At ten o'clock this morning we went over to the White House to a meeting the President had called to discuss the Philippine military and naval bases. To begin with Forrestal, Grew, Tydings and myself were there. I then found that the Navy had accepted our statement of principles as perfectly satisfactory to them for themselves, and so the two reports of the two Services were consolidated into a single statement of principles for both as well as the list of the localities where the bases would be placed for both. Then after this had been done President Osmeña came in and he accepted the statement of the Army and Navy as acceptable to the Philippine government. President Truman then signed it and the job was done. Tydings suggested an addition to the statement of principles to the effect that the United States should have jurisdiction to follow up espionage cases outside of the bases and throughout the Islands. This was made verbally and was accepted by Osmeña. The statement of principles as accepted by everybody is annexed to this day's diary.

Then I spent the rest of the time in the morning reading dispatches until at twelve o'clock Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, came in. I had about forty-five minutes with him on general matters but especially S-1. He brought me messages of congratulation from the Prime Minister and said that he would be very glad to convey to him anything that I wanted to tell him about S-1 in which he was deeply interested. I then outlined to him the progress which we have made and the timetable as it stood now, and told him my own feeling as to its bearing upon our present problems of an international character. After that we had lunch with Marshall and McIvor coming in to share it with us. There we had a talk in general about matters in Europe and particularly Germany
and the complications which are being made by Russia's difficulties.

Roger Makins and Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy had come over with Anthony Eden but had gone off with Harvey Bundy while Eden was with me.

I talked over with Marshall the list of questions which the State Department had fired at me and which I enumerated in my yesterday's diary and we both decided that they were rather impractical to discuss now with anyone. I had a talk with McCloy about them. I told him to look them over and see what he thought of them; if he thought there was anything serious to answer. I told him that my own opinion was that the time now and the method now to deal with Russia was to keep our mouths shut and let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them better than anything else. It is a case where we have got to regain the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty rough and realistic way. They have rather taken it away from us because we have talked too much and have been too lavish with our beneficences to them. I told him this was a place where we really held all the cards. I called it a royal straight flush and we mustn't be a fool about the way we play it. They can't get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique. Now the thing is not to get into unnecessary quarrels by talking too much and not to indicate any weakness by talking too much; let our actions speak for themselves.

Secretary Forrestal had very kindly invited me to join a dinner that he was giving on the "Sequoia" in honor of Anthony Eden. But by the end of the afternoon I felt very tired and General Kirk came in and reported to me the verdict of the group of officers in the Medical Corps who had examined me up at the house the other day. They told me that I was all right but that I was
still in danger of drawing on my reserves, the reserves of my heart, and
they wanted me to take a week's rest and let them see how that acted on
my heart action. So I went home instead and rested and spent the evening
quietly with Mabel and I think we shall probably go off either to White
Sulphur Springs where the Army has a fine place to stay or go quietly up
to Highhold.
Tuesday, May 15, 1945

Much to my regret I felt compelled to send word to Andover that I could not be up there for their commencement. I was very sorry. I did not get fuss on the telephone but I told his secretary. I felt that I owed them the visit but with the recent entanglement that the doctors have thrown over me, I didn’t feel that I could summon up the courage to go.

I really am pretty well tired out.

At 9:30 we went into our meeting of the Committee of Three, Grew, Forrestal and myself being present with McCloy as recorder. Averill Harriman, the Ambassador to Russia, came with Grew; also William Phillips, formerly Under Secretary of State years ago. Forrestal brought Major Correia.

We had a pretty red hot session first over the questions which Grew had pro pounded to us in relation to the Yalta Conference and our relations with Russia. They have been entered in the diary here so I will not repeat them. I tried to point out the difficulties which existed and I thought it was premature to ask those questions; at least we were not yet in a position to answer them.

The trouble is that the President has now promised apparently to meet Stalin and Churchill on the first of July and at that time these questions will become burning and it may be necessary to have it out with Russia on her relations to Manchuria and Port Arthur and various other parts of North China, and also the relations of China to us. Over any such tangled web of problems the S-1 secret would be dominant and yet we will not know until after that time probably, until after that meeting, whether this is a weapon in our hands or not. We think it will be shortly afterwards, but it seems a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in diplomacy without having your master card in your hand.

The best we could do today was to persuade Harriman not to go back until we had had time to think over these things a little bit harder.
There is also the problem of San Francisco where the delegates are babbling on as if there were no such great issues pending as are in our hands. Everything coming from the State Department seems to be rather unreal and yet they are occupying an altogether disproportionate position in the public mind with the problem of pulling some sort of a success out of San Francisco, no matter what it is, being the one that is uppermost in their thoughts and in the thoughts of the public.

We also discussed the Venezia matter where we are getting into a pretty tight squeak and things are pretty tense there. The President has decided to try to push Tito hard and yet to withhold the threat of force.

That makes a pretty stiff proposition because I imagine Tito is a pretty good gambler.

Well when this meeting adjourned, I called in George Marshall, and he and McCloy and I talked out the proposition of the coming Asiatic campaign. That involves trouble. T. V. Soong has turned up here and has been to the White House to try to persuade the President that the easiest way for America to win the war over Japan is to fight it out in China on the mainland of Asia—the very thing that I am resolved that we shall not do unless it is over my dead body; and there is also a slight difference of opinion in the Chiefs of Staff between the Navy and the Army. Marshall has got the straightforward view and I think he is right, and he feels that we must go ahead. Fortunately the actual invasion will not take place until after my secret is out. The Japanese campaign involves therefore two great uncertainties; first, whether Russia will come in though we think that will be all right; and second, when and how S-1 will resolve itself. We three argued the whole thing over and over for at least an hour.
Tuesday, May 15, 1945.

Then at twelve o'clock I was reminded that there was a meeting on Lend-Lease. I had asked for one a long time ago and as usual it had crystallized at a time when it was a little late and also when I was very busy and tired. But with McCloy, Lovett, Generals Somervell, Maxwell, Shingley, Jamison and Colonel Burgoyne all waiting for me, I had to go on; and for an hour we talked out the problems of Lend-Lease as they are presented to us now after the European war is over, and there were a good many problems involved. However, they were argued out with fairness and good temper and I think we made some progress in them. But when it was over I found I had been in steady meetings in my room and that meant steady work for my poor old brain for four hours in a row and I was pretty tired.

So I hurried home and after lunch with Mabel I lay down and fortunately got a nap and that rested me. Then I went at three-thirty to the Walter Reed Hospital where I expected to have only an X-ray taken and a brief appointment. Mabel went with me to sit outside in the car while I was there. Instead of that they took over an hour with me going all through the whole thing again that the people did down at Miami and I was rather tired of that when I got out. Then we hurried back to Woodley and had a little time sitting around. Ellen McCloy was there with her children and we saw them, and then Harvey Bundy came in for dinner, and we had a pleasant evening sitting out on the porch with him. The weather has turned hot but it was very pleasant to sit out there and he and I talked over some of our problems of S-1.