

UNCLASSIFIED

R F008 STATE D98

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OTTUZF4 RUENKDA9023 1381513
IMMEDIATE
O 181454Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9380
BT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 09023

FOR EA/J WILLIAM CLARK

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: MPOL, JA, US
SUBJECT: REISCHAUER INTERVIEW WHICH APPEARED IN
MAINICHI ON MAY 18, 1981

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF INTERVIEW:

1. DETAILS - INTERVIEW WITH FORMER AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER

JAPAN-US AGREEMENT EXISTS TO EFFECT THAT TRANSIT OF
NUCLEAR-ARMED NAVAL VESSELS POSES NO PROBLEM

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN PROFESSOR
REISCHAUER AND CORRESPONDENT KOMORI RECENTLY IN BOSTON
ARE AS FOLLOWS:

KOMORI -- PROFESSOR REISCHAUER, VOICES HAVE BEEN
RECENTLY HEARD IN JAPAN AMONG THOSE WHO SEEK THE
STRENGTHENING OF DEFENSE POWER. THAT IT IS CONTRADICTIONARY
FOR JAPAN TO DEPEND ON THE SO-CALLED "US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA"
WHILE FIRMLY MAINTAINING ITS "THREE NON-NUCLEAR
PRINCIPLES." TO PUT IT MORE ACCURATELY, THE PROBLEM IS
THE THIRD PRINCIPLE, THAT IS, "NOT TO INTRODUCE," OR
PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO BRING IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
WHILE JAPAN CONTINUES TO RELY ON THE UNITED STATES'
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA.

PROFESSOR REISCHAUER: YES, THEY ARE CONTRADICTIONARY. IT
IS QUITE TRUE.

KOMORI -- DOES THE ORIGIN OF THIS CONTRADICTION LIE IN THE
SECURITY TREATY REVISION NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH RESULTED IN
THE JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY NOW IN FORCE, THE BACK-
GROUND OF WHICH YOU KNOW SO WELL?

PROFESSOR: IT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE
AT THAT TIME. THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WERE VERY SENSITIVE
ON THE POINT OF NOT BRINGING THEM IN. THROUGHOUT THE
1950'S AND THE 1960'S, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE HARBORED VERY
STRONG FEELINGS IN REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM. THE
JAPANESE EXPRESSION "MOCHIKOMI" (BRINGING IN) AND THE TERM
"INTRODUCTION," AS USED BY THE US SIDE MEAN TWO DIFFERENT
THINGS. "MOCHIKOMI" IS A VERY TROUBLESOME PROBLEM WHICH
I EXPERIENCED PERSONALLY. WHEN OUR SHIPS ENTER PORTS

KOMORI -- TRANSIT? ...

PROFESSOR: YES, BUT SHIPS, AT ANY RATE, ENTER PORTS. LET
US ASSUME THAT THAT SHIP CARRIES NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON
BOARD. THAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE INTRODUCTION, AS VIEWED
FROM THE US STANDPOINT. INTRODUCTION, ON OUR PART, MEANS
THE LANDING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SETTING THEM UP. ON
THE OTHER HAND, "MOCHIKOMI" IN JAPAN IS TAKEN TO MEAN
SIMPLY BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPAN'S TERRITORIAL
WATERS. I THINK THERE CERTAINLY EXISTS A MISUNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND THE US GOVERNMENT. AND,

ACTION (U.6.7)
INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) ROJTF:LO(1)
DAMI(*) ADC-DAMI(*) DAMO(*) DACS-ZK(*) X0XX(*) IN(*)
009(*) 61(*) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DI-1(2)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB-2(1)
DB-2C(1) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)

36

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 36

THERE ARE FREQUENTLY MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE US GOVERNMENT TOO. I THINK
THAT IS BECAUSE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS FORGOTTEN
SOME AGREED MATTERS, AND WHAT ORAL AGREEMENTS THERE WERE.
IN OTHER WORDS, THAT IS THE AGREEMENT: THAT CALLING AT
PORTS AND THE TRANSIT OF SHIPS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DOES NOT POSE ANY PROBLEM.

KOMORI -- I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH AMBASSADOR
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, YOUR PREDECESSOR. AT THAT TIME, THE
AMBASSADOR IMPLIED THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE REVISION OF THE SECURITY TREATY, THE SO-CALLED
TRANSIT PROBLEM OR PORT CALLS, BY US NAVAL VESSELS
CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD, WAS NOT BROUGHT UP IN
ANY WAY AT ALL. IT MEANT THAT THE JAPANESE SIDE...THE
DIET MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, BROUGHT UP THIS
PROBLEM AT THE DIET, AFTER THE REVISED SECURITY TREATY WAS
FORMULATED, AND THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD TO COPE
WITH THEM. IN THAT MEANING, IT MEANS THAT THE US SIDE
HAD NOT REALLY BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THE PROBLEM.

PROFESSOR: YES, THAT IS PROBABLY THE CASE. PROBABLY THE
TWO GOVERNMENTS DID NOT MAKE THAT POINT CLEAR IN THE COURSE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REVISION OF THE SECURITY
TREATY. IT IS TRUE THAT THIS POINT WAS NOT MADE CLEAR
IN WRITING. HOWEVER, IT WAS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE US
GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY THAT TRANSIT WAS PERMITTED.
THEREFORE, WHEN THIS PROBLEM WAS TAKEN UP IN THE JAPANESE
DIET AT THE TIME WHEN I WAS AMBASSADOR, THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT SAID THAT IT ACCEPTED THE INTERPRETATION THAT
TRANSIT (OF US NAVAL SHIPS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) WAS
NOT PERMITTED. "HOWEVER THE GOJ TRUSTED THE US", WHICH
REPRESENTED A CHANGE TO THE TREATY. I WAS VERY TROUBLED.
IN OTHER WORDS, SUCH A REPLY BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
BT

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 7/24/2003 Exemption

MCN=81138/08449

TOR=81138/1528Z

TAD=81138/1530Z

CDSN=MAK224

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
181454Z MAY 81
SECT 01 OF 05

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OTTUZF4 RUEHKDA9023 1381516
IMMEDIATE
O 181454Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9381
BT

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 TOKYO 09023

FOR EA/J WILLIAM CLARK

MADE IT APPEAR THAT "THE US WAS ACTING DECEITFULLY."
THEREFORE, I MET WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND MADE A
REQUEST "NOT TO REPLY TO QUESTIONS IN THAT WAY."

KOMORI -- AS TO WHAT YOU SAID TO FOREIGN MINISTER OHIRA ...

PROFESSOR: I SAID: "PLEASE DO NOT REPLY THIS WAY. THAT
IS BECAUSE IT IS EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING FOR US. SUCH A
REPLY DIFFERS FROM THE US SIDE'S UNDERSTANDING." AND
FOREIGN MINISTER OHIRA SUCCEEDED IN HAVING THE OFFICIALS
CONCERNED PUT IT IN OTHER WAYS, VERY SKILLFULLY. EVERY-
THING QUIETED DOWN VERY QUICKLY. FOR THE TIME BEING
THIS PROBLEM WILL BE FORGOTTEN, BUT IT WILL COME UP AGAIN,
SOME YEARS LATER. WE WILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE SAME
KIND OF PROBLEM, ONCE AGAIN.

KOMORI -- IT WILL COME UP, AGAIN AND AGAIN?

PROFESSOR: THIS IS CORRECT. DO YOU REMEMBER THE
LAROQUE TESTIMONY? WAS IT IN 1972?

KOMORI -- IT WAS IN 1974.

PROFESSOR: 1974? YES, THAT'S RIGHT. IT WAS IN 1974.
IT CAUSED A BIG FUROR. BUT, IT SUBSIDED. IT SUBSIDED
VERY QUICKLY. I THINK THAT IT MEANS AS FOLLOWS: IN
JAPAN, THE PUBLIC THINKS THAT "SUCH A THING IS COMMON
SENSE. JAPANESE POLITICIANS GIVE RISE TO PROBLEMS OVER
THIS KIND OF THING, BUT WHEN CONSIDERED CAREFULLY, IT IS
JUST A JOKE." FOR THIS REASON, THIS MATTER HAS NOT BE-
COME A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

KOMORI -- IN THAT CASE, DO YOU INTEND TO PROPOSE THAT
THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE
THIS PROBLEM PUBLIC?

PROFESSOR: THAT IS MY INTENTION. I THINK IT WILL BE VERY
GOOD IF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT THINKS THAT NOW IS THE
TIME. HOWEVER, IN THIS KIND OF PROBLEM, WE DO NOT WISH,
FROM OUR SIDE, TO CHANGE IT LEGALLY. THE TIME SHOULD
COME WHEN THE JAPANESE PEOPLE RECOGNIZE THIS PROBLEM.
AND, IF JAPAN ACCEPTS THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA, AS YOU SAY,
IT SHOULD PERHAPS MOVE FORWARD, EVEN MORE THAN THAT. THAT
WOULD PROBABLY MEAN THAT SMALL SUPPORTING PILLARS --
(SMALL NUCLEAR BASES) FOR THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA SHOULD
ALSO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE JAPANESE HOMELAND. IN THE
SAME WAY AS NOT HAVING ANY PILLARS, THIS WILL NOT EXPOSE
JAPAN TO DANGER. THAT IS BECAUSE THOSE SUPPORTING PILLARS
ARE NOT THE CENTRAL PILLAR. THE MAIN AREAS WHERE THE
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA EMPLACED WILL BE THE WESTERN PART OF THE
US AND AT SEA. OTHER AREAS ARE SECONDARY SUPPORTS, SO TO
SPEAK.

KOMORI -- HOWEVER, NUCLEAR SUPPORTING PILLARS IN JAPAN
WILL COME TO HAVE A SYMBOLIC MEANING.

PROFESSOR: NO ONE WILL ATTACK SUCH SECONDARY SUPPORTING

ACTION (I.M)
INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RJJTF:LO(1)
DAMI(*) AOC-DAMI(*) DAMO(*) DACS-ZK(*) XXXX(*) IN(*)
009(*) 61(*) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB-2(1)
DB-2C(1) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)
SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 36

BASES. IF A NUCLEAR WAR SHOULD BE STARTED, IT WILL BE
LAUNCHED AND DIRECTED AT THE CENTRAL PART OF THE NUCLEAR
UMBRELLA.

KOMORI -- I SEE. HOWEVER, PROFESSOR, THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT TAKES THE OFFICIAL POSITION THAT THE TRANSIT
OF US NAVAL VESSELS CARRYING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD
IS TO BE A SUBJECT OF PRIOR CONSULTATION. AS AGAINST
THIS, THE US POSITION IS THAT THE SHIP AND ITS ORGANIC
WEAPONS CANNOT BE SEPARATED. THE US SIDE DOES NOT CLARIFY
THE KINDS OF WEAPONS.

PROFESSOR: WE ABSOLUTELY NEVER SAY WHERE THERE ARE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

KOMORI -- THEREFORE, THEY CANNOT BECOME THE SUBJECT OF
PRIOR CONSULTATIONS.

PROFESSOR: THEY CANNOT BECOME THE SUBJECT OF PRIOR
CONSULTATIONS. THAT IS BECAUSE IT WILL BE TANTAMOUNT
TO SAYING THAT WE ARE CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD.
WE ABSOLUTELY NEVER MENTION THOSE THINGS. CONSEQUENTLY,
THESE POINTS SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR.

KOMORI -- YOU ARE QUITE RIGHT. IF THE JAPANESE GOVERN-
MENT'S POSITION IS ACCEPTED AS IS, IT MEANS THAT OVER
THE PERIOD OF MORE THAN 20 YEARS UP UNTIL NOW, THERE
WAS NOT EVEN A SINGLE CASE OF TRANSIT BY US NAVAL SHIPS
CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

PROFESSOR: HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN KNOWS THAT
US NAVAL VESSELS, WHICH CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD
CONSTANTLY PASS THROUGH ITS WATERS. THE SAME IS TRUE
BT

MCN=81138/08461

TOR=81138/1529Z

TAD=81138/1530Z

CDSN=MAK225

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
181454Z MAY 81
SECT 02 OF 05

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OTTUZZF4 RUEHKOAG023 1381518
IMMEDIATE
O 181454Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 938Z
BT

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 TOKYO 09023

FOR EA/J WILLIAM CLARK

FOR THE JAPANESE PEOPLE, TOO, IS IT NOT?

KOMORI -- AS FOR THE PEOPLE, IT IS NOT QUITE THAT CERTAIN.

PROFESSOR: I MEAN A PART OF THE PEOPLE, THAT IS, PEOPLE OF HIGHER INTELLECTUAL LEVEL. I THINK THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION CONCERNING "MOCHIKOMI" IS NOT REASONABLE AT ALL.

KOMORI -- WHY DID SUCH A SITUATION ARISE? DID IT JUST HAPPEN, OR ...

PROFESSOR: THERE WAS PROBABLY A PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION. THE ENGLISH TERM "INTRODUCTION" IS A MORE LASTING CONCEPT. HOWEVER, THE JAPANESE TERM "MOCHIKOMI" CAN ALSO BE SAID TO HAVE A MORE LASTING MEANING, IN THAT RESPECT.

KOMORI -- HOWEVER, THE TERMS "MOCHIKOMI" OR "MOCHIDASHI" SIMPLY MEAN THE MOVING OF THINGS ...

PROFESSOR: YES. HOWEVER, THE TERM "INTRODUCTION" HAS A STRONG CONNOTATION OF INSTALLMENT, IN A PERMANENT STATE. IT IS INSTALLMENT FOR STORAGE, OR AS MISSILES, OR SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THAT. WE HAVE PROMISED JAPAN THAT WE WILL NOT DO THAT KIND OF THING, AND WE HAVE BEEN ABIDING BY THIS FAITHFULLY UP UNTIL NOW. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A CASE OF INTRODUCTION. AT THE TIME OF THE "HONDO-NAMI" (IN JAPANESE) (IN THE SAME WAY AS IN THE HOMELAND) REVERSION OF OKINAWA, WE WITHDREW NUCLEAR FACILITIES. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT REASONABLE (TO APPLY THAT RULE) TO NUCLEAR-ARMED NAVAL SHIPS WHICH MAKE PORT CALLS IN JAPAN OR WHICH MUST PASS THROUGH JAPANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS. I THINK THAT THE TIME HAS FINALLY COME WHEN THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT MUST ADMIT THIS FACT FRANKLY.

KOMORI -- THOSE JAPANESE PEOPLE WHO WISH TO TACKLE THE DEFENSE PROBLEM IN A SERIOUS WAY FEEL FRUSTRATED AT THE EXISTENCE OF A LARGE AND OBVIOUS GAP BETWEEN ARGUMENTS BASED ON PRINCIPLE AND ON REALITY. THIS GAP IS SYMBOLICALLY SHOWN BY THE "MOCHIKOMI" PROBLEM. IT SYMBOLICALLY SHOWS THE UNPRODUCTIVE NATURE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS. THEREFORE, THERE IS THE VIEW THAT THE TIME FINALLY COME.

PROFESSOR: YES. THERE HAS BEEN BIG PROGRESS RECENTLY. WHEN WE LOOK BACK AT THE 1950'S AND THE 1960'S, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WERE PARANOID IN REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM. IT HAS BECOME MUCH BETTER TODAY.

US SIDE'S INTERPRETATION OF "MOCHIKOMI" DOES NOT INCLUDE TRANSIT AND PORT CALLS

KOMORI -- I HAVE HEARD THAT YOU DID NOT NOTICE THIS GAP, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF TRANSIT, AT THE TIME YOU TOOK OVER FROM AMBASSADOR MACARTHUR.

ACTION
INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RDJTF:LO(1) (I.M)
DAMI(*) ACC-DAMI(*) DAMO(*) DACS-ZK(*) XOCX(*) IN(*)
009(*) 81(*) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB-2(1)
DB-2C(1) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)
SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 36

PROFESSOR: THAT WAS BECAUSE AT THAT TIME THAT KIND OF PROBLEM HAS NOT YET ARISEN. NO INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED. THEY AROSE IN THE DAYS OF FOREIGN MINISTER OHIRA, FROM 1962 TO 1964. IT WAS SOME TIME FROM 1962 TO 1963 THAT SUCH AN OCCASION AROSE AND WE HAD TO MAKE CLEAR THAT POINT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND I DISCUSSED THIS EXHAUSTIVELY AND MADE CLEAR THE POINTS AT ISSUE.

KOMORI -- RETURNING TO THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM, YOU ADVISED FOREIGN MINISTER OHIRA, AT THAT TIME NOT TO GIVE REPLIES WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN THE PAST ...

PROFESSOR: I SAID THAT TO THE SPOKESMAN (NOT THE FOREIGN MINISTER). I THINK IT WAS BEING SAID BY OTHER PERSONS, AND NOT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF, REPRESENTING THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. THAT IS BECAUSE THE SPOKESMAN MADE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SAYS THAT TRANSIT (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS) IS CONTRARY TO THE (JAPAN-US) AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE JAPANESE SIDE TRUSTED THE US TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US SIDE WILL NOT ACT IN A WAY WHICH WILL BE CONTRARY TO THAT AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THIS, WHEN VIEWED FROM THE US VIEWPOINT, DID NOT REPRESENT THE AGREEMENT AT ALL. IT PLACED THE US IN A VERY UNDESIRABLE POSITION. THAT IS WHY I ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOT TO USE THAT KIND OF EXPRESSION. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE SPOKESMAN SAID AS A RESULT, BUT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS VERY SKILLFUL IN HANDLING EVERYTHING IN AN UNOBTRUSIVE WAY, SOMEHOW OR OTHER. AT ANY RATE, EVERYTHING WAS CALMED DOWN COMPLETELY, AND THE PROBLEM DISAPPEARED VERY QUICKLY.

KOMORI -- IN THAT CASE, "INTRODUCTION" AS INTERPRETED BY THE US SIDE MEANS ONLY THE BRINGING OF NUCLEAR
BT

MCN=81138/08471 TOR=81138/1530Z TAD=81138/1530Z CDSN=MAK226

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
181454Z MAY 81
SECT 03 OF 05

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OTTUZZF4 RUEHKDA9023 1381519
IMMEDIATE
O 181464Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9383
BT

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 TOKYO 09023

FOR EA/J WILLIAM CLARK

WEAPONS AND LANDING THEM IN JAPAN, AS YOU MENTIONED
EARLIER. IS THAT CORRECT?

PROFESSOR: LANDING SO TO SPEAK, IN A PERMANENT SENSE.
THE INSTALLATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT IS EXACTLY
WHAT IT MEANS. IT MEANS TO LAND THEM AND TO TAKE SOME
MEASURES OR OTHER.

KOMORI -- IF THERE IS ANYTHING MISSING FROM THAT, THEN ...

PROFESSOR: IT IS NOT INTRODUCTION.

KOMORI -- IT DOES NOT COME UNDER THE (JAPAN-US) AGREEMENT
...

PROFESSOR: THAT IS SO. THAT IS NOT THE AGREEMENT WHICH
HAS BEEN UNDERSTOOD UNTIL NOW. IT WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD
BY THE US SIDE IN SUCH A WAY, THIS WAS VERY CLEAR.

KOMORI -- AT ANY RATE, THE GOVERNMENT PROCEEDED, CARRIED
ALONG BY DEVELOPMENTS, AND EVENTUALLY, FELL IN LINE WITH
THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' ASSERTIONS. IT WAS TOO LATE.
IT WAS AFTER THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.

PROFESSOR: YES. INSTEAD OF THE JAPANESE SIDE'S SAYING
OPENLY THAT "IT IS A MATTER OF COURSE FOR THE GOVERNMENT
TO RECOGNIZE TRANSIT, AND THE US MUST DO THINGS . IT
TOOK THE ROAD OF TRYING TO EVADE THIS PROBLEM. THE
JAPANESE SIDE DID NOT HAVE THE COURAGE TO SAY SUCH
THINGS. IT SAID THAT "THE GOVERNMENT TRUSTS THE US," AND
IT CONSIDERED THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO PLACE ALL
RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME ON THE US.

KOMORI -- HOWEVER, THE US CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS
TODAY. SO LONG AS THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOTHING ...

PROFESSOR: THAT IS SO. WHEN THE PROBLEM CROPS UP
AGAIN, THAT WILL BE THE TIME FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
TO SAY: "SOVIET NAVAL SHIPS ARE PASSING THROUGH JAPANESE
STRAITS, CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOARD. AMERICAN NAVAL
SHIPS SHOULD ALSO DO THE SAME, AS A MATTER OF COURSE.
AMERICAN NAVAL SHIPS MUST ALSO CALL AT JAPANESE PORTS."

KOMORI -- TECHNICALLY SPEAKING, THERE ARE NO WAYS BY
WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE REMOVED.

PROFESSOR: THE US HAS NEVER INTRODUCED NUCLEAR-EQUIPPED
SUBMARINES (MEANING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR-MISSILE SUBMARINES).
HOWEVER, IN POINT OF LAW, THE US THINKS THAT IT CAN DO
SO. IT IS COMPLETELY ALRIGHT TO DO SO. THE US IS
INTRODUCING ONLY COMPLETELY DIFFERENT KINDS OF NUCLEAR-
POWERED SUBMARINES. THE US HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED
THE POINT OF NOT HAVING OTHER TYPES OF SUBMARINES ENTER
JAPANESE PORTS.

KOMORI -- THAT IS OFFICIAL ...

PROFESSOR: THAT IS CORRECT. THAT IS BECAUSE EVERYONE

ACTION (I,M)
INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RDJTF:LO(1)
DAMI(*) AOC-DAMI(*) DAMO(*) DACS-ZK(*) XDCX(*) IN(*)
009(*) 81(*) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB-2(1)
DB-2C(1) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 36

KNOWS WHAT NUCLEAR-EQUIPPED SUBMARINES ARE. THEY ARE
NOTHING OTHER THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER, EVEN IN
THIS CASE, WE THINK THAT IT IS JUST AND PROPER FOR EVEN
THIS TYPE OF SUBMARINES TO ENTER PORTS.

KOMORI -- IN ACTUAL FACT, NUCLEAR-EQUIPPED SUBMARINES.

PROFESSOR: AS AN ACTUAL FACT, NO NUCLEAR-EQUIPPED SUB-
MARINES HAVE EVER ENTERED JAPANESE PORTS. ONLY
SUBMARINES PROPELLED BY NUCLEAR POWER HAVE CALLED AT
JAPANESE PORTS.

KOMORI -- ARE YOU SAYING WHAT YOU ARE SAYING AS THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL POLICY, OR ARE YOU
STATING THE REALITY?

PROFESSOR: ON THIS PROBLEM, I AM DISCUSSING THE
REALITY. THAT IS BECAUSE NUCLEAR-ARMED SUBMARINES ARE
VERY CLEARLY NOTHING OTHER THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AIR-
CRAFT CARRIERS HAVE VARIOUS FUNCTIONS. THEY ARE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, AND THEY ALSO BEAR OTHER WEAPONS, AT THE SAME
TIME.

KOMORI -- IN THE CASE, THE US SIDE IS ACTING CAREFULLY
SO AS NOT TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ...

PROFESSOR: THAT IS BECAUSE THE US UNDERSTANDS THE
JAPANESE PEOPLE'S SPECIAL SENTIMENTS (CONCERNING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS) AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THEREFORE, I THINK THAT
IT SHOULD BE SAID, IN REGARD TO THIS PROBLEM, THAT EVEN
NUCLEAR-ARMED SUBMARINES ARE PERMITTED...
BT

MCN=81138/08486

TOR=81138/1531Z

TAD=81138/1532Z

CDSN=MAK230

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
181454Z MAY 81
SECT 04 OF 05

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OTTUZZF4 RUEHKOAO9023 1381523
IMMEDIATE
O 181454Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9384
BT

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 TOKYO 09023

FOR EA/J WILLIAM CLARK

KOMORI -- IN THAT CASE, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ARE A SO-CALLED
"GRAY AREA"
PROFESSOR: THEY INCLUDE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND
CRUISERS.

KOMORI -- I SEE. THAT MEANS THAT THERE ARE, AMONG THE
CRUISERS, THOSE WHICH ARE CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

PROFESSOR: YES. CRUISERS HAVE BEEN ENTERING
(JAPANESE PORTS) IN THE PAST, TOO, AND AMONG THEM,
THERE ARE SOME WHICH CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

KOMORI -- IN THAT CASE, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD
MAKE THAT POINT CLEAR, OR CONCLUDE A NEW AGREEMENT,
SHOULD IT NOT?

PROFESSOR: WELL...AT ANY RATE, I THINK IT SHOULD EXPLAIN
THE MEANING OF "MOCHIKOMI," IN THE LIGHT OF THE MEANING
OF "INTRODUCTION."

KOMORI -- THAT MEANS...

PROFESSOR: IT WOULD BE A DIFFERENT MATTER IF WE WERE
TO MAKE A REQUEST TO JAPAN FOR THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS STORAGE BASES OR BASES FROM WHERE THE US CAN
LAUNCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM JAPAN. IN SUCH CASES, WE
WOULD HAVE TO HAVE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE
SIDE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE US SIDE HAS PROMISED THAT IT
WILL NOT DO SUCH THINGS, UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY.

KOMORI -- TO PUT IT IN AN EXTREME WAY, I THINK THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OF A SOVEREIGN STATE, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT,
IS TELLING A LIE OFFICIALLY. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S
EXPLANATION TO THE EFFECT THAT "PORT CALLS BY US NAVAL
SHIPS, CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD, WILL BECOME AN
OBJECT FOR PRIOR CONSULTATIONS" IS COMPLETELY NOT IN
CONSONANCE WITH THE US SIDE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
OFFICIAL EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS.

PROFESSOR: IF THAT IS WHAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS
TELLING THE JAPANESE PEOPLE, IT MEANS THAT IT IS TELLING
A LIE.

KOMORI -- LET ME CONFIRM IT AGAIN. THE TERM "INTRODUC-
TION" DOES NOT INCLUDE PORT CALLS AND THE TRANSIT OF
NAVAL VESSELS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IS THAT
CORRECT? FURTHERMORE, THIS WAS CLEAR, CONSISTENTLY,
FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

PROFESSOR: ACCORDING TO THE US SIDE'S INTERPRETATION,
IT WAS CONSISTENTLY THAT WAY.

KOMORI -- DO YOU THINK THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE
US SIDE TO HAVE CLARIFIED THIS POINT, AT SOME TIME
OR OTHER?

PROFESSOR: THE PROBLEM IS PROBABLY THE POINT THAT THE
OTHER PARTY IS THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN. IN REGARD TO THE

ACTION (I.M)
INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RDJTF:LD(1)
DAMI(*) AOC-DAMI(*) DAMO(*) DACS-ZK(*) XOX(*) IN(*)
009(*) 81(*) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB-2(1)
DB-2C(1) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 38

POINT OF EXPLAINING SOMETHING TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE.
OUR POSITION IS FAR WEAKER THAN THAT OF THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT. EVEN IN THE DAYS WHEN I WAS AMBASSADOR TO
JAPAN, I DID NOT THINK I WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED DOING
SUCH A THING. MANSFIELD
BT

MCN=81138/08497

TOR=81138/1531Z

TAD=81138/1532Z

CDSN=MAK231

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
181454Z MAY 81
SECT 05 OF 05