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The Peruvian Townsend Commission Report
and Declassified U.S. Documentation
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.
72
Edited by Tamara
Feinstein, [Phone: 202 / 994-7219]
Director, Peru Documentation Project
June 26, 2002
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Introduction
On the evening of September 14, 2000, Peruvian cable TV station
Canal N broadcast a video of Peruvian intelligence chief Vladimiro
Montesinos apparently giving a bribe of $15,000 to opposition
congressman Alberto Kouri for his defection to President Alberto
Fujimori's Peru 2000 Party. The video, leaked to the Peruvian
opposition party FIM (Independent Moralising Front) by sources
unknown, was the first to become public of thousands that
had been taped by Montesinos. The disclosure ignited a broad
corruption scandal that changed the face of politics in Peru,
resulting in Fujimori asking Montesinos to quit (September
15, 2000), the dissolution of Montesinos' National Intelligence
Service (SIN) (September 16, 2000), Montesinos's escape from
Peru (September 23, 2000), the flight of Fujimori to Japan
(November 13, 2000), Fujimori's subsequent removal as president
by the Peruvian Congress (November 21, 2000), and the eventual
capture and arrest of Montesinos in Venezuela and his extradition
to Peru (June 23-24, 2001).
Following Fujimori's fall, the new interim President Valentín
Paniagua took significant steps toward the restoration of
democracy, including the removal of restrictions on freedom
of the press, the replacement of the dismissed magistrates
to the Constitutional Tribunal-Peru's equivalent to the U.S.
Supreme Court which Fujimori gutted in 1997-and the return
of Peru to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. On June 3, 2001, Alejandro Toledo (who pulled
out of second round elections with Fujimori in 2000 to protest
voting irregularities) was elected president in a process
that was deemed free and fair by a host of domestic and international
observers. Since then, the Peruvian government and civil society
groups across the political spectrum have begun a process
of reassessing the Fujimori years, with a particular focus
on the role of Montesinos.
Townsend Commission
In the wake of the scandals surrounding Montesinos, the Peruvian
government launched a number of different criminal investigations
and congressional inquiries into the activities of the former
intelligence chief. Among them was a congressional commission
formed in November 2000 under the leadership of David Waisman
of the Peru Posible party. The Waisman Commission-which
included Congress members Anel Townsend, Adolfo Amorin, Luis
Chang Ching, and Carlos Cuaresma-was designed to look into
the complicated web of bank accounts controlled by Montesinos.
On June 12, 2001, the Waisman Commission came out with its
report, strongly recommending further investigation. Congressman
Waisman left Congress in July 2001 to become Peru's Vice President
and Defense Minister, but a new commission continued its uncompleted
work with Congress member Townsend as its new head, becoming
known as the Townsend Commission. The current members of the
Townsend Commission include Edgar Villanueva, Gustavo Pacheco,
Hildebrando Tapia and Cesar Zumaeta.
On May 15, 2002, the Townsend Commission released a preliminary
report, highlighting the key findings of their investigations,
based heavily on witness testimony and analyses of the bank
accounts. The Commission requested additional time to produce
its final report, which was released to the public on June
25, 2002. In spite of the one-month extension, the Townsend
Commission still admits that only part of their work has been
completed. The Peruvian Congress is considering how to handle
the pending investigations of the Townsend Commission and
the four other congressional commissions investigating corruption
during the Fujimori regime. Congress may create one combined
commission to complete the unfinished work of all five commissions.
Townsend Commission Findings
The findings of the Townsend Commission detail many different
aspects of corruption surrounding the Montesinos/Fujimori
regime. This includes information on electoral fraud; illicit
bank accounts; corrupt arms purchasing and trafficking; bribery
of government officials, congressmen and journalists; narcotics
trafficking and money laundering. After providing detailed
information on the evidence collected so far, the commission
concludes that it is imperative that the Congress continue
its investigations into illicit bank accounts, narco-trafficking,
and money laundering. The report also suggests a coordinated
effort between the Judiciary, Executive and the Public Ministry
to apprehend those at-large individuals tied to these investigations,
and calls for the repatriation of illicit funds in foreign
bank accounts.
In addition to the charges revolving around corruption, one
of the more interesting discoveries of the Townsend Commission's
preliminary report involves allegations of human rights abuses
committed by the Army Intelligence Service (SIE) and its "Grupo
Colina," a death squad linked to various human rights
abuses, including extra-judicial executions. Through the testimony
of various witnesses who appeared before the Commission, a
clandestine military prison, which included an incinerator,
was discovered on the grounds of the SIE Headquarters. Victims
were held, tortured, interrogated and sometimes killed in
this basement facility.
The final report connects a number of specific human rights
cases to Montesinos and Fujimori, including the Barrios Altos
massacre (1991); La Cantuta Massacre (1992); the assassination
of Mariella Barreto Riofano (1997); attacks against Canal
13 facilities and the torture of Fabián Salazar (2000).
It also concludes that previous Congressional investigations
into human rights abuses, like La Cantuta, were used by the
Fujimori government to cover-up and protect the authors of
the crimes.
The commission urges Congress to continue to investigate
human rights violations linked to Montesinos and Fujimori.
It also recommends that constitutional charges be filed against
Fujimori for both the torture of journalist Fabian Salazar
and human rights abuses committed in the basement of the SIE
facility. Furthermore, they recommend that legal charges be
filed against Montesinos for the torture of Salazar.
1) Townsend Commission Preliminary Report,
May 15, 2002 (Microsoft Word document - 472 KB)
2) Townsend Commission Final Report,
June 25, 2002 (Microsoft Word document - 2.37 MB)
Valuable Information in U.S. Government Archives
In its preliminary report, the Townsend Commission specifically
cites the value of declassified U.S. government documents
to the Commission's efforts. On January 7, 2002, the U.S.
Embassy (Lima) posted a
group of 38 documents in response to a request from the
Townsend Commission. (Click
here to see the Archive's analysis of the Embassy's release.)
The Commission has submitted an appeal for the material withheld
by the U.S. State Department.
In complement to the final report of the Townsend Commission,
the following recently declassified documents highlighted
in this National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
and received by the Archive through the FOIA illustrate the
kind of valuable information that the Bush administration
should continue to provide to assist Peru in its investigation
of truth and justice relating to Montesinos and the Fujimori
regime. These documents demonstrate some of the key themes
touched upon by the Townsend commission, and also reveal what
efforts the U.S. made to assist in Peruvian investigations
of Montesinos.
The documents in this book range from an undisclosed Peruvian
source's commentary in 1993 on the symbiotic relationship
between Montesinos and Fujimori (Document
1), to descriptions of the US assistance provided to Peruvian
investigations of Montesinos in 2001 (Document
12).
Note: The following documents are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free
Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
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U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, [Excised] Comments
on Fujimori, Montesinos, but not on Barrios Altos, January
22, 1993, Secret, 10 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
An undisclosed source describes the relationship between
President Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos. He critiques
their counter-terrorism strategy and policy toward human
rights. The cable sketches Montesinos's background history
and general character, noting his singular ambition for
power throughout his career.
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U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Amnesty Law
in Peru: Analysis and Recommendations, June 15, 1995,
Secret, 10 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
The U.S. Embassy strongly criticizes the new military amnesty
law as a blow to human rights accountability, suggesting
that Montesinos or Army Commander Nicolas Hermoza Rios may
have proposed the law to Fujimori. The cable notes that
both men were tried and found innocent before a secret military
court investigation of the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos
massacres. The embassy believes these findings were intended
as a "paper trail" to ensure that Hermoza and
Montesinos would be safe from any eventual civilian court,
but also speculates that the secret acquittal of the military
courts would not have the same credibility as a general
amnesty. The embassy concludes that the United States should
communicate its disappointment in the law, but should ensure
that such protest does not endanger US counternarcotics
cooperation with Peru.
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U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Press vs. Press
- New Campaign to Harrass Journalists, April 30, 1998,
Confidential, 4 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
The document describes harassment of the press, including
a mounting smear campaign using tabloid papers to attack
investigative journalists "perceived as threatening
to the Fujimori government." The Townsend Commission
report also specifically addresses the issue of bribes used
to influence journalists.
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U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, The Montesinos
Factor, July 22, 1999, Confidential, 4 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
This cable provides guidance on the pros and cons of a
proposed visit to Peru by US drug czar General Barry McCaffrey
for late August 1999. It warns that the visit might reopen
old wounds created by the public statement McCaffrey made
about Montesinos after his 1998 visit. (At a May 1998 D.C.
press conference, McCaffrey stated, "I am offended
at Montesinos using my visit to attempt to rehabilitate
himself in the eyes of the Peruvian people.") Montesinos
retaliated against McCaffrey's remarks by temporarily closing
down U.S. government supported counter-drug programs, which
were resumed after a "face-saving" coordinated
press release. Nevertheless, the document reports that the
Peruvian government has been and remains unenthusiastic
about counternarcotics programs since that time. Montesinos
is "part of the equation," the Embassy writes
and "like it or not, he is the go to guy, short of
the President himself on any key issue, particularly any
major counternarcotics issue." The cable notes that
Montesinos has been sending out informal feelers for six
months to meet with McCaffrey, which the U.S. has "fended
off" so far. However, McCaffrey will not be able to
ignore or avoid Montesinos without undermining the value
of the proposed visit and the post recommends that McCaffrey
meet with Montesinos to clear the air. "The bottom
line, Montesinos one way or the other, in front of the cameras
or not, will get face time with General McCaffrey and we
must be prepared to acknowledge this fact publicly. If that
is not acceptable then the trip is best avoided."
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U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Victim of Suspected
GOP-Directed Persecution Thanks Embassy for Intervention,
January 1, 2000, Confidential, 4 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
This cable describes the alleged persecution of an undisclosed
Peruvian by the National Intelligence Service. The harassment
abates after U.S. Ambassador John Hamilton personally takes
up the matter with Montesinos.
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U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, The State of
the Military on the Eve of the Elections, April 7, 2000,
Confidential, 6 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
This document recounts interference by the military during
the presidential elections, and speculates that further
blatant intervention by the armed forces is unlikely due
to Toledo's rise in the polls. "In sum, the armed forces
can only be asked to do so much before they begin to bridle
and resent the political tasks set before them," the
cable concludes.
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Peruvian Government, Resolución Número
Uno, September 5, 2000, 8 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
These are the formal charges filed by the Fujimori administration
against the group accused of arranging the illegal transfer
of 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles purchased from Jordan to
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Colombia (FARC), a
Colombian guerrilla group. The charges followed an August
21, 2000 announcement by Montesinos that the SIN had broken
up the ring that had delivered the arms to the Colombian
insurgents. While Montesinos was suspected of involvement
in this scandal, the charges were filed prior to the September
2000 bribery scandal with Montesinos and his subsequent
fall from power, and make no mention of his participation.
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U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Montesinos
Video, September 15, 2000, Secret, 2 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
The U.S. Embassy notes that the September 14 release of
the Montesinos video "provides incontrovertible, public
evidence of Montesinos' abuse of the concentration of power
in the National Intelligence Service". The embassy
notes that the tape is "clearly authentic" since
the US has been aware that Montesinos tapes most of his
meetings, and the embassy recognizes the office depicted
in the video as that of titular SIN Chief Admiral Humberto
Rosas.
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U.S. Department of State Cable, Guidance
on Peru Policy, September 20, 2000, Secret, 3 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
The State Department provides policy guidance to the US
Embassy in Lima, and requests that Ambassador Hamilton meet
with Fujimori. The Ambassador should show US support for
Fujimori's decision to remove Montesinos and state that
the US government will no longer have any contact with Montesinos.
Furthermore, the Ambassador should assure the Peruvian government
that the US will continue its cooperation with "legitimate"
Peruvian government agencies on counternarcotics efforts.
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Fiscal Provincial Penal de Lima, Declaracion
Testimonial de Carmen de Guadalupe Delgado Mendez, November
28, 2000, 10 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
This is the testimony of a witness regarding the Jordanian/Peruvian/FARC
arms scandal. The witness worked for the British as an intelligence
agent. According to her testimony, in February 1999 she
met with a U.S. Embassy official about information she had
uncovered about arms trafficking. She states that later,
in March 1999, the US Embassy gave the SIN a report on a
possible drug deal in South America that involved Peruvian
personalities and that also mentioned a possible arms trafficking
operation. She also declared that the arms trafficking operation
that was later uncovered was led by Vladimiro Montesinos,
Julio Salazar Monroe, Martha Chavez and General Hermoza
Rios, not by the Aybar Cancho brothers, who were on trial
for it. According to her testimony she was harassed by Montesinos
and his "Grupo Jupiter" on several occasions (including
on June 7, 1995 and February 27, 2000). She claims to have
met Fujimori on November 6, 2000: the president wanted to
know the information she had regarding arms and drug trafficking
and corruption because he wanted to capture Montesinos and
determine his successor. Delgado also mentions that Montesinos
planned to kill Jose Aybar and his wife and that she had
knowledge of the existence of a list of targets for assassination,
all of whom were involved in the arms trafficking case.
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U.S. State Department, Agenda for Law Enforcement/Intelligence
Cooperation Meeting, February 13, 2001, Secret, 2 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
This document provides the agenda of a meeting held to
coordinate U.S. government cooperation with Peruvian investigations
of Montesinos. It includes an attached copy of the December
1998 bank account record of Charles Acelor, an arms dealer
implicated in the Jordanian/Colombian arms scandal.
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U.S. Embassy (Lima), Circa early
2001, 2 pp. |
Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive |
This U.S. Embassy document highlights U.S. government activities
aimed at cooperating with Peruvian investigations of Montesinos.
Included in this list of tasks is how to respond to Peruvian
requests for the declassification of documents. The document
notes that the US Embassy in Lima transmitted requests to
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Drug Enforcement Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Intelligence Agency, on behalf of the Peruvian
Government. As noted earlier in this briefing book, the
Townsend Commission received 38 documents in January 2002,
in response to their request to the State Department. However,
they have still not received documents from any of the other
US government agencies listed.
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