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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. This dispute arises out of the activities of the Claimant, Metalclad Corporation (hereinafter "Metalclad"), in the Mexican Municipality of Guadalcazar (hereinafter "Guadalcazar"), located in the Mexican State of San Luis Potosi (hereinafter "SLP"). Metalclad alleges that; Respondent, the United Mexican States (hereinafter "Mexico"), through its local governments of SLP and Guadalcazar, interfered with its development and operation of a hazardous waste landfill. Metalclad claims that this interference is a violation of the Chapter Eleven investment provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter "NAFTA"). In particular, Metalclad alleges violations of (i) NAFTA, Article 1105, which requires each Party to NAFTA to "accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security"; and (ii) NAFTA, Article 1110, which provides that "no Party to NAFTA may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ('expropriation'), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6". Mexico denies these allegations.

## II. THE PARTIES

### A. The Claimant

2. **Metalclad** is an enterprise of the **United States of America**, incorporated under the laws of Delaware. **Eco-Metalclad Corporation** (hereinafter "**ECO**") is an enterprise of the **United States** of America, incorporated under the laws of Utah. **ECO** is wholly-owned by **Metalclad**, and owns 100% of the shares in **Ecosistemas Nacionales, S.A. de C.V.** (hereinafter "**ECONSA**"), a Mexican corporation. In **1993**, **ECONSA** purchased the Mexican company **Confinamiento Tecnico de Residuos Industriales, S.A. de C.V.** (hereinafter "**COTERIN**") with a view to the acquisition, development and operation of the latter's hazardous waste transfer station and landfill in the valley of La **Pedraera**, located in **Guadalcazar**. **COTERIN** is the owner of record of the landfill property as well as the permits and licenses which are at the base of this dispute.

3. **COTERIN** is the "enterprise" on behalf of which **Metalclad** has, as an "investor of a Party", submitted a claim to arbitration under NAFTA, Article **1117**.

4. In these proceedings, **Metalclad** has been represented by:

**Clyde C. Pearce, Esq.**  
**Law Offices of Clyde C. Pearce**  
**1418 South Main Street**  
suite 201  
**Salinas**, California 93908  
USA.

**B. The Respondent**

5. The Respondent is the Government of **the United Mexican States**. It has been represented by:

**Lic. Hugo Perezcano Diaz**  
Consultor Juridico  
Subsecretaria de Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales  
Direccion General de Consultoria Juridica de Negociaciones  
Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial  
Alfonso Reyes No.30, Piso 17  
Colonia Condesa  
Mexico, Distrito Federal, C.P. 06149  
Mexico.

**III. OTHER ENTITIES**

6. The Town Council of **Guadalcazar, SLP**, is the municipal government of **Guadalcazar**, the site of the landfill project. While neither **Guadalcazar** nor **SLP** are named as Respondents, **Metalclad** alleges that **Guadalcazar** and **SLP** took some of the actions claimed to constitute **unfair** treatment and expropriation violative of **NAFTA**.

**IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

7. On October **2, 1996**, **Metalclad** delivered to Mexico a Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration in accordance with **NAFTA, Article 1119**, thereby instituting proceedings on behalf of its wholly owned enterprise, **COTERIN**, for purposes of standing under **NAFTA, Article 1117**. On December **30, 1996**, **Metalclad** delivered to Mexico a written consent and waiver in compliance With **NAFTA, Article 1121(2)(a)** and **(b)**.

8. On **January 2, 1997**, and pursuant to the **NAFTA, Article 1120**, Metalclad filed its **Notice of Claim with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes** (hereinafter "**ICSID**"),<sup>1</sup> and requested the **Secretary-General of ICSID** to approve and register its application and to permit access to the **ICSID Additional Facility**.

9. On **January 13, 1997**, the **Secretary-General of ICSID** informed the parties that the requirements of **Article 4(2)** of the **ICSID Additional Facility Rules** had been fulfilled and that **Metalclad's** application for access to the **Additional Facility** **was** approved. The **Secretary-General of ICSID** issued a **Certificate** of Registration of the **Notice of Claim** on that same day.

10. On **May 19, 1997**, the Tribunal was constituted. The **Secretary-General** of **ICSID** informed the parties that the Tribunal was "deemed to **have** been **constituted** and the proceedings to have begun" on **May 19, 1997**, and that **Mr. Alejandro A. Escobar, ICSID**, would serve as Secretary to the Tribunal. All subsequent written Communications between the Tribunal and the parties were made through the **ICSID Secretariat**

11. The first session of the Tribunal **was** held, with **the parties' agreement**, in **Washington, D.C.** on **July 15, 1997**. **In accordance** with **Article 21** of the **ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules** (hereinafter "the Rules"), the Tribunal **then**

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<sup>1</sup> Under **NAFTA, Article 1120(1)(b)**, a disputing investor may submit its claim to arbitration Under the **Additional Facility Rules of ICSID** provided that either the **disputing Party** whose measure is alleged to be a **breach** referred to in **Article 1117** (in this case, **Mexico**) or the **Party of the investor** (in this case, the **United States of America**), but not both, is a **party to the ICSID Convention**. The **United States Of America** is a **party to the ICSID Convention**; **Mexico** is not. Hence the **Additional Facility Rules of ICSID** appropriately govern the administration of these **proceedings**.

determined **that the** place of **arbitration** would be Vancouver, **British Columbia, Canada**.  
The parties **accepted that determination** by the Tribunal,

12. Numerous requests for production of **documents** were exchanged by the parties, some of which were **allowed**, and some of which were **disallowed**, particularly those that came later in the proceedings. **Through instructions** given by its **President**,<sup>2</sup> the Tribunal **issued** a ruling on **April 27, 1999**, relating to Mexico's April 14, 1999 Request for **Production** of Documents. The President of the Tribunal indicated that he **could** not, at that stage of the case, decide the extent to which the requested documents and **materials might** be relevant to the case, but ordered Metalclad **to produce** the documents at issue and **noted** that **Metalclad might** seek an award of costs related to the production should the requests **be adjudged** unreasonable or **improper**. No such finding **has been** made.

13. On September **10**, 1997, pursuant to NAFTA, Article 1 **134** providing for interim measures of protection and Article 28 of the **Rules** providing for Procedural Orders, Mexico filed a Request, for a Confidentiality Order seeking a **formal** order that the proceedings be confidential, **Metalclad filed its response** on October 9, **1997**. On October 27, **1997**, the Tribunal issued **a determination**, which in its material part reads as follows:

"There remains nonetheless a question as to whether there exists any general principle of confidentiality **& that would operate to prohibit** public discussion **of** the arbitration proceedings by either party. . Neither the NAFTA nor the **ICSID** (Additional

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<sup>2</sup> At **the first** session of **the** Tribunal, of July **15, 1997**, **the** parties agreed that the President of the Tribunal should have the power to **determine** procedural **matters**.

**Facility) Rules contain any express restriction on the freedom of the parties in this respect. Though it is frequently said that one of the reasons for recourse to arbitration is to avoid publicity, unless the agreement between the parties incorporates such a limitation, each of them is still free to speak publicly of the arbitration. It may be observed that no such limitation is written into such major arbitral texts as the UNCITRAL Rules or the draft Articles on Arbitration adopted by the International Law Commission. Indeed, as has been pointed out by the Claimant in its comments, under United States security laws, the Claimant, as a public company traded on a public stock exchange in the United States, is under a positive duty to provide certain information about its activities to its shareholders, especially regarding its involvement in a process the outcome of which could perhaps significantly affect its share value,**

The above having been said, it still appears to the **Arbitral** Tribunal that it would be of advantage to the orderly unfolding of the arbitral process and **conducive to the maintenance** of working relations between the Parties **if** during the proceedings **they were** both to **limit** public discussion of the case to a minimum, subject only to any externally imposed obligation of disclosure **by which** either of them may be legally bound".

14. On October **14**, 1997, **Metalclad** filed its Memorial. On December **17**, 1997, Mexico filed a Request for an Extension of Time for the filing of its Counter-memorial. Metalclad filed an Opposition to the requested extension, Mexico **filed** a Reply and Metalclad filed a Rejoinder, **On** January **7**, **1998**, the Tribunal granted Mexico's request for an extension and ordered that Mexico's Counter-Memorial be filed February 17, 1998.

15. On February 17, 1996, Mexico filed its **Counter-Memorial** without objection. Certain exhibits of Mexico's Counter-Memorial were filed May 22, 1996, and Mexico's **translations** of certain **exhibits** were filed with the Claimant on July 17, 1998 and with the Secretariat on July 20, 1998.

16. On **February 20**, **1998**, Metalclad filed a Motion for Sanctions regarding **Mexico's** "untimely" filing of its **Counter-Memorial**. **Metalclad** objected to **Mexico's** failure to



submit translations of **all** pertinent documents with the **Counter-Memorial** on the date due and set by previous Order of the **Arbitral Tribunal**. **Mexico** filed an Opposition to the **Motion** for Sanctions, to which Metalclad filed a **Reply** and Rejoinder, to which Mexico filed an additional **Opposition**. On **March 31, 1998**, the Tribunal denied Metalclad's **Motion** for Sanctions and **stated** that **non-acceptance** of the Counter-Memorial **and/or** the exclusion of certain documents from consideration would be excessive under the circumstances. The Tribunal further stated that it had been "unable to **identify** significant, if any, harm suffered by the Claimant by **reason of the delay** in the filing of the translations."

17. On April 6, 1998, Metalclad filed a **Request to Submit** a Reply to Mexico's **Counter-Memorial**, to which Mexico filed an Opposition. On **April 20, 1998**, the Tribunal granted Metalclad's Request to Submit a Reply, **and** ordered **Metalclad** to file the same by June 30, 1998. In its Order, the Tribunal noted that the date for Mexico's Rejoinder would be set **after** the Tribunal had **considered** the Reply.

18. On June 22, 1998, Metalclad filed a Motion for Additional **Time** to **File** its Reply, to which Mexico filed a Response. On **June 29, 1998**, the Tribunal granted Metalclad's **Motion** for Additional Time and ordered the Reply to be filed August 6, 1998. On **July 28, 1998**, the Tribunal granted the Claimant's request for a further extension of the time **period** for filing its Reply until August **21, 1998**.

19. On **August 21, 1998**, Metalclad filed its Reply **without** objection, Transcriptions of portions of the American **Appraisal** Associate's ("**AAA**") Expert Report were **filed**

September **3, 1998**. Translations of the **Reply** were filed September **22, 1998** and translations of the AAA **Expert Report** were filed September 28, 1998.

**20.** On October 5, 1998, Mexico filed **Observations** regarding **Metalclad's** Reply, Metalclad filed a Reply to the **Observations**, to which **Mexico** filed a Reply. On November 13, 1998, the Tribunal denied Mexico's requests for **exclusion** of **certain** information submitted with the Reply and for the award of **costs** at that point in time. The Tribunal ordered Mexico to file its Rejoinder by March 19, 1999.

**21.** On **February 22, 1999**, **Mexico** filed a Request for an Extension of Time for the Filing of its Rejoinder. On March **4, 1999**, the **Tribunal** granted Mexico's Request for an Extension of Time and ordered Mexico to file the Rejoinder by **April 19, 1999**. In the same Order, the Tribunal set the **pre-hearing** conference for the **marshalling** of the evidence for July 6, **1999** in Washington, **D.C.** The Tribunal also ordered the parties' **witness lists** to be filed by June **11, 1999**, together with an **outline** of **each witness's** testimony and an estimate of time for each party's presentation of its case and for the examination of **witnesses**. The Tribunal further set the hearing on the merits for August **30, 1999**.

**22.** On March **11, 1999**, Mexico filed a Request for Production of Documents. Metalclad filed a Response to Mexico's **Request**, to which Mexico filed a Reply. On April 14, 1999, Mexico then filed a **request** for an extension of one month in the time for filing its Rejoinder, On **April 16, 1999**, the Tribunal granted in part Mexico's Request for an **Extension** and ordered that the Rejoinder be filed by May 3, 1999. The Tribunal

further extended the time for the parties to submit their **marshalling** of the evidence briefs to June 18, 1999. On May 3, 1999, Mexico filed its Rejoinder.

23. During the **written** phase of the **pleadings**, **statements** from the following persons were **submitted** by the Parties: **by Mistalclad** - American Appraisal Associates, **Augustina Armijo Bautista**, **Kevin C. Brennan**, **Gustavo Carvajal Isunza**, **Francisco Castillo Ayala**, **Centro JURICI**, **Ramon Chavez Quirarte**, **Anthony Dabbene**, **Daniel de la Torre**, **Jorge de la Tone**, **Lee A. Deets**, **William E. Gordon**, **Javier Guerra Cisneros**, **Bruce h. Haglund**, **Jaime E. Herrera**, **Ambassador James R. Jones**, **Grant S. Kesler**, **Ariel Miranda Nieto**, **Paul Mirchener**, **T. Daniel Neveau**, **Herbert L. Oakes Jr.**, **Sandra Ray-Baucom**, **David Robinson**, **Sergio Reyes Lujan**, **Humberto C. Rodarte Ramon**, **Mario Salgado de la Sancha**, **Leland E. Sweetser**, **Anthony Talamantez**, **Mike Tuckett**, **Roy Zanatta**; by Mexico - **Luis Manuel Abella Armella**, **Sergio Aleman Gonzalez**, **Rene Altamirano Perez**, **Salomon Avila Perez**, **Antonio Azuela de la Cueva**, **Fernando Bejarano**, **Alan Borner**, **John C. Butler III**, **Julia Carabias Lillo**, **Juan Carrera Mendoza**, **José Ramón Cossio Díaz**, **Pablo Cruz Llañez**, **Kevin Bages**, **Jaime de la Cruz Noguera**, **Jose Mario de la Garza Mendizabal**, **Carla de Silva**, **Fernando Diaz-Barriga Martinez**, **Hector Raul Garcia Leas**, **Jorge Adolfo Herminosillo Silva**, **Francisco Enrique Hernandez Sanchez**, **Sergio Lopez Ayllon**, **Joel Milan**, **Pedro Medellin Milan**, **Hermilo Mendez Agullar**, **Angelina Nunez**, **Santiago Oñate Laborde**, **Rogelio Orta Campos**, **Jose Antonio Ortega Rivero**, **Praxedis Palomo Tovar**, **Officials of PRODIN**, **Leonel Ramos Torres**, **Ronald E. Robertson**, **Aurelio Romo Navarro**, **Juan Antonio Romo**, **Horacio Sanchez Unzueta**, **Leonel Serrato Sanchez**, **Ulises Schmill Ordonez**, **Marcia Williams**, **Ramiro Zaragoza Garcia**, **Mark Zmijewski**.

24. As permitted by NAFTA, Article 1128, Canada made a written submission to the Tribunal on July 28, 1999. Although Canada does not have any specific commercial interest in the dispute in this case, the submission addressed the interpretation of NAFTA, Article 1110 relating to expropriation and compensation. Specifically, Canada rejected Metalclad's suggestion that NAFTA, Article 1110 is a codification of the United States' position on the rules of international law regarding expropriation and compensation.

25. With the agreement of the parties, a hearing was held in Washington, D.C. from August 30, 1999 through September 9, 1999, at which both parties appeared and presented witnesses. The Tribunal directed that only those portions of the written submissions that were disputed were to be introduced at the hearing. Witnesses called by Metalclad for cross-examination were Julia Carabias Lillo, Horacio Sanchez Unzueta, Pedro Medellin Milan, Leonel Ramos Tones, Marcia Williams and John Butler III; witnesses called for cross-examination by Mexico were Grant S. Kesler, Gustavo Carvajal Isunza, Anthony Dabbene, Lee A. Deets and Daniel T. Neveau.

26. The Tribunal posed questions to the parties, which were addressed by the parties in their post-hearing briefs submitted on November 9, 1999. Full verbatim transcripts were made of the hearing and distributed to the parties.

27. As permitted by NAFTA, Article 1128, the United States made a written submission to the Tribunal on November 9, 1999. Although the United States does not have any specific commercial interest in the dispute, in this case, the submission set forth the United States' position that the actions of local governments, including

municipalities, are subject to NAFTA standards, The United States also submitted that the NAFTA, Article 1110, term "tantamount to expropriation" addressed both measures that directly expropriate and measures tantamount to expropriation that thereby indirectly expropriate investments. The United States rejected the suggestion that the term "tantamount to expropriation" was intended to create a new category of expropriation not previously recognized in customary international law.

## V. FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS

### A The Facilities at Issue

28. In 1990 the federal government of Mexico authorized COTERIN to construct and operate a transfer station for hazardous waste in La Pedrera, a valley located in Guadalucazar in SLP. The site has an area of 814 hectares and lies 100 kilometers northeast of the capital city of SLP, separated from it by the Sierra Guadalucazar mountain range, 70 kilometers from the city of Guadalucazar. Approximately 800 people live within ten kilometers of the site.

29. On January 23, 1993, the National Ecological Institute (hereinafter "INE"), an independent sub-agency of the federal Secretariat of the Mexican Environment, National Resources and fishing (hereinafter "SEMARNAP"), granted COTERIN a federal permit to construct a hazardous waste landfill in La Pedrera (hereinafter "the landfill").

**B. Metalclad's Purchase. of the Site and its Landfill Permits**

30. Three months after the issuance of the federal construction permit, on April 23, 1993, Metalclad entered into a 6-month option agreement to purchase COTERIN together with its permits, in order to build the hazardous waste landfill.

31. Shortly thereafter, on May 11, 1993, the government of SLP granted COTERIN a state land use permit to construct the landfill. The permit was issued subject to the condition that the project adapt to the specifications and technical requirements indicated by the corresponding authorities, and accompanied by the General Statement that the license did not prejudice the rights or ownership of the applicant and did not authorize works, constructions or the functioning of business or activities.

32. One month later, on June 11, 1993, Metalclad met with the Governor of SLP to discuss the project, Metalclad asserts that at this meeting it obtained the Governor's support for the project. In fact, the Governor acknowledged at the hearing that a reasonable person might expect that the Governor would support the project if studies confirmed the site as suitable or feasible and if the environmental impact was consistent with Mexican standards.

33. Metalclad further asserts that it was told by the President of the INE and the General Director of the Mexican Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (hereinafter "SEDUE")<sup>3</sup> that all necessary permits for the landfill had been issued with the exception of the federal permit for operation of the landfill. A witness statement

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<sup>3</sup>SEDUE is the predecessor organization to SEMARNAP.

**submitted** by the President of the **INE suggests** that a hazardous waste landfill could be built if **all permits required by the corresponding federal and state laws** have been acquired.

**34. Metalclad** also asserts that **the** General Director of SEDUE told **Metalclad** that the responsibility for obtaining project **support in the state and local community lay with** the federal government.

**35.** On August **10, 1993**, the **INE granted COTERIN** the federal permit for operation of the landfill. On September **10, 1993**; **Metalclad exercised its** option and purchased **COTERIN**, the landfill **site** and the **associated permits**.

**36. Metalclad asserts** it **would not have** exercised **its COTERIN** purchase option but for the apparent approval and support of the project by **federal and state officials**.

#### **C. Construction of the Hazardous Waste Landfill**

**37.** Metalclad **asserts** that **shortly after its purchase of COTERIN**, the Governor of **SLP embarked** on a public campaign to denounce and prevent the **operation of the** landfill,

**36. Metalclad further asserts,** however, that in **April 1994, after months of negotiation, Metalclad** believed it had secured **SLP's** agreement **to** support the project **Consequently, in May 1994, after receiving an eighteen-month** extension of the previously issued federal construction **permit** from the **INE**, Metalclad began **construction of** the landfill. Mexico denies that **SLP's agreement or support had ever** been obtained.

39. Metalclad further maintains that construction continued **openly** and **without** interruption through October **1994**. Federal **officials** and state representatives inspected the construction site during this period, and Metalclad provided federal and state **officials** with written status reports of its progress.

40. On October 26, 1994, when the Municipality ordered the cessation of all **building** activities due to the absence of a municipal construction permit, construction was abruptly terminated.

41. Metalclad asserts it was once again told by federal **officials** that it had all the **authority** necessary to **construct** and operate the **landfill**; that federal officials **said** it should apply for the municipal construction permit to facilitate an amicable relationship with the **Municipality**; that federal **officials assured** it that the Municipality would issue the **permit** as a matter of course; and that the Municipality lacked any basis for denying the construction permit. **Mexico** denies that any federal **officials** represented that a municipal permit was not required, and **affirmatively** states that a permit was required and that **Metalclad** knew, or should have **known**, that the permit **was** required.

42. On November 15, 1994, Metalclad resumed construction and submitted an application for a municipal construction permit,

43. On January 31, **1995**, the INE granted **Metalclad** an additional federal **construction** permit to **construct** the **final disposition** cell for hazardous waste and other **complementary structures** such as the **landfill's administration** building and laboratory.

44. In February **1995**, the **Autonomous University** of SLP (hereinafter "**UASLP**") issued a **study** confirming **earlier findings** that, although the **landfill site** raised **some**



concerns, with proper engineering it was geographically suitable for a hazardous waste landfill. In March 1995, the Mexican Federal Attorney's Office for the Protection of the Environment (hereinafter "PROFEPA"), an independent sub-agency of SEMARNAP, conducted an audit of the site and also concluded that, with proper engineering and operation, the landfill site was geographically suitable for a hazardous waste landfill.

**D. Metalclad is Prevented from Operating the Landfill**

45. Metalclad completed construction of the landfill in March 1995. On March 10, 1995, Metalclad held an "open house," or "inauguration," of the landfill which was attended by a number of dignitaries from the United States and from Mexico's federal, state and local governments.

46. Demonstrators impeded the "inauguration," blocked the entry and exit of buses carrying guests and workers, and employed tactics of intimidation against Metalclad. Metalclad asserts that the demonstration was organized at least in part by the Mexican state and local governments, and that state troopers assisted in blocking traffic into and out of the site. Metalclad was therefore effectively prevented from opening the landfill.

47. After months of negotiation, on November 25, 1995, Metalclad and Mexico, through two of SEMARNAP's independent sub-agencies (the INE and PROFEPA), entered into an agreement that provided for and allowed the operation of the landfill (hereinafter "the *Convenio*").

48. The *Convenio* stated that an environmental audit of the site was carried out from December, 1994 through March, 1995; that the purpose of the audit was to check the

project's compliance with the laws and regulations; to check the project's plans for prevention of and attention to emergencies; and to study the project's existing conditions, control proceedings, maintenance, operation, personnel training and mechanisms to respond to environmental emergencies. The **Convenio** also stated that, as the audit detected certain deficiencies, Metalclad was required to submit an action plan to correct them; that Metalclad did indeed submit an action plan including a corresponding site remediation plan; and that Metalclad agreed to carry out the work and activities set forth in the action plan, including those in the corresponding plan of remediation. These plans required that remediation and commercial operation should take place simultaneously within the first three years of the landfill's operation. The **Convenio** provided for a five-year term of operation for the landfill, renewable by the INE and PROFEPA. In addition to requiring remediation, the **Convenio** stated that Metalclad would designate 34 hectares of its property as a buffer zone for the conservation of endemic species. The **Convenio** also required PROFEPA to create a Technical-Scientific Committee to monitor the remediation and required that representatives of the INE, the National Autonomous University of Mexico and the UASLP be invited to participate in that Committee. A Citizen Supervision Committee was to be created. Metalclad was to contribute two new pesos per ton of waste toward social works in Guadalupe and give a 10% discount for the treatment and final disposition of hazardous waste generated in SLP. Metalclad would also provide one day per week of free medical advice for the inhabitants of Guadalupe through Metalclad's qualified medical personnel, employ manual labor from within Guadalupe, and give preference to the inhabitants of Guadalupe for technical training. Metalclad would also consult

with government authorities on matters of remediation and hazardous waste, and provide two courses per year on the management of hazardous waste to personnel of the public, federal, state and municipal sectors, as well as social and private sectors.

49. Metalclad asserts that SLP was invited to participate in the process of negotiating the *Convenio*, but that SLP declined. The Governor of SLP denounced *the Convenio* shortly after it was publicly announced.

50. On December 5, 1995, thirteen months after Metalclad's application for the municipal construction permit was filed, the application was denied. In doing this, the Municipality recalled its decision to deny a construction permit to COTERIN in October 1991 and January 1992 and noted the "impropriety" of Metalclad's construction of the landfill prior to receiving a municipal construction permit.

51. There is no indication that the Municipality gave any consideration to the construction of the landfill and the efforts at operation during the thirteen months during which the application was pending.

52. Metalclad has pointed out that there was no evidence of inadequacy of performance by Metalclad of any legal obligation, nor any showing that Metalclad violated the terms of any federal or state permit; that there was no evidence that the Municipality gave any consideration to the recently completed environmental reports indicating that the site was in fact suitable for a hazardous waste landfill; that there was no evidence that the site, as constructed, failed to meet any specific construction requirements; that there was no evidence that the Municipality ever required or issued a municipal construction permit for any other construction project in Guadalupe; and that

there was no evidence that there was an established **administrative** process with respect to **municipal construction permits** in the **Municipality of Guadalupe**.

53. **Mexico** asserts that **Metalclad** was aware through due diligence that a municipal permit might be necessary on the basis of the case of **COTERIN (1981, 1992)**, and other **past precedents** for various **projects** in **SLP**.

54. **Metalclad** was not **notified of the Town Council** meeting where the permit **application was discussed and rejected**, nor was **Metalclad** given any opportunity to participate in that process, **Metalclad's** request for reconsideration of the denial of the permit was *rejected*.

55. In December **1995**, shortly following the Municipality's rejection of **Metalclad's** permit **application**, the **Municipality** filed an administrative complaint with **SEMARNAP** challenging the **Convenio**. **SEMARNAP** **denied** the **Municipality's** complaint.

56. On January **31, 1996**, the **Municipality** filed an **amparo** proceeding in the Mexican courts challenging **SEMARNAP's** dismissal of its **Convenio** complaint. An injunction was issued and **Metalclad was barred** from conducting any **hazardous waste landfill operations**. The **amparo was** finally dismissed, and the injunction **lifted**, in May 1999.

57. On February 6, **1996**, the INE granted **Metalclad** an additional permit authorizing the expansion of the landfill **capacity from 36,000** tons per year to 360,000 tons per year.

58. From May 1996 through December **1996**, **Metalclad** and the State of **SLP** attempted to **resolve their issues with** respect to the operation of **the** landfill. These

**efforts** failed and, on January 2, **1997**, **Metalclad** initiated the present **arbitral** proceedings **against** the Government of **Mexico** under Chapter **Eleven** of the **NAFTA**.

59. On September 23, 1997, three days before the **expiry** of his ten, the Governor issued an Ecological Decree declaring a Natural **Area** for the **protection** of rare cactus. The Natural Area encompasses the area of **the** landfill. **Metalclad** **relies** in part on **this** Ecological Decree **as an additional element** in its **claim of** expropriation, maintaining that the Decree effectively and **permanently precluded** the operation **of** the **landfill**,

60. **Metalclad** also alleges, on **the basis** of reports by the **Mexican** media, that the Governor of SLP stated, that the Ecological Decree 'definitely **cancelled** any possibility **that exists of opening the industrial waste landfill of La Pedrera**'.

61. **Metalclad** also asserts that a high level SLP official, with respect to the Ecological **Decree and** as reported by **Mexican media**, **expressed confidence** in closing in this way, all possibility for the United States firm **Metalclad** to operate **its** landfill in this **zone**, independently of the **future outcome of its claim before the Arbitral Tribunals of the** NAFTA treaty?

62. The landfill remains dormant. **Metalclad** has not sold or transferred any portion of it,

63. Mexico denies each of **these media accounts** as they relate to the **Ecological** Decree.

64. **Mexico also maintains that consideration of the Ecological Decree is outside the** jurisdiction of **the** Tribunal because the Decree was enacted **after** the **filing of the Notice**

**of Intent of Arbitration. More particularly, Mexico argues that NAFTA, Article 11 19,** entitled "Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim", precludes claims for breaches that have not yet occurred, relying on the language in that Article which states that:

"The disputing investor shall deliver to the **disputing Party** **written notice of** its intention to submit a claim to arbitration at least 90 days before a claim is submitted, which notice **shall specify:**

\* \* \*

- (b) **The provisions** of [the NAFTA] alleged to have been breached and any other **relevant** provisions.
- (c) **The issues and factual basis for the** claim.

Mexico further **invokes** NAFTA, Article 1120 which requires that **six months elapse** between the events **giving rise to** a claim and **the submission** of the claim. On the basis of these two Articles, Mexico argues that a claimant **must** ensure its claim is ripe **at** the time it is filed. At the same time, **Mexico** does **not** exclude the possibility that amendments to a claim may be made. Rather, Mexico initially **asserted #at in order to** ensure fairness and **clarity,** amendment of a claim or the presentation of an ancillary claim within Article 48 of the Additional Facility Rules should be the subject of a **formal** application **and** the required amendment should be **stated** clearly. Later, **Mexico** adjusted **its** position in its **post-hearing** brief in which it argues that Section **B** of Chapter **Eleven does not** contemplate the amendment of ripened claims to include post-claim **events.** Mexico contends **that** Section **B** of Chapter Eleven **modifies** the Additional **Facility** Rules as regards the amendment of claims **and** the **filing of ancillary claims,** making Article 48 of the Additional Facility Rules inapplicable.

oo. **Metalclad's** position is that Mexico's analysis of Articles **1119** and **1120** is **artificial**, and that **the** six month rule merely sets forth **an** initial rule for claim **eligibility** designed to foster exhaustion of **pre-arbitral** methods of dispute resolution. In **support** of its position, Metalclad invokes **NAFTA**, Article **11 18**, which provides that disputing parties should first attempt to **settle** a claim through consultation or negotiation. **Metalclad** further adduces policy **reasons** in support of its right to base its claim on **acts** **occurring** after submission of its Notice of Claim. First, Metalclad argues that policies **related** to the administration of justice support its position. In particular, it argues that an inability to rely on post-Notice of Claim acts would deprive parties of redress **concerning** a period during which a State **might** be most inclined to disregard its treaty obligations. **Second**, **Metalclad** argues that **requiring** a claimant to forego or defer the airing of subsequent, related, breaches, **would** be **inconsistent** with NAFTA's stated **aim** of creating effective procedures for the **resolution** of **his** disputes. Such an interpretation, **Metalclad** suggests, would create **serious inefficiencies** by requiring the claimant to bring related actions **seriatim** and **that** these actions would be **subject to res judicata** principles to a Claimant's detriment. **Metalclad** also argues that injustice would result because claimants will choose, for financial and other reasons, not to start a fresh **NAFTA** action and **tribunals** would be **unable** to **consider** acts of bad **faith** occurring during the arbitration, Third, **Metalclad** maintains that **its view is** consistent with the **ICSID Arbitral Tribunal's** broad **jurisdiction**. **Metalclad** points out that **the texts** mentioned in **NAFTA**, Article **1120**, **allow** for amendment of claims and cites Article 48 of **the** Rules as **allowing** for incidental or additional claims **provided** that such claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement of the parties. **Metalclad** concludes that

**the policies underlying NAFTA, Articles 1119 and 1120, are fulfilled once the appropriate periods have passed prior to submission of the claim and that the Respondent is not prejudiced by the amendments, provided that they are made no later than the Claimant's Reply and that the Respondent is permitted a Rejoinder.**

66. The Tribunal accepts Mexico's contention that a case may not be initiated on the basis of an anticipated breach. However, the Tribunal cannot accept Mexico's interpretation and application of the time limits set out in the NAFTA. Metalclad properly submitted its claim under the Additional Facility Rules as provided under NAFTA, Article 1720. Article 1120(2) provides that the arbitration rules under which the claim is submitted shall govern the arbitration except to the extent modified by Section B of Chapter Eleven. Article 48(1) of the Rules clearly states that a party may present an incidental or additional claim provided that the ancillary claim is within the scope of the arbitration agreement of the parties.

67. The Tribunal does not agree with Mexico's post-hearing position that Section B of Chapter Eleven modifies Article 48 of the Rules. The Tribunal believes it was not the intent of the drafters of NAFTA, Articles 1119 and 1120, to limit the jurisdiction of a Tribunal under Chapter Eleven in this way. Rather, the Tribunal prefers Mexico's position, as stated in its Rejoinder, that construes NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Section B, and Article 48 of the Rules as permitting amendments to previously submitted claims and consideration of facts and events occurring subsequent to the submission of a Notice of Claim, particularly where the facts and events arise out of and/or are directly related to the original claim. A contrary holding would require a claimant to file multiple subsequent and related actions and would lead to inefficiency and inequity.



68. The Tribunal agrees with Mexico that the **process regarding amendments to claims** must be one that ensures fairness and **clarity**. Article **48(2)** of the Rules ensures such fairness by requiring that any ancillary claim be presented **not** later than the Claimant's Reply. In this matter, **Metalclad** presented information relating to the Ecological Decree and its intent ~~to rely on the Ecological Decree~~ as early as its Memorial. Mexico **subsequently filed its Counter-Memorial and Rejoinder**. The Ecological Decree directly relates to **the property and investment at issue**, and **Mexico has had ample notice and opportunity to address issues relating to that Decree**.

69. The Tribunal thus finds that, although the **Ecological Decree** was issued subsequent to **Metalclad's** submission of its claim, issues relating to it **were** presented by **Metalclad** in a timely manner and **consistently with** the principles of fairness and **clarity**. Mexico has had **ample opportunity to respond** and has suffered no prejudice. The Tribunal therefore holds that **consideration of the Ecological Decree** is within its jurisdiction but, as will be seen, does not attach to it controlling importance.

## VI. **APPLICABLE LAW**

70. A Tribunal **established** pursuant to **NAFTA** Chapter Eleven, Section **B** must decide the issues in dispute in **accordance** with **NAFTA** and **applicable rules of international law**, (**NAFTA Article 1131(1)**). In addition, **NAFTA** Article **102(2)** provides that the Agreement must be **interpreted** and applied in the light of its stated objectives and in accordance with **applicable rules of international law**. These objectives specifically include **transparency** and the **substantial** increase in investment opportunities in the territories of the **Parties**. (**NAFTA Article 102(1)(c)**). The Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1) provides that a **treaty** is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the **ordinary** meaning to be given to the **terms of the treaty in their** context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. The context for the purpose of the **interpretation** of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the **text**, including its preamble and **annexes**, any **agreement** relating to the **treaty** which was made between all the **parties** in **connection** with the **conclusion of the treaty**. (*Id.*, **Article 31(2)(a)**). There shall also be **taken** into account, together with the context, any relevant rules of **international law**, applicable in *the* relations between the parties. (*Id.*, **Article 31(3)**). Every **treaty** in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good **faith**. (*Id.*, **Article 26**). A State party to a treaty **may not** invoke the provisions of its internal law as **justification** for its **failure to perform** the treaty. (*Id.*, **Article 27**).

. . . .

71. The Parties to **NAFTA** specifically agreed to "ENSURE a predictable **commercial** framework **for** business planning and investment." (*NAFTA Preamble, para. 6 (emphasis in original)*). NAFTA further requires that "[e]ach Party shall ensure that its laws, **regulations**, procedures, and **administrative rulings** of general application respecting any matter covered by this Agreement are promptly published or otherwise **made** available in such a manner' as to **enable** interested persons and Parties to become acquainted with them." *Id. Article 1802.1*.

## VII. THE TRIBUNAL'S DECISION

72. Metalclad contends that Mexico, through its local governments of **SLP** and **Guadalcazar**, interfered with and precluded its operation of the landfill. **Metalclad**

alleges that this interference is a violation of **Articles 1105 and 1110** of **Chapter Eleven** of the investment provisions of **NAFTA**.

**A Responsibility for the conduct of state and local governments.**

**73.** A threshold question is whether Mexico is internationally responsible for the acts of SLP and **Guadalcazar**. The issue was largely disposed of by Mexico in **paragraph 233** of its post-hearing submission, which stated that "[Mexico] did not plead that the acts of the Municipality were not covered by **NAFTA**. [Mexico] was, and remains, prepared to proceed on the assumption that the normal rule of state responsibility applies; that is, that the Respondent can be internationally responsible for the acts of state organs at all three levels of government." Parties to that Agreement must "ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of the Agreement, including their observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial governments". (*NAFTA Article 105*) A reference to a state or province includes local governments of that state or province. (*NAFTA Article 201(2)*) The exemptions from the requirements of **Articles 1105 and 1110** laid down in **Article 1108(1)** do not extend to states or local governments. This approach accords fully with the established position in customary international law. This has been clearly stated in **Article 10** of the draft articles on state responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations in **1975** which, though currently still under consideration, may nonetheless be regarded as an accurate restatement of the present law: "The conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial government entity or of an entity empowered to exercise elements of the Governmental authority, such organ having acted in that capacity, shall be considered as an act of the State under.

international law even if, in the particular case, the organ exceeded its competence according to internal law or contravened instructions concerning its activity". (*Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1975, vol. II, p.61*)

**B. NAFTA Article 1105: Fair and equitable Treatment**

74. NAFTA Article 1105(1) provides that "each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security". For the reasons set out below, the Tribunal finds that Metalclad's investment was not accorded fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international law, and that Mexico has violated NAFTA Article 1105(1).

75. An underlying objective of NAFTA is to promote and increase cross-border investment opportunities and ensure the successful implementation of investment initiatives. (NAFTA Article 102(1))

76. Prominent in the statement of principles and rules that introduces the Agreement is the reference to "transparency" (NAFTA Article 102(1)). The Tribunal understands this to include the idea that all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully operating investments made, or intended to be made, under the Agreement should be capable of being readily known to all affected investors of another Party. There should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters. Once the authorities of the central government of any Party (whose international responsibility in such matters has been identified in the preceding section) become aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this connection, it is their duty

to ensure that the correct position is **promptly** determined and clearly stated **so that** investors can **proceed** with all appropriate expedition in the **confident** belief that **they** are acting in accordance **with** all relevant **laws**.

77. **Metalclad** acquired **COTERIN** for the same purpose of developing and operating a hazardous waste landfill in the valley of **La Pedrera**, in **Guadalcazar**, SLP.

78. The Government of **Mexico** issued federal **construction** and operating permits for the landfill prior *to* **Metalclad's** purchase of **COTERIN**, and the Government of SLP likewise issued a state operating **permit** which **implied its** political **support for** the landfill project,

79. A central point in this case **has been** whether, in addition to the above-mentioned permits, a municipal **permit** for the **construction** of a hazardous waste landfill was required.

80. When **Metalclad** inquired, prior *to* its purchase of **COTERIN**, as *to* the **necessity** for municipal permits, federal **officials** assured **it** that it had all that was **needed** to undertake the landfill project. Indeed, following **Metalclad's** acquisition of **COTERIN**, the federal government extended the **federal construction** permit **for** eighteen months.

81. As presented and **confirmed by** **Metalclad's** expert on **Mexican law**, the authority of the municipality extends only to the administration of the construction permit, ". . .to grant licenses and permits for constructions and to participate in the creation and administration of **ecological** reserve zones . . ." (*Mexican Const. Art. 115, Fraction V*). However, Mexico's experts on constitutional law expressed a **different** view,

82. Mexico's General Ecology Law of 1988 (hereinafter "LGEEPA") expressly grants to the Federation the power to authorize construction and operation of hazardous waste: landfills. Article 5 of the LGEEPA provides that the powers of the Federation extend to:

- V. [t]he regulation and control of activities considered to be highly hazardous, and of the generation, handling and final disposal of hazardous materials and wastes for the environments of ecosystems, as well as for the preservation of natural resources, in accordance with [the] Law, other applicable ordinances and their regulatory provisions.

83. LGEEPA also limits the environmental powers of the municipality to issues relating to non-hazardous waste. Specifically, Article 8 of the LGEEPA grants municipalities the power in accordance with the provisions of the law and local laws to apply:

[l]egal provisions in matters of prevention and control of the effects on the environment caused by generation, transportation, storage, handling treatment and final disposal of solid industrial wastes which are not considered to be hazardous in accordance with the provisions of Article 137 of [the 1988] law. (Emphasis supplied).

84. The same law also limits state environmental powers to those not expressly attributed to the federal government. *id.*, Article 7.

85. Metalclad was led to believe, and did believe, that the federal and state permits allowed for the construction and operation of the landfill, Metalclad argues that in all hazardous waste matters, the Municipality has no authority. However, Mexico argues

that **constitutionally** and lawfully the **Municipality** has the authority to **issue construction** permits.

86. Even if Mexico is correct that a **municipal construction** permit was required, the evidence **also** shows that, as **to hazardous waste** evaluations and assessments, the federal authority's jurisdiction was **controlling** and the authority of the municipality only extended **to** appropriate construction considerations. Consequently, the **denial** of the , permit by the Municipality by reference to environmental impact considerations in the . case of what was basically a **hazardous** waste disposal landfill, was improper, as **was** the **municipality's** denial of the **permit for any** reason' other **than** those related to the physical construction or **defects** in the **site**.

67. **Relying** on the representations of the federal government, **Metalclad** started constructing the **landfill**, and **did this** openly **and** continuously, and with the full knowledge of the federal, state, **and municipal** governments, until **the** municipal "Stop Work Order" on October 26, 1994. The basis of this **order** was said **to** have been Metalclad's failure to obtain a municipal **construction permit**.

88. In addition, **Metalclad** asserted **that federal officials told it that if it** submitted an **application for a municipal construction permit, the Municipality would** have no legal , basis for **denying the permit** and that it would be issued as a matter of course. The **absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not** of a municipal **construction** permit, as well as the absence of any established **practice or procedure as to the manner of** handling applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to **a failure** on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA.

89. **Metalclad** was entitled to rely on the representations of **federal** officials and to believe that it was entitled to continue its construction of the **landfill**. In following the advice of **these** officials, and filing the **municipal permit** application on November 15, 1994, **Metalclad** was merely acting **prudently** and in the **full** expectation **that the** permit would be granted.

90. On December 5, 1995, **thirteen** months **after** the submission of **Metalclad's** application – during which **time Metalclad** continued **its** open and **obvious investment** activity – the Municipality denied **Metalclad's** application for a construction permit. The denial was **issued** well **after** construction **was virtually** complete **and immediately** following the **announcement of the Convenio** providing for the operation of the landfill.

91. Moreover, the permit was denied at a meeting of the Municipal Town **Council** of which **Metalclad** received **no notice**, to which **it** received no **invitation**, and at which it was given no opportunity to appear,

92. The Town Council denied the **permit** for reasons which **included**, but may not have been limited **to**, the opposition **of** the local population, the fact that **construction** had already begun when the application was submitted, the denial of the **permit to COTERIN** in December **1991** and **January 1992**, and the ecological concerns **regarding** the environmental effect and **impact on** the site and surrounding communities, None of the reasons included a reference **to** any problems associated with the physical **construction** of the landfill or **to** any physical **defects** therein.



93. The Tribunal therefore finds that the construction permit **was** denied without any consideration of, or specific reference **to**, construction aspects **or** flaws of the physical **facility**.

94. Moreover, the Tribunal **cannot disregard the** fact that immediately after the Municipality's denial of the permit it filed an **administrative** complaint with **SEMARNAP** challenging the **Convenio**. The Tribunal **infers** from this that the **Municipality** lacked confidence in **its** right to deny **permission** for the landfill **solely** on the basis of the absence of a **municipal construction permit**.

95. **SEMARNAP** **dismissed** the **challenge** for lack of standing, which the **Municipality** promptly challenged by filing an **amparo** action. **An injuncion** was issued, and the landfill was barred from operation **through 1999**.

96. In 1997 SLP **re-entered** the scene and issued an Ecological Decree in **1997** which effectively and permanently prevented the use by **Metalclad** of its investment,

97. The actions of the Municipality following its denial of the municipal **construction permit**, coupled **with** the procedural **and substantive** deficiencies of the denial, **support** the Tribunal's finding, for the reasons stated **above**, that the Municipality's **insistence** upon and denial of the **construction permit** in **this** instance was improper.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The question of turning to NAFTA before **exhausting local remedies** was examined by the parties. However, Mexico does not insist that local remedies **must** be exhausted. Mexico's position is correct in light of NAFTA **Article 1121(2)(b)** which provides that a disputing investor may submit a claim under NAFTA **Article 1117** if both the investor and the enterprise **waive** their rights to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal **or court** under the law of any Party any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in NAFTA **Article 1117**.

98. This conclusion is not affected by **NAFTA Article 1114**, which permits a Party to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner **sensitive to** environmental concerns. The conclusion **of the Convenio** and the issuance of the federal **permits** show clearly that Mexico was satisfied that this project **was** consistent with, and sensitive to, **its** environmental concerns.

**99.** Mexico **failed** to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for **Metalclad's** business planning and investment. The totality of these circumstances demonstrates a lack of orderly process and timely **disposition in** relation to an investor of a Party acting in the expectation that **it** would be treated fairly **and** justly in **accordance** with the NAFTA.

**100.** Moreover, the acts of the State and the Municipality – and therefore the acts of Mexico – **fail** to comply with or adhere to the requirements of **NAFTA, Article 1105(1)** that **each Party** accord **to** investments of **investors** of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment. This is so particularly in light of the governing principle that internal law (such as the Municipality's stated permit requirements) does **not** justify failure to perform a treaty. (*Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 26, 27*).

**101.** The Tribunal therefore holds that **Metalclad** was **not treated** fairly or equitably under the **NAFTA** and **succeeds on** its claim under **Article 1105**.

### **C. NAFTA, Article 1110: Expropriation**

**102.** NAFTA Article 1110 provides that "[n]o party shall directly or indirectly . . . expropriate an investment . . . or take a measure tantamount to . . . expropriation . . .

**except:** (a) "for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and **Article 1105(1)**; and (d) on payment of compensation . . . ." "A measure" is defined in **Article 201(1)** as including "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice".

**103:** 'Thus, **expropriation** under **NAFTA** includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of **property**, such as **outright seizure** or formal or obligatory transfer of title in **favour** of **the** host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use **of property** which has the **effect** of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use **or reasonably-to-be-expected economic** benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of **the host** State,

104. By permitting or tolerating the conduct of **Guadalcazar** in relation to **Metalclad** which **the** Tribunal has already held, **amounts** to unfair and inequitable treatment breaching **Article 1105** and **by** thus participating **or** acquiescing in the **denial to** **Metalclad** of the right to operate the **landfill**, **notwithstanding** the **fact** that the **project** was fully approved and endorsed by **the federal government**, Mexico **must** be held to have taken a measure tantamount **to expropriation** in violation of **NAFTA Article 111 O(1)**.

**105.** The **Tribunal** holds that the exclusive authority for **sting** and **permitting** a hazardous waste **landfill** resides with the Mexican federal government. This finding is consistent with the testimony of **the** Secretary of **SEMARNAP** and, as **stated** above, is consistent with the express language **of** the LGEEPA.

**106.** As **determined** earlier (**see** above, **para 92**), the **Municipality** denied the **local** construction permit in part because of the **Municipality's** perception **of** the adverse

environmental effects of the hazardous waste landfill and the **geological unsuitability** of the landfill sites. In so doing, the Municipality acted outside its authority. As stated above, the Municipality's denial of the construction permit without any basis in the proposed **physical construction** or any defect in the **site**, and extended by its **subsequent administrative and judicial actions** regarding the *Convenio*, effectively and unlawfully prevented the Claimant's operation of the landfill.

107. These measures, taken together with the representations of the Mexican federal government, on which **Metalclad** relied, and the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for the denial by the Municipality of the **local construction** permit, amount to an indirect **expropriation**.

108. The **present** case resembles in a number of pertinent respects that of *Biloune, et al. v. Ghana Investment: Centre, et al.*, 95 I.L.R.183, 207-10 (7993) (Judge Schwebel, President; Wallace and Leigh, Arbitrators). In that case, a private investor was renovating and expanding a resort **restaurant** in Ghana. As with **Metalclad**, the investor, **basing itself** on the representations of a government affiliated entity, began construction before applying for a building permit. As with **Metalclad**, a **stop work order** was issued after a substantial amount of work had been completed. The order was based on the absence of a building **permit**. An application was submitted, but **although** it was not expressly **denied**, a **permit was never issued**. The Tribunal found that an indirect expropriation had taken place because the totality of the circumstances had the effect of causing the irreparable cessation of work on the project. The **Tribunal** paid particular regard to the investor's justified reliance on the government's representations regarding the permit, the fact that government **authorities** knew of the construction for more than

one year before issuing the stop work order, the fact that permits had not been required for other projects and the fact that no procedure was in place for dealing with building permit applications. Although the decision in *Biloune* does not bind this Tribunal, it is a persuasive authority and the Tribunal is in agreement with its analysis and its conclusion.

109. Although not strictly necessary for its conclusion, the Tribunal also identifies as a further ground for a finding of expropriation the Ecological Decree issued by the Governor of SLP on September 20, 1997. This Decree covers an area of 188,758 hectares within the "Real de Guadalcázar" that includes the landfill site, and created therein an ecological preserve. This Decree had the effect of barring forever the operation of the landfill.

110. The Tribunal is not persuaded by Mexico's representation to the contrary. The Ninth Article, for instance, forbids any work inconsistent with the Ecological Decree's management program. The management program is defined by the Fifth Article as one of diagnosing the ecological problems of the cacti reserve and of ensuring its ecological preservation. In addition, the Fourteenth Article of the Decree forbids any conduct that might involve the discharge of polluting agents on the reserve soil, subsoil, running water or water deposits and prohibits the undertaking of any potentially polluting activities. The Fifteenth Article of the Ecological Decree also forbids any activity requiring permits or licenses unless such activity is related to the exploration, extraction or utilization of natural resources.

111. The Tribunal need not decide or consider **the** motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree. **Indeed**, a finding of expropriation on the basis of the **Ecological** Decree is not essential to the Tribunal's finding of a violation of **NAFTA** Article 1110. However, **the Tribunal** considers that the **implementation of the Ecological** Decree would, in and of **itself**, constitute an act tantamount to **expropriation**.

112. In conclusion, the Tribunal holds that Mexico has indirectly expropriated Metalclad's investment **without** providing compensation to Metalclad for the expropriation. Mexico has violated **Article 1110** of the **NAFTA**.

## **VIII. QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES OR COMPENSATION**

### **A. Basic Elements of Valuation**

113. In this instance, **the** damages arising under **NAFTA**, Article **1105** and the compensation due under **NAFTA**, Article 1110 would be the same since both situations invoke the complete **frustration** of the operation of the landfill and negate the possibility **of any meaningful return on Metalclad's investment**. In other **words**, **Metalclad has** completely lost its **investment**.

114. Metalclad has proposed **two** alternative methods for calculating damages: the first is to use **a** discounted cash flow analysis of **future** profits to establish the fair **market value of** the investment (approximately **\$90** million); the second is to value **Metalclad's** actual **investment** in the landfill (approximately **\$20-25** million).

115. **Metalclad** also seeks an additional **\$20-25** million **for** the negative impact the circumstances are alleged to have had on its other business **operations**. The Tribunal disallows this additional **claim** because a variety of factors, not necessarily related to the

La Pedrera development, have affected Metalclad's share price. The causal relationship between Mexico's actions and the reduction in value of Metalclad's other business operations are too remote and **uncertain** to support **this** claim. This element of damage **is**, therefore, left aside.

116. Mexico asserts that a discounted cash flow analysis is inappropriate where the expropriated **entity** is not a going **concern**. Mexico offers an alternative calculation of fair market value based on COTERIN's "market **capitalization**." Mexico's "market capitalization" **calculations show a loss to Metalclad of \$1345 million**.

117. Mexico also suggests a direct Investment value approach to **damages**. Mexico **estimates** Metalclad's direct investment value, or loss, to be approximately **\$3-4 million**,

118. NAFTA, Article **1135(l)(a)**, provides for the **award** of monetary damages and applicable interest **where a** Party is found to have violated a Chapter Eleven provision. **With** respect to expropriation, **NAFTA**, Article 1110(Z), specifically requires compensation to be equivalent to the **fair market value of** the expropriated investment immediately **before the expropriation** took place. This paragraph further states that "the valuation criteria shall include *going concern* value, asset **value** including declared **tax value of tangible** property, and other **criteria**, as appropriate, to determine fair market value",

119. Normally, the fair market **value of** a going concern which has a history of profitable operation may **be based on an estimate of future profits** subject to a discounted **cash flow** analysis. *Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl v. The Government of the*

*People's Republic of Congo*, 1 ICSID Reports 330; 21 I.L.M. 758; *AGIP SPA v. The Government of the People's Republic of Congo*, 1 ICSID Reports 306; 21 I.L.M. 737,

120. However, where the enterprise has not operated for a sufficiently long time to establish a performance record or where it has failed to make a profit, future profits cannot be used to determine going concern or fair market value. In *Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran (1987)* (14 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 224, 240-42; 83 I.L.R. 460, 480-81), the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal pointed to the importance in relation to a company's value of "its business reputation and the relationship it has established with its suppliers and customers.\* Similarly, in *Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka* (4 ICSID Reports 246 (1990) at 292), another ICSID Tribunal observed, in dealing with the comparable problem of the assessment of the value of good will, that its ascertainment "requires the prior presence on the market for at least two or three years, which is the minimum period needed in order to establish continuing business connections".

121. The Tribunal agrees with Mexico that a discounted cash flow analysis is inappropriate in the present case because the landfill was never operative and any award based on future profits would be wholly speculative.

122. Rather, the Tribunal agrees with the parties that fair market value is best arrived at in this case by reference to Metalclad's actual investment in the project. Thus, in *Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran* (10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 121 (1986)), the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal concluded that the value of the expropriated property was the value of claimant's investment in that property. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal considered that the property's future profits were so dependent on as yet unobtained



preferential treatment from the government that any prediction of them would be entirely speculative, (Id. at 132-33). Similarly, in the *Biloune* case (see above), the Tribunal concluded that the value of the expropriated property was the value of the claimant's investment in that property. While the Tribunal recognized the validity of the principle that lost profits should be considered in the valuation of expropriated property, the Tribunal did not award lost profits because the claimants could not provide any realistic estimate of them. In that case, as in the present one, the expropriation occurred when the project was not yet in operation and had yet to generate revenue. (*Biloune*, 95 I.L.R. at 228-229). The award to Metalclad of the cost of its investment in the landfill is consistent with the principles set forth in *Chorzow Factory (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), Germany v. Poland, P.C.I.J., Series A., No. 17* (1928) at p.47, namely, that where the state has acted contrary to its obligations, any award to the claimant should, as far as is possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would in all probability have existed if that act had not been committed (*the status quo ante*),

123. Metalclad asserts that it invested \$20,474,528.00 in the landfill project, basing its value on its United States Federal Income Tax Returns and Auditors' Workpapers of Capitalized Costs for the Landfill reflected in a table marked Schedule A and produced by Metalclad as response 7(a)A in the course of document discovery. The calculations include landfill costs Metalclad claims to have incurred from 1991 through 1996 for expenses categorized as the COTERIN acquisition, personnel, insurance, travel and living, telephone, accounting and legal, consulting, interest, office, property, plant and equipment, including \$328,167.00 for "other,"

124. Mexico challenges the correctness of these calculations on several grounds, of which one is the lack of supporting documentation for each expense item claimed. However, the Tribunal finds that the tax filings of Metalclad, together with the independent audit documents supporting those tax filings, are to be accorded substantial evidential weight and that difficulties in verifying expense items due to incomplete files do not necessarily render the expenses claimed fundamentally erroneous. See *Bilbune*, 35 I.L.R. at 223-24

125. The Tribunal agrees, however, with Mexico's position that costs incurred prior to the year in which Metalclad purchased COTERIN are too far removed from the investment for which damages are claimed. The Tribunal will reduce the Award by the amount of the costs claimed for 1991 and 1992.

**B. "Bundling"**

126. Some of the subsequent costs claimed by Metalclad involve what has been termed "bundling". "Bundling" is an accounting concept where the expenses related to different projects are aggregated and allocated to another project. Metalclad has claimed as costs related to the development at La Pedrera earlier costs incurred on certain other sites in Mexico. While not taking any decision in principle regarding the concept of bundling as it may be applicable to other situations (for example in the oil industry where the costs in relation to a "dry hole" may in part be allocated to the cost of exploring for and developing a successful well), the Tribunal does not consider it appropriate to apply the concept in the present case. The Tribunal has reduced accordingly the sum payable by the Government of Mexico.

### **C. Remediation**

**127.** The question remains of the future **status** of the landfill site, **legal title to** which at **present** rests with COTERIN. Clearly, **COTERIN's** substantive interest in the **property** will come to an end when it receives payment under this award. **COTERIN** must, therefore, relinquish as from that moment all claim, tie and interest in the site. The fact **that the site may require remediation has been borne in mind by the** Tribunal and allowance has been made **for this in the calculation of the sum payable by the Government of Mexico.**

#### **5. Interest**

**128.** The question arises **whether any interest is** payable on the amount **of the compensation,** In providing in Article 1135(1) that a Tribunal may award "monetary **damages and any applicable interest**", **NAFTA clearly contemplates the inclusion of** interest in an award, On the **basis of a review** of the **authorities,** the tribunal in *Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka* (4 **ICSID Reports** 245) held that "interest becomes an **integral part of the compensation itself, and should run** consequently from the **date** when **the State's international responsibility became** engaged" ([*ibid.* p.294, **para. 114**]). The Tribunal sees no reason to depart from this view. As has **been shown above,** **Mexico's international responsibility is founded upon an accumulation of a number of** factors. In the circumstances, the Tribunal **considers that of the various possible dates at which it might be** possible to fix the engagement of **Mexico's** responsibility, it is **reasonable to select** the date on which the Municipality **of Guadalucazar** wrongly denied **Metalclad's** application for a construction **permit. The Tribunal therefore** concludes that

interest should be awarded from that date until the date an award is made.

Award is made. So as to restore the Claimant to a reasonable approximation of the position in which it would have been if the wrongful act had not taken place, interest has been calculated at 6% p.a., compounded annually.

#### E. Recipient

129. As required by NAFTA, Article 1135(2)(b), the award of monetary damages and interest shall be payable to the enterprise. As required by NAFTA, Article 1135(2)(c), the award is made without prejudice to any right that any person may have in the relief under applicable domestic law,

#### IX. COSTS

130. Both parties seek an award of costs and fees. However, the Tribunal finds that it is equitable in this matter for each party to bear its own costs and fees, as well as half the advance payments made to ICSID.

#### X. AWARD

137. For the reasons stated above, the Tribunal hereby decides that, reflecting the amount of Metalclad's investment in the project, less the disallowance of expenses claimed for 1991 and 1992, less the amount claimed by way of bundling of certain expenses, and less the estimated amount allowed for remediation, plus interest at the rate of 6% compounded annually, the Respondent shall, within 45 days from the date on which this Award is rendered, pay to Metalclad the amount of \$16,686,000.00. Following such period, interest shall accrue on the unpaid award or any unpaid part thereof at the rate of 6% compounded monthly.

E. Lauterpacht


Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, CBE, QC

Date: 25 August 2000



Mr. Benjamin R. Civiletti

Date: 8/22/2000



Mr. José Luis Siqueiros

Date: 21-VIII-2000.