MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCCLOY:

SUBJECT: Comments re: Proposed Program for Japan

1. In accordance with yesterday's discussion, it appears that the subject may best be handled by breaking it down four (4) ways:
   a. Draft memorandum for the President.
   b. Proclamations for Japanese consumption:
      (1) For the Japanese government
      (2) For the Japanese people.
   c. Implementation:
      (1) Agreement with U.K., China, and (?) U.S.S.R.
      (2) Procedure if Japs accept.
         (a) Machinery, organization, chain of authority.
   d. Implications of Mr. Stimson's proposal with respect to overall U.S. objectives toward Japan.

2. With respect to 1 a. above, it is believed that China should be a party to the proposed proclamation directed at the Japanese. It is further considered that the memorandum for the President should include a terse recommendation that this Government take immediate steps jointly with its principal Allies, to provide the opportunity for a Japanese surrender in lieu of invasion and complete destruction of Japan.

3. With respect to 1 b., it is considered that there should be two (2) types of proclamations directed to the Japanese. The first should be directed to the Japanese government and should represent the maximum leniency acceptable to the Allies. It should be made perfectly clear that a Japanese "Yes" or "No" is the only type answer sought, and that no Allied-Jap negotiations will be tolerated. The second type proclamation should be designed for the consumption of
the Japanese people and should point towards the immensity of the Allied might and to the inevitability of utter destruction of all Japan if the war continues. This latter type proclamation, possibly distributed by air in leaflet form, might induce sufficient feeling in Japan in favor of capitulation that the present government would have no choice, other than to comply. Possibly the U.S.S.R., as a neutral intermediary, might be requested to communicate the Allied demand to the Japan government. Possibly, the U.S.S.R. might be persuaded to go one step further and indicate that it believes the Allied demand a reasonable one and that a failure on the part of the Japanese Government to accept this might possibly result in an addition to the present Allies engaged in the war against Japan.

4. With respect to 1 c. (1), it is anticipated that the desires and objectives of this government with respect to Japan will require some reconciliation with the desires of the U.K., China and the U.S.S.R.

5. With respect to 1 c. (2), it is considered that the U.S. is committed to consultation with its Allies at war with Japan; to the principle of united action for the prosecution of the war; and to acting together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan. Likewise, it is considered that our Allies have a responsibility to participate with the U.S. in the occupation of Japan and the obligation to assume a share in the burden thereof. At the present time, the U.S. has a preponderance of military means adjacent to Japan in readiness for an assault on the main islands. Also, the U.S. has been almost entirely responsible for Japan's military reverses thus far. It seems logical, therefore, that should the Japanese capitulate at this time, the initial occupation and control should be substantially U.S. with the understanding that as soon as suitable Allied control machinery could be agreed upon, control and supervision of the Japanese government, including the means to
effect it, would become a joint responsibility of the principal Allies. In order that some machinery could become immediately available, it is believed that consideration might well be given to the constitution of the Far East Advisory Commission (SWEOC 65/2) which might be assigned as its first duty the task of devising appropriate control or supervisory machinery for Japan. A diagrammatic concept of this approach is attached as Appendices "A" and "B".

6. With respect to 1 a., see Appendix "C".
APPENDIX "B"

PHASE II

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF CONTROL MACHINERY FOR JAPAN PROPER
(A Main Islands, about 1,000 Offshore Islands
Including Tsushima & Kafuruto or So. Sakhalin)

President
USA

Prime Minister
UK

President
CHINA

Stalin
USSR

Other heads of State as may be appropriate

SEC
STATE

SEC
WAR

SEC
NAVY

SEC
TREAS

SEC
FSA

DIR

Far East Advisory Comm

US
rep

UK
rep

China
rep

USSR
rep

Other
representatives

US
JCS

Collaboration

SWNCC

Guidance

JAP Control and Supervisory Comm

US
rep

UK
rep

China
rep

USSR
rep

Other
representatives

JAP GOVT

Occupation Forces

US

UK

China

USSR

Other

TOP-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority

23 June 1945
(Lt Col. Fahey)
APPENDIX "G"

IMPLICATIONS OF MR. STimson's PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVES TOWARDS JAPAN

1. The principal objective of the United States with respect to Japan has been stated to be the creation of conditions which will insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and which will permit the emergence of a Government which will respect the rights of other nations and observe Japan's international obligations. Steps to be taken for the accomplishment of this objective have been described, and include, as essentials, the drastic reduction of her territorial boundaries, the abolition of militarism and ultra-nationalism, the apprehension and punishment of war criminals, the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, and the strengthening of democratic processes and tendencies in the government and social institutions of Japan. The United States has also indicated that it will utilize the resources of Japan to provide relief and reparations to the United Nations (SWCC 150).

2. Although plans presently being formulated with respect to the post-defeat military government and occupation of Japan are based on the assumption that unconditional surrender will include the total capitulation of the Japanese Government and of the Emperor (JCS 1275), the United States is neither committed to that assumption, nor to any particular definition of unconditional surrender. It is clear, however, that any modification of tacitly assumed policy would be unacceptable if it substantially jeopardized the objectives of the United States. It would be short-sighted in the extreme to save the lives of this generation only to lose those of the next.

3. Should the Japanese Government offer unconditionally to surrender all her armed forces to the United States, or to the United States and the major Allies, and should she effectively bring about that surrender, the physical power of the Japanese to resist the will of the Allies would be destroyed. Limitations upon the freedom of the United States and her Allies
to take such action as they might consider appropriate for the achievement of their objectives would be self-imposed limitations. Restrictions of international law conventionally applicable to belligerent occupation need not bar the achievement of the proclaimed objectives of the United Nations or prevent action to compensate the victims of Japan's lawless aggression. The formal demand for unconditional surrender of the armed forces, which must be the only Allied pronouncement prior to surrender, has been so drafted as to leave unquestionable power of decision and freedom of action in the hands of the victors. Japan, no longer an empire, but an island nation confined within narrow boundaries, would be given the opportunity without interference to conduct those internal affairs which do not concern the interests of other nations. Having announced our basic purpose of demilitarizing Japan, we should remain free by direct action or otherwise to assume the achievement of our objective. The Japanese Government and the Emperor could, to the extent which we consider desirable, be used as our agent for carrying out our purposes.

4. The assumption in earlier plans that the unconditional surrender of Japan would involve the total capitulation of the Japanese Government and of the Japanese Emperor necessitated planning for a complete occupation of the four main islands and the establishment by the military government of a complete system of administration. It has been the United States policy that responsibility for this military government would be centralized in a United States commander under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Participation of Allied forces in the occupation would be encouraged, but the primary responsibility for conducting the military government would be vested in the United States commander and the United States forces of occupation (SHOCC 70/2; JCS 1398). This plan not only involved a large commitment of United States troops. It involved the possibility of a long-term occupation of Japan under the most unfavorable circumstances possible. Though a skeleton national administration might be utilized
by the military government, no central indigenous institutions would
exist around which desirable loyalties and aspirations might develop. The
military government would either have to be supported by force alone or
would be compelled to encourage the early development of conditions sub-
stantially similar to those which would have existed from the first had
the Government and the Emperor never surrendered themselves to the Allies.

5. In the event that there should be an unconditional surrender of
the armed forces only, it is believed that the controls necessary for the
achievement of the Allied objectives could, after a very brief initial
show of force, be effected by a limited, if not token occupation of the
main islands. A careful study of the critical administrative, strategic
and industrial centers would, of course, have to be made before any
estimate of the minimum and maximum limits of the commitment of forces
would be possible. It seems self-evident, however, that full utilization
of the authority and power of the Japanese Government and Emperor would
enormously reduce the task of military government. An Allied military
control agency in Tokyo, under United States direction, supported by
garrison forces of the United States and her Allies and stationed at
critical centers, and supplemented with appropriate civilian agencies
to assure the industrial disarmament of Japan, should be able to effect
prompt enforcement of Allied policy.

6. It is concluded that an unconditional surrender of the armed
forces of Japan, occurring after the promulgation by the United States
of a forceful statement of the presently defined objectives of the Allies,
would not only be sufficient to permit the accomplishment of those ob-
jectives, but, as compared with an unconditional surrender of the armed
forces, Japanese Government and Emperor, would facilitate their achieve-
ment.