



EX0 SS/ID

[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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DIST 8 SEPTEMBER 1973

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[REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

[REDACTED]

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1. [REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

2. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE NAVY IS SCHEDULED TO INITIATE A MOVE TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT SALVADOR A L L E N D E IN VALPARAISO AT 01 30 A.M. ON 10 SEPTEMBER. [REDACTED] THAT THE AIR FORCE (FACH) WOULD SUPPORT THIS NAVY INITIATIVE AFTER THE NAVY TAKES A POSITIVE ACTION, SUCH AS

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

TAKING OVER THE PROVINCE OF VALPARAISO, ISSUING AN ULTIMATUM DEMANDING ALLENDE'S RESIGNATION, OR THREATENING TO MOVE AGAINST SANTIAGO [REDACTED] NOTED THAT ADMIRAL JOSE M E R I N O, COMMANDER OF THE FIRST NAVAL ZONE IN VALPARAISO, IS ATTEMPTING UNSUCCESSFULLY TO DELAY THIS ACTION UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER WHEN HE EXPECTS TO BE NAMED AS NAVY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (CINC).

3. [REDACTED] THAT AFTER THE NAVY TAKES A POSITIVE ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, THE FACH WILL MOVE TO SILENCE ALL GOVERNMENT RADIOS. AT THE SAME TIME THE FACH PLANS TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK USING EXISTING OPPOSITION RADIO STATIONS SUCH AS RADIOS BALMacedA, MINERIA AND AGRICULTURA.

1.5 (C)

4. [REDACTED] THAT FACH CINC GENERAL GUSTAVO L E I G H HAS CONTACTED ARMY CINC GENERAL AUGUSTO P I N O C H E T ON THIS MATTER, AND PINOCHET HAS SAID THAT THE ARMY WILL NOT OPPOSE THE NAVY'S ACTION. [REDACTED] BELIEVES THAT ARMY UNITS WILL JOIN IN THE COUP AFTER THE FACH LENDS ITS SUPPORT TO THE NAVY. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE ARMY GENERALS WOULD ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE NAVY AND FACH EFFORT TO OVERTHROW ALLENDE. GENERAL LEIGH, HOWEVER, PLANS TO CONTINUE HIS CONTACT WITH PINOCHET AND OTHER ARMY GENERALS THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF 8-16

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SEPTEMBER.

5. [REDACTED] THAT GENERAL ARTURO YOVANICH OF THE CARABINEROS (UNIFORMED NATIONAL POLICE), HAS PROMISED TO SUPPORT THE COUP AND HAS GUARANTEED THE SUPPORT OF THE CARABINERO NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS SCHOOL, THE SPECIAL SERVICES GROUP AND THE PALACE GUARDS. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND ALLENDE'S RESIDENCE, BUT WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE CARABINEROS, THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE ABLE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THESE STRATEGIC LOCATIONS. 1.5 (C)

6. [REDACTED] THAT A COUP COULD OCCUR ON 18 SEPTEMBER OR AT LEAST DURING THE WEEK OF 18 SEPTEMBER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD STOP A COUP ATTEMPT. [REDACTED] THAT IF ALLENDE RESIGNS, CALLS A

PLEBISCITE OR ANNOUNCES THE FORMATION OF AN ALL MILITARY CABINET, THIS COULD LEAD TO A POSTPONEMENT IN THE NAVY'S PLANS. [REDACTED] 1.5 (C)

THAT ADMIRAL MERINO, WHO IS WELL RESPECTED BY JUNIOR NAVAL OFFICERS IN VALPARAISO, MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THE PLOTTERS IN VALPARAISO TO DELAY THEIR PLANS FOR SEVERAL DAYS.

7. [REDACTED] COMMENT: PRESIDENT ALLENDE IS UNQUESTIONABLY CONFRONTED WITH THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT FROM THE ARMED FORCES TO HIS CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE SINCE HIS ELECTION THREE YEARS AGO. AT THE SAME TIME IT HAS

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TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL HAS SOME ROOM TO MANEUVER. HE COULD THROW OFF THE TIMING OF THE PLOTTERS OR STOP THEM COMPLETELY BY AN INITIATIVE ON HIS PART WHICH WOULD MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE ARMED-FORCES AND/OR THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. TO AVERT THIS PRESENT THREAT, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD TAKE SOME KIND OF ACTION ON 8 OR 9 SEPTEMBER. HE ALREADY HAS HAD ONE MEETING ON 8 SEPTEMBER WITH LEADERS OF HIS COALITION: AND ANOTHER IS SCHEDULED FOR 9:30 PM ON THE SAME DATE. ACCORDING TO RADIO PORTALES, NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT CRISIS DURING THE FIRST MEETING. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER OR NOT THE POPULAR UNITY LEADERS, ESPECIALLY THE SOCIALIST PARTY, WILL GIVE HIM THE SUPPORT NECESSARY TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE MILITARY/OPPOSITION. THUS, TIME COULD RUN OUT ON THE PRESIDENT, ESPECIALLY IF HE IS NOT AWARE THAT HE IS FACING A 15 SEPTEMBER DEADLINE. IT ALSO SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT AT A CERTAIN POINT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STOP A MOVE BY THE NAVY NO MATTER WHAT CONCESSIONS HE MIGHT MAKE, DEPENDING ON THE MOMENTUM THE COUP ACTION HAS DEVELOPED AT THE TIME HE MAKES HIS VIEWS KNOWN.

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