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DEPTEL 851 (PARIS 1519 TOSEC)

I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT INSTRUCTIONS BE SUPPLIED PROMPTLY RE OUTSTANDING ISSUES STOCKPILE AGREEMENT RELATING TO GO! DESIRE FOR CONSULTATION ON THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS AND TO SEPARATE "CONSENT FOR USE" AGREEMENT ALONG LINES (RBM AGREE-MENT PROVISION.


GOI STRONGLY ARGUES THAT IT MUST KNOW EXTENT TO WHICH ITALY BEING USED FOR STORAGE WEAPONS THIS TYPE AND BELIEVES THIS IS A MATTER WHICH NO SOVEREIGN STATE COULD OR SHOULD IGNORE. THEREFORE THE ARGUMENTS WE HAVE USED SO FAR, A) THAT GO! REPS HAVE PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AT SACEUR AND THAT B) CONSULTATION ON NUMBERS WOULD BE AN UNACCEPTABLE IMPEDIMENT TO SACEUR'S REQUIRED FLEXIBILITY HAVE NOT BEEN CONVINCING. IN FACT WE BELIEVE OUR ATTITUDE HAS TO SOME EXTENT AROUSED GOI SUSPICIONS THAT WE MAY PLAN STORE IN ITALY WEAPONS BEYOND NEEDS FOR ITALIAN DEFENSE.

I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF WE WERE TO PERSIST IN A POSITION WHICH MIGHT UNDERMINE THE VITAL BASIS OF MUTUAL TRUST WHICH HAS EXISTED IN THIS FIELD UP TO NOW AND RECOMMEND THAT WE GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD MEETING GO! DESIRE. PERHAPS AN "ORDER OF MAGNITUDE" FORMULA SUCH AS SUGGESTED

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
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
BY GENERAL NORSTAD MIGHT PROVE ACCEPTABLE SINCE, AS DEPT IS AWARE, GOI HAS BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE THIS FIELD; HAS PERMITTED ENTRY WEAPONS THUS FAR ON BASIS INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS; HAS ACQUIESCED IN OUR HAVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT AVIANO WITHOUT EVEN INFORMAL APPROVAL; AND, HAS NEVER BEEN INQUISITIVE AT EITHER GOVT OR FORCE LEVELS AS TO WHETHER OR IN WHAT QUANTITY WE HAVE ACTUALLY INTRODUCED SUCH WEAPONS. ALSO, WHEN WE RECENTLY SECURED PERMISSION RETURN ONE SQUADRON TO AVIANO NO QUESTION WAS RAISED RE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, NUMBERS INVOLVED, ETC.

EXPERIENCE THUS SUGGESTS THAT GOI WOULD PROBABLY TAKE A REASONABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY CONSULTATION FORMULA WE MIGHT PROPOSE, AND THAT THE "ORDER OF MAGNITUDE" FORMULA MIGHT WELL SUFFICE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE CONTINUE TO REFUSE AND IF SUSPICION AROUSED, THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION MIGHT BE ENDANGERED. EVEN IF WE SHOULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON OUR TERMS THE GOI MIGHT STILL, IF UNEASY OVER THE OUTCOME, LIMIT THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS ENTERING ITALY BY RESTRICTING STORAGE CAPACITY. GOI WOULD BE ABLE TO DO THIS SINCE ARTICLE 1, AS PROPOSED BY US, REQUIRES AGREEMENT WITH ITALY ON LOCATION OF STOCKS.

RE CONSENT FOR USE GO! WANTS PROVISION SAME AS THAT ALREADY INCLUDED IN IRBM AGREEMENT. I AGREE WITH GENERAL NORSTAD THAT SUCH A REQUEST CANNOT LEGITIMATELY BE DENIED. ALSO BELIEVE SUCH PROVISION FULLY CONSONANT WITH PARA 7 E) OF APRIL 20 POLICY DIRECTIVE, ALTHOUGH IRBM AGREEMENT WORDING CALLS FOR GO! "AGREEMENT" IT MAY BE POSSIBLE MEET GO! DESIRES BY SUBSTITUTING "CONSULTATION" FOR "AGREEMENT" AS FAVORED BY NORSTAD.

EMBASSY EXPECTS PROMPT ARRIVAL CINCEUR REPS TO ARRANGE FOR CONSULTATION ON COST PROBLEMS. EARLY AGREEMENT ON ABOVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES COULD FAVORABLY INFLUENCE GOL ATTITUDE





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FROM ROME

ON COSTS AND THUS LEAD TO EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION AGREEMENT.

EMBASSY HAS HAD NO INDICATION FROM GOI THAT ALLESSANDRINI HAS REPORTED GENERAL NORSTAD'S VIEWS BUT ASSUMES HE MUST HAVE AND THAT GOI NOW KNOWS OF SACEUR'S WILLINGNESS ARRIVE AT "ORDER OF MAGNITUDE" FORMULA FOR NUMBERS AND "CONSENT FOR USE" AGREEMENT.

REINHARDT

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