Monday, July 16, 1945

I spent the morning with McCloy and Bundy in drafting the papers in re Manchuria; the problem of Germany, and third, the answer to the proposition of the State Department on the Ruhr, viz: protectorate by France, Belgium, and Holland, and a total excision of the Ruhr from Germany.

I also received important paper in re Japanese maneuvers for peace.

At 7:30 PM Harrison's first message concerning the test of the S-1 bomb arrived and I took it at once to the President's house and showed it to Truman and Byrnes who of course were greatly interested, although the information was still in very general terms.

Tuesday, July 17, 1945

I went to the White House for a conference with Byrnes early in the morning. We first discussed methods of handling Harrison's paper. Byrnes was opposed to a prompt and early warning to Japan which I had first suggested. He outlined a timetable on the subject warning which apparently had been agreed to by the President, so I pressed it no further. I impressed on him the importance of the Open Door policy in connection with Stalin's new pressure for commercial rights in Manchuria, and advised that any claim for exclusive rights should be firmly opposed. I described to him the development of the Open Door and the Nine Power Treaty. Byrnes evidently accepted that advice, and I then discussed with him the papers on Germany which had been united into one paper. I very briefly outlined our position taken in the paper, but emphasized the danger of trouble which would come from the territorial excision and the denationalization of the German population of the Ruhr, pointing out that it was entirely against the historical tendency of
the evolution towards nationalism which had taken place for the past one hundred and fifty years in Europe, and I contrasted this with the wiser territorial results reached in the Treaty of Versailles. Later I heard through the grapevine and McCoy that the State Department proposition had been practically abandoned.

After a half hour with Byrnes I took a trip to Berlin, going through the principal parts of the city. I was distressed at the picture of destruction. Almost every house had either been demolished or gutted, and the city looked like a dead city except for despondent looking groups of homeless people going from place to place with all their worldly goods pushed by them in little carts, baby carriages, bicycles, etc. In the Russian part of the city there was more activity, apparently still engaged in trying to make passable the streets.

I returned to Potsdam and lunched with the Prime Minister, Attlee, and Lord Leathers, although a number of others were in the house including his daughter Mary. It was a most singular luncheon because Churchill and Attlee were the two opponents in the election in England. In spite of this they were most cordial and familiar with each other at the luncheon and apparently on the best of personal terms and were poking a great deal of fun at each other. We had a very good time, Churchill and I chaffing each other in reminiscences of our youth including particularly in re Cuba, and I prolonged my stay there until nearly half past four. We had some talk about ships—the distribution of the German merchant marine, Europe and others. We discussed the coal situation in Great Britain and the United States—supplies of both were going to be short this winter.
Tuesday, July 17, 1945.

As he walked down to the gate I told him of Harrison's message. He had not heard from his own people about the matter. He was intensely interested and greatly cheered up, but was strongly inclined against any disclosure. I argued against this to some length.

I then went back to the villa and had a short rest and massage and went to dinner with the President at 7:45.

The guests at the dinner were Byrnes, myself, Marshall, Arnold, King and Leahy, together with members of the President's staff, including General Vaughan, two naval aides, Ross of Public Relations and possibly others.

It was rather disappointing because they had a string quartet on the piazza right outside the window which kept at it all through the dinner so that we had no opportunity to talk. However, I imagine that was the way the President rested himself. He certainly was entitled to do it. The President, however, told me briefly of his first meeting with Stalin and said he thought that he had clinched the Open Door in Manchuria.

When I got back to our house I found Generals Clay, Echols, and Hilldring, and others. Clay told me of the situation in Germany and his plans.

Wednesday, July 18, 1945.

Harrison's second message came, giving a few of the far reaching details of the test. I at once took it to the President who was highly delighted.

The President again repeated that he was confident of sustaining the Open Door policy, and I took the occasion to emphasize to him the importance of going over the matter detail by detail so as to be sure that there would be
Wednesday, July 18, 1945

no misunderstanding over the meaning of the general expressions. The President was evidently very greatly reinforced over the message from Harrison and said he was very glad I had come to the meeting.

I then went for a walk and shopping with McCloy and Bundy.

In the afternoon after a rest I had a long talk with McCloy and Bundy. We were all troubled by the wastage of time in getting information about what is going on. Informal as well as formal conferences are being held, and we have to wait until they are finished and then McCloy gets hold of some one of the State Department subordinates who has been present, finds out from him what has happened and then brings it to me. So, on McCloy's insistence, I decided to go see Byrnes and see whether I could not get admittance for McCloy into the conferences where other Assistant Secretaries were present.

Thursday, July 19, 1945

Shortly after nine o'clock I went around to the Little White House and saw Byrnes in respect to this matter of having McCloy participate in the Conference. He told me that in regard to the formal Conference there had been a limit placed on each nation bringing not more than two helpers, and that would cut out the possibility of bringing in McCloy. I told him I knew of a great many informal conferences of the State Department subordinates going on and asked him if he had any objection to McCloy going to those. He said he had not and gave him his blessing. I then asked him about minutes — if any minutes were kept of the meetings which I could have the privilege of looking over. He said that there were none; that they were not being written up until the interpreters had finished at the end of the
Conference. So my meeting with him was rather a barren one. He gives me the impression that he is hugging matters in this Conference pretty close to his bosom, and that my assistance, while generally welcome, was strictly limited in the matters in which it should be given.

I returned to the house and found General Clay there and had a conference with him and McCloy. He had just arrived at Potsdam and it is very interesting to talk with him about his problems which he is handling in a masterly fashion.

Later General Hildring came in and the main topic of the feeding of the Germans in the United States area in Berlin was brought up. It is a difficult problem and a hiatus has arisen in it.

At twelve o'clock Lord Cherwell called, and he and Bundy and I sat out under the trees and talked over S-1. He was very reasonable on the subject of notification to the Russians, feeling about as doubtful as we.

He reported Churchill as being much pleased with our luncheon together last Monday and much cheered by the talk.

After lunch at two o'clock Field Marshal Alexander and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson came in. The main subject of their call was the appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas to be the American member of the Italian Control Commission. There had been delay and some complications about it and Alexander reported that there had been news reports which had been embarrassing to the present incumbent, Admiral Stone. He thereupon proposed a solution by suggesting that Douglas came out on a visit of inspection preparatory to assuming the duties of the office, and invited him to stay with him. Then he would take office later in September. This was agreed to and the telegrams
were drawn up and sent. I talked over with Alexander his campaigns in
Italy and complimented him on their success which seemed to please him.
It is the first time I had met him personally, he having been absent when
I visited both Africa and Italy. We talked over the episodes of Tito
and deGaulle in their incursions into Italy.

Later in the afternoon at a quarter to five McCloy, Bundy, and
I had a long and interesting discussion on our relations with Russia; what
the cause of the constant differences between the countries are, and how to
avoid them. As a result, I dictated a memorandum on the subject to serve
as a sort of analysis and possible basis for action. It boiled down to the
possibility of getting the Russians to see that the real basis of the evil
was the absence of freedom of speech in their regime, and the iron-bound rule
of the OGPU. I have been very much impressed on this visit with the atmos-
phere of repression that exists everywhere, and which is felt by all who come
in contact with the Russian rule in Germany. While the Russian soldiers and
American soldiers seem to like each other individually when they meet, the
people who have to deal with the Russian officials feel very differently, and
it greatly impairs the cooperation between our two countries. Churchill is
very rampant about it, and most of our people who have seen the Russians most
intimately think we have been too easy and that they have taken advantage of it.

It is a very difficult problem because they are crusaders for their
own system and suspicious of everybody outside trying to interfere with it.

At the same time it is becoming more and more evident to me that a nation whose
system rests upon free speech and all the elements of freedom, as does ours,
cannot be sure of getting on permanently with a nation where speech is strictly
controlled and where the Government uses the iron hand of the secret police.
The question is very important just now, and the development of S-1 is
bringing it to a focus. I am beginning to feel that our committee which
met in Washington on this subject and was so set upon opening communications
with the Russians on the subject may have been thinking in a vacuum.

Today's talk with McCloy and Bundy was a good one and opened up the situation.

Friday, July 20, 1945.

In the morning George Patton arrived with General Floyd L. Parks
who is the Commander of the district here. Patton had flown up from his
headquarters near Munich to see me. We went out a little before noon and
reviewed the Second Armored Division whose tanks were drawn up on the side
of the road facing the roadway like a line of soldiers for I should say con-
siderably over a mile long. General Patton went with me in the reviewing
car past the line of tanks together with General Parks, McCloy, Bundy, and
Kyle. We drove in a half track car up and down the line and it was a very
impressive sight. At luncheon we had as guests Patton and Parks, Major
Murnane and Captain Hayo who were respective aides to the generals.

Immediately after lunch we hurried off with the same company to
the Little White House where we joined the Presidential procession into Berlin.
There the President raised the flag at the Headquarters of the American Control-
Group in the Air Defense buildings. It was an impressive ceremony. It was
the same flag I saw raised a year ago in the Palazzo Venetzia in Rome. Next
time it will be Tokyo. Eisenhower and Bradley were also present and I had a
pleasant chat with each of them after the show was over.
We then returned to the house and Ambassador Harriman soon came in on my invitation to talk over the subject of our relations with Russia which McCloy, Bundy, and I were discussing last evening. I showed him the paper which I had dictated on the importance of getting freedom of speech in Russia. It would up as a suggestion as to the importance of beginning to get the Russians accustomed to the thought of coming to that one of the Bill of Rights which in my opinion is the most important of all. Harriman read the paper and said that the analysis of the reasons for the differences were in his opinion exactly correct but he was pessimistic as to the chances of getting Russia to change her system in any way. He has been in Russia now for nearly four years and has grown evidently depressed and troubled by the situation. I talked with him for a long time regarding the matter and, in view of his intelligence and capacity, such a despairing view from him troubled me a great deal.

General Cannon came in. He is in charge of the Army Air Forces in the E.T.O. He offered guidance and information as to any explorations I wished to make in Germany to see conditions.

Late in the afternoon Allen Dulles turned up and I had a short talk with him. He has been in the OSS in Switzerland and has been the center of much underground information. He told us about something which had recently come into him with regard to Japan.

Saturday, July 21, 1945

I got up and found myself rather stalled with not much to do so I cleared up my papers, talked to Bundy, and said goodbye to Patton who came in to pay his respects. I then dictated my notes and also an agenda for further conferences with the President, Byrnes, Churchill and Marshall.
At eleven thirty-five General Groves' special report was received by special courier. It was an immensely powerful document, clearly and well written and with supporting documents of the highest importance. It gave a pretty full and eloquent report of the tremendous success of the test and revealed far greater destructive power than we expected in S-1.

While I was reading it with Bundy, Joseph E. Davies came in by appointment, and I had to break off and discuss with him matters purely related to a call of courtesy. I talked with him of the character of the Russians as he had observed it in his ambassadorship in Russia, and he was a little bit more encouraging than Harriman. But I had to break away as quickly as I could in order to get back to the reading of the report. I made an appointment with the President for as soon as he could see me, which was at three-thirty.

Meanwhile I had lunch and talked with General Clay and General Echols over their work in solving the economic problem in Germany.

At three o'clock I found that Marshall had returned from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to save time I hurried to his house and had him read Groves' report and conferred with him about it.

I then went to the "Little White House" and saw President Truman. I asked him to call in Secretary Byrnes and then I read the report in its entirety and we then discussed it. They were immensely pleased. The President was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the Conference and being present to help him in this way.
I then left the "Little White House", picked up Bundy, and went to the Prime Minister's house where we conferred with him and Lord Cherwell. I turned over the paper to Churchill and he began reading it but was interrupted a few minutes before five in order to hurry to the Big Three Conference at five o'clock. He asked me to return on the following morning to finish up the report.

Massage and dinner, and then in the evening about ten-thirty two short cables came in from Harrison indicating that operations would be ready earlier than expected, and also asking me to reverse my decision as to one of the proposed topics. I cabled, saying I saw no new factors for reversing myself but on the contrary the new factors seemed to confirm it.

Called on President Truman at nine-twenty. The foregoing day I had left with him my paper on reflections as to our relations with Russia, copy of which is hereto attached. I had told him that this paper was in no sense an official paper — that it did not even contain my matured opinions, but that it represented an analysis which I thought was correct and a program of what I hoped might sometime be done. With that understanding he asked me to see it and I left it with him and this morning I picked it up. He gave it to me and stated that he had read it and agreed with it.

I also discussed with him Harrison's two messages. He was intensely pleased by the accelerated timetable. As to the matter of the special target which I had refused to permit, he strongly confirmed my view and said he felt the same way.
At ten-forty Bundy and I again went to the British headquarters and talked to the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell for over an hour. Churchill read Groves’ report in full. He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner; telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He said “Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn’t understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting”. Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and that he felt the same way. His own attitude confirmed this admission. He now not only was not worried about giving the Russians information of the matter but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations. The sentiment of the four of us was unanimous in thinking that it was advisable to tell the Russians at least that we were working on that subject and intended to use it unless we finished.

At twelve-fifteen I called General Arnold over, showed him Harrison’s two cables, showed him my answer to them and showed him Groves’ report, which he read in its entirety. He told me that he agreed with me about the target which I had struck off the program. He said that it would take considerable hard work to organize the operations now that it was to move forward.

After luncheon and rest, at three-fifty we took an auto drive out into the country to the west of Babelsberg, and saw some open country and also the very battered city of Potsdam. Captain G. T. Gabelia came with us as a
guide, and the party consisted of Bundy, Kyle, Kreps, Cabell and myself.

In the evening we had the usual movies. The daily massage which I have been having every afternoon just before dinner has been a great success in keeping me going.

Monday, July 23, 1945

At ten o'clock Secretary Byrnes called me up asking me as to the timing of the S-1 program. I told him the effect of the two cables and that I would try to get further definite news. I dictated a cable to Harrison asking him to let us know immediately when the time was fixed.

At ten-fifteen Ambassador Harriman arrived and he and McCloy, Bundy, and I had a talk over the situation. Harriman giving us the information of yesterday afternoon's meetings. He commented on the increasing cheerfulness evidently caused by the news from us, and confirmed the expanding demands being made by the Russians. They are throwing aside all their previous restraint as to being only a Continental power and not interested in any further acquisitions, and are now apparently seeking to branch in all directions. Thus they have not only been vigorously seeking to extend their influence in Poland, Austria, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but they are seeking bases in Turkey and now are putting in demands for the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. He told us that Stalin had brought up yesterday the question of Korea again and was urging an immediate trusteeship. The British and the French are refusing to consider a trusteeship on Hong Kong and Indo-China, and I foresee that if that is continued the Russians will probably drop their proposal for trusteeship of Korea and ask for solitary control of it.
At eleven o'clock I went down to the "Little White House" to try to see the President or Byrnes. I am finding myself crippled by not knowing what happens in the meetings in the late afternoon and evening. This is particularly so now that the program for S-1 is tying in what we are doing in all fields. When I got there I found Byrnes out, and I asked for the President who saw me at once. I told him that it would be much more convenient for me to form my program on the military side if I could drop in early every morning and talk with him or Byrnes of the events of the preceding day. He told me to come; that he would be glad to see me every morning and talk over these matters with me. I then told him of matters that came up in the conference with Mr. Harrison this morning which I just referred to, and told him that I had sent for further more definite information as to the time of operation from Harrison. He told me that he had the warning message which we prepared on his desk, and had accepted our most recent change in it, and that he proposed to shoot it out as soon as he heard the definite day of the operation. We had a brief discussion about Stalin's recent expansions and he confirmed what I have heard. But he told me that the United States was standing firm and he was apparently relying greatly upon the information as to S-1. He evidently thinks a good deal of the new claims of the Russians are bluff, and told me what he thought the real claims were confined to.

After lunch and a short rest I received Generals Marshall and Arnold, and had in McCloy and Bundy at the conference. The President had told me at a meeting in the morning that he was very anxious to know whether Marshall felt that we needed the Russians in the war or whether we could get
along without them, and that was one of the subjects we talked over. Of

course Marshall could not answer directly or explicitly. We had desired

the Russians to come into the war originally for the sake of holding up in

Manchuria the Japanese Manchurian Army. That now was being accomplished

as the Russians have amassed their forces on that border, Marshall said,

and were poised, and the Japanese were moving up positions in their Army.

But he pointed out that even if we went ahead in the war without the Russians,

and compelled the Japanese to surrender to our terms, that would not prevent

the Russians from marching into Manchuria anyhow and striking, thus permitting

them to get virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms. Marshall
told us during our conference that he thought thus far in the military con-

ference they had handled only the British problems and that these are

practically all settled now and probably would be tied up and finished to-
morrow. He suggested that it might be a good thing, something which would
call the Russians to a decision one way or the other, if the President would
say to Stalin tomorrow that "as much as the British have finished and are

going home, I suppose I might as well let the American Chiefs of Staff go away
also" that might bring the Russians to make known what their position was
and what they were going to do, and of course that indicated that Marshall felt
as I felt sure he would that now with our new weapon we would not need the
assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan.

There was further talk about the war in the Pacific in the con-
ference. Apparently they have been finding it very hard to get along with

MacArthur, and Marshall has been spending most of his time in conferences in
smoothing down the Navy.
Monday, July 23, 1945.

I talked to Marshall about the preparation of S-1 and he gave us a bad picture of the rainy season weather in Japan at this time and said that one thing that might militate against our attack was the low ceiling and heavy clouds, although there were breaks and good days in between.

After the conference I took a short drive with Colonel Kyle accompanied by Captain Gabilia, Russian interpreter, past the Potsdam shelling yards to the Schloss Cecilienhof. This Schloss was where the meetings of the present Conference were held. The drive was a refreshing one.

In the evening I received a telegram from Harrision giving me the exact dates as far as possible when they expected to have S-1 ready, and I answered it with a further question as to further future dates of the possibility of accumulation of supplies.

Tuesday, July 24, 1945.

At nine-twenty I went to "The Little White House" and was at once shown into the President's room where he was alone with his work, and he told me about the events of yesterday's meeting with which he seemed to be very well satisfied. I then told him of my conference with Marshall and the implication that could be inferred as to his feeling that the Russians were not needed. I also told the President of the question which Marshall had suggested might be put to Stalin as to the Americans going home, and he said that he would do that this afternoon at the end of the hearing, but he told me that there had been a meeting called by Leahy of the Military Staffs to meet either this afternoon or I think tomorrow morning.

The President was frank about his desire to close the Conference and get away. He told me Churchill was going away Wednesday and was coming...
back Friday, and that he hoped to get the whole thing closed up and get away either Sunday or Monday. I told him that I thought I had done all that I could see in sight, and that as Churchill was going away, I was thinking of going down to see Patton's troops in Bavaria for a day or so and then, if he did not telegraph me that he would like me to come back, I thought I would go on home. He said that arrangement was perfectly agreeable to him and, if he wanted to have me come back, he would let me know at Patton's.

I then showed him the telegram which had come last evening from Harrison giving the dates of the operations. He said that was just what he wanted, that he was highly delighted and that it gave him his cue for his warning. He said he had just sent his warning to Chiang Kai-shek to see if he would join in it, and as soon as that was cleared by Chiang he, Truman, would release the warning and that would fit right in time with the program we had received from Harrison.

I then spoke of the importance which I attributed to the reassurance of the Japanese on the continuance of their dynasty, and I had felt that the insertion of that in the formal warning was important and might be just the thing that would make or mar their acceptance, but that I had heard from Byrnes that they preferred not to put it in, and that now such a change was made impossible by the sending of the message to Chiang. I hoped that the President would watch carefully so that the Japanese might be reassured verbally through diplomatic channels if it was found that they were hanging fire on that one point. He said that he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it.

We had a few words more about the S-1 program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets. He again reiterated
with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria.

**Tuesday, July 24, 1945**

This morning I learned that I had been invited to meet Stalin at his quarters at the meeting place of the Conference, so with Mr. Page who acted as my interpreter I went there at twelve-fifteen. We were ushered into the Schloss Cecilienhof, where the conferences have taken place, and on my way to Stalin's room I passed through the conference room where one of the intermediary conferences was already taking place. Molotov who was there greeted me and also Andrei Gromyko, the Russian Ambassador to the United States. Molotov introduced a Mr. Pavlov who was also there.

After just a few words with them I went on through some more corridors until I was ushered into Stalin's room. He came and greeted me cordially and showed me a seat in front of his desk where he then took his seat, and I had a short talk with him, the minutes of which I afterwards dictated and which are attached hereto. Stalin impressed me as older than I thought he would look and the impressive part of him was a very large head.

I then went back to lunch and immediately after lunch we took the C-54 for Munich. On arrival there I was met by General Patton and General Gay