went out, and in 15 minutes the agreement had been reached. If we take a break now, and if you achieve agreement in 10 minutes, you can consider it another victory for you.

**Shultz.** One question arises which is not a problem, perhaps, but I want to clarify it. In your formulation you say that in the course of the following five years the remaining 50 percent of the strategic offensive weapons will be reduced. Do you have in mind a gradual process of reduction which in the long run will lead to the elimination of these weapons by the end of that period?

**Gorbachev.** Yes, by the end of the second five-year period they will be completely eliminated.

**Shultz.** All right, I understand.

But there is another difference. We are talking about the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

**Gorbachev.** But we already agreed on a 50-percent reduction of all strategic weapons in the course of the first five years. It would be logical for the remaining 50 percent to be eliminated in the following five years. The weapons to be eliminated would include all components of the triad—missiles, including heavy missiles, submarine

missiles, and bombers. That would be fair. I think that when we have the specific text of the treaty it will show precise schedules for the reduction and elimination of weapons while maintaining equality in all stages.

**Shultz.** The option we are proposing talks of the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. These missiles include not only strategic missiles but also, for example, intermediate-range missiles and others. What you are talking about are strategic offensive weapons. That is a different category of weapons.

**Gorbachev.** I thought that yesterday we had offered, and you had agreed to, an option which calls for a 50-percent reduction of the entire triad of strategic weapons, including missiles like the SS-18 that you are so worried about. That option did not come easy to us. But we went along with it in order not to get bogged down in a swamp of levels, sublevels, and so on.

So let's agree that in this case, again, we're talking not only about missiles but about all strategic offensive weapons. Especially considering that, as I understand it, our experts have agreed to your proposal regarding the rules for counting bombers with bombs and SREM [unidentified] missiles].

*(Break)*

**Reagan.** We have kept you a long time, because it hasn't been easy reaching an agreement between us. We have sought a formulation which would meet you halfway with respect to your desire regarding the 10-year period. Here is the final option which we can offer:

"The USSR and the U.S. pledge for a period of 10 years not to exercise their right to withdraw from the unlimited ABM Treaty and, during that period, to comply strictly with all its provisions, while at the same time continuing research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty.

"In the course of the first five years (until 1991 inclusive), there will be a 50-percent reduction in the two sides' strategic offensive weapons.

"In the course of the following five years of that period, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of both sides will be reduced.

"In this way, by the end of 1996 the USSR and the U.S. will have completely eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles.

"At the end of the 10-year period, each side may deploy defensive systems if they so desire, provided that the two sides do not agree on something else."

How do you feel about that formula?

**Gorbachev.** I have two questions for you by way of clarifying the American formulation. You speak of research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty. Your formula omits any mention of laboratory testing. Was this done specially?

**Reagan.** At the negotiations in Geneva our delegations discussed the question of what comprises research and other activities permitted by the ABM Treaty. This question could have been settled at the talks in Geneva.

**Gorbachev.** What I'm asking is, did you omit the mention of laboratories deliberately or not?

**Reagan.** Yes it was deliberate, what's the matter?

**Gorbachev.** I'm simply clarifying the American formulation. For the time being I'm not commenting. Another question: the first half of the formula talks about the two sides' strategic offensive weapons which will be reduced by 50 percent in the first five years, but in the second part, which talks about the following five years, it mentions offensive ballistic missiles. What is being referred to here? Why this difference in approach?

**Reagan.** We were told during the break that the Soviet side would like a special mention of offensive strategic missiles. That's why we included that formula. It's true that in the first part we talk about all types of strategic nuclear weapons, including missiles and bombs aboard bombers. In the second part, however, we talk about ballistic missiles, in the belief that that's what you want.

**Gorbachev.** There is some kind of confusion here. When it comes to strategic offensive weapons, we agreed between us long ago that they include all components of the triad—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. I don't see what could have changed in this question. If we're talking about a different class of missiles—RSD [medium-range missiles] and those having a range of less than 1,000 kilometers—the reduction of them is provided for in a different part of the package. We also are not removing anything from our proposals here. But as for the first part of your formulation and the second part regarding the following five years, the wording has to be identical. If we're talking about a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, then in the following five years the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive weapons must be eliminated.

**Reagan.** I understand, then, that by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive ballistic missiles will be eliminated?

**Gorbachev.** How about airplanes? After all, strategic weapons represent a triad which includes ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. So it is clear between us what strategic weapons are. And our group, which worked this evening, recorded that all elements of the triad are to be reduced by 50 percent.

**Reagan.** What I want to know is, will all offensive ballistic missiles be eliminated?

**Gorbachev.** The first part of your formulation talks about strategic offensive weapons, while the second part speaks only about ballistic missiles. Of course, strategic weapons include ballistic missiles—ground-based and submarine-launched missiles, and also bombers. Why does the second part of your formulation speak only about ballistic missiles?

**Reagan.** Is that the only thing you object to?

**Gorbachev.** I'm just trying to clarify the issue.

**Reagan.** It will have to be sorted out.

**Gorbachev.** What we need here is for both formulations to be identical. If we talk about all the components in the first case, everything also needs to be clear in the second case.

**Reagan.** Evidently we have simply misunderstood you. But if that's what you want, all right.

**Shultz.** We need to be careful here. When we talk of eliminating all strategic offensive weapons, it does not refer to shorter-range ballistic missiles. I know that the question of them is handled within the framework of a different category, but it is here, it seems to me, that we ought to take decisive measures.

**Gorbachev.** Perhaps you could have your second paragraph say that in the following five years the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive weapons will be eliminated, including ballistic missiles. As for shorter-range missiles, we deal with them in the second point of our agreement. Missiles having a range of less than 1,000 kilometers are being frozen, and negotiations are underway concerning their future fate. This is dealt with in the section on medium-range missiles, but this question is also covered.

**Shultz.** Perhaps we could formulate it this way: by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive weapons and all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the U.S. will be eliminated.

**Gorbachev.** But the question of other ballistic missiles is dealt with within the framework of another category, and this has to be mentioned there.

**Shultz.** But there the question of their elimination does not come up.

**Gorbachev.** We will freeze them, we will begin negotiations about their fate, and I think we'll decide their fate.

**Shultz.** In regard to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, we did not talk about two five-year periods. We talked about an agreement which will exist until such time as it is replaced. If we agree that this will happen in five years, by the end of that period all missiles will be eliminated.

**Gorbachev.** We can agree on all missiles, including those having a range of less than 1,000 kilometers. But here, when we are dealing with the context of the ABM Treaty we are talking about strategic offensive weapons. And we share with you our understanding of what constitutes strategic offensive weapons.

**Shultz.** But the ABM Treaty has to do with all missiles, not just strategic ones. But perhaps we have nothing to quarrel about here?

**Gorbachev.** I don't think there is any disagreement between us in this regard, and we only have to find a way to reflect our agreement.

**Shultz.** That's why I propose that we write that by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive weapons and all offensive ballistic missiles are to be eliminated.

**Gorbachev.** But in that case we will again have different formulations in the first and the second paragraphs. I think we can settle this matter when formulating our agreements.

**Reagan.** Let me ask this: Do we have in mind—and I think it would be very good—that by the end of the two five-year periods all nuclear explosive devices would be eliminated, including bombs, battlefield systems, cruise missiles, submarine weapons, intermediate-range systems, and so on?

**Gorbachev.** We could say that, list all those weapons.

**Shultz.** Then let's do it.

**Reagan.** If we agree that by the end of the 10-year period all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, we can turn this agreement over to our delegations in Geneva so that they can prepare a treaty which you can sign during your visit to the U.S.

**Gorbachev.** Well, all right. Here we have a chance for an agreement. What I am seriously concerned about is another factor. What we are talking about is to comply strictly with the unlimited ABM Treaty for the purpose of pledging not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years. We are doing this under conditions of reducing nuclear weapons. We don't understand, then, why the American side does not agree to having research, development, and testing be restricted to the confines of the laboratory. If we write it a different way, this will enable one of the sides to interpret the ABM Treaty such that it can conduct such work where it pleases while claiming that it is not violating the ABM Treaty. What effect will that have on the process of nuclear weapons reduction that has been undertaken by that time? A negative one, of course. It will create an unequal situation, impair the security of one of the sides, and lose in clarity. Hence, the ABM Treaty has to be strengthened, which means that we cannot remove the mention of laboratories from our text. This cannot be done if we insist on precise compliance with the ABM Treaty. The question of laboratories is of fundamental importance.

**Reagan.** I do not agree that strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty means restricting the testing of ABM components solely to laboratories. We have a difference in the interpretation of the ABM Treaty which we have acknowledged. From the standpoint of the substance of the issue, in my opinion, it is of no importance. Our aim is to safeguard ourselves from a revival of missiles after they have been destroyed, in order to make a kind of gas mask against nuclear missiles and deploy a defense system. Moreover, we view this variant only as a possibility, as one probable outcome. I have already spoken of this. And I have also spoken of the danger of nuclear maniacs.

**Gorbachev.** Yes, I've heard all about gas masks and maniacs, probably ten times already. But it still does not convince me.

**Reagan.** I'm talking about one possibility of what can happen after 10 years. Perhaps there will be nothing of the kind. Perhaps the people who become the leaders at that time will decide that the system is too costly to deploy and will give up the SDI. In any case, the world would welcome it if we could undertake to reduce nuclear weapons and not make this issue a stumbling block. We are asking not to give up SDI, and you are trying to determine now what will happen in 10 years.

**Gorbachev.** If we make a stipulation acknowledging the possibility of conducting research work relating to SDI within the confines of the laboratory, that will not mean that the American government will not be able to decide questions relating to the program. Such a stipulation will not prohibit research, development, and testing, including the kind that relates to space weapons. But it would make it possible to guarantee a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty; it would make it possible to prevent bringing such weapons out of the laboratories, out in the atmosphere and into space. These are completely different things. We are talking about an agreement that is supposed to strengthen peace instead of subjecting it to new dangers.

**Reagan.** I'm not demanding the right to deploy ABMs in space, I'm only talking about research permitted by the ABM Treaty. By the way, the Soviet Union is not entirely without reproach in this. I'm referring to the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station. We have differing interpretations of the ABM Treaty, that's a fact.

**Gorbachev.** What we are talking about is seeing to it that SDI testing takes place only in the laboratory. We cannot go along with allowing it to come out in the atmosphere or into space. That is unacceptable to us. It is a question of principle.

**Reagan.** You're destroying all my bridges [vse v mosty] to continuation of my SDI program. I cannot go along with restrictions on the plan as you demand.

**Gorbachev.** In regard to laboratories. Is that your final position? If so, we can end our meeting at this point.

**Reagan.** Yes it is. The whole thing comes up against the fact that your side and our side differ as to what is permitted by the ABM Treaty and what is not.

**Gorbachev.** From our discussion I conclude that the U.S. wants to reserve the possibility of conducting tests of the SDI program not only in the laboratory but also outside, in the air and in space. If that's so, there can be no agreement between us.

**Reagan.** But you have to understand that experimentation and research cannot always be kept within the laboratory; sometimes it is simply necessary to go outside the laboratory.

**Gorbachev.** You must understand me. To us the laboratory issue is not a matter of stubbornness or hard-headedness. It is not casuistry. It is all too serious. We are agreeing to deep reductions and, ultimately, the destruction of nuclear weapons. And at the same time, the American side is pushing us to agree to give them the right to create space weapons. That is unacceptable to us. If you will agree to restricting research work to the laboratory, not letting it out into space, I will be ready in two minutes to sign the appropriate formulation and adopt the document.

**Reagan.** I can't go along with that. You and I have different positions, different problems. In your country, nobody can criticize you without winding up in prison. In my country the situation is different. I have a lot of critics who wield great influence. And if I agree to such a formulation, they will launch a campaign against me; they will accuse me of breaking my promise to the people of the United States regarding SDI. So I pledge not to deploy the corresponding systems for 10 years, and to restrict ourselves to research permitted by the ABM Treaty. I'm not asking you for anything out of the ordinary.

**Gorbachev.** If I understand you, Mr President, you are now addressing me in a trusting manner, as a man who occupies in his own country a position equal to yours. Therefore, I say to you frankly and in the same trusting manner: if we sign a package containing major concessions by the Soviet Union regarding fundamental problems, you will become, without exaggeration, a great president. You are now literally two steps from that. If we come to an agreement on strengthening the ABM regime, on complying strictly with the ABM Treaty and on laboratory research which will not rule out work within the SDI framework, it will mean our meeting has been a success. If not, then let's part at this point and forget about Reykjavik. But there won't be another opportunity like this. At any rate, I know I won't have one.

I firmly believed that we could come to an agreement. Otherwise I would not have raised the question of an immediate meeting with you; otherwise I would not have come here in the name of the Soviet leadership with a solid store of serious, compromising proposals. I hoped that they would meet with understanding and support from your side, that we could resolve all issues. If this does happen, if we manage to achieve deep reductions and the destruction of nuclear weapons, all of your critics will not dare open their mouths. They would then be going against the opinions of the overwhelming majority of people in the world, who would welcome our success. If, on the other hand, we are not able to come to an agreement, it will obviously become the job of another generation of leaders; you and I have no more time.

The American side has essentially not made any concessions, not a single major step to meet us halfway. It's hard to do business on that basis.

**Shevardnadze.** Let me speak very emotionally, because I feel that we have come very close to accomplishing this historic task. And when future generations read the record of our talks, they will not forgive us if we let this opportunity slip by.

**Reagan.** I want to say one thing to you as one political leader to another. I have a problem that is quite a substantial one for me. I am being subjected to criticism which began even before I came here. They were saying that I would make concessions, that I would agree to a lengthy period of time of not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. And so I ask you as a political leader to take one step which will substantially facilitate our relations and the solution to many questions for both of us. Let me say frankly that if I give you what you ask it will definitely hurt me badly at home.

**Gorbachev.** All right, then, let's end it here. What you propose is something we cannot go along with. I've said all I can.

**Reagan.** Are you really going to turn down a historic opportunity for agreement for the sake of one word in the text? It is clear from our own text that we will comply with the ABM Treaty for that entire period.

**Gorbachev.** You say that it's just a matter of one word. But it's not a matter of a word, it's a matter of principle. Obviously, if we undertake reductions, we will have to have secure logistics/rear services [uverennyye tyly]. We cannot agree to a situation in which you are expanding your SDI and going into space with it while reductions of nuclear weapons are going on.

If I go back to Moscow and say that despite our agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons, despite our agreement on the 10-year period, we have given the United States the right to test SDI in space so that the U.S. is ready to deploy it by the end of that period, they will call me a fool and irresponsible leader.

If you agree to restrict research to the laboratory, then there will be a framework, for 10 years you will have enough work to do research within the SDI framework and inside the laboratory. And you will be able to say that you are continuing the SDI, that you are not giving it up, if that is so essential to you for the American people.

To us this whole question is not a matter of prestige, I do not ascribe special importance to it; it is a question that touches upon the interests of our people.

**Reagan.** After our meeting in Geneva I was convinced that you and I had established personal contact of the kind the leaders of our two countries never had before. You and I understood each other very well. But now, when I have asked you a personal favor which would have enormous influence on our future relations, you have refused me.

**Gorbachev.** There are various kinds of favors. If you came to me and said that you were having trouble with your farmers, they were demanding increased grain purchases by the Soviet Union, that you were asking this as a personal favor, I could understand that. But I can't understand how you can

ask the USSR to agree to grant the U.S. the right, during the period of deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons, to test a space ABM system in space, to implement SDI in its entirety, at the same time we were destroying our offensive nuclear potential. If you think about it, that wouldn't even be right for the U.S. It would create nervousness, a lack of trust, and is completely unacceptable to us. You don't need that kind of favor either.

**Reagan.** But if you don't have nuclear weapons, you won't have anything to threaten us with. The defensive system could not be deployed earlier than in 10 years' time, we have gone along with that deferment. As for the word "laboratory," it has its own particular meaning and subtext. They would simply tell me in that case that I had capitulated, that I had given away what I promised not to give away. All of the other formulations we have taken from you. We are saying we will comply with the ABM Treaty for 10 years. And now I see that nothing is coming of it, and all because of one word which has such specific meaning. I simply don't understand how you can think that I want to gain some special military advantage. After all, it's you, with your actions, who are violating the ABM Treaty. Yet we are not telling you to eliminate what you have. We're not setting that condition and we will not even mention it outside this room.

But now it's a matter of one word. Perhaps you will propose a different formulation? But the text now contains everything you have asked for—not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, strict compliance with its provisions, and the conduct only of the kind of research, development, and testing which are permitted by the treaty.

For this reason I want to ask you once more to change your viewpoint, to do it as a favor to me so that we can go to the people as peacemakers.

**Gorbachev.** We cannot go along with what you propose. If you will agree to banning tests in space, we will sign the document in two minutes. We cannot go along with something else. We have already agreed to what we could; we are not to blame.

Even though our meeting is ending this way, I have a clear conscience before my people and before you. I have done everything I could.

**Reagan.** It's too bad we have to part this way. We were so close to an agreement. I think you didn't want to achieve an agreement anyway. I'm very sorry.

**Gorbachev.** I am also very sorry it's happened this way. I wanted an agreement and did everything I could, if not more.

**Reagan.** I don't know when we'll ever have another chance like this and whether we will meet soon.

**Gorbachev.** I don't either.

Copyright: Rossiyskaya Akademiya Nauk Institut mirovoy ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy RAN, 1993