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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rumsfeld/Mr. Cheney
Mr. Buchen/Mr. Hills
Mr. Marsh/Dr. Wolhuis
General Scowcroft/Major McFarlane

FROM: James A. Wilderotter *JW*

SUBJECT: Reports requested by the Senate Select
Committee

The CIA has sent over for our review two reports requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities:

- o "Middle East Task Force Report,"
May, 1964 (The Nolting Report)
- o "Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements,"
December 1966, The Inspector General's
Survey (The Cunningham Report)

Abstracts of these reports are attached.

These reports are available for your review from the Duty Officer in the Situation Room. They are in an envelope marked "Nolting and Cunningham Reports."

I recommend that the CIA be directed to undertake whatever paraphrasing is necessary on the Cunningham Report, and that appropriate Select Committee Staff then be permitted to review that report at CIA. The Nolting Report, which summarizes and evaluates U. S. intelligence activities against ten specific Middle East nations, is still of extreme sensitivity, and I recommend that it be discussed in general terms only with Senators Church and Tower. I would appreciate it if you would review these reports and complete the attached memoranda by COB Monday, May 12.

Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 93-9 #60 NSC 14-513/95
By KSH NARA, Date 6/19/95



WHOPus: Robert K. Wolthius files, subject series, b.2, f.1 "Intell Investigations - Church Can (1)." Declassified

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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements," December 1966, The Inspector General's Survey } *CONFIDENTIAL REPORT*
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 200-plus page report, including annexes and charts
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: The overall report is classified Top Secret, Handle via "Codeword" channels only; however, the Principal Findings, as well as large segments of the report are classified Secret.
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The report examines in exhaustive detail the cumulative effect of all collection requirements upon all means of collection within the Agency and concludes that CIA's conception of its job causes it to require too much, collect too much, publish too much, try to read too much--and end by understanding too little. The report blames the current community approach to requirements and collection for the information explosion and challenges the "more is better" assumption underlying the CIA Long Range Plan of 1965. Instead it calls for redefinition and refinement aimed at distinguishing between what is essential and what merely desirable. The report paints a generally dismal picture of the requirements and collection guidance picture, both within the Agency and throughout the community; however, it finds the work of the Collection Guidance Staff to be a small ray of hope. The report contains many suggestions for corrective action, and 27 specific recommendations, most of which are directed to specific Deputy Directors and call for better control and management.
7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 13 of 12 March 1975 request from Senate Select Committee
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Director of Central Intelligence
9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff

WHK:pas 1 Robert K. McWhinns Files, subject Series, b.2, f. "Total Investigations - Current Can (1)..."

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MR 938, #62 CIA Rk. 5/2/97
By KBH NARA, Date 10/15/97

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

APR 22 1997

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

None that will be of particular interest to the Senate Select Committee. The Principal Findings, Chapter II, The Problem of Priorities; II, Requirements for Collection by Human Sources, IV, Collection Guidance; and VIII, Responsibilities of Management, together with the titles of the remaining chapters could be provided to the Senate Select Committee at the Secret classification. It is considered unlikely that the remaining chapters will be requested, however, if that should occur, they could be edited to the Secret classification with no real loss of meaning.

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MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Middle East Task Force Report,"
May 1964. (The Nolting Report)
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: DCI/National Intelligence
Programs Evaluation (NIPE) Staff
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Report (22 pages) and "Statistic
Annex," pages unnumbered, but more than 100
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET "Codeword"
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The report is a "clinical
study" of U.S. intelligence prepared for the DCI pursuant
to a letter from President Kennedy of 16 January 1962. It
attempts to summarize, analyze and evaluate the total U.S.
intelligence effort directed against the Middle East countries.
It presents a number of conclusions based on analysis of manpower,
costs and other data contributed by Community agencies or
developed by the NIPE Staff, which were qualified because of
the incompatibility of the data used. The report, and especially
its annex, would probably be of current interest only to someone
engrossed in aggregate analysis. It clearly illustrates the
difficulties of doing a statistical study before the present
systems for collecting Community data were available.

The report concluded there was no need for significant
change in the substance, scope or organization of U.S.
intelligence programs in the countries analyzed. It was
observed, however, that the manpower ratio of collectors to
producers seemed to be too high, there appeared to be some
imbalance in finished intelligence, producers were relatively
inexperienced and lacked in-depth specialization, more
coordination of requirements seemed called for, and policy-
makers appeared to give insufficient time to consideration of
available intelligence information.

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II No. 8 of the 12 March
1975 request from the Senate Select Committee

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Director of Central
Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c) 1.6(d)(1)

MR 93-8, #61 CIA Mr. 5/12/97

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

By KBH, NARA, Date 10/15/97

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1.5(c)
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WH Ops; Robert K. Walthrus Files, Subject Series, b, 2, A: "Total Investigations - Central Com. (1)."

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9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: DCI/IC Select Committee
Coordinating Staff
11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEM:

It is doubtful that the report would be of any particular interest to the Senate Select Committee in today's world.

The Third Agency Rule probably applies to some of the statistical data provided in the annexes. If decision is made to release the report, the statistical annex should not be included.

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