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
Authority MND 969 000

By JP NARA Date 6/27/08

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Department of State

TELEGRAM



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ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

R 101945Z APR 68  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7795  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 2735  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3209  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1548  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1018  
USMISSION NATO 573  
USMISSION GENEVA 813  
USMISSION USUN 222

S E C R E T BONN 10689

LIMDIS

SUBJ: NPT; SCHNIPPENKOETTER COMMENTS ON GERMAN SIGNATURE

1. SUMMARY: SCHNIPPENKOETTER BELIEVES THAT A GERMAN DECISION ON NPT SIGNATURE SHOULD NOT BE REACHED (1) UNTIL THE UN DISCUSSION

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RESULTS ARE AVAILABLE; (2) SEVERAL MORE INTERPRETATIVE QUESTIONS ARE RESOLVED; AND (3) THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE US INTERPRETATIONS IS AVAILABLE. THIS SHOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR A WELL-PREPARED SIGNATURE DEBATE IN THE BUNDESTAG, AND HOPEFULLY AVOID A POLITICAL CRISIS OVER NPT. END SUMMARY.

2. AMB SCHNIPPENKOETTER TOLD A FDP-SPONSORED CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT--ATTENDED BY AN EMBOFF--LAST FRIDAY THAT THE FRG ADHERED TO THE "PRINCIPLE" OF NON-PROLIFERATION; ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE AN NPT; AND CERTAINLY WOULD "NOT BE THE LAST TO SIGN".

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, SCHNIPPENKOETTER THOUGHT THE FRG ALSO WOULD NOT BE AMONG THE FIRST. NO ONE IS PLANNING TO "START TO PROLIFERATE OVER NIGHT". TIME, THEREFORE, IS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS ACHIEVING

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A TEXT WHICH WILL CAUSE A MINIMUM OF RESENTMENT. THE PRESENT TEXT IS GREATLY IMPROVED BUT STILL NOT QUITE "CLEANED UP AND MATURED ENOUGH" FOR GERMAN SIGNATURE. "NO ONE", SCHNIPPENKOETTER CONCLUDED "SHOULD THEREFORE GET TOO EXCITED IF THE FRG DOES NOT SIGN THE TREATY IN JUNE, AND IF IT TAKES ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY CHANGES". SCHNIPPENKOETTER MADE A SIMILAR

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COMMENT TO THE CANADIAN DCM LAST WEEK TO WHOM HE SAID THE GERMANS WOULD SIGN NPT, BUT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE AMONG THE FIRST FORTY.

4. THE SAME THEME OF POSSIBLE DELAYS WAS STRESSED IN A MAJOR EDITORIAL IN YESTERDAY'S DIE WELT AND IN THE APRIL 8 ISSUE OF SPIEGEL, BOTH REPORTED IN BONN'S 10636.

5. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE WELT ARTICLE A MEMBER OF THE FONOFF DISARMAMENT SEC TOLD AN EMBOFF IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE INCLUDING GUTTENBERG, WERE "MOST ANXIOUS" NOT TO BE RUSHED IN TO ANY POLITICALLY EXPLOSIVE DEBATE OVER NPT SIGNATURE. ALTHOUGH STRAUSS'S INTENTIONS ARE STILL NOT CLEAR, THERE WAS ENOUGH RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL CDU/CSU OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY THAT A PREMATURE SIGNATURE DEBATE, IN WHICH NPT HAS ONLY MARGINAL BACKING, COULD BE "DISASTROUS" AND LEAVE DEEP SCARS OF RESENTMENT FOR THE FUTURE.

6. SCHNIPPENKOETTER, OUR SOURCE CONTINUED, ALSO BELIEVES, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, THAT NO FURTHER GERMAN STEPS SHOULD NOW BE TAKEN, AT LEAST UNTIL THE UN RESULTS ARE IN. THE UN COULD PRODUCE TEXTUAL

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CHANGES OR MIGHT REFER NPT TO THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE (WHICH THE GERMANS CONSIDER UNLIKELY BUT POSSIBLE) OR TO THE ENDC (WHICH THEY CONSIDER UNLIKELY). THE FONOFF AT ANY RATE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE WIDESPREAD CRITICISM THE TREATY WAS STILL GENERATING, INCLUDING INDIA'S FLAT OPPOSITION AND THE CONTINUING OPPOSITION FROM BRAZIL, PAKISTAN, ITALY AND MANY OTHERS.  
MCGHEE

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