June 13, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Analysis of Memorandum Presented by Mr. Hoover

In response to your memorandum of June 7, 1945, to which there was attached a paper submitted to you by Mr. Hoover entitled "Memorandum on Ending the Japanese War", I submit the following analysis of the latter mentioned document.

1. Mr. Hoover's conception of American objectives in relation to the war with Japan as set forth in paragraphs 1 to 6 of his memorandum falls substantially within the framework of the policies with regard to the post-defeat treatment of Japan that are now being formulated by the Department of State in consultation with other interested departments.

We regard as one of the cardinal policies the implementation of the Cairo Declaration, by which Manchuria, along with other areas in China annexed or occupied by Japan, would be returned to China.

We would expect that reparation would be made by Japan to China in various ways, not only by the transfer to China of all Japanese public property in Manchuria and elsewhere in China, but through deliveries to China from Japan's current industrial production.

The delivery to the United Nations of all Japanese military equipment would be an essential feature of Japan's surrender. We contemplate destruction of such equipment, the disbandment of the Japanese army and navy, and the demilitarization of Japanese industry.

Mr. Hoover refers to a Japanese military caste. There was a time when a military caste was one of the established orders of the Japanese social system, with membership therein governed by rigid rules. The Japanese military caste of today is limited in membership to no particular social group. It is in effect a specific philosophy which derives support from all Japanese
social strata. The dissolution of the Japanese army and navy would not, therefore, of itself effectively destroy the military caste; there must be also a program of intelligent re-education.

We believe it to be the established policy of the United States to bring to trial and punish all persons, whether German or Japanese, who are responsible for, or have participated in, the committing of, crimes against nationals, both military and civilian, of the United Nations.

It will be recalled that the Cairo Declaration calls for the separation from the Japanese Empire of the islands in the Pacific mandated to Japan.

2. The complete compass of the terms which we propose to impose on Japan would be considerably wider than the points proposed by Mr. Hoover. We believe it important that there should be a program — and we are in process of formulating such a program — designed to create in the post-defeat period conditions which would conduce toward the abandonment by the Japanese of militarism, militant nationalism and other archaic concepts, and toward the regeneration of these people along liberal and cooperative lines. We would therefore contemplate, first of all, a suspension of those organs of the Japanese Government which formulate policy. To encourage search for truth as something essential toward the establishment of a democracy we would guarantee freedom of speech and of religion, we would revise the system of education, and we would do away with obnoxious laws suppressing fundamental human rights. These and other things we would consider necessary to have done in order to achieve a total victory. They would be basic American objectives equally with the payment of reparations to China, the demilitarization of Japanese industry, or the trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals.

3. In paragraph 7 of his memorandum Mr. Hoover presents certain points which might be offered to the Japanese by way of inducing them to offer surrender. My comment follows.

(a) The United Nations have no desire to destroy either the Japanese people or their Government, nor do they wish to interfere unnecessarily in the Japanese way of life. Nevertheless it would have to be made clear that such political and social institutions as the Japanese might hope to retain in the future must conduce to the observance by Japan of its international obligations and to common peace and security.

(b) The
(b) The United States is committed through participation in the Cairo Declaration to the return of Formosa to China and to the independence "in due course" of Korea. There might well be inescapable repercussions if there were failure by the United States to observe this commitment by any such proposal as the placing of Formosa and Korea under Japanese trusteeship.

(c) With regard to the suggestion that the United States waive reparations by Japan, there is general agreement that the amount which could be made available by Japan to the United States in the form of payment from current industrial production would be extremely small. Nevertheless, there is a widely prevalent feeling in the United States that reparation should be obtained to the maximum amount possible. It would therefore seem unwise for this Government to make any public statement in the direction of waiving reparations.

4. There is much with which we would agree in the brief discussion by Mr. Hoover of the factors favorable to the acceptance by the Japanese of the terms proposed by him. Every evidence, without exception, that we are able to obtain of the views of the Japanese with regard to the institution of the throne, indicates that the non-molestation of the person of the present emperor and the preservation of the institution of the throne comprise irreducible Japanese terms. These indications are that, whereas the Japanese would be ready to undergo most drastic privations so long as these irreducible terms were met, they are prepared for prolonged resistance if it be the intention of the United Nations to try the present emperor as a war criminal or to abolish the imperial institution. We are disposed to agree with the view that failure on our part to clarify our intentions in this regard, or the proclamation of our intention to try the emperor as a war criminal and to abolish the institution of the throne, will insure prolongation of the war and cost a large number of human lives.

5. Mr. Hoover has assumed that the task of setting up a military government in Japan would be "an impossible one".

We conceive of the war against Japan as having two components, the military war, and the intellectual war. It would benefit us very little from the long point of view if we were to achieve merely a military victory and fail to pursue the victory into the field of ideas. It is true that we could, as Mr. Hoover proposes we should, destroy Japan's physical equipment
ment necessary for the making of war and then presumably withdraw and impose a virtual blockade for an indefinite period of time. A blockade, in our view, would do little toward generating on the part of the Japanese a progressive and cooperative attitude; and it could be maintained only so long as a world security organization were operative and so long as the American people were prepared to maintain the blockade. Upon the termination of the blockade, the Japanese people would be found to be substantially in the same hostile and resentful frame of mind that they might be expected to be at the time of their defeat and surrender.

It is our view that total victory cannot be achieved without a military occupation of Japan and a period during which Japan would be under military government. It is only under military government that conditions might be created favorable to the generation of those forces which, in the light of experience elsewhere, could be expected to promote democratic tendencies within Japan and cooperative attitudes in Japan’s relations with the rest of the world.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently proposed to the Secretary of State that a communication be sent to the Japanese Government demanding the immediate and unconditional surrender of Japan. The Joint Chiefs state that safeguards must be taken now against the Japanese Government putting forward a proposal for a negotiated peace at a time when there would be in the United States a large number of troops returned from Europe and awaiting redeployment in the Pacific. It is thought possible that a Japanese peace proposal at such a time might have serious adverse effects on American morale. The proposed communication to the Japanese Government would stress the inevitability of Japan’s defeat.

It is our intention, of course, to further in every practical way any measures which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may consider necessary to maintain the morale of the American people. It is our view, however, that a mere call on the Japanese to surrender, in whatever terms it might be couched but without clarification of “unconditional surrender”, is not likely to bring any affirmative response. We feel, on the other hand, that there might conceivably be a derisive rejoinder by the Japanese, with such effects on the morale of the American people as it might be difficult to predict. We have therefore prepared a draft statement which would, on the one hand, call upon the Japanese to surrender in terms substantially those proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would, on the other hand, indicate to the Japanese those things which, after their surrender, we would intend to accomplish in Japan.
It will be noted that the latter part of the draft statement presents in general terms the salient features of a program for the demilitarization, both physical and intellectual, of Japan, which would include most of the points considered essential by Mr. Hoover. It also presents some points which would be designed to allay certain fears of the Japanese and to meet their basic position, that the United Nations shall not molest the person of the emperor or disestablish the institution of the throne.

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
Draft of a Proposed Statement

AD-EHDeman: bmz