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TELEGRAM

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2155
BT
SECRET USNATO 4936

CONTROL: 4 4 2 1Q
RECD: 16 OCT '73 5:49PM

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT: STATEMENTS BY
AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD AT OCTOBER 16 NAC

REF: STATE 204576

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF TWO STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD
AT THE OCTOBER 16 NAC. DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTE AS DESIRED.

BEGIN TEXT:

AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S FIRST STATEMENT

TALKING POINTS

NAC - OCTOBER 16, 1973

1. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR ON OCTOBER 6, ONCE OUR ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES HAD FAILED, OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO TWO OBJECTIVES: TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE TOWARD A FINAL JUST AND LASTING ARAB-ISREALI PEACE.

2. TO THESE ENDS WE (A) TOOK THE INITIATIVE ON OCTOBER 7 TO CONVENE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, (B) HAVE HELD INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHERS, AND (C) EXERCISED RESTRAINT DURING INITIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN SHIPMENT OF FURTHER ARMS TO THE AREA OF THE CONFLICT. IN ADDRESSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 7, OUR AMBASSADOR STATED THE PRINCIPLES WE BELIEVE SHOULD GOVERN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN THE PRESENT CRISIS. WE HAVE MADE NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHILE FREE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF IDEAS IN SEARCH FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS GOES FORWARD.

3. WHILE WE WERE ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN ARMS SUPPLY EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL WAS THEN ON DEFENSIVE, THE SOVIETS UNDERTOOK A MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO ARAB

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COUNTRIES; AS OF OCTOBER 15, SOVIET FLIGHTS TO EGYPT, SYRIA AND IRAQ NUMBER MORE THAN 300.

4. THE USG VIEWS THIS SOVIET AIRLIFT VERY SERIOUSLY AND HAS INITIATED A RAPID RESUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL. AS HAS BEEN NOTED, THE MILITARY SITUATION IS STILL INCONCLUSIVE. BOTH SIDES HAVE SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE-EAST AND ARE NOT GOING TO REMAIN PASSIVE IN THE FACE OF THIS SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

5. AT THIS POINT LET ME MAKE ONE THING CATEGORICALLY CLEAR, IN THE LIGHT OF A NUMBER OF IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF U.S. FORCES IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES: THERE IS NO REPEAT NO INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES OR PERSONNEL IN THIS FIGHTING.

6. WE BELIEVE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN STANDING FIRM WITH THE U.S., AND WE LOOK TO OUR NATO PARTNERS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS IN THE DAYS AHEAD TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM AND TO BRING AN END TO THE FIGHTING ON A BASIS WHICH WILL OPEN POSSIBILITIES FOR DIPLOMACY LOOKING TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO THESE ENDS.

7. I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTED COMMENT DIRECTLY TO EACH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED HERE. WE ARE GOING TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE SOVIET RESUPPLY FROM TIPPING THE MILITARY BALANCE. THE POSITIONS AND ATTITUDES OUR NATO ALLIES TAKE IN THIS CRISIS CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE AN EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS. THE PRESENT CRISIS IS A TEST OF THE EVOLVING SPIRIT OF DETENTE, AND WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET. EACH OF YOU HAS JUST AS MUCH AT STAKE AS WE DO IN PERSUADING THE SOVIETS OF THIS FACT.

8. WE ARE DISTURBED BY STATEMENTS IMPLYING THAT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONSTITUTE A FAILURE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET "DETENTE" AND CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AGREEMENTS. IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY FAILURE OF DETENTE OR SOVIET VIOLATION OF COMMITMENTS, IT INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP BUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USSR AND ALL THOSE WESTERN NATIONS WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAVE PURSUED A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HAVE SIGNED VARIOUS AGREEMENTS WITH IT. FOR US THE OPERATIONAL ISSUE AT PRESENT IS, HOWEVER, NOT WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED SOME COMMITMENT, BUT HOW ALL THE ALLIES TOGETHER CAN

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HOLD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE KIND OF CONDUCT ALL OF US SEPARATELY AND JOINTLY HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE STANDARD FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S SECOND STATEMENT

TALKING POINTS

NAC - OCTOBER 16, 1973

1. WE DO NOT TAKE KINDLY TO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS FOOLISHLY DRAWN INTO DETENTE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR AND MUST NOW USE THOSE SAME RELATIONSHIPS TO DEAL WITH THE USSR OVER THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS. WE DO NOT WELCOME PRONOUNCEMENTS FINDING THE SOVIETS IN VIOLATION OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENTS WHEN ANY SUCH VIOLATION APPLIES EQUALLY TO UNDERSTANDINGS THAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE WITH THE USSR.

2. THE U.S. HAS NEVER VIEWED DETENTE AS A STATIC POLICY THAT COMES ONE DAY AND DISAPPEARS THE NEXT. THE ONLY SENSIBLE MEANING OF DETENTE IS TO USE IT AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PROTECT OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND AS A MEANS TO RESTRAIN SOVIET EFFORTS TO DAMAGE THEM.

3. IN OUR VIEW, WHAT WE NEED TO CONSIDER NOW AS AN ALLIANCE IS HOW WE CAN COORDINATE OR HARMONIZE A SET OF POLICIES THAT WILL CONFRONT THE SOVIETS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO ITS OWN INTERESTS IF THEY CHOOSE TO DAMAGE OURS. THE U.S. CAN, OF COURSE, TAKE ACTIONS ALONE; BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE IN THE SPIRIT OF THE ALLIANCE AS JUST SET FORTH ELOQUENTLY IN THE VARIOUS SUBMISSIONS FOR THE YEAR OF EUROPE DECLARATION. THE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF HARMONIZING DETENTE POLICIES SHOULD NOW, IF THE ALLIES AGREE, BE TRANSFORMED INTO A CONSENSUS FOR USING THOSE POLICIES IN A CRISIS SITUATION.

4. AMONG THE ACTIONS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER ARE: ✓

-- A SLOWDOWN OR EVEN SUSPENSION OF WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN CSCE AS AN INCONGRUOUS EXERCISE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES;

-- ECONOMIC MEASURES IN SUCH AREAS OF EXPORT CONTROLS, CREDITS, ETC..

-- COMMON PRESSURES ON HUNGARY AND YUGOSLAVIA IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR ACTIVE ROLE IN THE PROLONGATION OF THE MIDDLE-EAST WAR BY DIRECT AND INDIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS FROM THE

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OUTSET OF THE FIGHTING.

-- A REVIEW OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, SUCH AS THE U.S.-SOVIET PRINCIPLES AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT, FRENCH-SOVIET PRINCIPLES AND CONSULTATION AGREEMENTS, ETC., WITH A VIEW TO UNDERTAKING A COMMON EFFORT TO HOLD THE USSR TO THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

-- ANY OTHER IDEAS PROPOSED BY SYG LUNS AND BY THE ALLIES WE WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE U.S. HAS TAKEN UNILATERAL ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPPLIES FOR ISRAEL, WE CONSIDER THE PRESENT SITUATION A MAJOR TEST FOR THE ALLIANCE. HOW THIS TEST IS MET WILL BE OBSERVED WITH THE GREATEST CARE BY SOVIETS, EAST EUROPEANS, ARABS AND OTHERS.

END TEXT. RUMSFELD

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