



Department of State  
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(E3)

TELEGRAM

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 ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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 FM USINT BAGHDAD  
 TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
 INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6113

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 3101

EXDIS CAPTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK) ON 11/29/93

FOR AMB RUNSFELD'S PARTY: FOR TOM HILLER

EO 12356 DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: OVIP  
 SUBJ: TALKING POINTS FOR AMB RUNSFELD'S MEETING WITH  
 TARIQ AZIZ AND SADDAM HUSSEIN

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE ANTICIPATE TWO MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD, THE FIRST WITH DEPUTY  
 PM AND FORMINISTER AZIZ AND THE SECOND WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM  
 HUSSEIN. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE ARE LIMITS ON NUMBERS OF US  
 PARTICIPANTS IN THE TARIQ AZIZ MEETING SO AMB RUNSFELD SHOULD  
 INDICATE HIS PREFERENCE RE THE AMERICAN SIDE. HOWEVER, UNDERSEC  
 SAHHAF TOLD US THE IRAQI PRACTICE IS THAT ONLY THE VISITOR  
 AND THE LOCAL CHIEF OF MISSION WOULD ATTEND A MEETING WITH SADDAM  
 HUSSEIN. WHEN I SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF PELLETREAU  
 ALSO ATTENDING, HE SAID THIS COULD BE CONSIDERED. IF AMB RUNSFELD  
 WANTS PELLETREAU OR SOMEONE ELSE TO ATTEND, WE CAN RENEW THE  
 REQUEST.

3. THE SECRETARY AND A NUMBER OF AMERICAN VISITORS HAVE MET  
 WITH TARIQ AZIZ DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, AND I HAVE RELATIVELY  
 EASY ACCESS TO HIM. HENCE, HE IS ACCUSTOMED TO A RELAXED GIVE-  
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 AND-TAKE WITH AMERICANS. WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, HOWEVER, THIS WILL

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BE A FIRST. HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MET PRESS REPS AND AT LEAST ONE CONGRESSMAN (SOLARZ IN AUG 82) BUT HE HAS NOT RECEIVED A REP OF THE EXECUTIVE SIDE OF THE USG. HENCE, A MAJOR OBJECTIVE IN THE MEETING WITH SADDAM IS TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE AND ESTABLISH PERSONAL RAPPOR. IN THAT MEETING AMB RUMSFELD WILL WANT TO EMPHASIZE HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN REGIONAL ISSUES. IN BOTH MEETINGS QUESTIONS ARE ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AS ANSWERS, SO SEVERAL HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE FOLLOWING POINTS (REQUESTED BY AMB RUMSFELD) WHICH ARE FOR BOTH MEETINGS:

I. THE GULF WAR

A. RUMSFELD

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE USG ARE COMMITTED TO A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO HELP END THE WAR WHICH WE SEE AS A TRAGEDY FOR THE COMBATANTS AND DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA.

-- THE USG RECOGNIZES IRAQ'S CURRENT DISADVANTAGE IN A WAR OF ATTRITION SINCE IRAN HAS ACCESS TO THE GULF WHILE IRAQ DOES NOT AND WOULD REGARD ANY MAJOR REVERSAL OF IRAQ'S FORTUNES AS A STRATEGIC DEFEAT FOR THE WEST.

-- THE USG STRONGLY SUPPORTS UNSC 540 AND WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO BRING IRAN TO ACCEPT OR ACQUIESCE IN ITS TERMS.

-- THIS REQUIRES DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES AS WELL AS A MILITARY POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE IRAN IS ADMITTEDLY LIMITED, PREMATURE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE GULF WILL IMPEDE EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE IRAN AND WILL NOT GUARANTEE  
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THE ACHIEVEMENT OF IRAQ'S OBJECTIVES.

-- BEFORE CONSIDERING EXTENDING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE GULF, WE BELIEVE IRAQ SHOULD MAINTAIN THE MORAL HIGH GROUND BY FIRST EXHAUSTING ALL POSSIBILITIES UNDER UNSC 540 TO OPEN THE GULF TO IRAQI SHIPPING.

-- THE US LOOKS WITH FAVOR ON OTHER MEANS, SUCH AS THE EXPANSION OF IRAQ'S PIPELINE CAPABILITIES THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE TO REDRESS THE IRAN-IRAQ OIL EXPORT

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IMBALANCE.

B. IRAQI SIDE

-- IRAQ IS SEEKING A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT BUT MUST BACK THIS WITH MILITARY PRESSURE.

-- IRAQ WANTS ALL COUNTRIES TO CEASE SUPPLYING IRAN WITH ARMS.

-- ARMS PROVIDED BY ISRAEL MAY NOT BE LARGE IN NUMBERS BUT THEY ARE VITAL ITEMS SUCH AS SPARE PARTS FOR ADVANCED WEAPONRY.

-- TRADE WITH IRAN WHICH STRENGTHENS IRAN MILITARILY, PARTICULARLY PETROLEUM PURCHASES, SHOULD BE CURTAILED, OR USED TO PUT PRESSURE ON TEHRAN TO END THE WAR.

-- THE US COULD DO MORE TO INFLUENCE ITS ALLIES TO DEPRIVE IRAN OF THE MEANS TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

-- (POSSIBLE) THE US COULD LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON SOME MILITARY ITEMS IRAQ WISHES TO PURCHASE FROM THIRD PARTIES.

-- IRAQ DOES NOT WISH TO ESCALATE IN THE GULF BUT WILL CONTINUE TO INTERDICT IRANIAN SHIPPING AND TAKE OTHER APPROPRIATE MEASURES SO LONG AS IRAN REFUSES TO ACCEPT UNSC 540 AND IRAQ'S RIGHT TO

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USE THE GULF.

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FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO ANEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6114

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 3101

EXDIS

FOR AMB RUMSFELD'S PARTY: FOR TOM HILLER

II. MIDDLE EAST PEACE

A. RUMSFELD

-- RUMSFELD WOULD PROBABLY OPEN WITH A DESCRIPTION OF HIS MISSION, FOLLOWED BY QUESTIONS RE THE IRAQI ATTITUDE TOWARD A) THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND (B) VARIOUS SCENARIOS INVOLVING KING HUSSEIN AND THE PALESTINIANS.

B. IRAQI SIDE

-- IRAQ WILL SUPPORT PEACE INITIATIVES THAT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE PALESTINIANS.

-- IRAQ CONSIDERS YASIR ARAFAT THE LEGITIMATE LEADER OF THE PLO AND SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

-- IRAQ WOULD SUPPORT AN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND THE PALESTINIANS TO ENTER THE PACE PROCESS.

-- IRAQ FINDS SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE BUT DOES NOT UNDERSTAND US REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE

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THE PLO AND THE PLAN'S RESTRICTIONS ON THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE:

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III. LEBANON

A. RUMSFELD

-- STANDARD STATEMENT OF US POSITION.

-- WHAT IS THE IRAQI ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GEHAYEL GOVT?  
WALID JUNBLATT AND THE DRUZE? THE SHIA (MAJORITY AND FACTIONS)?  
A SYRIAN PRESENCE?

B. IRAQI SUDE

-- IRAQ SUPPORTS THE LEBANESE GOVT AND THE EVACUATION OF ALL  
FOREIGN FORCES.

-- BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON  
WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. (POSSIBLE) THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT HAS HURT  
THE LEBANESE GOVT'S ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE OPPOSITION AND  
REWARDS ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION.

IV. SYRIA

A. RUMSFELD

-- IRAQ KNOWS THE SYRIANS WELL. WHAT IS YOUR ADVICE?

-- WHAT LEVERAGE CAN WE APPLY TO OBTAIN SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL  
FROM LEBANON?

-- WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ASSAD'S ILLHCSS AND WHAT ARE THE  
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FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE SYRIAN REGIME?

B. IRAQ SIDE

-- IRAQ WANTS AN UNCONDITIONAL SYRIAN PULLOUT FROM LEBANON.

-- WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE AMERICAN INSISTENCE THAT SYRIA  
HAS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN LEBANON SINCE THIS SEEMS TO CONDONE  
SYRIAN OCCUPATION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE ON INTERNAL LEBANESE  
FORCES.

-- US RETALIATION AGAINST SYRIA WINS ASSAD SYMPATHY IN ARAB

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EYES.

V. EGYPT

A. RUMSFELD

-- THE US SUPPORTS THE STRENGTHENING OF TIES BETWEEN EGYPT AND IRAQ.

B. IRAQI SIDE

-- IRAQ SUPPORTS EGYPT REINTERGRATION INTO THE ARAB WORLD.

VI. TERRORISM

A. RUMSFELD

-- WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION IRAQ'S EXPULSION OF THE ABU NIDAL TERRORIST GROUP.

-- WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN COMBATTING TERRORISM PARTICULARLY SINCE WE ARE IN MANY CASES TARGETED BY THE SAME GROUPS. THE CONTINUING THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS SECTION IS A CASE IN POINT.

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B. IRAQI SIDE

-- IRAQ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

VII. US-ISRAELI STRATEGIC COOPERATION

A. RUMSFELD

-- OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S WELL-BEING AND SECURITY IS WELL-KNOWN. RECENT TALKS WITH PM SHAMIR WERE ESSENTIALLY AN ATTEMPT TO RESTORE THE RELATIONSHIP AFTER A PERIOD OF SOME STRAIN AND MISUNDERSTANDING. WE ALSO HIGHLY VALUE OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS AND NOTHING IN OUR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH ISRAEL IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ARAB WORLD.

(IRAQIS MAY NOT RAISE THIS AT AEL)

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4. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED STATE 353B21 WITH DETAILED TALKING POINTS ON THE GULF WAR WHICH OF COURSE SUPERCEDES SOME OF THE ABOVE AND WILL BE EXTREMELY USEFUL. EAGLETON

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