Selected Documents on the 1964 Election in Chile from
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico

Released by the Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department
Documents 245-278

245. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

250. Memorandum Prepared for the Special Group

253. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk

254. Telegram From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Chile (Jova) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)

272. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Coordination for Intelligence and Research (Carter) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)

245. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

Washington, January 3, 1964.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-01690R, DDO Files, Western Hemisphere, Chile, [file name not declassified]. Secret. Drafted on January 2. Forwarded through the Deputy Director for Plans. Copies were sent to DDCI, DDP, and ADDP.

Political Action Program in Chile

A. WHD Memorandum to DCI on Same Subject Dated 24 December 1963/2/
B. Memorandum dated 30 December 1963 from E.H. Knoche requesting clarification on some points of the WHD Memorandum/3/

/2/ Not found.

/3/ Not found. Enno Henry Knoche was Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

1. Our comments on the questions posed in Mr. Knoche’s memorandum are listed below.

2. Support for the Democratic Front

On 19 December 1963 the Special Group approved a one-time payment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to the Democratic Front [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./4/ The suggestion for this payment originated with Ambassador Cole and was concurred in by Assistant Secretary Martin. Arrangements are now being made to transfer this money [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This Special Group paper did not request regular monthly payments to the Democratic Front.

/4/ The minutes of the meeting are in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings, January 2, 1964.

During his December 1963 Washington visit, [name not declassified] mentioned that the Democratic Front required 1.5 million dollars for its election campaign-one million of which it could raise locally. The implication was a pitch for $500,000 from United States sources.

3. Present Assistance to the Christian Democratic Party

a. Policy Approval

In view of the ambiguous position of the Christian Democratic Party on a number of issues of interest to the United States, the subject of assistance to this party was periodically coordinated at various levels, with the people responsible for policy. The idea of assisting the Christian Democrats was first broached to us on 22 March 1962 by Ambassador Cole and the then Special Assistant to the President, Richard Goodwin. The Special Group approved a program of assistance to the Christian Democrats on 19 April 1962 and again on 30 August 1963./5/ The Latin American Policy Committee approved the continuation of the assistance at meetings held on 10 January 1963 and 20 June 1963./6/ On 14 August 1963 Mr. Martin and Ambassador Cole agreed again that this assistance should continue. The Special Group paper on one-time assistance to the Democratic Front which was approved on 19 December 1963 refers explicitly to our assistance to the Christian Democrats./7/

/5/ The funding approved was [text not declassified] and [text not declassified], respectively. The minutes of the Special Group meetings are in the Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings, April 26, 1962 and September 6, 1962.

/6/ The minutes for both meetings are ibid., LAPC Action Minutes, 1962-1963.

/7/ Reference is to a CIA paper for the Special Group, December 13, 1963. (Ibid., Special Group Files, Meetings, December 19, 1963)

b. Rationale for this Assistance

The reasons for our non-attributable assistance to the Christian Democratic Party are:

(1) To Deprive the Chilean Communist Party of Votes

The Christian Democratic Party is the fastest growing party in Chile. Its social program and evangelical fervor has enabled it to compete successfully with the Communists for the votes of students and workers. The Christian Democratic Party is the only non-Communist party in Chile in a position to attack directly the Communist Party at its mass base. This has been demonstrated in the municipal elections of April of last year, in the student elections, and in the fight for control of labor unions, which, though still controlled by the Communists, are showing the signs of Christian Democratic Party inroads.

(2) To Achieve a Measure of Influence Over Christian Democratic Party Policy

This objective could not be realized effectively because of security restrictions under which we must operate in this case. The Special Group, in approving assistance to the Christian Democratic Party, insisted that this assistance be non-attributable. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Since security has been tightly maintained, Eduardo Frei, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, is unwitting of the fact that he is being aided by the United States Government and believes that this assistance is being provided by his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] friends.

(3) To Foster a Non-Communist Coalition

One of the original objectives in March 1962 was to strengthen the Christian Democratic Party so that it would be more attractive to the Radical Party as a coalition partner. Up to April 1963 the Radicals had been the largest single party and the Christians the second largest in Chile. Hence a coalition of these parties with the greatest voter appeal was viewed as a viable non-Communist barrier. Since the Radical Party joined the Conservatives and Liberals in their own alliance, the Democratic Front, on 11 October 1962, this objective is not now feasible.

4. Parliament’s Role in the Election of a President

In the event no candidate achieves a majority, the Chilean constitution does provide parliament with the right to select the president between the two leading candidates. The composition of the present parliament is such that it could select the runner-up over the Popular Front candidate. Historically, however, parliament has never passed over the candidate who received the largest popular vote, and we have no hard intelligence to the effect that any leading groups are planning to do this, if it should become necessary, nor do we have any indication that public opinion would approve such a move. Moreover, parliamentary elections are scheduled for March 1965, and it is unlikely that many parliamentarians will conclude that their reelection will be best assured by going against the will of the people by flouting Chile’s proud democratic spirit and by assuming the responsibility for the civil unrest that would follow such a decision.

5. Military Intervention

Traditionally, the Chilean military establishment has not interfered with the political life of the country. The last military coup occurred in 1932. The Chilean military stood idly by and watched a Popular Front government assume power in 1938 and permitted it to govern until 1941 when it fell of its own weight and without military intervention. Although the military have the capabilities to intervene, we have no intelligence or other reports indicating they are planning or considering this.

6. How Business Circles View the 1964 Elections

The fact that the Socialist/Communist Front did not do as well as anticipated in the municipal elections of April 1963 has created some new optimism in regard to the 1964 election results. However, although we (and our counterparts in the State Department) do not view the election of the Popular Front candidate as a probability, we do feel it is a distinct possibility. Business circles of course have no illusion about what would happen should the Socialist/Communist Front win, but they believe this possibility to be less likely than we do.

Should a Christian Democratic victory occur, it might be noted that the Christian Democratic Party tends to favor selective nationalization and increased state planning. Undoubtedly, private industry would be in a better position with Duran as president and will probably suffer increased restrictions under a Christian Democratic administration.

7. Should we be Supporting the Christian Democratic Party

Although the Christian Democratic Party and the Democratic Front do not, in large measure, compete for the same votes and the Christian Democratic Party has demonstrated its ability to compete with the communists for worker votes, its position on a number of issues of interest to the United States makes it advisable to reexamine our aid to this party. [21/2 lines of source text not declassified] In any event, we must face the fact that the Christian Democratic Party will be less favorable and responsive to United States Government policies than the Democratic Front, that it will try to establish relations with Iron Curtain countries, that within the limited capability of Chile it will endeavor to increase its trade with the Soviet Bloc and will not follow the United States lead in foreign policy with the same willingness as the present government.

8. Should we Alter our Chilean Program

Two aspects of our Chilean program should be exploited with Secretary Mann.

a. Depending on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] our intelligence reports, and State Department findings, the entire subject of Chilean election subsidies, with particular emphasis on assistance to the Democratic Front, should be discussed with Secretary Mann.

b. If a decision is made to continue assistance to the Christian Democratic Party, an effort should be made to achieve greater influence over it by modifying the Special Group restriction on non-attributability. Funds could be provided in a fashion causing Frei to infer United States origin of funds and yet permitting plausible denial.

J. C. King/8/

/8/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

250. Memorandum Prepared for the Special Group/1/

Washington, April 1, 1964.

/1/ Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969. Secret; Eyes Alone. Dungan forwarded the paper to Bundy as an attachment to an April 2 memorandum in which he commented: "As I told you this morning, I have no way of knowing whether $750,000 is the right amount, but I certainly would not balk at it. You might inquire, however, why the cost of campaigning in [text not declassified] Chile is always so much higher than it is in the United States. As I indicated, I will follow up with Des[mond FitzGerald] on the implementation of this program without getting in any further than is absolutely necessary." (Ibid.)

Support for the Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September 1964

A. Memorandum for The Special Group, dated 13 December 1963, Subject: Financial Support to Chilean Democratic Front [1 line of source text not declassified]/2/
B. Memorandum for The Special Group, dated 27 August 1962, Subject: Support to the Christian Democratic Party of Chile (PDC)/3/

/2/ Not printed. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings, December 19, 1963)

/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., August 30, 1962)

1. Summary

This is a proposal for political and propaganda action directed at the defeat of Salvador Allende, the Communist-supported candidate for the Chilean presidential elections of 4 September 1964. The sum of $750,000 is being requested for the implementation of courses of action that will contribute to this objective by increasing the organizational efficiency and campaigning ability of the Christian Democratic Party, by inducing as far as feasible, supporters of the former Democratic Front to cast their votes for Frei and deny their support to Allende, and by attempting to discourage third candidacies-such as Jorge Prat’s. It should be noted that representatives of the Christian Democratic Party visited, on their own initiative, the U.S. Embassy in Santiago on 26 March and, after presenting their current and proposed budgets, asked for a one million dollar subsidy for Frei’s campaign. The Embassy and our field representative recommended that this amount be provided for this purpose.

Funds for this activity have not been programmed for FY 1964 and are not available within the Agency; it is recommended that this amount be obtained from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.

2. Problem

To provide financial support, as necessary, to the democratic forces of Chile in an effort to defeat Salvador Allende, the Communist-sponsored candidate of FRAP. The objectives of this support are: (a) to minimize the number of democratic votes that may drift to FRAP as a result of the fractionalization of the Democratic Front; (b) to obtain the support of democratic parties and organizations for Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic candidate; (c) to strengthen the Christian Democratic organizational structure and campaigning ability so that it can appeal to the largest number of Chileans including FRAP voters, former Democratic Front supporters, and new voters; and (d) to induce "Independent" candidates, such as Jorge Prat, to withdraw from the campaign.

3. Factors Bearing on the Problem

a. The Curico by-elections of 15 March 1964 changed the Chilean political spectrum radically by forcing the withdrawal of the Democratic Front’s presidential candidate, Julio Duran, and disrupting the Democratic Front coalition composed of the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical parties.

b. The dissolution of the Democratic Front has polarized the elections around the candidacies of Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party and Salvador Allende of FRAP. In this situation the preferences of the voters who had been committed to Duran become the key to the election and to the defeat of Allende. In turn, the attitudes of these voters will be heavily influenced by the official position of the Radical, Conservative, and Liberal parties. The parties of the Democratic Front coalition polled approximately 921,000 votes in the April 1963 municipal elections which amounted to 46% of the votes cast. (Out of this 46%, the Radicals got 21.6%, the Liberals got 13.1%, and the Conservatives got 11.3%.) As a basis of comparison it should be noted that the Christian Democratic Party obtained 453,000 (23%) votes and FRAP 583,000 (29%) votes at that time. Since the estimated electorate for the 1964 presidential elections is two and one quarter million, either candidate will have to poll roughly one million, one hundred, and fifty thousand votes to win. Thus, even if there is no precise correlation between the voting patterns of municipal as compared to presidential elections it is clear that neither candidate can hope to win the elections of 4 September without appealing to a substantial number of the Conservative, Liberal, Radical, and new voters.

c. It can be said, in general, that the majority of the Conservative vote will be for Frei in view of this party’s Catholic tradition. The Liberal Party, which is staunchly anti-Communist, also can probably be depended upon to deliver a substantial segment of its vote to Frei. Historical factors, including the traditional anti-clericalism of the Radical Party and its past participation in a Popular Front Government, indicate that a substantial number of votes will probably shift from that party to FRAP.

d. The ability of the Christian Democratic Party to appeal openly for the vote of the former Democratic Front is seriously limited by Frei’s need to maintain his image as an honest and dedicated leader of the underprivileged who is above political "deals." Conversely, the leaders of the former parties of the Democratic Front, especially the Radical Party which depends heavily on patronage to maintain its organization intact, would be hard pressed to throw their support to Frei in the absence of a PDC public appeal for their assistance. This dilemma poses the need for an external stimulus which will bring the Democratic Front parties and the PDC to a sophisticated agreement on the support of Frei for the presidential elections.

e. Apart from the problem noted above, there remains the persistent need to assist the PDC in the construction of an efficient capillary organization that will conduct an effective campaign, especially among peasants and women. A tentative analysis of the Curico election results indicate that the greatest FRAP gains and Democratic Front losses came from the category of peasants and women. Consequently, Frei must make a major organizational effort to counteract FRAP influence in these areas. The Curico campaign also demonstrated that the PDC organization is inadequately supplied with vehicles, party workers, loudspeakers, and the other accouterments of an effective campaign.

f. Thus, as a result of the situation outlined above, it becomes necessary to take all possible action to assist Frei in his campaign and to limit the number of former Democratic Front votes that might go to Allende. Some of the methods that will be used to achieve these objectives, insofar as feasible, are:

(1) Bring pressure to bear on the Radical Party to prevent it from formally endorsing Allende, or, failing in this, to remain neutral or to run its own candidate if it appears that he will not damage Frei. In the event the Radical Party declares for Allende, financial assistance will have to be provided to individual Radical leaders or groups capable of bringing Radical voters into the Frei camp.

(2) To influence the Conservative and Liberal parties to support Frei in a manner that will not damage his image as a reform candidate. To achieve this it will be necessary to provide financial assistance to the Liberal and Conservative parties or those of their leaders who will work to swing their votes behind Frei.

(3) Provide a substantial subsidy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the purpose of strengthening his electoral machine and campaign capabilities. Efforts will also be made to influence Frei to reach a private agreement with the Radicals for their support in exchange for some patronage.

(4) Bring pressure to bear on Jorge Prat, partly through Conservative and Liberal leaders, to induce his withdrawal from the presidential contest.

(5) Provide financial assistance, as necessary, to ancillary organizations, such as youth and student groups, peasant organizations, slum dwellers’ associations, labor unions, and women’s clubs, to bring their votes to Frei.

(6) In the latter stages of the campaign to buy some votes outright if required.

(7) [3 lines of source text not declassified]

(8) Some funds will also be utilized for specialized propaganda operations, some of which will be black, to denigrate Allende.

4. Coordination

This proposal has been coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs who believes that-should it appear necessary at a later date-additional funds should be sought./4/

/4/ In a memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, April 2, Mann approved the proposal with the following clarification: 1) that the money be divided, [text not declassified] going to support Frei and the remainder to other objectives; 2) that Frei be made "explicitly aware" that the U.S. Government was the source of the money; and 3) that the procedures for transferring the money be "closely coordinated with Mr. Mann." (Ibid., April 2, 1964)

In this regard, it should be noted that on 26 March 1964 the Embassy was visited by Frei’s [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] campaign managers who presented their current budget showing a rate of expenditure of $100,000 per month which they claim they are meeting with much difficulty. They also presented a proposed campaign budget for the next five months of $300,000 per month which they state would be required to mount an effective campaign. The Chileans suggested that the U.S. Government make up this difference which amounts to one million dollars for the period from now to election time. The Embassy and our field representative reviewed the budgets, felt they did not seem unreasonable, and subsequently recommended that the Chilean’s request for one million dollars be granted as soon as possible.

At the same time, the Embassy strongly recommended that the mechanics of the operation insure that this assistance not seem to come from U.S. sources.

5. Recommendation

It is recommended that:

a. Action under paragraph 3 f above be approved for immediate implementation.

b. The U.S. Government provide $750,000 for this purpose.

c. Funds [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified], be passed covertly in a manner [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to infer U.S. Government origin of the funds yet permit us plausible denial if necessary. This will be done by attributing the funds, explicitly, to U.S. non-official sources. This approach is required in an effort to obtain some essential leverage [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

It is realized that this recommendation does not reflect the Embassy’s position./5/

/5/ The Special Group met on April 2 at 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 408, Date Books, 1964) The minutes of the meeting record the decision on Chile as follows: "The paper, ‘Support for Chilean Presidential Elections,’ was approved. Mr. FitzGerald announced that a solution to the slight difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the CAS in Santiago had been reached and that attribution of U.S. support would be inferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr. FitzGerald indicated that this was operationally feasible." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, April 9, 1964, 116)

253. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 1, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Dentzer.

Presidential Election in Chile

This memorandum will inform you of the status of the presidential race and indicate US Government activity concerning this important election./2/

/2/ Bundy forwarded this memorandum to the President under a May 13 covering memorandum that noted the importance of the upcoming Presidential election in Chile. "In essence, the problem we face is that a very popular and attractive candidate, named Allende, who has thrown in his lot with the Communists, has more than a fighting chance to win. We have a coordinated Government-wide program of action to strengthen his opponent and support actions in Chile which will work to the advantage of those now in power. It is a highly fluid situation and one in which there may have to be further action as we get into the summer. I have been very much encouraged by the determination and unity which all Departments of the Government are showing on this one, and we will be watching it very closely, but I do think you ought to know about it yourself." (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IV)


On September 4, two months before our own elections, a critical presidential election is scheduled in Chile. The two leading candidates are Salvador Allende, an avowed Marxist leader of a Communist-

Socialist coalition, and Eduardo Frei. Frei heads the Christian Democratic Party, a somewhat left of center reform party close to the Catholic Church. In the 1958 election Allende came within 32,000 votes of winning a plurality and becoming president.

At this point in the campaign, most observers rate Frei slightly ahead, but the race will be extremely close and many things could happen in the four months before the election. The democratic forces are presently split, with Radical party candidate Julio Duran back in the race after the results of a congressional bi-election in March shattered his coalition of rightist parties and indicated he stood almost no chance of being elected. Also working against Frei is a Chilean tolerance for native Communists, who have long been on the public scene, and a long-standing anti-clerical feeling which hurts the Church-identified Christian Democrats.

Discussion of U.S. Action Program

Clearly, the September election will be determined by factors which are deeply rooted in the political, economic, and social fabric of the Chilean scene and by the campaign abilities of the major contenders. Given the consequences, however, if this major Latin American nation should become the first country in the hemisphere to freely choose an avowed Marxist as its elected president, the Department, CIA, and other agencies have embarked on a major campaign to prevent Allende’s election and to support Frei, the only candidate who has a chance of beating him. Chief elements in this campaign are the following:

1) Providing covert assistance through secret CIA channels to Frei’s campaign chest and for other anti-Allende campaign uses. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been approved by the Special Group and earmarked for these purposes, and additional funds will be sought as necessary.

2) Providing AID loans in CY 64 amounting to approximately $70 million, principally in program budget loans to maintain the level of the government investment budget, thereby keeping the economy as a whole active and unemployment low. $60 million of this aid has already been extended./3/

/3/ On April 3 the United States and Chile signed an agreement to provide $55 million in program loan assistance in CY 1964. For an account on how the funds were utilized, see United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case Study, Washington, 1966, p. 31.

3) Examining means to alleviate the rising cost of living through efforts to increase the supply and lower the price of major foods. We are making available $20 million of PL 480, almost half of which is wheat. In addition, we are reviewing our on-going PL 480 Title III food distribution program through voluntary organizations to expand it wherever possible; the current FY 64 program costs $12.5 million and touches an estimated 2 million people, 1/4 of Chile’s population.

4) Assisting U.S. business groups with information and advice through David Rockefeller’s Business Group for Latin America-a blue ribbon group of American companies in Latin America-in their support of a Chilean business group helping Frei and attempting to hold down prices.

5) Organizing a political action and propaganda campaign through CIA contacts in coordination with or parallel to Frei’s campaign. This includes voter registration drives, propaganda, person-to-person campaigning in the cities and rural areas, and arrangements to provide some Italian Christian Democratic organizers to Frei as advisers on campaign techniques.

6) Encouraging the GOC and IMF to avoid rupturing their stand-by stabilization agreement, a break which would have damaging financial and psychological consequences. An IMF team presently is completing a review in Chile, and a Chilean team sent by President Alessandri will arrive in Washington on May 4 for discussions with the Department.

7) Attempting discreetly through normal U.S. contacts with the non-political Chilean military and police to encourage their rising awareness of the subversion which would take place under an Allende government.

8) Continuing USIA placement in Chile of unattributed material, giving special care to low-keyed efforts which do not expose U.S. Government involvement.

9) Encouraging, through covert ties and private U.S. organizations, effective anti-Allende efforts by Chilean organizations including the Roman Catholic Church, trade union groups, and other influential bodies, such as the anti-clerical Masons.

We are attempting to insure that extraordinary caution is observed in this action campaign to conceal official U.S. government interest, and we have rejected several ideas which have seemed to entail undue risks or excessive American involvement.


I plan to strengthen our Embassy in Chile in the four months prior to the election by adding to the present staff there next week a top-ranking political officer with an excellent record on the Cuban desk, Robert Hurwitch./4/

/4/ Hurwitch was given the rank of first secretary in the Embassy’s political section. Although he reported to Santiago in May, Hurwitch did not officially assume his position until July 5.

I also plan to raise with Ambassador Cole, who recently arrived in the U.S. by ship on two months’ leave from post, the desirability of interrupting his vacation to return to Chile soon for a ten-day period. I am aware of the background concerning his two months’ leave, but I am concerned about possible reactions in Chile and the U.S. to so long an absence in relation to this critical election./5/

/5/ Later that afternoon Mann told Rusk that "he would like to talk about Chile and a number of problems." A meeting was set for 6 p.m. (Rusk to Mann, May 1, 12:14 p.m., National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls 4/20/64-5/22/64) According to Rusk’s Appointment Book Rusk met Mann at 6:35 p.m. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

254. Telegram From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Chile (Jova) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)/1/

Santiago, May 5, 1964.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile, 1964-1967. Secret; Priority. Also addressed to Dentzer. The telegram was forwarded through CIA channels.

76320. Please pass to Mann and Dentzer from Jova.

1. Accompanied by Robinson/2/ I had a two-hour conversation May 4 with Frei at latter’s home. Also present was latter’s top political advisor, Juan de Dios Carmona. At end of conversation/3/ Frei asked to see me alone.

/2/ John P. Robinson, AID mission director in Santiago.

/3/ During the earlier discussion, Frei expressed "unusual optimism" concerning his electoral prospects-although he "jokingly observed that his selfish interests should lead him paint a bleaker picture to the US authorities for obvious reasons." (Telegram 999 from Santiago, May 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE) Jova urged Frei to reconsider his position on a presidential election by congress should no candidate receive an absolute majority of the vote; Frei had publicly accepted the tradition of selecting the front-runner, even though the Chilean constitution formally allowed a choice between the two leading candidates. Jova reported that "this is obviously a course which does not appeal to him [Frei], but which he might be prepared to follow if the margin by which he trailed were small and providing the military as well as the congress were cooperative." (Telegram 1005 from Santiago, May 5; ibid.)

2. He started off this private conversation by expressing gravest concern activities and indiscretion of [name not declassified]. He said he had been horrified to hear that on at least two occasions [name not declassified] had spoken indiscriminately in regard to USG aid to the Frei campaign. On one occasion speaking to Salvador Pubill, PDC campaign finance manager, [name not declassified] told him he saw no emergency requirement in collecting funds from industrialists for campaign in view of fact that Frei was to receive one million dollars in assistance from USG. On another occasion he told Antonio Baeza of COPEC that the financial resources of the business community should be kept in reserve for the congressional elections in March as the Frei campaign was well supplied with funds amounting to approximately one million dollars from USG and private sources. On a third occasion he said (it was not clear to whom) that on his recent trip to the U.S. he had agreed arrange with [name not declassified] and his group that the technique to follow would be to feed funds raised by [name not declassified] to Frei to help him win campaign but with ultimate intention of using this as a noose with which to control him once he were elected president.

3. Frei said that he has only seen [name not declassified] three times in his life and on only one occasion, at a recent tea at his house, had serious campaign matters been discussed. He was concerned however at [name not declassified] thrashing around in a variety of political fields in which he was unfamiliar and in which he seemed to be enjoying "playing cops and robbers". He told me that he had impression [name not declassified] respected and paid attention to me and hoped that I would convey to him the message to be discreet. Statements such as those he had made above might already have done great damage to his campaign and moreover they were in large part untrue. He hoped that all concerned would be extremely careful on any loose talk on any matters connected with financial assistance. Much of this in any case was still undecided upon but any linking of him to USG or U.S. private sector financial assistance was fatal.

4. (FitzGerald and Gomez felt that their own conversation with [name not declassified] seems bear out some of above allegations. Hence we decided Belton/4/ in view his close friendship might be best person admonish [name not declassified] and we asked him to do so prior his departure last night’s plane.)

/4/ William Belton, then political advisor to the Commander in Chief, Southern Command, had been counselor at the Embassy in Santiago, 1956-1958.

5. As will be reported in separate telegram/5/ Frei said he thought that Duran should be kept in the race at any price. Although some members of his party disagreed with him he said he still was of firm opinion that a withdrawal by Duran might have as its consequence the endorsement of Allende by Radical Party or instances of individual Radical senators and deputies proclaiming Allende individually. Such actions would then enhance Allende’s stature as "democratic", respectable candidate and would serve increase his independent votes.

/5/ Telegram 1000 from Santiago, May 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE) On April 5 Durán reentered the race as the candidate of the Radical Party.

6. He spoke with considerable cordiality in regard to Duran and expressed hope that some way might be found help him financially. While such support might be obtained from Radical bankers and business men, he doubted that enough would be forthcoming and felt that serious consideration should be given subsidizing him either from PDC campaign funds or from other (presumably USG) sources. He said subsidy required would add up to some escudos 450,000. From this campaign chest Radical deputies would in turn be subsidized at rote escudos 4,000 apiece. He said some "dignified" manner to channel this subsidy would have to be found, that it should not in any way be through PDC officials but might preferably be handled through some pro-Radical banker or business man.

7. Frei said he would call on Duran personally in next few days in order try salve his feelings which have been hurt by other PDC activities and church attitudes. He would speak to [name not declassified] on latter and asked me to do same. (I intend to do this by merely reporting to [name not declassified] without comment some of Duran’s complaints.)/6/

/6/ Mann replied on May 18: "We informed [name not declassified] of [name not declassified] indiscretions and told him effort being made put gag on [name not declassified]. We have no reason to believe American business community will make contributions to campaign." (Mann to Jova, undated; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA Country Files, Chile, 1964-1967)

272. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Coordination for Intelligence and Research (Carter) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/

Washington, October 1, 1964.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965. Secret. Also addressed to Denney and Evans.

ARA-Agency Meeting September 30, 1964

ARA-Mr. Mann, Mr. Adams, Mr. Pryce
CIA-Mr. FitzGerald, [name not declassified]
INR/DDC-Mr. Carter


FitzGerald said the Station Chief in Chile had talked with Ambassador Cole shortly before the latter’s departure from Santiago and that Cole said Secretary Rusk doesn’t want us in our dealings with the Frei Government to use leverage acquired through support of the CD./2/ FitzGerald said this made him very unhappy. He wanted to know if Mann was aware of a directive of this nature.

/2/ According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, Rusk met with Cole on September 11. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.

Mann said he was not. In any case, he added, it depended on the way you use leverage. He doubted that the Secretary’s directive was "as sweeping as it sounds." He thought the matter could easily be cleared up by talking with the Secretary./3/

/3/ A handwritten note in the margin by this paragraph reads: "INR participation?"

[name not declassified], who made a recent trip to Chile, said he found Jova (DCM) concerned about "our using our power position." Mann commented he was not worried about using it; only about our misusing it.

FitzGerald said "it’s the atmosphere of mistrust that bothers me."

Said Mann: "Don’t worry. I trust you."

Mann went on to reveal there will be a new Ambassador in Santiago soon and indicated it would be Ralph Dungan, though cautioned that this was to be held close since the agrement had not yet been requested.

Mann said a topflight economist is needed to replace the outgoing economic counselor./4/ In his view the political battle is over. The battle now will be in the economic field.

/4/ The outgoing chief of the economic section, Thomas R. Favell, did not report to his next assignment until August 1965. He was replaced 3 months later by Robert G. Walker.

[name not declassified] reported that while in Chile he talked with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whom we assisted to the tune of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] shortly before the September 4 election./5/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] told him that funds on hand would last only until December, clearly implying he expected more. [name not declassified] said he made it clear to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that no more funds would be forthcoming. Asked if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had clearly understood this [name not declassified] replied, "He didn’t hear me."

/5/ See Document 267.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cuba and Venezuela.]