



Nuclear Terrorism Intelligence: A Special Operations Perspective

Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict)

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Nuclear Terrorism: A National Priority



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"We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."

-National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002

"We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons."

- National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002

"The prospect of future attacks, potentially employing weapons of mass destruction, makes it imperative we act now to stop terrorists before they can attack again."

- National Military Strategy of the United States, 2004


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Preemptive Defense



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Debacle at Desert One



- APRIL 1980: FAILURE OF ATTEMPTED RESCUE OF 66 HOSTAGES HELD IN IRAN
- SUPERFICIAL REASON – BREAKDOWN OF THREE RH-53D HELICOPTERS EN ROUTE TO OR AT DESERT ONE
- UNDERLYING CAUSES:
 - LACK OF ATTENTION TO SOF SINCE VIETNAM CONFLICT
 - ABSENCE OF A STANDING JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
- ENTIRE OPERATION AD-HOC
 - TASK ORGANIZATION
 - COMMAND STRUCTURE
 - ROTARY WING SUPPORT/AIRCREW
 - INADEQUATE SUPPORT DUE TO OPSEC CONSIDERATIONS
 - NO FULL DRESS REHEARSAL






Grenada: "FUBAR"



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- OCTOBER 1983: U.S. INVADES ISLAND OF GRENADA TO:
 - RESTORE DEMOCRACY
 - EVACUATE ~600 AMCIT/
POTENTIAL HOSTAGES
- HEAVY SOF INVOLVEMENT
- OPERATION REVEALED MAJOR DEFICIENCIES IN U.S. ABILITIES TO CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS
 - OVER-INVOLVEMENT OF JOINT STAFF
 - CONSTANTLY SHIFTING PLANS & PRIORITIES
 - UNFAMILIARITY OF SUPPORTED COMMAND (U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND) WITH GROUND OPERATIONS
 - INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS




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Congress Takes Action



- 1986: CONGRESS PASSED GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEFENSE REFORM ACT
 - SPURRED BY PROBLEMS DURING OPERATION URGENT FURY
- COHEN-NUNN AMENDMENT (P.L. 99-661) ESTABLISHED:
 - POSITION OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT;
 - U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND;
 - MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM 11






ASD SOLIC Charter



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- PRINCIPAL STAFF ASSISTANT AND CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO SECDEF ON ALL SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT MATTERS
- SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT ON ALL SOLIC MATTERS WITHIN OSD
- PERFORMS POLICY OVERSIGHT OF ALL SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITY WITHIN DoD
- SUPERVISES PREPARATION AND JUSTIFICATION OF USSOCOM BUDGET
- ADVISES SECDEF, THROUGH USD(I) ON THE ADEQUACY OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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





US Special Operations Command



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US Army Special Operations Command

Special Forces
Rangers
160th SOAR
Psychological Operations
Civil Affairs Operations



Air Force Special Operations Command

Fixed Wing Special Opns Aviation
Rotary Wing Special Opns Aviation
Special Tactics units



Naval Special Warfare Command

SEALS
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams
Special Boat Units



Joint Special Operations Command

Ensures SOF Interoperability;
Conducts Joint Studies,
Training, and Operations

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Special Operations Core Tasks





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Direct Action
Counterterrorism

Counterproliferation of WMD
Unconventional Warfare
Foreign Internal Defense
Special Reconnaissance
Civil Affairs Operations
Psychological Operations
Information Operations




SOURCE: Joint Publication 3-05,
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
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Direct Action



- Short-duration strikes and other small-scale actions conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments
- Taken to seize, capture, recover, exploit, destroy, or damage designated targets
- Differ from conventional offensive actions in:
 - level of physical and political risks
 - operational techniques
 - degree of discriminate and precise use of force



SOURCE: Joint Publication 3-05,
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

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Counterterrorism




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- Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorist acts and incidents
- Special Operations conducted via clandestine or other low visibility means, including:
 - Hostage or Sensitive Material Recovery
 - Intelligence Operations
 - Network and Infrastructure Attacks
 - Non-Kinetic Attacks

SOURCE: Joint Publication 3-05,
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

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Counterproliferation of WMD



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■ Clandestine or other low visibility Special Operations taken to:

- locate;
- seize;
- destroy;
- capture;
- recover;
- or render safe WMD



SOURCE: Joint Publication 3-05,
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations


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Hypothetical Scenario #1 – Maritime Intercept



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


Intelligence Required - Maritime Intercept



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[Redacted]

- "You don't know what you don't know"
- Nuclear intelligence ≠ terrorism intelligence

[Redacted]

- Better intelligence collection against targets of interest to SOF will benefit other COCOMs and government agencies, not just USSOCOM
- SOF CBW intelligence requirements will be similar to those for nuclear, except for those dealing with S&TI issues

[Redacted]


- The problem is not an academic one
- The U.S. is embroiled in global war
- Intelligence requirements for SOF differ from those for policymakers & conventional forces in the level of detail and timeliness required

Observations






State of Knowledge Issues






SOCOM Overview: WMD Intelligence Requirements



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
Target Complexities



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Collection Objectives





Recommendation



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We recommend that the Commission, in its report, highlight:

- the unique nature of SOF's intelligence requirements;
- the gaps that currently exist in our knowledge; and
- stress the need for improved collection to fill these gaps and put badly needed intelligence in the hands of our Special Operators


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- Humans are more important than hardware
- Quality is better than Quantity
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced
- Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur

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- **Special Operations are inherently intelligence-intensive**
- **Adequate intelligence to the degree of detail necessary to support Special Operations cannot be created after a crisis is underway**

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**“Life is
Tough.
It’s Tougher
if You’re
Stupid.”**

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Purpose

- Provide postulated nuclear counterterrorism-counterproliferation roles for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the Global War on Terrorism to a *non-SOF audience*
- Examine the intelligence required to support these roles
- Highlight the importance of intelligence to SOF counterproliferation-counterterrorism core tasks
- Examine the adequacy of the current state of intelligence knowledge for support of SOF counterproliferation-counterterrorism core tasks
- Provide a recommendation to the Commission staff with regard to intelligence requirements and priorities