

ES

RELEASED IN FULL

S/AS:R KELLEY  
7/9/79 EXT 24252  
S/AS:AMB SMITH

NAME  
EXT  
NAME

IO/UNP : MR ADAMSON  
S/S  
CLEARANCES

NAME

NEA/PAB : MRS COON  
CLEARANCES

NAME

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY: VIENNA

OTHER ACTUALS

PRIORITY: ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI PRIORITY, LONDON PRIORITY,  
PARIS PRIORITY, MOSCOW PRIORITY, BEIJING PRIORITY, BONN PRIORITY

MODIS AND  
VIENNA FOR IAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS {7/9/85} KELLEY, ROBERT, S/AS

TAGS: PK, PARM, MNUC, TECH

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: BRIEFING OF IAEA  
DIRECTOR GENERAL EKLUND

{S} ENTIRE TEXT

1. BELOW IS MEMCON OF AMBASSADOR GERARD SMITH'S DIS-  
CUSSIONS OF PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH IAEA DIRECTOR  
GENERAL EKLUND ON JUNE 25 AND 27 ON EDGES OF IAEA BOARD  
MEETING IN VIENNA:

BEGIN TEXT:

ON JUNE 25, AMBASSADOR SMITH, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR  
KIRK AND ROBERT GALLUCCI OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF,  
MET WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL EKLUND TO BRIEF HIM ON PAKISTAN'S  
SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. AMBASSADOR SMITH BEGAN BY  
NOTING THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES VIEWED  
THE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN AND EMPHASIZED THE EXTREME  
SENSITIVITY OF THE INFORMATION WE WERE PROVIDING. GALLUCCI  
THEN GAVE SOME EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. CONCLUSION THAT  
PAKISTAN WAS PURSUING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PROGRAM, MENTION-  
ING ACTIVITY IN REPROCESSING, GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT AND  
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DESIGN.

S/S  
RKRK  
A  
S/S

809840 59-90-0110

12

EKLUND SAID HE WAS DEEPLY SHOCKED. HE OF COURSE HAD HEARD REPORTS OF PAKISTANI INTEREST IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS ANOTHER MATTER ENTIRELY TO LEARN OF SUCH EXTENSIVE FACILITIES ALREADY BUILT AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING WHERE PAKISTAN WOULD GET ITS URANIUM AND HEXAFLORIDE CONVERSION CAPABILITY TO FEED THE ENRICHMENT FACILITY. HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF NIGER'S URANIUM WAS INVOLVED. GALLUCCI SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD SOME INDIGENOUS URANIUM, BUT WE DID NOT KNOW IF IT WAS ADEQUATE, AND THAT THERE WAS INTEREST IN HEXAFLORIDE CONVERSION BUT THAT WE LACKED FURTHER INFORMATION. EKLUND THEN ASKED IF PAKISTAN HAD THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY TO MANUFACTURE CENTRIFUGE MACHINES, AND GALLUCCI RESPONDED BY NOTING THE LARGE SCALE PAKISTANI SHOPPING EFFORT IN THE MORE DIFFICULT CENTRIFUGE COMPONENTS WHICH PROBABLY PUT THE OVERALL PROJECT WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITY. SMITH OBSERVED THAT IN RECENT MONTHS WE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS AND HAD MET WITH SOME SUCCESS IN CLOSING OFF SALES OF CENTRIFUGE COMPONENTS. EKLUND RECALLED THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS HE HAD HAD WITH THE PAKISTANIS ON THE SUBJECT OF PAKISTAN'S COMPLIANCE WITH ITS TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE AND THE AGENCY. HE GAVE AMBASSADOR SMITH A COPY OF THE LATEST (JUNE 18) PAKISTANI RESPONSE TO HIS QUERIES, WHICH ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS NO FACILITY IN PAKISTAN REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE AGREEMENT. HE THEN REPEATED HIS COMMENT ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IN LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE OF CURRENT PAKISTANI EFFORTS TO BUILD RE-PROCESSING FACILITIES.

IN MUSING OVER THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND THE LIMITED TOLERANCE OF THE WORLD TO ACCEPT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS, EKLUND WONDERED WHETHER PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE AT SOME POINT. SMITH INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT BE EFFECTIVE IN THE FUTURE, BUT FOR NOW HE REMINDED EKLUND OF THE SENSITIVITY AND CARE WITH WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE. EKLUND SAID HE WOULD THINK MORE ABOUT WHAT COULD BE DONE AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH THROUGH AMBASSADOR KIRK.

LATER EKLUND ASKED IF HE COULD DISCUSS THIS EVIDENCE WITH ANYONE ELSE. SMITH SAID NO.

DR. EKLUND ASKED TO SEE AMBASSADOR SMITH JUNE 27 TO DISCUSS THE PAKISTAN SITUATION AGAIN. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS QUESTION. HE DID NOT FEEL A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA WOULD BE FEASIBLE, GIVEN THE

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 155-A (OCT. 1961)  
Formally DS 522-A (OCR)  
Dep. of State

INDIAN AND CHINESE ATTITUDES. HE WONDERED IF EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC PRESSURE COULD BE EXERTED ON PAKISTAN, GIVEN THEIR ACCESS TO MOSLEM OIL MONEY. HE FEARED THAT MOSLEM SOLIDARITY MIGHT MEAN THAT COUNTRIES SUCH AS LIBYA WOULD BE WILLING TO FINANCE THE PROJECT AND MIGHT WANT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

EKLUND SAID HE FELT THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO GIVE WIDE PUBLICITY TO THE INFORMATION WE HAD. THIS MIGHT LEAD THE RESPONSIBLE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD TO PUT ENOUGH PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN TO STOP THE PROGRAM. THIS SEEMED THE ONLY CHANCE OF STOPPING THE PAKISTANIS. THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS IN THE UN FORUM MIGHT NOT BE GOOD BUT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH PUBLICITY. AMBASSADOR SMITH NOTED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SEEL MIRAGE AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN, AND THERE SEEMED NO DISPOSITION TO USE PAKISTAN'S LARGE DEBTS TO THE DEVELOPED WORLD TO PRESSURE PAKISTAN. DR. EKLUND SAID HE THOUGHT GISCARD, WHO HAD BROUGHT SEVERAL CHANGES IN FRENCH NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, MIGHT AGREE TO PRESSURE PAKISTAN.

AMBASSADOR SMITH NOTED THAT HE FELT WE STILL HAD SOME TIME, AS HE DOUBTED THE PAKISTANIS WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPLORE A DEVICE FOR TWO TO THREE YEARS. DR. EKLUND SAID THERE WAS NOT SO MUCH TIME, AS THE MORE WORK THE PAKISTANIS DID, THE HARDER IT WOULD BE TO STOP THEM. DR. EKLUND CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL IN ANY WAY HE COULD. AMBASSADOR SMITH SAID HE WOULD STAY IN TOUCH WITH DR. EKLUND THROUGH AMBASSADOR KIRK, AND AT THE NEW DELHI GENERAL CONFERENCE.

EKLUND WAS CLEARLY SHOCKED AND UPSET BY THIS INFORMATION. HE SEES A PAKISTAN EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS OF THE FUTURE.

END TEXT.

44

OC/T : PLEASE INCLUDE FOLLOWING INFO ADDRESSEES :

PRIORITY	OTTAWA
PRIORITY	CANBERRA
PRIORITY	TOKYO
PRIORITY	ROME
PRIORITY	THE HAGUE
PRIORITY	US MISSION USUN NEW YORK