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1994 Rwanda Pullout Driven by Clinton White House, U.N. Equivocation

White House Clears E-Mail Release and Susan Rice Hand-written Notes

Newly Declassified E-Mails Detail U.S. Role at Genocide Turning Point

Political Restrictions on Peacekeeping Missions Were Key to U.S. Thinking in 1994, Not Protection of Civilians or Prevention of Genocide

State Department Attempts to Cover Up Well-Known U.S. "Bombshell" - Excises Key Parts of Cable Already Released in Substance by Other Governments

Documents Show Minimal High-Level U.S. Attention to Rwanda Genocide in April 1994; Ended with Evacuation of U.S. Citizens April 11, Notwithstanding Last-Minute Add-On to Deputies' Meeting of April 29

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 511

April 16, 2015

For more information contact:
Tom Blanton/Emily Willard, nsarchiv@gwu.edu, 202.994.7000

IN THE NEWS

Genocide Under Our Watch
By Colum Lynch, Foreign Policy, April 16, 2015

Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited
By Colum Lynch, Foreign Policy, April 5, 2015

Declassified U.N. Cables Reveal Turning Point in Rwanda Crisis of 1994
By Mark Landler, The New York Times, June 3, 2014

The Shroud Over Rwanda's Nightmare
By Michael Dobbs, The New York Times, January 9, 2014

Refusing to Call it Genocide: Documents Show Clinton Administration Ignored Mass Killings in Rwanda
Emily Willard, Democracy Now! [Video], April 7, 2014

Don't Assume that the Rwandan Genocide Couldn't Happen Today
Sarah J. Bloomfield and Michael Abramowitz, The New RepublicApril 7, 2014

Britain ignored genocide threat in Rwanda
By Oscar Williams, The Independent, March 9, 2014

Tracing the Rwanda "Genocide Fax," Letter to the Editor, The New York Times
By Karel Kovanda, The New York Times, January 14, 2014

"The Rwandan Genocide," Letter to the Editor, The New York Times
 By Linda Melvern, Gregory Stanton, et al., The New York Times, January 15, 2014 (published January 21, 2014)

"The Rwandan Genocide," Letter to the Editor, The New York Times
By Rafael Medoff, The New York Times, January 10, 2014

 

RELATED POSTS

Rwanda Re-Examined
"Unprecedented" 2014 Conference Illuminates International Response (and Lack Thereof) to Genocide
April 6, 2015

Key Diplomat's Personal Notebook Sheds Light on Inner Workings of US Government Response to Genocide Unfolding in Rwanda in 1994
Ambassador Prudence Bushnell provides unique window into the making of US Foreign Policy during the Rwandan Genocide
January 30, 2015

Inside the UN Security Council: April–July 1994
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Czech Republic Declassified Documents Reveal New Perspectives on United Nations Security Council Debates on Rwanda in April 1994
June 2, 2014

Rwanda: The Failure of the Arusha Peace Accords
International Community's Lack of Support for Military Demobilization and Rwandans' Inability to Implement Accords Led to Genocide in 1994
May 21, 2014

Sitreps Detail Rwanda's Descent into Genocide 1994
April 7, 2014

The Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Before the Genocide
March 31, 2014

The Rwandan Crisis Seen Through the Eyes of France
Part One: The Leadup to the Genocide.
March 20, 2014

Warnings of Catastrophe
French, US, UN, and Belgian Documents Foreshadow the Genocide in Rwanda 1994.
March 6, 2014

The Rwanda Sitreps
Daily Pleas to New York Detail How International Failure Left Peacekeepers Ill-Equipped to Respond to Rising Violence in January 1994
February 3, 2014

The Rwanda "Genocide Fax": What We Know Now
New Documentation Paints Complex Picture of Informant and his Warnings
January 9, 2014

The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: The Assassination of the Presidents and the Beginning of the "Apocalypse"
April 7, 2004

The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response
March 24, 2004

The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction
August 20, 2001

Lessons Learned from U.S. Humanitarian Interventions Abroad
May 9, 2000

 


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Susan Rice in 2009.  Rice was a member of the NSC staff involved with peacekeeping in 1994.  Photo courtesy of the Department of State.


President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton meet with State Department Staff on April 11, 1994 in the room where the Rwanda Monitoring Group met 24 hours a day from April 7th through April 15th 1994 in Washington, DC. Photo from the personal collection of Prudence Bushnell.


Bill and Hillary Clinton during a visit to the State Department on April 11, 1994. Prudence Bushnell is at left, speaking with the First Lady. Photo from the personal collection of Prudence Bushnell.


The Security Council votes to extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until 29 July 1994. Date: 05 April 1994. Courtesy of United Nations, New York Photo #286894.


UN Ambassadors Ibrahim Gambari, David Hannay, and Karel Kovanda at "International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993" conference at The Hague, June 2014. Photo courtesy of The Hague Institute for Global Justice.


UN DPKO's Iqbal Riza and UN Ambassador Colin Keating at "International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993" conference at The Hague, June 2014. Photo courtesy of The Hague Institute for Global Justice.


CLICK for quick link to collection of newly released Clinton Library documents.

Washington, DC, April 16, 2015 – Newly declassified Clinton White House e-mails and notes detail a decisive U.S. role in the tragic pullout of United Nations peacekeepers during the first two weeks of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, according to documents and analysis posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University on Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom HaShoah).

The documents show U.S. skepticism about United Nations peacekeeping operations as early as September 1993, as domestic political criticism of U.S. involvement, the specter of U.S. troops under UN "blue helmet" command, and budgetary constraints, led to a lengthy Clinton administration review and series of highly restrictive conditions for any future UN operation even before the Somalia "Black Hawk Down" disaster on October 3, 1993. On September 29, 1993, for example, senior National Security Council official Richard Clarke "intimated that Rwanda may be the case the NSC is looking for to prove the U.S. can say 'no' to a new peacekeeping operation."


State Department Cable to USUN, September 29, 1993, newly declassified by the Clinton Library in response to National Security Archive request.

The documents show the U.S. agreed to the Rwanda mission mainly because of a quid pro quo with France that would keep French troops engaged in the Somalia mission in exchange for U.S. support of the Rwandan mission; but even then, Defense Department officials had argued that the peacekeepers in Rwanda should be totally unarmed observers rather than combat-ready troops.

Only two days after the beginning of the genocide on April 7, 1994, when extremist Hutu militia massacred a group of Belgian peacekeepers guarding the prime minister and began slaughtering both Tutsis and those Hutus supporting a peace process, Clarke seized the opportunity to say "no" to the mission, arguing "We make a lot of noise about terminating UN forces that aren't working. Well, few could be as clearly not working. We should work with the Frecnh [sic] to gain a consensus to terminate the UN mission."


National Security Council email from Richard Clarke, April 9, 1994, newly declassified by the Clinton Library in response to National Security Archive request.

By April 15, the U.S. delegation at the UN dropped a "bombshell" on the Security Council's secret deliberations, arguing for total termination of the mission and pullout of the peacekeepers, only to find they did not have the votes given opposition from the Non-Aligned Movement and others. On April 21, the Security Council voted to reduce the force in Rwanda from over 2,000 troops down to 270, which U.S. ambassador Madeleine Albright in an earlier cable had all-too-accurately called a "skeletal staff."

Experts and former officials gathered at The Hague last year for a critical oral history conference reviewing the Rwanda tragedy agreed that the UN pullout decision was a turning point, a "green light" for genocide, a "disastrous decision [with] horrendous consequences," as the Nigerian UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari called it.

Figuring into the pullout decision were a multitude of breakdowns in the United Nations process, including contradictory signals from the often-absent UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, disagreements between the secretary-general and the UN peacekeeping staff headed by Kofi Annan, the dysfunctional relationship of the UN special representative in Rwanda (Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh) and the UN force commander on the ground (Gen. Romeo Dallaire), and the dramatic shift in the Belgian position from wanting to reinforce their troops (the best-equipped of Dallaire's force) on April 8, to lobbying for total pullout of all the force by April 15.

But the documents show the one constant throughout this debate was the U.S. position, driven by Clarke at the National Security Council, and the U.S. concern to limit UN missions only to monitoring peaces that could be kept, with stringent conditions on any U.S. involvement. This hard line seems to have been a key factor in the reversal of the Belgians, who wanted to expand the peacekeepers' mandate on April 8 both to "protect people who would be in danger such as remaining Rwandan politicians" and to evacuate foreigners, only to hear from their UN ambassador that day that this was impossible, in fact "Several western members of the Council are already questioning the utility, in the present circumstances, of maintaining UNAMIR."

Prior to release of the latest White House documents on Rwanda, the conventional narrative of events leading up to the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers had focused on the April 12 decision by the Belgian government to pull out its peacekeeping contingent. According to a seminal 2002 book, "A Problem from Hell," by Samantha Power, currently U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Secretary of State Warren Christopher "agreed to back Belgian requests for a full UN exit." In fact, the new documents make clear that the White House was already advocating a pullout of UNAMIR before the Belgian decision.

Previously published documents show that highest-level U.S. attention to Rwanda peaked on April 11 when President and Mrs. Clinton visited the State Department task force in charge of evacuating American citizens to congratulate them on finishing their job. That day, according to the diary of State Department official Prudence Bushnell, the "NSC requested IO to draft resolution to pull UNAMIR" meaning that Clarke had tasked the International Organizations bureau in State to push the pullout.

The documents show that White House officials kept asking about the safety of a single Rwandan human rights activist, Monique Mujawamariya, who had met President Clinton in December 1993. The only other high-level U.S. attention to the Rwandan disaster in the first month was a discussion added at the last minute to a planned April 29 Deputies Committee meeting, but taking up only 15 minutes. Hand-written notes by Clarke's deputy, Susan Rice, from subsequent interagency meetings on Rwanda throughout May show that the crucial early decision for pullout of most of the UN force left few policy options thereafter for any international actors, even as the scale of the genocide became clear.

The first indication in the new White House documents of any consideration other than terminating the UN mission did not come until April 19, when NSC staffer Eric Schwartz wrote Susan Rice and Don Steinberg that Human Rights Watch was pleading with him to oppose a quick pullout because the remaining peacekeepers were "protecting thousands (25,000?) Rwandans and if they pull out, the Rwandans will quickly become victims of genocide. Is this true? If so, shouldn't it be a major factor informing high-level decision-making on this issue? Has it been?"


White House email from Eric Schwartz to Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg warning of possible genocide, April 19, 1994, newly declassified by the Clinton Library in response to National Security Archive request.

But in the context of political restrictions on U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping, and the post-Somalia mindset in Washington, the documents show that the protection of civilians was seen early on as an expansion of the mandate and thus to be avoided.

Long sought under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive and other genocide researchers including current U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, the new documents include dozens of e-mails between National Security Council officials Richard Clarke, Don Steinberg, Susan Rice, and Eric Schwartz, among others, hand-written notes by Rice from meetings on Rwanda, options papers and cables produced by the State and Defense Departments, and responses by national security adviser Tony Lake to staff queries.


Left: Redacted State Department "Bombshell" document, Right: Excerpts from cables reporting on the "bombshell" from Czech's Kovanda, New Zealand's Keating, UN's Annan, and UK's Hannay.

Rice subsequently told author Samantha Power, now the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, for her article in The Atlantic in September 2001 titled "Bystanders to Genocide": "There was such a huge disconnect between the logic of each of the decisions we took along the way during the genocide and the moral consequences of the decisions taken collectively. I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis again, I would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required." In the Obama administration, Rice and Power helped create the new Atrocities Prevention Board and argued in favor of intervention in Libya, a discussion in which "the ghosts of 800,000 Tutsis were in that room," according to news accounts.

White House and Clinton Presidential Library reviewers cleared most of the Rwanda documents to be released in full, but State Department reviewers arbitrarily censored some of the key passages on ostensible "foreign government information" grounds. For example, the cable from the U.S. UN mission to the State Department on April 15 titled "US drops bombshell on Security Council" has both its summary and the key body paragraph deleted as still classified, even though the governments of Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Czech Republic have all released their Security Council ambassadors' accounts of the "bombshell" - the U.S. call for total pullout.

"The State Department is covering up its embarrassment and shame, and damaging our national security, with these flagrant deletions," said Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive.

The documents are part of a long-term joint project between the Archive and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, to examine the international community's response and lack thereof to genocides including Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Darfur. Directed by the Center's senior advisor Michael Dobbs together with the Archive's documentation specialist Emily Willard, the project has already opened more than 20,000 documents on Rwanda from dozens of sources and countries, and organized the historic "critical oral history" conference on Rwanda hosted by The Hague Institute for Global Justice in June 2014.

 


DOCUMENTS RELEASED

Document 1 [NEW]
September 28, 1993
From: Madeleine Albright, US Mission to the UN
To: Secretary of State
Subj: "Rwanda and Criteria for New PKO"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

In this White House situation room memo, Madeleine Albright discusses the US position toward the French push for a UNSC Chapter 6 PKO in Rwanda, referencing Clinton's speech at the UNGA outlining criteria for US support of PKOs and timing of deliberations. The memo makes the clear linkage between supporting the French on Rwanda in order to keep French troops in Somalia.

Albright notes that "if we take the step of vetoing the French draft resolution, thereby forcing the French to maintain their battalion in Kigali, we can almost certainly write off the possibility of French troops remaining in Somalia."

 

Document 2 [NEW]
September 28, 1993
From: Secretary of State
To: US Mission to the UN
Subj: "Evening Notes 9/28"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0265

This cable from the U.S. Secretary of State to the United States Mission to the UN (USUN) reports on the proposed Rwanda peacekeeping mission in a section of the cable titled, "The NSC is Downbeat on a Rwanda Operation," it states:

"In an aside before this morning's HFAC briefing, Dick Clarke intimated that Rwanda may be the case the NSC is looking for to prove that the U.S. can say "no" to a new peacekeeping operation…if, as USUN reports, a Rwanda resolution has 10 votes in the NSC, we may have to say no with a veto."

 

Document 3
September 30, 1993
Subj: "Assessment: Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

This detailed intelligence assessment reports that conditions in Rwanda favor an "easily executed" peacekeeping operation (PKO); if properly executed, UN PKO has a high chance of success while a failure to provide a Rwandan PKO will lead to "regional instability adverse to US interests." The assessment continues that the proposed UN PKO is "inexpensive and uncomplicated, unlike other missions in Africa, including Somalia," while mentioning the "sometimes explosive" political situation.

 

Document 4 [NEW]
October 1, 1993
From: Richard Clarke and Susan Rice
To: Tony Lake
Subj: "Draft Message to General Quesnot on Rwanda Peacekeeping"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

In a memo from Richard Clarke and Susan Rice to Tony Lake, they propose a draft letter to General Quesnot, an advisor to French President Mitterrand. The memo accompanying the draft letter explains that even though UNAMIR has chance of success, the Security Council will be reluctant to agree since they don't want to say yes to every operation. The memo writes in underlined and bolded text that that "US troops will not participate."

The draft letter to General Quesnot also clearly indicates the linkage between the US supporting France's position on Rwanda, and keeping French troops in Somalia, "I understand that deployment of a UN force will permit France to withdraw its forces from Rwanda. I hope you can also tell the UN that the creation of a UN force in Rwanda can permit French forces to remain in Somalia beyond the end of the year."

 

Document 5 [NEW]
October 4, 1993
From: Susan Rice
To: Sandy Berger
Subj: "Rwanda"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

Susan Rice writes of a successful compromise between the Department of State and the Defense Department in which "JCS walked back from a cliff" regarding details about the UN peacekeeping mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) "agreeing to drop their insistence on unarmed observers rather than actual soldiers."

 

Document 6 [NEW]
April 8, 1994
From: National Photographic Interpretation Center
Subj: "Runway Blocked"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

This report from the National Photographic Interpretation Center reports that the runway at the Kigali airport is blocked, and that there are no roadblocks near the US Embassy in Kigali. This report indicates that the US had reconnaissance surveillance over Rwanda on the first day of the genocide.

 

Document 7
April 8, 1994
From: Paul Noterdaeme
To: Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes
Subj: [Security Council on UNAMIR]
Source: 1997 Belgian Senate Commission Inquiry into Rwanda

In this cable Belgian Ambassador to the UN, Paul Noterdaeme, expressed concern that UNAMIR was doing very little to protect Belgian civilians in Kigali. This cable makes clear that other UNSC members are not going to accept transformation of mandate from Chapter VI to Chapter VII. He writes:

"In any case, several permanent members of the Council have already informed me that the Council will not transform the present mandate of UNAMIR (peacekeeping) into a peace enforcement mission. The original mandate was meant to accompany a political process. Its collapse takes away much of the reason for maintaining this mission. Several western members of the Council, by the way, are questioning the utility of maintaining UNAMIR in the present circumstances."

 

Document 8
April 8, 1994
From: American Embassy Brussels
To: Secretary of State
Subj: "Claes Asks SYG for Change in UNAMIR Mandate; Ask for USG Views and Support"
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request

A "NIACT" ("night action requested") cable from the US embassy in Brussels to the Secretary of State in Washington reports on the Belgian Foreign Minister's call to the embassy to say that "Claes had spoken to UNSYG Butros-Ghali morning April 8 to urge that UN consider exchanging/extending mandate of UNAMIR: A) to protect people who should be in danger as remaining Rwandan politicians; and B) to assist foreign residents who need protection or wish to leave Rwanda in an evacuation."

 

Document 9 [NEW]
April 9, 1994
From: Richard Clarke
To: Donald Steinberg, et. al.
Subj: "Rwanda: Next Steps, for Sunday and Beyond"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

In a National Security Council (NSC) email from April 9 1994, Richard Clarke writes to Donald Steinberg and several other NSC officials about working to coordinate with the French to get American citizens out of Rwanda, and to terminate UNAMIR. He writes in a section titled "Terminating the UN Force":

"We make a lot of noise about terminating UN forces that aren't working. Well, few could be as clearly not working. We should work with the Frecnh [sic] to gain a consensus to terminate the UN mission."

 

Document 10
c. April 11, 1994
Subj: "[UNAMIR Troop Withdrawal]"
Source: Prudence Bushnell Personal Notebook No. 3, National Security Archive

Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell wrote in her personal notebook "NSC requested IO to draft resolution to pull UNAMIR."

 

Document 11 [NEW]
April 11, 1994
Subj: "Rwanda: Tutsi Military Poised to Attack"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

An intelligence report from a US government agency states that:

"A senior UN official privately has told Belgian, French, and US officials that the Secretary General believes the lightly armed UN force of 2,500, which already has suffered 16 killed, must be evacuated unless there is an effective cease-fire. It probably will continue to be attacked if it remains in Kigali after the evacuation."

 

Document 12 [NEW]
April 11, 1994
From: Richard Clarke
To: Donald Steinberg, et. al.
Subj: "Rwanda: Decision May Be Required"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

In an April 11, 1994 email from Richard Clarke to Donald Steinberg and others, he writes of the UN's plan to pull the UN peacekeeping force out, and that the UN may ask for US support in airlifting them out. Clarke asks for guidance on how to respond to such a UN request.

 

Document 13 [NEW]
April 11, 1994
From: Tony Lake (via Mary Emery)
To: Richard Clarke
Subj: "Re: Rwanda: Decision May Be Required"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

Tony Lake responds (via Mary Emery) to Richard Clarke's email "Rwanda: Decision May Be Required" on how to respond to the UN's request with the following: "Inclined to help. But decision should go to the Principals."

 

Document 14
April 12, 1994
From: Madeleine Albright, US Mission to the UN
To: Secretary of State
Subj: "TFRWOL: Future of UNAMIR and French Roles in Rwanda"
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request

Madeleine Albright writes that it appears that "relative calm has descended on Kigali" and it might be an opportunity to evacuate UNAMIR forces. She continues, "It is worth considering taking the lead in the Security Council to authorize the evacuation of the bulk of UNAMIR, while leaving behind a skeletal staff."

 

Document 15 [NEW]
April 14, 1994
From: MacArthur DeShazer
To: Tony Lake, et. al.
Subj: "Rwanda Update"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

MacArthur DeShazer writes to Tony Lake updating him on the unsuccessful attempts to "extract" seven American journalists from the Milles Collines hotel. Additionally, DeShazer reports on the future of UNAMIR:

"At the UN, Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to the Security Council informing them of the Belgian decision to withdraw from Rwanda, and stating that unless a similar contingent can be found UNAMIR's mandate will become 'untenable.' He further stated that he has asked his representative and force commander to draw up contingency plans for UNAMIR withdrawal. USUN estimates we do not have the votes on the UNSC to adopt a resolution formally terminating UNAMIR. As Dick Clarke might have told you from his teleconference yesterday, there will be a short delay while we seek a mechanism to terminate UNAMIR while attempting to maintain a UN political presence in or near Rwanda."

 

Document 16 [NEW]
April 15, 1994
From: US Mission NY (USUN)
To: Sec State, White House (Rice and Mozena), et. al.
Subj: "TFRWOL: US Drops Bombshell on Security Council - 4/15"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

In this State Department cable, reviewers redacted the "bombshell" that the US mission to the UN dropped on the Security Council-calling for the full withdrawal of UNAMIR troops. However, the US's decision to call for the withdrawal of UNAMIR troops was previously released by several other governments last year in response to National Security Archive Freedom of Information requests and published on the Archive's website and in the critical oral history conference briefing book, "International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994," in June 2014.

New Zealand Ambassador to the UN, Colin Keating reported the "bombshell" in his April 15 1994 cable back to Wellington; Czech Ambassador to the UN, Karel Kovanda reported the information in his April 16 1994 cable; as did Kofi Annan in his cable to the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali on April 15; and David Hannay, the UK's representative on the Security Council in a report back to London (see below).

 

Document 17
April 16, 1994
From: David Hannay, UKUN
To: UK FCO
Subj: "Rwanda"
Source : United Kingdom Freedom of Information Request

In a cable from David Hannay, the UK's representative on the Security Council, he reports on Security Council meetings about the fate of UNAMIR:

"The US did not believe that there was a role now in Rwanda for the United Nations peacekeeping force. They supported the decision of the Belgian government to withdraw immediately…Walker underlined that the US opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda under the current conditions was firm."

Later, the Hannay describes a meeting after the discussions:

"Albright said that the US had been convinced by the Belgians. But they were also concerned that a wrong turn now in Rwanda would put an end to any possibility of US support for expanded peacekeeping elsewhere in Africa, particularly after the Somali experience."

 

Document 18 [NEW]
April 19, 1994
From: Eric Schwartz
To: Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg
Subj: "Pull-out of UNAMIR"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

National Security Council staffer Eric Schwartz writes to Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg on April 19th saying that "Human Rights Watch seemed to indicate that UNAMIR is protecting thousands (25,000?) Rwandans and if they pull out, the Rwandans will quickly become victims of genocide." He then asks in the email, "Is this true? If so, shouldn't it be a major factor informing high-level decision-making on this issue? Has it been?"

 

Document 19 [NEW]
May 16, 1994
From: United States Department of State
Subj: Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

This very detailed Department of State options paper makes it clear that the United States will not support strengthening UNAMIR on the basis of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25).

 

Document 20 [NEW]
June 14, 1994
From: Donald Steinberg
To: President William Clinton
Subj: "Points for POTUS with Members"
Source: Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278

This memo from Donald Steinberg relays talking points on Rwanda for President Clinton, saying Lake needs to approve language concerning Rwanda. Steinberg says: "I think it would do the President well to stand up himself and say that genocide has occurred in Rwanda. Period. He is in the unique position to break through the goobledy-gook that the rest of us are required to say. If he does it, it will make it seem like he himself is frustrated over the bureaucracy's inability to call a spade a spade — that would be a good thing..." Steinberg goes on to note the talking points, one of which crucially is: "We have every reason to believe that [acts of genocide have] [genocide has] occurred in Rwanda, as defined under the 1948 convention." If asked about obligations, Steinberg notes, "The Genocide Convention does not impose a responsibility on the part of any government to take any specific action."

 


DOCUMENTS RELEASED

DateOriginTitle / Subject AuthorRecipient(s)
12 July 1993National Security CouncilInfo Memo to LakeJennifer WardNorma Schillaci
2 August 1993National Security CouncilFive Imminent New U.N. Peacekeeping OperationsSusan Ricen/a
20 September 1993National Security CouncilDeputies Committee Meeting on African Peacekeeping IssuesSusan Rice, Nick Rasmussenn/a
28 September 1993National Security CouncilRwandaJennifer WardSandy Berger, Records, Records, Mary C. Emery, Wilma C. Hall, Knsten K. Cicio, Kathenne M. Veit, James W. Reed, William H. Itoh, Kristie A. Kenney, M. Brooke Darby, Richard A. Clarke
28 September 1993National Security CouncilRwanda and Criteria for New PKOMadeleine AlbrightWarren Christopher, POTUS, et. al.
29 September 1993National Security CouncilRwanda Peacekeeping OperationNick RasmussenSandy Berger et. al.
30 September 1993Intelligence Community Assessment: Peacekeeping Operations in Rwandan/an/a
1 October 1993National Security CouncilDraft Message to General Quesnot on Rwanda PeacekeepingRichard Clarke, Jennifer Wardn/a
2 October 1993National Security CouncilDraft Message from the President to Francois Mitterrand on Rwanda PeacekeepingRichard Clarke, Jennifer WardAnthony Lake
2 October 1993National Security CouncilRwanda UpdateSusan RiceSandy Berger
4 October 1993National Security CouncilRwandaSusan RiceSandy Berger
5 October 1993White House Situation RoomMessage from Clinton to MitterrandWilliam ClintonFrancois Mitterrand
6 October 1993Defense Intelligence Officer for AfricaNew Reports, Courtesy Copies for Your Infon/an/a
6 April 1994National Security CouncilCrosshatch ClearanceAllison WrightDonald Steinberg, MacArthur DeShazer, Dan Mozena
7 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda UpdateDonald SteinbergSusan Rice, Mary Emery, et. al.
7 April 1994National Security CouncilUpdate on Rwanda/BurundiDonald Steinbergn/a
8 April 1994United States Department of StateResponse to Belgian RequestMarc GrossmanAnthony Lake
8 April 1994National Security CouncilUpdate on RwandaSean J DarraghRichard Clarke
8 April 1994National Security CouncilUpdate on RwandaDonald SteinbergMary Emery
8 April 1994National Photographic Interpretation CenterRunway BlockedNPICLake, Berger, Soderberg, Fuerth, Clarke, Rice, Steinberg, et. al.
8 April 1994US Department of StateRequest for Department of Defense participation in joint US-Belgian-French evacuation of expatriates from Rwanda and for Department of Defense provision of appropriate air support on a non-reimbursable basisMarc GrossmanWilliam Itoh
8 April 1994National Security CouncilUpdate on KigaliDonald SteinbergTony Lake, Sandy Berger, et al.
8 April 1994National Security CouncilMonique Mujawamariya of RwandaEric SchwartzTony Lake, Sandy Berger, et al.
8 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda: New Report from UNRichard ClarkeMary Emery, Wilma Hall, et al.
9 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda: Next Steps, For Sunday and BeyondRichard Clarken/a
9 April 1994Central Intelligence AgencyRwanda Background to the Crisisn/an/a
9 April 1994Intelligence Community Rwandan/an/a
9 April 1994National Security CouncilReporting on MediaDonald SteinbergMary Emery, Wilma Hall, et al.
11 April 1994Intelligence Community Tutsi Military Poised to Attackn/an/a
11 April 1994National Security CouncilOur Actions on RwandaDonald Steinbergn/a
11 April 1994State DepartmentSituation Report No. 28, Situation as of 0545 EDT, 04/11/94David Pierce, Peter Petrihosn/a
11 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda: Decision May Be RequiredRichard ClarkeTony Lake, Sandy Berger, et al.
11 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda: Decision May Be RequiredRichard ClarkeTony Lake, Sandy Berger, et al.
11 April 1994National Security CouncilMonique Mujawamariya of Rwanda Eric SchwartzTony Lake
11 April 1994National Security CouncilMonique Mujawamariya: Followup MessageEric SchwartzTony Lake
11 April 1994National Security CouncilRE: Rwanda - Update (11:00 a.m.)Mary EmeryDonald Steinberg
11 April 1994National Security CouncilRE: Rwanda: Decision May Be RequiredMary EmeryRichard Clarke
11 April 1994National Security CouncilMonique Mujawamariya: Corrected InformationEric SchwartzAnthony Lake
12 April 1994National Security CouncilC-P-L lunch agenda -- 13 AprilNeal WolinJane E. Holl, Daniel Fried, et al.
13 April 1994National Security CouncilU.S. Support for Evacuation of Allies' from RwandaMacArthur DeShazerNeal Wolin
13 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda and Belgian AssistancePat BattenfieldRichard Clarke
14 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda UpdateMacArthur DeShazerAnthony Lake et al.
14 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda UpdateMacArthur DeShazerAnthony Lake et al.
15 April 1994US Department of State
TFRWOL: US Drops Bombshell on Security Council 4/15Madeleine Albright
Secretary of State [Warren Christopher]
19 April 1994National Security CouncilPull-Out of UNAMIREric SchwartzSusan Rice, Donald Steinberg
19 April 1994National Security CouncilSomalia UpdateSean DarraghRichard Clarke, Randy Beers
20 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda: Meeting with MoniqueDonald SteinbergMorton Halperin, Eric Schwartz et al.
20 April 1994National Security CouncilMONIQUEEric SchwartzDonald Steinberg
20 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda (Refugee Issue)Susan Ricen/a
21 April 1994National Security CouncilPCG RwandaSusan Ricen/a
25 April 1994National Security CouncilUSG Actions on RwandaDonald Steinberg
n/a
26 April 1994National Security CouncilRwanda and the UNRichard Clarken/a
27 April 1994National Security CouncilFor Berger: Add Rwanda to Somalia DCRichard ClarkeBerger
28 April 1994National Security CouncilThursday Morning Notes for Sandy Berger from GlobalRichard ClarkeSamuel Berger, Kristen Cicio
28 April 1994National Security Council***FOR CLEARANCE: Rwanda DC PaperRichard ClarkeDonald Steinberg et al.
29 April 1994National Security CouncilFor Sandy's Approval: Draft DC Summary [Somalia and Rwanda]Richard ClarkeSandy Berger
29 April 1994National Security CouncilDiscussion Paper: Deputies Committee on Somalian/an/a
29 April 1994National Security CouncilSummary of Conclusions of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia and Rwandan/an/a
30 April 1994National Security CouncilSaturday Notes for Sandy from GlobalRichard ClarkeSandy Berger; Mary Emery
1 May 1994National Security CouncilAdditional Actions on RwandaDonald SteinbergMary Emery, Richard Clarke, Susan Rice, et. al.
3 May 1994National Security CouncilSlightly Revised Kofi Annan MemoSusan RiceSandy Berger and Richard Clarke
3 May 1994National Security CouncilPeacekeepingand Peace Enforcement Options for Rwandan/an/a
3 May 1994National Security Council**URGENT FOR RICE** Rwanda TPSDonald SteinbergSusan Rice et al.
6 May 1994National Security CouncilSuggested Talking Points for VP's Meeting on RwandaSusan RiceSandy Berger
7 May 1994National Security CouncilUpdated Talking Points on RwandaSusan RiceSandy Berger and Tony Lake
9 May 1994National Security CouncilRwanda Options Papern/an/a
9 May 1994National Security CouncilRwanda [Handwritten Notes]Susan Ricen/a
12 May 1994National Security CouncilFORN Policy Team MTGTony LakePOTUS
13 May 1994National Security CouncilPCG - Rwanda [Handwritten Notes]Susan Ricen/a
13 May 1994National Security CouncilRwanda [Handwritten Notes]Susan Ricen/a
14 May 1994National Security CouncilSaturday Morning Notes for SRBRichard ClarkeSandy Berger
16 May 1994US Department of State
Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping Options in RwandaMarc GrossmanWilliam Itoh
23 May 1994OPS/NESAPrice and Availability Data for 50 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) for UN/UNAMIR Troops in Rwandan/an/a
31 May 1994National Security CouncilRwanda [Handwritten Notes]Susan Ricen/a
14 June 1994National Security CouncilPoints for POTUS with MembersDonald SteinbergJeremy Rosner et al.
16 June 1994Executive Secretariat Operations CenterFrench Proposal for Intervention in RwandaDeputy Secretary, US Department of State [Strobe Talbott]Dominique de Villepin
17 June 1994US Department of State
Points on Rwanda for the Secretary for Telcon with FM JuppeSecretary, US Department of State [Warren Christopher]Alain Juppe
17 June 1994US Department of StateFrance's Rwanda INitiative; Bosnia Peace Process (TELCON)Alain JuppeWarren Christopher
8 April 2015National Security Council***For 4:00 Meeting in PentagonRichard ClarkeTony Lake, Sandy Berger, et al
13 December 1993National Security CouncilUpcoming Issues in UNSCSusan RiceTony Lake, Sandy Berger, et al
24 May 1994National Security CouncilRwanda [Handwritten notes]Susan Ricen/a
31 May 1994National Security CouncilUNDPKO Rwanda 5/31 [Handwritten notes]Susan Ricen/a
c. May/June 1994White House/National Security CouncilRwanda: Daily Report [Memo for POTUS]Anthony LakeWilliam Clinton; Al Gore; White House Chief of Staff
12 May 1994National Security CouncilForn Policy Team MTGAnthony LakePOTUS

 

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