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To: Flag and General Officers

Subj: Dope

THE BUDGET

General:

We are now in the home stretch of the budget. The Department of Defense is in the process of putting the '61 budget to bed. However, there are still some things that have to be done and so we don't have the final figures on the budget and we don't know exactly what will be presented to the National Security Council on Wednesday, 25 November.

The SecDef, the Service Secretaries, and the Chiefs of the Services have all met with the President. These meetings did not result in any significant changes in the budget but did permit us to express our views and hear the President's views on the bigger issues in the national budget. Not many details could be discussed. For this reason it is believed that the '61 budget as it now stands except for some adjustments is pretty firm. It should be in the hands of the BuBud not later than 28 November and will surely be wrapped up.

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SSBN ULTIMATE POTENTIALS

During recent months many authors have written articles on the POLARIS Missile System. Information has been geared to the general policy of speaking only to the capability of the missile that is under test now. It is time honored custom for the Navy to follow a conservative policy with regard to stating the capabilities of weapon systems that are in development stage. This is sound practice but must be tempered with the realization that public vision for weapons of the future is readily translated into dollars in defense budgets.

Since public opinion can only reflect a desire for economical and adequate military equipment if it is accurately and truthfully informed, it is important that people know the honest growth potentials of our weapon systems when they can be determined and to do so does not impair security. For example, we are now adhering to the Navy tradition of sober conservatism by speaking of POLARIS as a 1200-1500 mile missile. We have proposed attaining ranges exceeding 2500 miles, and this has received some publicity. It appears feasible that POLARIS could provide a missile
that would be effective against any Soviet bloc target from almost any ocean launching spot that we might choose. Increased funding and a resumption of warhead testing, could probably provide such a missile before the first POLARIS submarines have completed half their life, perhaps by 1965. One of our justifications for the initial cost of the SSBN system is the long submarine life. We should remember the potentials that exist for missiles of expanded capability during this later life.

The development potential of POLARIS into a longer range missile is important to the American people because:

(a) It will permit eventually the United States to move its deterrent missile forces many, many miles from any land. Such distances in the light of fallout, fixed site attraction for enemy missiles, blast destruction and nuclear holocaust are important and very impressive.

(b) It enlarges the possible launch area for ballistic missiles to tens of millions of square miles -- the whole North Atlantic, much of the South Atlantic and the Pacific, and most of the Indian Ocean -- many times the area of the U.S. would become available.
The SSBN is a superior deterrent system that will be available in the near future and useful for a long time.

(c) It assures beyond any question the invulnerability of the SSBN system. Who could hope to surprise and destroy a fleet of submerged submarines dispersed over such a vast area?

(d) It shows the SSBN as a warfare instrument to insure peace, with a rising long term usefulness to warrant its initial cost.

(e) It shows the long term visions of Navy planning.

The Navy is and should be recognized as a far-sighted branch of our Armed Services. Other areas with bright futures are also worthy of public viewing and knowledge: communications and navigation satellites; oceanography developments; nuclear powered ships; are but a few topics that the average American is not very aware of, although he is paying for them.