In Attendance - Friday, July 9, 1976

Secretary of State Kissinger - Chairman

D  Mr. Robinson
P  Mr. Habib
T  Mr. Maw
M  Mr. Eagleburger
AF  Mr. Blake (Acting)
ARA  Mr. Shlaudeman
EA  Mr. Gleysteen (Acting)
EUR  Mr. Hartman
NEA  Mr. Atherton
INR  Mr. Saunders
S/P  Mr. Lord
EB  Mr. Boeker
S/PRS  Mr. Funseth
PM  Mr. Vest
IO  Mr. Lewis
H  Ambassador McCloskey
L  Mr. Leigh
S/S  Mr. Borg
S  Mr. Aherne
S  Mr. Covey
(The Secretary's Staff Meeting was convened at 8:21 p.m., Secretary of State Kissinger presiding as Chairman.)

MR. ROBINSON: Good morning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Good morning.

MR. ROBINSON: You have a memo recommending some action and position that I am to take at a meeting of the Export Administration Review Board that takes place at 10 o'clock this morning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You don't think I'd have that memo already, do you?

MR. ROBINSON: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not seen it, heard of it, now do I know what the subject is.

MR. ROBINSON: To export the Control Data Corporation computer.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can't expect me to take a position. You can't take a position. I just regret if our people can't produce their memos in time the Department can't take positions. We go through this at every Staff Meeting.

MR. ROBINSON: I think this memo was in the day before yesterday.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If it was, I didn't get it.
We'll have to reschedule the meeting or take no position. I will not -- I mean we made it clear a thousand times. I will not act this way. I will not just have things run by me this way. I don't know what this is all about.

MR. HABIB: There's a case of one similar to the Burroughs on the computer.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I regret it. We will have to tell them the Department of State is not ready, couldn't get its paper.

MR. ROBINSON: O.K.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's the only way we can have some discipline here. I have never seen this memorandum. It's never been brought to my attention.

MR. ROBINSON: Well --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It may be trivial, but it's no way to do business.

MR. ROBINSON: Well, we'll just take the position we have to get --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but then you have to make sure they don't take a position.

MR. BOSINSON: Yes. We'll have to block it if there's any move toward a decision.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know what this is all about. To whom is the export?

MR. HABIB: China.

MR. ROBINSON: It's to China. Well, it's to France; and then France will combine it with their six million dollar contract; but it has to do with the safeguards that would apply after the equipment is installed. It could be converted to strategic military purposes, and we have a NSSM -- a NSSM 246 and 247 -- that sets out the requirements we insist upon after a similar sale -- after Russia and the Soviets accept it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, they'll never accept it.

MR. ROBINSON: They won't accept it. And the question is: Do you modify our rule? And our people have recommended we not modify the rule. It creates problems with France, who are determined to go forward.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the other hand, we told them on our visit to China that we would be understanding. You just have to hold this up. This is one of those things where the idiots went along just -- where was this done -- in NEA, at the Desk Office?

MR. LORD: I got this ten days ago. I can't...
imagine why you didn't get the memo. It's been staffed a long time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, by the time it leaves you, there are at least ten other people who have to see it.

MR. HABIB: It has gone to every Bureau.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My concern is not whether it's gone to every Bureau; my concern is whether it's gone to me. Most of these things I understand as well as the Bureaus. But this is a special case, and I don't know how many people have signed off. Most of them don't know about Chinese relations on this issue.

MR. ROBINSON: Well, we'll just hold off on it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have a very special problem with this, which you know.

MR. LORD: That's right, and that's why I suggest this option on the Burroughs case as well.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It cannot be handled routinely, and this sort of thing should be flagged to me right away. It's insane to get the bureaucracies locked in on something in which we may have a special requirement. Every department, I'm sure, now has taken
a position.

MR. ROBINSON: They are all agreed. I'll call Elliot Richardson and forewarn him.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a special problem here. He'll say he'll solve it on a trip to China. (Laughter.)

MR. ROBINSON: Well, I'll take care of it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but this cannot be handled routinely, to begin with.

MR. ROBINSON: Well, I signed off on it as soon as it came in to you, and I sent it in to you; and that was the day before yesterday.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That isn't the point. By the time you signed off, you have eight Bureaus who probably have worked on it -- plus every scion on an issue that has some additional complications. By the time they're all locked in, what do you expect me to do -- overrule the whole Government?

MR. ROBINSON: Well, I recognize the problem. You'll get it deferred.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but I don't know how to handle it -- particularly now -- in any event, no matter what happens -- with all the paperwork that's already
gone on.

MR. ROBINSON: We know the other agencies' positions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't give a damn. I mean they don't know anything. You guaranteed an Evans and Novak column out of this -- unless we go along with a consensus.

MR. LORD: You remember the Burroughs case. We suggested an option, and I think it applies in this case as well.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't remember it.

MR. HABIB: On the movement of ships and planes, it's underway -- mainly in today. It's shipped on the 12th.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Art?

MR. HARTMAN: There's some talk that Moro may resign today, which means that we won't have the interim government.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well then, what happens, technically?

MR. HARTMAN: Technically, it only falls on another Christian Democrat. The rumors are Andreotti, Cossiga -- although he denies any ambitions. Andreotti is,
certainly -- he expects to be called.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But can they form a government?

MR. HARTMAN: Well, I think this is the first step in the dance. They'll discuss program, and the key question will be whether or not the Socialists decide to join. If the Socialists don't join--in effect, they're going to have to go along and get a government that will exist really by everyone not voting against it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but if they do join, they can't get a program.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, if they do join -- at the moment, at least -- the Socialists are asking for Communist agreement to the program, at the least. Many in the Socialist group would like them actually participating. They fear they will be further weakened if they are accepting a tough economic program and the Communists are outside and not committed to it. But there are some Socialists who have apparently already started talking to Andreotti about the possibility of joining a program and putting it out publicly to the Communists without asking them to join it -- saying, "This is what we have to support to get the country out of its
economic difficulties, and this is a test of whether or not you are prepared to act in the national interest."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Supposing they say yes?

MR. HARTMAN: If they say yes and the government goes ahead and that's the understanding with the Socialists, you in effect have an understanding that they are there by the sufferance, by the Communists having said yes.

I think that's really the minimum that you can expect. Otherwise the other alternative is that they will have some deal that nobody knows about that hasn't worked out behind the scenes -- where probably some payoff has been made on the Communists in terms of positions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why did the Communists get the Speakership?

MR. HARTMAN: To represent their No. 2 position in the vote. Probably some of them thought it's the least way to pay them off.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But they've had the No. 2 position in the vote for 20 years.

MR. HARTMAN: Not with the size of the two parties now. They would have to have either that or some committee Chairmanships, and I suppose they felt that
the head of the House, although somewhat prestigious, was less difficult in terms of getting programs.

I've sent up to you a message to send out to all people. He thinks something more will happen, and Puerto Rico has been told about it. I've sent both messages about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's have it then.

MR. HARTMAN: But the trouble is that the Italians have come back interpreting what did or did not happen -- saying that, in effect, since they want to be informed on the subject of Communist participation, there was sort of a tacit understanding that it would be all right. So my cable answers that quite clearly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What cable? When are we going to go to the Turks with this?

MR. HARTMAN: We're waiting for Bitsios to send it back to us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In your mind he told us that if Makarios agreed, he would agree. Now, we've gotten Makarios' agreement. Now we go back to Bitsios. Then he'll say it ought to go back to Makarios.

MR. HARTMAN: Bitsios hadn't gotten the word yet
from the Cypriots, and there's also some confusion because you have the two levels of maps now—and it's better to have Bitsios clearly understand that this is because he never heard about the second level of map that he discussed only with the Cypriots.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have news for you. I haven't heard about the second level of maps either.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, the one is getting on the table, no matter how unrealistic it is. The second is the map they give to you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to get into that game. The second one—I'm not—

MR. HARTMAN: That's why I want to get Bitsios to come back to us and say O.K. to go to the Turks. He hasn't done that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The only one I'm interested in is the first level of maps.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, if we don't—

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'm not going to let Makarios suck me into putting something forward in which he can then start riots in Nicosia.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, first, we obviously have to get some map on the table. It's certainly not going to be a
realistic one. So that is the first stage.

Well, if we don't hear by the end --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If he gives me a realistic map, 23 percent, then what do I do?

MR. HARTMAN: Well, it can't be that.

"Realistic" has got, at least, to be what he said privately to us. That's the whole point of it being realistic.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are two maps on the table. That's the second stage.

MR. HARTMAN: O.K.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is not a substitute.

MR. HARTMAN: Since we've given him plenty of time now to come back to us, I'll get a message up to him --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What did Kubisch ask him though about the -- about the private map, or the --

MR. HARTMAN: No, no. Kubisch asked him whether or not it was all right for us to go to the Turks. He did not make a distinction between these two things. He told us maybe the reason --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look -- you guys are playing a game again. It's the first one I'm interested in; it's the second one you're interested in. I want to get
the goddam talks started again. I don't give a damn about getting myself into the middle of this. I didn't understand we had mixed these two things up. I know what I said to Christophides. I have to keep him in place. I've handled negotiations before.

MR. HARTMAN: Yes. The Greeks don't know about this. The Greeks have heard something from the Cypriots which is different from what they have heard from us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I told Christophides if he ever gets serious he can give me a private proposal. That has nothing to do with starting the communal talks on the basis of something we've been talking about for two months. And if you now channel everything into this other one, they're going to put me in the middle as a mediator and we're going to have riots in Ankara and Nicosia when they're still 20 miles apart.

I don't understand why -- because he agreed to it once before, saying the only thing they depended on was what Makarios said.

MR. HARTMAN: I think the reason he hasn't come back is because he's been hearing something different from Nicosia. And when he hears something different from Nicosia, he gets very cautious.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: And from Kubisch?

MR. HARTMAN: No. Kubisch didn't even know about this, so he shows a certain amount of confusion.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn't know about it, so why should Kubisch know? I didn't know people had operated something that we had kicked around in my office into a formal proposal.

MR. HARTMAN: Look -- we had never put it forward as a proposal. Makarios apparently likes it very much.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The only thing I want is to see whether the Greeks would put forward their absurd proposal so we can go to the Turks and get their absurd proposal.

Now, that's not a hard problem to handle. We've been working on it for eight weeks.

MR. HARTMAN: Makarios would give you something which would put the monkey on your back. He did not then give a clear signal to the Greek Government that he would put forward a map.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you don't think I'm going to put forward a map, no matter what he tells me privately, and get every American Greek marching down
Pennsylvania Avenue.

MR. HARTMAN: That's right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I told Christophides I would never do it. I never told them I would do it when they were 20 percent apart.

MR. HARTMAN: But when he sees an opportunity he takes it. He's not given his word to the Greek Government that he will put a map on the government.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can force you to clear up what the issue is so that everybody knows he's talking about the same thing. We want everybody to agree to put forward a map on the next session. That's not a hard concept to get across.

MR. HARTMAN: Right. Probably we will not get Turkish agreement to do that, but perhaps they will put forward more precise criteria.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If they don't, I have come to the conclusion nobody wants an agreement anyway. So I just don't want to get myself or the U. S. into the middle of something that all the parties have decided is going to fail. There's no will to an agreement anywhere --

MR. HARTMAN: That's right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- but we do have to make
some procedural efforts, which are getting screwed up in a way that is incomprehensible. We've got the Greeks agreeing to put forward a proposal, right?

MR. HARTMAN: The Greek Government in Athens, yes -- but they say they cannot commit the Cypriot Government until they hear from them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You don't think the human language can be constructed to get a yes or no answer from the other places within 24 hours and say, "We want to know this"?

This is where I started with Waldheim -- when was it? -- six weeks ago. And here we are waffling around six weeks later when all we needed was to get a yes or no.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, I'm just telling you what happened.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but what did we do when we got the confusing telegram?

MR. HARTMAN: We asked Kubisch to go back in and say: "Wouldn't the Cypriot Government put a map on the table to begin the negotiations?" And we needed that. O.K.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And Bitsios said, "Why don't you ask the Cypriot Government?"
MR. HARTMAN: No. Bitsios said, "I must ask the Cypriot Government" -- which he did.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right. Now what is he saying?

MR. HARTMAN: Now he's got the question again, and he hasn't answered us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And what did -- I understand Makarios said yes.

MR. HARTMAN: He said yes to give you a map.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And at that point, when it was clear there was confusion, what did we do?

MR. HARTMAN: We --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We said: "Yes, there is confusion."

MR. HARTMAN: No, no.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, why don't we go back to Makarios? All I want is to get this thing cleared up? Is that beyond our technical capability?

MR. HARTMAN: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All we want is a clear question to Makarios already, telling him what we said to Christophides -- telling him we can't do anything until there are maps on the table and until they have
explained their position. I have explained to Christofides at great length why we couldn't do anything.

MR. HARTMAN: All right. Let me just see whether I can get something out of Bitsios today.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You also have to get something out of Makarios.

MR. HARTMAN: No. Bitsios will not answer us until he's gotten Makarios' approval. They're the ones that have the maps on the table. We started off with him. He then had to get the Greek Cypriots to agree. Then we were going to go to the Turks, and they were going to put something on the table.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but all of this has been taking weeks.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, we're not out of phase with Waldheim because he's just sending his man around; and that's just beginning now as a preparation to see whether he'll call me.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Art, can we get an answer?

MR. HARTMAN: Yes.

MR. SAUNDERS: On the Foreign Research Institute
question which we discussed with the university presidents in April, they have had some considerable staff work done since --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'm having lunch with them on Monday. Can I get something on it?

MR. SAUNDERS: Yes. We will have a memo for you today, so you will have it over the weekend to read.

They have done a survey of the universities now. They've pictured the problems as closer to ten men rather than four -- which raises the question whether the long-term problem can be resolved with existing authority. They will propose that we try in the next year to not use HEW money over the short term, but over the longer term I think they'll seek money from the Congress.

Then the question will again be: Which Administration is best able to administer HEW?

There's even now something from the National Science Foundation. At least, we've now had some harder figures than we've had before. This is a step forward. This is what they'll be presenting to you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. Jim?
MR. BLAKE: Only warm words continue between the Kenyans and the Ugandans, but there's no sign of military activity.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Sam?

MR. LEWIS: The debate will start this afternoon. We will not speak before Monday or Tuesday at the earliest, Mr. Secretary. The Kenyan Foreign Minister is now in New York, and there are indications that he's going to hit the Ugandans fairly hard when he speaks. There's a dispute about how you list this whole affair on the agenda with the Africans insisting on the word "aggression" on the agenda.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How many votes do they need -- nine?

MR. LEWIS: They need nine.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can they get it?

MR. LEWIS: If we can hold seven sympathetic to our draft, that blocks the option. The odds are someone will block it before it's over.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So we don't have to veto.

MR. LEWIS: That's right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But then can't they come in with their own resolution then?
MR. LEWIS: Well, they've got their own resolution. What they can do is take some elements out of ours and make it sufficiently palpable to the Swedes or Panamanians and then block off some votes. Then we'll be back to the veto situation. And that's the game we'll play.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Monroe, what exactly is our legal position on this -- that this was a defensive act?

MR. LEIGH: Well, I think it's better to say it was a legitimate act, under international law, to protect the lives of nationals whose lives had been threatened by terrorist acts. Ultimately, that basis goes back to self-defense. But self-defense 2300 miles from your own territory isn't the best public-relations way to put it. So we have tried to play that down in the legal memorandum which we've prepared. But you may have to say it -- and when you get around to talking about the C-130s, the language we have within the agreement with Israel is "self-defense," but I think the legal basis --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When I have a press conference today I'm surely going to be asked about it -- probably by some Jewish correspondent who will accuse me of betraying
Israel, if I carry out what he’s starting—

MR. LEIGH: Well, the problem here is to
get ahead of the Israelis before they state their legal
position, it seems to me. Now, you could take the
line --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do I say if I’m asked
-- we don’t state our legal position -- or do I say if
they ask me: they received C-130s in conformity with
agreements with us?

MR. LEIGH: Well, we just say yes. Then the
next question will be: "What is your theory?" probably.
And I would simply say that the agreements contemplate
that certain actions can be taken under the rubric of
self-defense.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Turks can now defend
their people 50 miles from Turkey, but the Israelis can’t
defend their people 2300 miles from Israel?

MR. LEIGH: Well, if the Turks hadn’t sent in
the second wave, you would have had a good legal position
for it -- but the second wave destroyed it.

MR. HABIB: You can use somewhat the same argument.

MR. LEIGH: Here the Israelis got out fast.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was an international
agreement where the Turks were an international power.

MR. HABIB: We used the same argument -- basic self-defense for their security.

MR. LEIGH: We used it Mayaguez.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, no one was going to cut our economic aid. (Laughter.) Brademas hasn't gone this far yet.

MR. HABIB: In the case of Indonesia --

MR. EAGLEBURGER: You have to say our finding is the use of this equipment was not in violation of the agreement -- period.

MR. LEIGH: You can say that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Check with Congressman Wayne Hays. (Laughter.)

And what is the theory on the first one -- they were protecting their nationals?

MR. LEIGH: They were protecting their nationals.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I'm going to try to avoid taking a very firm position anyway.

MR. LEIGH: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you know whether the statement the White House is going to make today is on this issue?
(Addresses Mr. Eagleburger.)

MR. EAGLEBURGER: No; apparently it's not.

It's on the UN.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the UN vote.

MR. LEWIS: Had they decided to put that out?

AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY: No, they had not yet decided. Therefore, we're going to keep to your schedule.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They have not decided what to do is the long and short of it. At least, the White House Press Secretary doesn't understand. So we may find that they are going to hold a press conference.

AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY: I doubt that, very seriously. The only possibility I think is a statement by the President.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's the worst of everything. I'd rather have him have a press conference. That's the worst possible solution.

AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY: They were unable to give me a clear answer on what they were going to do. Their advice was: "Don't cancel the Secretary's press conference."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. My point is if in answer to a question at a press conference he says it's bad
enough -- because it just takes every European off the hook. They're going to let us vote alone and nobody is going to do anything. But if we put out a formal statement, then we are totally --

AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY: I would make that view known personally when you go there this morning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no intention of going there this morning.

AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY: You can do it by phone.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, I'll make my view known.

Roy?

MR. ATHERTON: You saw that Bhutto wants you to come to Kabul.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, how does Bhutto know that I'm going to Kabul? Just a minute -- how does he know? The old palaver factory was working.

(Laughter.) Well, how would he know that I'm even thinking of going to Kabul since all I have said to Mr. 'Nime' is that I would conceivably go to Kabul?

MR. ATHERTON: Because Bairoad was asked to brief Bhutto on your talks with Nime -- including that point.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: You know, it is reaching the point where I need a lawyer. You know, I read these things through very rapidly. I don't anticipate that you add to it 50 other pieces of information. Why was that a significant piece of information for Bhutto?

MR. ATHERTON: Well, Mr. Secretary, I don't know. I was not here. But I read the telegram when I came back and it was signed out by you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, but I just glanced at it to see if it was a correct summary of my conversation. I didn't read it as a legal brief.

You're absolutely right. I've got to do that from now on.

MR. ATHERTON: Well, in any case, if you were to go, Bhutto would have certainly raised it at some point.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if I cancel Kabul he'll think I cancelled it because I didn't want to go to Islamabad. I can't go to Islamabad without going to Delhi.

MR. ATHERTON: You can.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How?

MR. ATHERTON: Because you can put it in the
context of a trip to Tehran, and in recent discussions Pakistan
has really got two orientations in this -- very much in the
contest of Western orientation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I'm sure that would
be clearly understood in New Delhi. That's a self-evident
explanation.

MR. ATHERTON: It would be a problem, but it's
one you could manage.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's not as bad as
selling May 7th -- I'll grant you --

MR. ATHERTON: That's right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- but it's a clear signal.

MR. HABIB: There also is a considerable desire
for you to go to Singapore, Bangkok, and other places when you
go to East Asia. Now, that you might be able to combine,
if anything happens in the Philippines.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. There's no way I can
go to Islamabad, Singapore, and Bangkok and overfly
India. That wouldn't also be understood, because we weren't
going to another part of the world.

MR. HABIB: I wouldn't think you would want to do
Bangkok and Singapore, unless the Philippine agreement is
at a stage when you're going to go to the Philippines and
close it out. I would say forget about Singapore and Bangkok.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Does Sullivan understand this?

MR. HABIB: Well, Sullivan is still hopeful of getting an agreement by the end of July. Now, frankly, I don't see any chance of a snowball in hell for getting it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I don't see any sign that they're working on it seriously.

MR. HABIB: Oh, they're working on it. I've checked on it myself this week, and it's just that the Filipinos have produced a draft. They haven't even yet told us how much money is involved, and you're in the fourth week of negotiations. And that's the most significant element. They're holding back on it.

If they come up with a 700 million dollar package, plus other considerations which they've raised -- in which the military are just unwilling to give on it -- it's going to take a little while to force their hand. They may very well take the initiative. At this stage Sullivan still has some smoking out to do. He's not yet got the full Philippine position, so I don't know.
What do you think, Bill?

MR. GLEYSTEEN: It's impossible.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My strong position from the very beginning is Sullivan wanted this thing held over until after the election.

MR. HABIB: No, sir. It's just the other way. The military are now convinced that Sullivan will get an agreement by July and is going to sell them down the river. And you've got an element of suspicion in it, which means they're trying to drag their feet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's fine with me too.

MR. HABIB: Well, the only thing is -- you recall the President said to Marcos he'd like to have it by September --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can we find out from Sullivan what it is?

MR. HABIB: We sent a cable to Sullivan yesterday asking him just that question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K., good.

Harry?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: I think the signs are that the Videla Argentine Government -- this group of military --
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Could I see that Bhutto cable, incidentally? What is the principle on which I'm shown a cable? No possible operational significance -- is that it? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR MCCLOSKEY: Least need to know is the principle. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I got the wrong message from you, Larry, yesterday. The message I got was there was a definite decision not to have a press conference in the White House. That's what I got.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: The message I sent to the Secret Service was there apparently would be no press conference; there would be a statement.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's a total disaster.

Go ahead, Harry.

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: Well, let me just say that it looks very much that this group for Videla in Argentina -- the security forces are totally out of control. We have these daily waves of murders.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whom are the security forces working for though?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: They're working for themselves pretty much now.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but in what direction?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: It's what's turned into a very large-scale Mafia warfare between the security forces and the leftist urban guerrillas. We get our human rights constituents -- who, it sometimes seems to me, are the only ones we have -- clamoring after us all the time about Argentina, because they think it is another Chile -- but it isn't.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's worse.

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: It's totally different. The Chileans eliminated their opposition, really, in the first 24 hours; but nobody in Argentina is in control of anything. And this thing is a bad situation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what could be done if we wanted to do something --

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: I don't think there's anything we can do, frankly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- if they're out of control? I think we have to wait until somebody surfaces to get a handle on this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do the security forces work according to some theory? I mean do they have specific
targets?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: Yes. I think their theory is that they can use the Chilean method -- that is, to terrorize the opposition -- even by killing priests and nuns and others.

The problem is that they're up against a much tougher situation with the Chileans where the guerrillas are very well organized, very well armed.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But whom do the guerrillas get their support from?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: They're getting most of their support internally. They have a lot of middle-class supporters.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But where do they get their arms from?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: They got their arms from killing people and building a very large war chest.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but what is their basic orientation?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: There are two groups -- the ERP and the Montoneros. The ERP are Trotskyites --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's a great choice we have.

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: -- really.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: But if these guerrillas are so powerful that even even something doesn't put them down, what are they screaming about -- that they can terrorize and kidnap?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: That's exactly right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean what is it that should be done? -- because, clearly, these movements aren't going to stop their kidnapping; are they?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: No, not at all.

I think the difference between the two countries has to be explained -- the difference between these situations -- and the fact is that we can really do nothing at the moment about this situation, I think.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But even if we could, what would we do? Wouldn't the operational consequence of telling the government to lay off be that the terrorists take over -- if the situation is as you've described it?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: Yes; and I also think that telling them to lay off is fruitless, because the people who are doing it -- they have no real control of it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's the position. But it isn't just mindless terror either, is it?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: No -- although it descends to that
level at times.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But on both sides.

MR. SHLAUDENMAN: Very much so. The terror -- the guerrillas are using these bombs increasingly, if you say the story about the police chief's daughters' best friend who put the bomb under his bed and blew him up.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What was she doing in his bedroom? (Laughter.)

MR. HABIB: She had gone to study. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you want to do a memo for me --

MR. HABIB: I will.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- giving me the breakdown of the various groups so that I understand what I am reading?

MR. HABIB: I will.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Does EA have anything?

MR. GLEYSTEEN: Nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I like quiet Bureaus. (Laughter.)

MR. GLEYSTEEN: I might just say one thing on the
Olympic issue. The Taiwan authorities, according to the press, have made a statement which may help -- saying that they will accommodate to whatever the International Olympic Committee says about their nomenclature. But I'm not sure precisely how far they'll go without your help.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What should I say when I'm asked about this today?

MR. GLEYSTEEN: I think you should say what we have been saying -- which is that the issue is not one of states, that we hope it will be possible for athletes to participate.

MR. HABIB: Well, also, that the matter is one between the International Olympic Committee and the Canadians and it's being dealt with in that context -- that it's not a subject that we have to make a decision on.

This has always been done in this way in previous Olympics. It's handled by an international committee.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But isn't there a case where the government objected to decisions by the Olympic committee?

MR. GLEYSTEEN: I don't think so. The previous case was where the Olympic committee sat in the room. The
Olympic committee itself set the rule. And this time it's the Canadian Government. I think it's unprecedented.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What happened in '72?

MR. GLEYSTEEN: In '72 there was no problem.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did the Chinese complain in Ottawa?

MR. GLEYSTEEN: The Chinese complained in Ottawa very strongly over a long period of time -- several months.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K.

(Whereupon, at 9:00 a.m., the Secretary's Staff Meeting was adjourned.)