

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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National Security Decision Memorandum 13

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Japan

As a result of the NSC meetings on Japan, the President has made the following decisions with regard to U.S. policy toward Japan:

1. We shall basically pursue our current relationship with Japan as our major partner in Asia, seeking ways to improve this relationship from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests and to seek an increasingly larger Japanese role in Asia.
2. We shall allow the present Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to continue without amendment after 1970 when it becomes subject to renunciation or amendment.
3. We shall continue to make gradual alterations in our base structure and base utilization in Japan to reduce major irritants while retaining essential base functions.
4. We shall continue our present policy of encouraging moderate increases and qualitative improvement in Japan's defense efforts, while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play a larger regional security role.

With respect to Okinawa, the President has directed that a strategy paper be prepared by the East Asia Interdepartmental Group under the supervision of the Under Secretaries Committee for negotiations with the Japanese Government over the next few months on the basis of the following elements:

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1. Our willingness to agree to reversion in 1972 provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing U.S. military use and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time.
2. Our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.
3. Our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicating that the President is prepared to consider, at the final stages of negotiation, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement are satisfactory.
4. Other commitments to be sought from Japan with respect to Okinawa.


Henry A. Kissinger

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