



Concept Development & Experimentation Directorate
 Army Capabilities Integration Center
 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
 







Defeating An Insurgency Seminar Wargame

“Changing the Environment”

February 20-23, 2007
McLean, VA



Panel 3:
**Frame the Problem, Set Initial Conditions and
 Develop the Approach, Issues and Insights**

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Frame the Problem

Current Conditions:

- The KRG move for an independent Iraqi Kurdistan is a potential problem throughout the moderate Arab world and for the coalition
- Increased Sunni Arab émigrés attempting to enter the Kurdistan area
- KRG is maneuvering into a position to control the Kirkuk oilfields
- Coalition forces remain in Iraq
- Early stage of insurgency with goal to overthrow the government
 - Al Qaeda (Sunni Arabs) and Ansar al Islam (Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds)
 - Expansion of insurgency (Sunni Rebels) is a symptom of Kurdish / Arab tensions
- There is the potential for neighboring states (Turkey & Iran) to intervene against PKK and PJAK
- Rising level of violence within the KRG
- Turkey and Iran have a keen interest in maintaining status quo
- Peshmerga provides an indigenous security force
- Decreasing public support for the KRG

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Frame the Problem

Current Conditions (cont):

- What does the KRG gain from remaining part of a federated Iraq?
 - Keeps the neighboring countries at bay
 - Routes available for oil distribution (percentage of oil revenue)
 - Trade in general
 - International recognition
 - Coalition support
- What are the Kurdish perceptions of an independent KRG?
 - 100% of oil revenue from the Kirkuk oilfields
 - Ethnic pride, re-address historic wrongs
 - Nation state status
 - Less support from Coalition
 - Possible Turkish/Iranian intervention



Frame the Problem

Current Conditions (cont):

- What is the spill over from an independent Kurdistan?
 - Danger of being surrounded by hostile neighbors
 - Current friends could be enemies
 - Border disputes with ICG and Sunni Arabs
 - Tension generated by other independence movements
 - Potential resistance from the ICG over Oil revenues
 - KRG loses U.S. support
 - Economic problems due to closed borders and temporary loss of oil export
 - Situation in Kurdistan is influenced by larger situation in Iraq
 - Sunni Arab refugee / IDPs
- Turkey
 - PKK terrorism/insurgency in Anatolia
 - Turkey desire EU membership
 - Large well connected Kurdish Diaspora in EU
 - Chances of Islamic radicalization of Turkish government



Frame the Problem

Describe the Insurgency: (1/2)

- **Insurgency nascent but growing:**
 - **Ansar al Islam (Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds) Endstate:**
 - Proponents of a Sunni radical interpretation of Islam and Holy War
 - Want Coalition forces out of Iraq
 - Creation of an Islamic state in northern Iraq
 - **Al Qaeda (Sunni Arabs) Endstate:**
 - Force the withdrawal of US led forces from Iraq
 - Maintain Sunni Arab control of Kirkuk, adjacent oil fields, prevent Kurdish de-Arabization efforts and to strike at Coalition forces and infrastructure
 - Establish a Sunni Islamic state
 - **Sunni Arab clashes focused on Kirkuk and Mosul**
 - **Influx of Sunni émigrés into region**
 - **Attempts to force Sunni Arabs out of Kirkuk and Mosul**
 - Expansion of insurgency (Sunni Rebels) is a symptom of Kurdish / Arab tensions



Frame the Problem

Describe the Insurgency: (2/2)

- **Insurgency nascent but growing (Cont):**
 - **PJAK and PKK activities against Iran and Turkey respectively (Kurdistan is the sanctuary for both insurgents)**
 - **PJAK Endstate:** An independent secular Kurdistan in Iran. Eventually becoming a "Greater Kurdistan"
 - **PKK Endstate:** Want to create an independent Kurdish state in Eastern Turkey (where 50+% of the Kurdish population resides)



Purpose

To Achieve:

Stable, economically viable, multi-ethnic, and semi-autonomous region that is mindful of the rule of law and cooperates with the ICG: capable of minimizing Kurdish-based regional threats

- Security forces capable of defending the region from internal and external threats without posing a threat to neighbors
- Insurgent elements isolated & neutralized (maintained for and by the population)
- Sunni immigration no longer causing instability
- An agreed upon process to resolve border issues
- A negotiated resolution of Kirkuk oilfield revenues achieved
- Ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil
- Kurdistan remains part of a federated Iraqi state
- Ensure PKK and PJAK activities below threshold of foreign intervention
- Minimal popular support for radical Islamic movement
- Maintain minimal U.S. presence and visibility




Campaign Design

Assumptions:

- Disaffected Sunnis are the primary source of insurgent manpower for al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam
- This is a coalition operation
- Kurdish population will support the decision of the Kurdish Government to back off of independence movement
- Neighboring states do not want Kurdistan to gain independence
- ICG remains stable
- Necessary SOFA are in place

Kurdistan Logical Lines of Operation



Campaign Design Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Diplomatic Efforts

- Build international legitimacy
- Establish regional stability with bordering states
- Determine the interests of border states (Turkey, Syria and Iran) and identify which of our objectives they will support and what they may attempt to subvert
- Coalition and regional support to reverse actions to establish an independent Kurdistan
- Coalition and regional support for the KRG as part of a federated Iraqi state
- Establish a unified coalition effort (civil and military)



Campaign Design Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Governance:

- Resolve Sunni Arab immigration problem
- Address the Arab and Kurd property disputes in Mosul and Kirkuk
- Facilitate and reward good governance programs
 - Rule of Law
 - Fair elections
 - Culturally acceptable business practices
 - Minority rights
 - Freedom of the Press
- With the ICG and KRG develop process to define regional / provincial boundaries and the roles & responsibilities of the respective governments (jurisdictional implications)



Campaign Design Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Security

- Training and employing Kurdish Security Forces
- Educate U.S. advisors to understand the relevant laws and customs
- Establish regional stability with bordering states (focus on PJAK and PKK)
- Enable the security forces to handle the local threats
 - Intelligence resources
- Assess the performance of all forces
- Assist in the interdiction of external support to internal insurgents.
- Assist in the protection of key Iraqi / Kurdish infrastructure



Campaign Design Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Essential Services / Economic Development

- Maintain oil flow
- Maintain trade with neighboring states
- Monitor the economic growth in the area (all ethnic groups)
- Continue to promote equal employment
- Monitor and improve essential services



Campaign Design Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Information Operations

- Participate in a viable public information program to encourage popular support of the Federated Iraq
- Build international support for the Coalition efforts in Iraq
- Internal I/O campaign focused on unique Kurdish issues
- Target insurgent infrastructure/support
- Attempt to influence, ICW with the Kurdish education ministry, an educational curriculum and supporting texts that teach tolerance
- Information operations message reinforces tolerance and acceptance of others
- Ensure mutual support of actions vs. message



Approach to Setting Initial Conditions

Conditions:

- Set diplomatic conditions for coalition assistance
 - ICG and KRG commitment to resolve the problems
 - Commitment from U.S. government.
 - Interagency support
 - KRG has tabled independence movement
 - Determine interests of border states
- Coalition understands the complex dynamics along the "green line"
- ICG supports efforts against insurgents

Objectives:

- Ensure unity of command
- Train security forces capable of suppressing insurgents
- Minimize Coalition "footprint" in KRG
- Enable ICG to resolve the problems in Kurdistan



Approach to Setting Initial Conditions

Required Actions:

- Diplomatic actions ICW the ICG to ensure KRG tables their independence movement
- Establish a unified coalition effort (civil and military)
- Assess:
 - ICG assessment of regional problems
 - KRG security forces
 - Governance / Rule of Law
 - Economy and Infrastructure
 - Social Services
 - Cultural Intelligence (especially along the "green line")
 - Provincial boundaries
 - Property disputes
 - Tribes
 - Militias
 - Insurgent threats (internal & external)
- Develop the organization & the Campaign Plan ICW the ICG / KRG
- Develop a strategic communications plan



Approach to Setting Initial Conditions

Capabilities:

- Multi-agency / multi-national expertise empowered to leverage the capabilities of their department or agency
- Security assistance
- Liaison with ICG and KRG
- Public information expertise
- Build governing and security capacity
- Obtain regional/international support
- Persuade KRG leadership to back-off from independence movement
- Population and regionally oriented intelligence network
- Political / economic / cultural / energy expertise
- Regional diplomacy
- Leadership expertise
- Appropriate funding for flexible and rapid interagency activity
- Use of contractors



Capability Gaps

Capability Gaps:

- Unity of command
- Funding for flexible and rapid interagency activity
- Communication gap with Sunni Arab / Tribal leaders
- Assistance to law enforcement / legal system
- Regional diplomacy
- Political / economic / demographic / cultural / energy expertise
- Integrated population and regionally oriented intelligence analysis
 - Integrate indigenous HUMINT and U.S. technical capabilities
- Obtain regional / international support
- Capability to build governing and security capacity
- Population control measures
 - National ID cards
 - National Census
- Government advisors working with ICG / KRG / provincial / local governments
- Development / production of education materials for the educational system



COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Conditions:

- Internal insurgent groups no longer threaten the stability of the KRG
 - Al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam
- Iraqi infrastructure secure in northern Iraq
- Stability of the "Green Line"
- An agreed upon process to resolve border issues
- KRG satisfied with the ICG plan for sharing of oil revenues
- Volume of Sunni Arab émigrés is at a manageable level
- Inter-ethnic tensions managed by rule of law
- External insurgent groups no longer incite the intervention of the neighboring states
 - PKK & PJAK
- Kurdish autonomy is a diminished concern for the ICG



COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Objectives:

- KRG backed-away from independence
- The KRG is stable and secure:
 - Violence and security return to pre-crisis levels
 - All internal insurgencies reduced to a level that can be handle by KRG security forces
 - External insurgents being contained by KRG security forces
 - Ethnic tensions reduced
 - KRG cooperating with the ICG
- Oil revenue sharing being mediated between KRG and ICG
- Physical control of the Kirkuk oilfields resolved to the satisfaction of both the KRG and ICG (remained controlled by the ICG)
- With the ICG and KRG develop process to define regional / provincial boundaries and the roles & responsibilities of the respective governments (jurisdictional implications)



COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Required Actions (1/2)

- Apply diplomatic pressure on the ICG and KRG to resolve issue related to ownership and oil revenue sharing of the Kirkuk oilfields
- Advise / support Kurdish security force operations against the insurgents
- Assist in the Interdiction of external support to internal insurgents
- Assist in the protection of key Iraqi / Kurdish infrastructure
- Ensure ICG and KRG effort to prevent ethnic cleansing
- Control emigration of Sunni Arabs
 - Displaced person system monitored (PRC)
 - Resettlement plan for émigrés
- International level program / arbitration board to resolve property disputes between Kurds and Sunni Arabs with a appropriate compensation / resettlement program
 - Work with moderate Sunni Arab nations (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, etc.) to help resource relocation of losers of arbitration
- Facilitate and reward good governance programs



COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Required Actions (2/2)

- Monitor trade with neighboring states
- Monitor the economic growth in the area (all ethnic groups)
- Promote equal employment
- Monitor and improve essential services
- Attempt to influence, ICW with the Kurdish education ministry, an educational curriculum and supporting texts that teach tolerance
- Information operations message reinforces tolerance and acceptance of others
- Information operations to isolate the insurgents from the population



COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Capabilities:

- Provide CA and PSYOP support to assist Kurdish security forces
 - Tips and rewards programs
 - Civilian non-interference program
 - Safety program
 - Support of counter-propaganda
 - Advise legal system and governance
- Competent Kurdish security forces operating within the Rule of Law
- Population control measures
- Government advisors working with ICG / KRG / provincial / local governments
- Development / production of education materials for the educational system
- Coalition capabilities to provide training and education to the Kurdish forces conducting COIN operations



COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Capability Gaps:

- Population control measures
 - National ID cards
 - National Census
- Government advisors working with ICG / KRG / provincial / local governments
- Development / production of education materials for the educational system



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
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**Panel 3:
Insights, Implications and Actionable Recommendations**




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Ideal Vision of Transition




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Realistic Vision of Transition



Building Capacity – Options



Panel 3

Insight 1

What are the DOTMLPF implications for the military to increases or build partner capacity without interagency support in these areas?

- Governance
- Policing / Judicial
- Education / training
- Agriculture
- Economic Development

There are significant DOTMLPF implications for all of these categories

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Panel 3

Insight 1

Key DOTMLPF Implications

- Governance Teams / Doctrine / Training already exist – but too little
- Ensure current doctrine for governance is not CA specific
- Develop career tracks for building capacity
 - ✓ New MOS and new ASIs
 - ✓ Ability to code, track active, NG, RC, prior service and retired individuals
- DOD ability to call-up and deploy expertise to areas of conflict
 - ✓ Ability to code individuals based on civilian skills
- Provide education/training: just tools and / or content?
- Holistic agriculture program vs. local farming
 - ✓ Distribution
 - ✓ Marketing
 - ✓ Storage
- Flexible, available and responsive funding
- Legislative changes required

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Panel 3

Insight 1

Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

- Governance:
 - (O,P,F) CA BN – AC Per Div
 - Governance Teams / Doctrine / Training already exist – but too little & in RC
 - (O,P) RC "governance unit" = akin to RC medical units
 - (D,O,T,P) Knowledge broker (ethnicity based)– Recruit to build network
 - Cultural consultant
 - AC / RC / Contractor
 - Adam Smith serves to help the QC
 - NGOs are regional experts

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Insight 1

Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

- Governance:
 - ---

AC / RC

Title 10 Civilians / SOF For Life

Contractors

 - (O, L, P) Establish contingency contractor relationship with NGO and contracts who specialize in governance type work (Brown & Root analogy)
 - (D) Recognition of differences between "governance advice" vs "Martial Law"
 - (D, T) Training and doctrine for execution of martial law
 - (D) Ensure current doctrine for governance is not CA specific

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Panel 3

Insight 1

Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

• Policing and Judicial

- (D) MP / CA / JAG decision
- (O) active / NG - RC split, MP / JAG capacity expansion
- (T) New doctrine/new mission requires training
- (M) More study required but example; Civilian clothes with force protection
- (L) Change mind set
- (P) New MOS, new ASI and ability to code and track active / NG - RC and retired individuals
- (F) Create CTC-like facility for this mission

- Legislative changes required

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Panel 3

Insight 1

Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

Education / Training

• Intent: U.S. help build system

- Provide tools and/or content?
- Organization / structures / supplies

- (D) Need to establish a doctrine (infrastructure, funding, materials, teachers), unknown CA capabilities, needs expansion,
- (O) Develop and expand units (CA) active duty vice reserve, multi-functioning elements capable of handing all nation building functions, CA MTTs to train deploying units
- (T) CA training, Pre-deployment unit training, General Nation building training for leadership at various levels
- (M,F) Facilities, classroom materials / supplies / needs funding
- (L) Educate leaders at various levels, cultural sensitivity
- (P) Develop career tracks for nation building

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Insight 1

•Insight 1: The military needs to be capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

- Agriculture
 - Goals: increase productivity, increase self-sufficiency, and increase employment
 - (D,O,T,L,P) Techniques
 - University partnering
 - Contract farming trainers
 - "Dual track" reservist, especially IRR, under CA control
 - Liaison with NGOs
 - Develop host nation department of Agriculture
 - Liaison with U.S. Department of Agriculture (Irrigation engineering, water conservation)
 - Issues:
 - Holistic agriculture program vs. local farming
 - Closely tie agriculture to economic program
 - Gap:
 - DOD ability to recall and deploy agriculture experts to areas of conflict

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Insight 1

•Insight 1: The military needs to be capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

Economic development

- Expectation (D, O, T, L, P)
 - Long term Programs
 - Structured, centralized
 - USAID, etc
 - Short term projects / jobs
 - Unstructured, decentralized
 - Flexible funds, scope
- Team Composition
 - Additional skill set
 - Economics, finance, project management
 - Engineering, health services, social services
 - PRT model
- Skills / Attributes (T, P)
 - Initial entry language and culture
 - Mid-career economics, finance and project management

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Insight 1

Insight 1: The military needs to be capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

Economic Development

Expected Environment	Who / What	Skills / Attributes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long Term • Structured • Centralized • USAID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interim team • GP Force • Economic Background • Finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modular • Language • Culture
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Short Notice • Unstructured • Decentralized • *Bag of \$\$\$ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects / Jobs • Eng Svcs • Health Svcs • "PRT" Model 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modular • Economics • Finance • Project Mgt



* Legislative Change Required

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Panel 3 - Insights

Insight 2:

Ability to identify and utilize SMEs for non-traditional topics

Insight 3:

No institutional responsibility for non-traditional topics

Insight 4:

Inadequate USG civilian and military command and support relationships

Insight 5:

No U.S. Government unified narrative (message) plan

Insight 6:

No USG capacity to conduct timely coordinated / integrated / synchronized regional diplomacy

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Panel 3 - Insights

Insight 7:

Funding for flexible and rapid capacity building

Insight 8:

Lack of cultural and language skill sets within DOD

Insight 9:

Dilemma of changing standards in "war amongst the people"

Insight 10:

Cultural acuity



Panel 3 - Insight 3

Insight 3:

Unclear institutional responsibility for non-traditional topics

- Governance
- Policing & judicial
- Civilian education and training
- Agriculture
- Economic development

Why is it Important?

- Insufficient expertise with no interagency support
- Need to clarify responsibility for force-wide DOTMLPF for the non-traditional topics
- JFCOM, TRADOC, MCCDC, CAC, AWC, USAJFKSWC all have pieces of this problem

Way forward?

- Collaborative development
- TRADOC lead



Panel 3 - Insight 4

Insight 4:**Inadequate USG civilian and military command and support relationships****Why is it Important?**

- There is no unity of command or effort between civilian and military authorities
- There is no integration of DIME
- Strategic, operational and tactical disconnects

Way forward?

- Collaborative development within the entire USG
- CJCS lead with strong SECDEF support



Panel 3 - Insight 9

Insight 9:**Dilemma of alternating standards in "war amongst the people"**

- Warfighting and policing are dynamically linked in COIN / SSTRO
- Conducting combat operations to establish the rule of law

Why is this Important?

- During COIN / SSTRO operations, US military are tasked to conduct operations to achieve stability and development
- Evidentiary collection, transfer and repository practices are not embedded in our institutional training programs but are essential tasks

Way forward?

- Immediate implementation: Plan and execute within 1 year
- TRADOC (MANSCEN) lead, with MCCDC



Panel 3 - Insight 10

Insight 10:


Cultural acuity

Why is this Important?


- Current operations in SSTRO are based on trust and influence
- Cultural transgressions at the tactical level can have strategic consequences
- Interactions between all actors


Way forward?

- Immediate implementation: Institutionalize cultural respect and understanding IOT effectively work within other societies
- JFCOM lead




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Panel 3:
Questions

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