13 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:


1. Recommend that the following be sent to Chief of Staff as G-2 comments on Message 893 from Tokyo to Moscow, dated 12 July 1945:

   a. Neckerling believes there are a number of interesting deductions suggested by Message 893:

      (1) That the Emperor has personally intervened and brought his will to bear in favor of peace in spite of military opposition;

      (2) That conservative groups close to the Throne, including some high ranking Army and Navy men, have triumphed over militaristic elements who favor prolonged desperate resistance;

      (3) That the Japanese governing clique is making a well coordinated, united effort to stave off defeat believing (a) that Russian intervention can be bought by the proper price, and (b) that an attractive Japanese peace offer will appeal to the war weariness in the United States.

2. Of these (1) is remote, (2) a possibility, and (3) quite probably the motivating force behind the Japanese moves. Mr. Grew agrees with these conclusions.

   [Signature]

John Neckerling
Brigadier General, G3G
Deputy A.C. of S, G-2

MEMO FOR RECORD: I called Gen. Handy, the Deputy Chief of Staff, at about 1230 today and told him that I had written up the comments on the Japanese message described above; that these comments were practically the same as I gave in the C/S's conference today and that I recommended that these comments be forwarded to the C/S. Gen. Handy agreed and stated that he did not want to see the memorandum.

   J.W.