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P.O. Box 1663
Los Alemos, New Mexico

May 23, 1952

In reply refer to: T-411A

Mr. Gordon Dean, Chairman United States Atomic Recry Commission Washington, D. C.

Dear Comissioner Dean:

From conversations with Dr. Teller and with members of the G.A.C., I understand that many important numbers of the Department of Defense are grevely concerned that the Russians may be engaged in a major effort to develop the H-bomb and that they may actually be ahead of us. I fully share the first concern, and I believe that this possibility is the one compelling reason for our present rapid development of this weapon. On the other hand, I think there are good arguments for the belief that the Russian project has at least not reached a more advanced stage than ours.

It is obviously difficult for me to assess the Bussian progress, especially since I have no access to intelligence reports. However, in the Fall of 1945, I make an estimate, purely on the basis of reasoning that the Bussians could probably have an atomic bomb in about five years. This estimate, published in the pamphlet "One World or Hone", proved rather accurate, and I may, therefore, be permitted to make another guess. (Similar estimates were made in 1945 and "46 by many of my colleagues who had actually worked on the Manhattan Project and were repeatedly published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and elsewhere. General Groves and Dr. V. Bush predicted times up to twenty years.)

Undoubtedly, the Russians were very much helped in the development of their ficsion bomb by the information given them by Dr. Klaus Fuchs. This

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CD 471.6 (ABomb) 1952 RG 330



Page 2

removed such uncertainty from their thinking, especially concerning the actual assembly of the bomb. I believe they have saved at least two years due to Dr. Fuchs. They still had to make a great industrial effort to construct plants for the production of fissionable materials, and a sizosble experimental and engineering effort to perfect an implesion bomb. Their quick success in these tasks showed that their technology is at a very high level, and that they considered atomic bombs important.

It has been pointed out that Fuchs also gave to the Russians our information on thermomelear books as of 1946. It has been argued that this information would leed them in a rather straightforward way to a successful hydrogen book. This conclusion, I believe, is incorrect because the H-book designs for which we now expect success are almost exactly the opposite of those proposed in 1946.

To substantiate this point, I enclose a brief history of our thermomelear program to date. As you are undoubtedly more, the "super bomb" envisaged in 1946 was based on a self-propagating nuclear reaction in deuterium. However, calculations in 1950 showed that this reaction probably cannot take place at all, or if it can, that it is highly uneconomical and impractical. If the Bussians have followed the 1946 line of development, we can only be happy because they would have wasted a lot of effort on a project without military significance.

In 1951, Teller discovered an entirely new approach to thermomelear reactions. I believe that among all scientists in the United States, he was the only one who could have made this discovery, due to his ingenuity and his persistent belief in thermomelear reactions, in spite of the severe setback implied by the 1950 calculations. Even with Teller, the discovery was largely accidental. The new approach used high densities of deuterium rather than high temperatures and was based on two separate discoveries, (a) that high densities would be useful and (b) that they could be achieved by a radiation implesion. Whether this approach will actually be successful, only the test late this year can show. Whether the same accidental discoveries have been made in Russia, it is entirely impossible to judge.

In any case, the Russian therromelear development earnot have been straightforward, and we have no basis on which to predict the present status of their art, in contrast to their development of flacton veapons where such a prediction could be made in 1945. We have, however, one very strong piece of evidence: there has not been my successful large-scale therromelear test in Bussia because otherwise we would surely have observed it. The therromelear burbs we are now designing are exceedingly complicated, and many of their design parameters cannot be fixed by theory or preliminary



Mr. Gordon Denn, Chairman May 23, 1952



Page 3

experiment alone, as was fortunately the case with fission bombs. Mobody, I believe, can arrive at a successful hydrogen bomb without one or more full-scale tests. We can, therefore, safely assume that the Russians are not as much as half a year ahead of us. I further would trust our own technical ability enough to believe that the time from the first successful test to a practical bomb which can be delivered, would be somewhat shorter for us than for them.

It is, therefore, my opinion that a continuation of our efforts at the present rate would assure us of a safe margin over the Russians. In the endoced memorandum, I show that the progress of our work on thermomelear weapons, since the first Russian bomb explosion and especially since Teller's discovery of the new approach, has been about as rapid as was technically feasible. I would expect that this will continue to be the case.

Clearly, no amount of work can assure us of a lasting monopoly in this field. On the contrary, if we now publicly intensify our efforts we shall force the Russians even more into developing this weapon which we have every reason to dread.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/H. A. Bothe

Hens A. Bethe

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