

AAA 2001575/0000

SECRET/FOCAL POINT



CONTAINS  
SECRET/PRECISE BOLT  
MATERIAL

DOE EXERCISE 03-01  
JACKAL CAVE  
AFTER-ACTION  
REPORT (U)

Classified By: Harry A. Page  
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Derived From CG-WN-4 & CJCSI 5113.01A  
Declassify ON: X4

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
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Prepared for the Department of Energy's Office of Emergency Response  
by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education

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NNSA.T.000020230

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**DOE 03-01**  
**EXERCISE JACKAL CAVE**  
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DOE 03-01  
EXERCISE JACKAL CAVE  
AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DOE b(1)  
DOE b(3)

INTRODUCTION



(U) This report documents lessons learned from DOE participation in JACKAL CAVE. As a result of terrorist actions against the United States and early termination, lessons learned are limited to DOE emergency response asset alert, mobilization, deployment and re-deployment. While the exercise was terminated early, DOE elements were provided the first overseas deployment opportunity since 1998. The observations and recommendations listed in the Findings section of the report provide a record of operational issues, strengths, and weaknesses observed during exercise play. ORISE, NSP maintains logs and exercise comments at its office, 1140 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington D.C.

(U) The After-Action Report is organized as follows:

**BACKGROUND** – outlines overall exercise goals and broad objectives and then focuses on specific DOE exercise objectives. It also describes DOE exercise participation and the exercise control structure.

**SUMMARY EVALUATION** – presents a considered judgment regarding the success of the exercise and an assessment of the overall performance of DOE's response elements.

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
**FINDINGS** – provides the substance of the evaluation of DOE operational element performance. It summarizes key issues that emerged during exercise play. The issues are organized sequentially by operational phase – Alert, Deployment, Employment and Redeployment.

**EXERCISE FLOW** – provides an account of how exercise events unfolded and traces the response of government agencies.

TAB A – DOE Asset Capabilities


TAB B – DOE Exercise Participants Roster

DOE b(1)  
DOE b(3) UNCL




(U) DOE EXERCISE GOALS

DOE b(1)  
DOE b(3) UNCL



- (U) Validate Security and Safety plans.


DOE b(3) UNCL



- (U) Validate a no-notice deployment.

(U) DOE SPECIFIC EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

DOE b(1)  
DOE b(3) UNCL




(U) DOE EXERCISE PARTICIPATION


DOE b(3) UNCL



(U) INTERAGENCY EXERCISE PARTICIPATION – The following members of the interagency participated in JACKAL CAVE-01.



DOE b(3) UNCL



**(U) FINDINGS**

What follows are operational issues, strengths and weaknesses observed during the exercise play with relevant recommendations. The observations presented are organized sequentially by operational phase: Alert, Deployment, Employment and Redeployment.

**(U) Alert Issues:**

1. **(U) Observation: Emergency Response Official (ERO) Instruction Book Contained Out-Dated LINCOLN GOLD Call Out Procedure**


DOE b(3) [unclear]



**(U) Recommendation: The Office of Emergency Operations should ensure that latest procedures are distributed to all concerned.**

2. **(U) Observation: Lack of No-Notice Alert**

DOE b(3) [unclear]




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(U) Recommendation: In the future ensure DOE officials have procedures in place to conduct appropriate overseas briefings for DOE elements in a responsive manner.

3. (U) Observation: Lack of Sensitive Material Deployment Procedures

DOE b(3)

UCNS




(U) Recommendation: Office of Emergency Response, in conjunction with involved facilities develop a stand alone order outlining deployment procedures for sensitive emergency response material, communications frequency identification and necessary security briefings.

4. (U) Observation: No-Notice Travel Orders

DOE b(3)

UCNS




(U) Recommendation: Office of Emergency Operations should brief travel arrangements prior to no-notice exercise.

5. (U) Observation: DOE-DoD Relationship

DOE b(3)

UCNS



(U) Recommendation: Continue training and exercise events between JTOT II and 21<sup>st</sup> EOD to enhance command and control relationships.

(U) Deployment Issues:

6. (U) Observation: NRAT conducted no-notice deployment.

(U) Recommendation: None




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(U) Employment Issues:

7. (U) Observation: Potential DOE Leadership Disparity

DOE b(3) UCH



(U) Recommendation: The Office of Emergency Response should review the SEO and Federal Team Leader assignment process to ensure an appropriate chain of command is present in an emergency response situation.

(U) Re-Deployment Issues:

(U) With outstanding DoD cooperation and assistance, all DOE participants and equipment returned to the United States by military air-lift with-in five days of the September 11, 2001 terrorists incidents.

8. (U) Observation: Lack of DOE Communications for Control Purposes

DOE b(3) UCH




(U) Recommendation: Issue secure international cell phones to control members and team leaders.

(U) EXERCISE FLOW

DOE b(1)  
DOE b(3) UCH






(U) Immediately following the terrorist incidents, the Commander-in-Chief, European Command cancelled JACKAL CAVE. Team Leaders were directed to reconstitute team members and equipment and prepare to return to home stations. By September 15, all DOE personnel and equipment were back in the United States.

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TAB A – DOE Force List Capabilities

(U) Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT)


DOE b (3)



(U) Team Size: 5-8 personnel.

(U) LINCOLN GOLD/Joint Technical Operations Team Phase I (JTOT I)

DOE b (3)




(U) Team Size: 1 Federal official and 5 (scientists) personnel.

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(U) Joint Technical Operations Team (JTOT)(Phase II)


DOE b(3) UCLF



(U) Team Size: 1 Federal official, 21 DOE personnel, augmented by 10-12 DoD EOD personnel.

(U) Consequence Management Planning Team (CMPT)


DOE b(3) UCLF



(U) Team Size: 8-12 personnel.

(U) Commander-in-Chief Liaison Officer (CINC LNO)

DOE b(3) UCLF



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(U) Disposition Team (DT)




DOE b (3) UONE

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
TAB B- Exercise Participants Roster

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
(U) Deployed Asset Participants



DSE b (3) (C)



(U) Deployed Control Team



DSE b (3) (C)


NOFORN

(U) Deployed Observers

DOE b(3) LCI



(U) Home Team



DOE b(3) LCI