1. Dispersal of Fuel Stocks in Japan and Korea:

On 8 July an Army supply depot at Moji requested authority to make an urgent shipment of 12,000 empty drums, "in order to disperse the fuel in the tanks at Itozaki" (35 m. NE of Kure) (FES 30 July 45). The type of fuel stored at Itozaki is not known. Several messages now available, however, indicate that a general Army aircraft fuel dispersal program has been under way at least since the latter part of June:
(1) On 23 June the Air General Army at Tokyo, reporting that some of the fuel in tanks at Kagamitahara (15 m. N of Nagoya) had been lost by fire during an air attack on the 25th, directed subordinate commands to speed up fuel dispersal "all the more". The message added that storage of fuels in tanks should be prohibited, and that fuel accumulated "in the field" should be stored in underground or half-underground installations.

(2) In messages of 2 July, Neiho (NW Korea) reported that "cave-type" and "half-underground" fuel storage installations were being constructed at airfields in Northwest Korea (FBS 25 July 45).

(3) On 13 July the Air General Army noted that "the trend of fuel destruction by fire in recent bombings is gradually becoming greater" and ordered air units to take additional precautions so that "not one drum will be lost by fire."

2. Southwest Celebes—Plans for Disposal of Bombs at Makassar:

On 3 Aug Base Force 23 (Navy; Hq Makassar) reported to Surabaya that the following steps are to be taken so that "the total of 2,792 30-kg and 250-kg bombs at Makassar will not fall into the hands of the enemy":

-3-
"The 60-kg bombs will be diverted to land warfare, but there seems to be no alternative to destroying the 1,400 250-kg [word missing] bombs. About ten days will be required to remove those bombs from storage and to destroy them, and, in view of the present war situation, it seems advisable to begin doing so now".

Note: An Army message of 6 July stated that "the southern part of Celebes is the likely objective of the enemy's advance during the next period" (FES 16 July 45). On 25 July, Base Force 23 reported that an invasion was "near".

3. Operation Homelands—Combined Naval Force Directive:

TAB A gives the text of a directive sent on 29 July by the Supreme Commander of the Combined Naval Force to all units participating in preparations for Operation Homelands. The directive includes the following points:

(1) "When the enemy attacks Honshu", all Army and Navy air strength must be concentrated on the threatened point, in order to "defeat and destroy the enemy forces". To accomplish that, however, it will be necessary for the Japanese
to carry out considerable training and to preserve their equipment in the meantime.

(2) It will require "the greatest of caution" to avoid a slump in morale during the period of waiting.

(3) Training must "somehow" be continued, "even in the face of our present fuel situation".

(4) The emphasis in training will be on improving suicide aircraft and surface and underwater suicide strength. Air strategy is to be "based on total suicide air attacks".

(5) Although aircraft losses on the ground have already been curtailed, there are still instances of "heavy losses at one time", which are generally attributable to imperfect "anti-loss" measures.

4. Operational Patrols by JAAF Suicide Units:

A 2 Aug message contains the first evidence that TO (suicide) units of the Japanese Army Air Force are being used on operational patrols. The message directs two TO units operating from Kyushu airfields to carry out patrols off Northwest Kyushu (in the Tsushima Strait area and southwestward to the Goto Islands).
Note: It is not known whether the two units are equipped with combat aircraft or trainers.

5. Japanese Intelligence on Allied Operations:

A Japanese Army message sent from Tokyo on 31 July, reporting on Allied radio communications for the 50th, includes the following paragraph:

"It is very significant that messages from Guam addressed to a 'collective call' have been transmitted every day since the 27th to all operational divisions, to Manila, to Chungking, to the Supreme Commander of Naval Forces in the Philippines area, to the Commander of the Far East Air Force, to Melbourne, etc. In the past we have noted just this phenomenon during the period of about two weeks preceding an invasion."

6. Japan—Army Ground Units:

3. New division: The 331st Div has been identified in Japan, from a 13 July message which stated that the Division was to receive its regimental colors on 25 July. The Division is the 39th active division (3 infantry and 1 armored) to be identified in Japan; its exact location is not known.
Note: The highest-numbered Japanese division noted previously was the 344th, in Shikoku (FES 11 July 45).

b. Nova of 206th Div: Recent messages disclose that a division with the operational code name "Aso" has moved from the Kumamoto area of Central Kyushu to the sector of Southwest Kyushu lying to the west of Kagoshima Bay; it now apparently has Hq at Izaku (12 m. S of Kagoshima). The division is believed to be the 206th, which was formed in the Kumamoto Divisional District some time before 5 May (FES 9 July 45). The 77th and 143th Divs and the 3rd Amphibious Brig previously have been identified in that sector, which is commanded by the Fortieth Army (Hq Ijuin, 10 m. W of Kagoshima). There have been indications that another division (not identified) is moving there from the Nagoya area (FES 23 July 45).

7. Operation Tomahawk—Scheduled Move to Formosa: Twenty-five Frances' medium bombers have been standing by at Komatsu (30 m. NW of Nagoya), awaiting orders to move to Formosa for Operation Tomahawk—attacks against the Allied task force at Leyte "then it returns from its raids on Japan" (FES 3 Aug 45).
A 4 Aug message from Air Flotilla 29 (Formosa), apparently referring to Operation Tomahawk, states that "the Frances medium bombers" will move to Formosa (possibly to Tainan and Shinchiku) in three phases—on the 5th, 6th and 7th, respectively. Also on the 4th, Air Flotilla 29 directed that all its operational Myrt reconn planes move to Tainan and then engage in reconnaissance of the Manila area.

Note: A Japanese Navy intelligence report sent early on 3 Aug stated that the Allied task force "apparently is proceeding south, but precise indications of its course are lacking".

9. Suicide Trainers—Instruction on Allied Ships

On 31 July Air Flotilla 13 (Navy suicide trainer Hq Yamato) requested that it be furnished "pictures and data on [Allied] attack transports and attack cargo ships, [words missing] for use in the instruction of suicide attack personnel."

9. Concealed Naval Airfields in Western Japan:

SEE PULL-OUT MAP ATTACHED TO PAGE 9

A 7 July message, just available, from the Kure Naval District listed 11 concealed airfields in western Japan, located at the points indicated on the map, which
were "expected to be completed by 16 July". The three airfields in West Shikoku were described as "located in mountainous areas and thoroughly concealed". Of the five airfields in West Honshu, two (Kabe and Akago) are "not suitable for night use" and the remaining three can be used at night to a limited degree only.

Note: On 27 July Mineyama Force (Navy, Willow: elementary trainers) "completed redeployment" of 22 aircraft at Kabe.

10. Operation Damocles—Equipping of Betty:

Air Group 706 has been the principal air group connected with preparations at North Honshu and Hokkaido bases for Operation Damocles (possibly airborne raids on 8-29 bases). A 31 July message from the Bureau of Aeronautics at Tokyo to a Naval Air Depot at Gurnato (N Honshu) directs that, by 10 Aug, 30 Betty medium bombers of Air Group 706 are to be converted into transport planes at Hitaya (N Honshu). The message adds:

"Auxiliary tanks will be installed in the [wings], and 400-liter auxiliary tanks will be installed in the fuselage of all [newer model] Bettys included in the 30 planes."

Note: Technical Air Intelligence Center estimates the maximum range of Betty, when carrying a
2,200-lb bomb load and no extra fuel tanks, at 3,075 miles. Each 400-liter auxiliary tank would add about 176 miles to that range. The round-trip distance from Tokyo to Saipan is about 2,930 miles; the one-way distance from Paramushiro to Seattle is about 3,500 miles.

11. Expansion of Aircraft Machine Tool Supply in Manchuria

a. The only two planes which the Japanese are known to be producing in Manchuria are the KL-79 advanced trainer and the single-engine fighter Frank. Recent messages have suggested that the Manchuria Air Depot might also be preparing to begin either production or major overhaul of three other combat planes (FES 1 Aug 45)*. A lack of machine tools, however, is believed to have been one of the factors limiting the extensive development of aircraft production in Manchuria.

b. A 24 July message from Tokyo to Hanking provides the first significant evidence that the Japanese are planning to build up Manchuria's supply of machine tools for aircraft production. The message reads as follows:

*The three planes are the twin-engine bomber Peggy, the twin-engine fighter Randy and the KL-100 (probably a radial-engine version of the single-engine fighter Tony). A 29 June message from Hanking, just available, requested production blueprints for aircraft cannon used in those planes.
"The plan to increase our machine tool capacity in Manchuria in order to bring about greater aircraft production there. We will utilize the technical direction of the Hitachi and Ikagai companies (i) in the designing, manufacture and employment of machine tools and master machine tools needed for mass production, and (ii) in the modification and overhaul of our existing machine tools [in Manchuria].

The division of labor between the two companies will be as follows: Ikagai will be charged with the modification and overhaul of [existing] machinery and with giving advice on designing and manufacturing master machine tools; Hitachi will plan and advise on the actual use of machinery and master machine tools. An advisory group of 46 engineers and subordinates from both companies will be established.

"About eight machines" are to be transferred [from Japan to Manchuria] and set up. The number will be increased as required."

Note: The Hitachi Machine Works and the Ikagai
Iron Works are believed to be the two foremost producers of machine tools in Japan.
Text of 20 July Directive from the Supreme Commander of the Combined Naval Forces

In the eve of Operation Homeland my fondest hopes have been strengthened by the fact that we have been able to perfect our preparations and, in the face of the enemy's determination, to reduce his effective strength. However, on closer investigation I find the following points which I should like to make, and it is my earnest desire that everything possible be done to facilitate the realization of them:

(1) Since Operation Homeland is a finish-fight operation, its success will require the utmost cooperation from all hands. When the enemy attacks Honshu, we must concentrate all the strength of our air force—Army and Navy—on the threatened point, and defeat and destroy the enemy force. To be able to accomplish this, it will be necessary for us to carry out such training and to preserve our equipment in the meantime. The conservation of our fighting strength during such period of uncertainty may cause a slump in morale, and everything possible, consistent with our plans, must be done to prevent this. The key to an ambush-interception operation lies in the ability to hold back our forces until the right moment, and in maintaining morale during
the period of waiting. Preparations pursuant to this
policy will require the greatest of caution, so that
morale will not be injured.

(2) Our requests for operational needs should
be limited to actual requirements. It goes without say-
ing that, somehow, our training must continue as before,
even in the face of our present fuel situation. Oper-
tional prospects include improvements in such various
branches as suicide aircraft and surface and underwater
suicide strength. These we must improve by training.

(3) Our scheme of separation of air and
ground forces, presently to become effective, is con-
ected with (i) our preparations on the ground and (ii)
our air strategy which is based on total suicide air
attacks. The plan has as its objective the freedom of
action of our "A" air groups. "A" and "B" air groups
are to operate [word missing]; in particular, the "A"
air groups should build up, from the commander on down,
a spirit for destruction of the enemy which will result
in annihilating the enemy in the air. The "B" air groups,
maintaining this fundamental policy, are to make sure
that nothing stands in the way of its realization.  

*Available messages do not disclose the meaning of
the categories "A" and "B".

A-2
(4) We are put in a rather difficult spot by the attack operations of the enemy task force, etc., during the period of conservation for Operation Homeland. However, we are carrying out research on countermeasures to utilize [word missing] strength and are devising plans of [word missing] of operational command. It appears, however, that we are entering a phase of fighting to maintain basic strength. All hands are expected to train toward the objective of putting up a desperate fight.

(5) Tactics for limiting our losses of aircraft and other war potential on the ground are being carried out under a unified plan and have resulted in general improvement. Nevertheless, there are still some cases of heavy losses at one time. It cannot be denied that in some instances the losses must be attributed to bad luck, but in general they were caused by imperfect "anti-loss" measures. All hands must realize that if the principal battle potential is lost before we even start to attack, the loss cannot be fully made up, regardless of what countermeasures may be taken later. Accordingly, every effort must be exerted to limit any such loss.