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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY



PACKAGE SATYR AFTER-ACTION REPORT

4-6 August 1998

PREPARED FOR DOE BY:



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Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education

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Reviewed by: William J. McNally Date: 30 November 1998

EXERCISE
PACKAGE SATYR
AFTER-ACTION REPORT
November 9, 1998

INTRODUCTION

PACKAGE SATYR was a U.S. Government interagency exercise conducted from 4 - 6 August 1998, at Pease Air National Guard Base, Newington, New Hampshire.

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The exercise tested the interagency ability to respond effectively to terrorist incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Radiological/Nuclear materials. It also served to validate U.S. crisis response and consequence management capabilities and to improve coordination among the responding federal agencies.

The Department of Energy was one of several participating federal agencies. Others were the Department of State, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense. Collectively, participants totaled about 75 personnel.

This report documents lessons learned from DOE participation in PACKAGE SATYR. Particular attention is given to key issues raised in the course of technical operations performed by DOE emergency response elements.

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Lessons learned highlight strengths as well as shortfalls and facilitate assigning appropriate corrective action.

This report also addresses DOE exercise planning and management issues. The DOE counterterrorism exercise program evaluates and validates DOE's tailored counterterrorism emergency response capabilities. Specific issues identified in this report are tabulated in an automated After-Action Tracking System presented in Tab A.

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The After-Action Tracking System provides a record of operational issues, strengths, and weaknesses observed during exercise play. Exercise results provide the basis for assessing the readiness of DOE counterterrorism emergency response elements. Over time, DOE counterterrorism emergency response training is adjusted accordingly to build upon strengths and to remedy weaknesses that were identified during the exercise. Hence, the training program not only enhances DOE's response capability but also improves the overall interagency response to Weapon of Mass Destruction and Radiological/Nuclear terrorism.

This After-Action Report is organized as follows:

The **BACKGROUND** section outlines the scope and broad objectives of the exercise and then focuses on specific DOE exercise objectives. It also describes DOE exercise participation and the exercise control structure and process.

The **FLOW OF THE EXERCISE** section presents the functional exercise scenario involving a Radiological/Nuclear material terrorist situation, and briefly traces U.S. authorities' responses.

The **SUMMARY EVALUATION** section presents a considered judgment regarding the success of the exercise and an assessment of the overall performance of DOE's response elements.

The **MAJOR ISSUES** section provides the substance of the overall evaluation of DOE operational element performance. It summarizes key issues that emerged during exercise play. The issues are organized sequentially by operational phase -- Alert, Deployment, Employment and Redeployment phases. Operational issues precede exercise planning and management issues.

BACKGROUND




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The interagency exercise objectives were as follows:

- Alert, assemble, and deploy the Foreign Emergency Support Team to a "foreign" country (OCONUS crisis site) via the dedicated Foreign Emergency Support Team aircraft in accordance with established interagency guidelines/and procedures.
- Once deployed, the Foreign Emergency Support Team would exercise political, operational and logistical components of their response operations in support of the United States Ambassador and Host Government Officials.
- Exercise interoperability between Host Government Officials, Embassy Country Team, and the Foreign Emergency Support Team to include communications connectivity, intelligence sharing, and crisis and consequence management coordination.
- Exercise communications fidelity between the Foreign Emergency Support Team and the Consequence Management Response Team.
- Conduct Foreign Emergency Support Team equipment load-out.

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
Participating DOE Emergency Response Elements included 39 personnel in Package Satyr. Response elements were the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team, Search Response Team, and Search Augmentation Team. The role of the Nuclear Incident Team was played by a simulation cell operating as part of the Joint Exercise Control Group. DOE Emergency Response capabilities are listed at Tab B. The DOE exercise force list is at Tab C.

The DOE Exercise control structure consisted of a Joint Exercise Control Group and a Field Control Cell. DOE Controllers at both locations observed activities and recorded observations which are the basis for this evaluation of DOE Emergency Response Elements' performance.

EXECISE FLOW

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SUMMARY EVALUATION

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MAJOR ISSUES

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Tab A - Exercise Controller After-Action Comments and Observations

11mer-Agency After Action Tracking System Detail Report

Item No	Origin/Area	Category	Issue	Action	Assigned To	Status	Due/Complete
DOE-98-0205	PACKAGE SATYR	Improvement	UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL LEADERS COORDINATED INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES WHILE KEEPING OTHERS INFORMED.		NOT ASSIGNED		
DOE-98-0206	PACKAGE SATYR	Improvement	UNCLASSIFIED TIME MANAGEMENT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT PROCESS WAS WELL EXECUTED. IT ALLOWED THE TEAMS TO CONDUCT MISSION PLANNING PRIOR TO ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT.		NOT ASSIGNED		
DOE-98-0207	PACKAGE SATYR	Improvement	UNCLASSIFIED AUTOMATED SYSTEMS FOR LOGGING PERSONNEL IN AND OUT OF THE FACILITY ENSURED FULL ACCOUNTABILITY OF PERSONNEL AT ALL TIMES. FACILITY CCTV AND INTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS ALLOWED FOR REAL-TIME MISSION UP-DATES TO PERSONNEL CONDUCTING MISSION PREPARATIONS IN SEPARATE LOCATIONS.		NOT ASSIGNED		
DOE-98-0208	PACKAGE SATYR	Improvement	UNCLASSIFIED ONCE TASKED, MANAGEMENT CONVENED MEETING TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOME TEAM AND RECONSTITUTION OF SRT		NOT ASSIGNED		

December 1, 1998

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Inter-Agency After Action Tracking System Detail Report

Item No	Origin/Area	Category	Issue	Action	Assigned To	Status	Due/Complete
DOE-98-0209 (b) (5) FOUO	PACKAGE SATYR SRT/SAT	Improvement	Unclassified SAFETY WAS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE AT RSL AND NVO FOR ALL PHASES OF MISSION PLANNING		NOT ASSIGNED		

December 1, 1998

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Inter-Agency After Action Tracking System Delay Report

Item No	Origin/Area	Category	Issue	Action	Assigned To	Status	Due/Complete
DOE-98-0219	PACKAGE SATYR	Improvement	Unclassified		NOT ASSIGNED		

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Inter-Agency After Action Tracking System Detail Report

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
Complete

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Tab B - DOE Emergency Response Capabilities


DOE Emergency Response capabilities to deal with terrorism incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Radiological/Nuclear Materials include the following operational assets:

(U) Nuclear Incident Team (NIT)



(U) Team Size: 8-12 personnel per shift.

(U) Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (Nuclear and Radiological Advisory Team)



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(U) Team Size: 5-8 personnel.

(U) Emergency Response Home Team (ERHT)




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(U) Team Size: 4 scientific personnel.

(U) Search Response Team (SRT)

(U) Search Augmentation Team (SAT)



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Tab C- DOE Force List


NUCLEAR INCIDENT TEAM (NIT)

Eight Controllers simulated the NIT at a Joint Exercise Control Group.


NUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL ADVISORY TEAM (NRAT)

Eight personnel--two Federal officers and six scientists and technicians--
deployed as an element of the Foreign Emergency Support Team.


SEARCH RESPONSE TEAM (SRT)



SEARCH AUGMENTATION TEAM (SAT)



The total DOE participation in Exercise PACKAGE SATYR included 52
personnel.



(U) Team Size: The Search Response Team: 7 personnel. The Search Augmentation Team: 24 personnel.


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Tab D - Exercise Major Events

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


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Detailed Description of Daily Events

August 4

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August 5


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


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August 6

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