MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL STINSON:

I am enclosing the short form of proposed proclamation by the heads of state. I am not sending you the longer form of the State Department draft or some of the other drafts that we have as I think this raises all the questions. It needs further polishing but the ideas, I think, are contained in it.

I am also sending you a rough draft of a paper which discusses the timing. You will appreciate that this has no relation to S-1 but as it discusses other factors which relate to the timing I think that the S-1 element can be readily introduced in it.

The more important questions which have been resolved in the manner set forth in the draft are:

1. The method by which the warning should be delivered to the Japanese. Both the State Department and ourselves feel it should not be done through diplomatic channels but should be done by way of a declaration with all the usual propaganda following it up.

2. Should the warning be made unilaterally or in conjunction with the other countries? We concluded that if possible U.S., U.K. and China should join in the declaration.
and, if Russia was then or about to become a belligerent, it should also join.

3. The maintenance of the dynasty. This point seems to be the most controversial one and one on which there is a split in opinion in the State Department. The draft suggests the language we have used in the memorandum to the President. This may cause repercussions at home but without it those who seem to know most about Japan feel there would be very little likelihood of acceptance.

4. The necessity for occupation. We have felt that without occupation there would not be the symbol of defeat that is necessary to impress both the Japanese and the Far Eastern peoples nor the means to demilitarize the islands. As you will see, we have left the time for the occupation somewhat indefinite.

We are continuing to work on the paper and I will have some new drafts by Sunday night.

[SIGNED] JOHN J. McCLOY

J.J.McC. Inc.