NOTE: No one, without express permission from the proper authorities, may disseminate the information reported in this Summary or communicate it to any other person.

Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.

No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy.

The enemy knows that we attempt to exploit these sources. He does not know, and must not be permitted to learn, either the degree of our success or the particular sources with which we have been successful.

PART II

1. Latest message from Satō: As previously noted, Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Satō on 2 August that an effort was being made "to collect the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms" for peace and that "there is a disposition to make the Potsdam Three Power Proclamation the basis of our study concerning terms" (DS 2 Aug 45).
Sato had previously advised Togo that the Proclamation left Japan no alternative but "immediate unconditional surrender if we are to try to make America and England moderate and to prevent Russia's participation in the war" (DS 1 Aug 45). In a message sent yesterday, Sato makes the following additional comments:

"Regardless of whether we are able to obtain the good offices of the Russian Government for the termination of the war, the fact is undeniable that the Three Power Proclamation of 26 July by America, England and China already provides a basis for ending the Greater East Asia War. Therefore, if Russia assumes the role of mediator, it is already settled that action will have to be carried out on that basis. I feel that the statement in your message of 2 August indicating that you are disposed at least to make the Three Power Proclamation the basis for study of our conditions is extremely auspicious.

"I have received the relay of Minister Kase's message on this subject." [Several lines missing.]

*Presumably a reference to Kase's 29 July message commenting favorably on the Three Power Proclamation (DS 2, 3 Aug 45).
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As for the peace terms which would \textit{ultimately} be worked out \ldots if one looks at the terms for the handling of Germany decided upon at Potsdam, it is not far-fetched to surmise that a certain amelioration of conditions for Japan would be possible. Moreover, if communication to the United Nations of Japan's resolution to seek peace is speeded up by even one day, the degree of amelioration will be \textit{affected} to that extent. However, if the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes and we will not be able \textit{to avoid} following the road to ruin.

"Even though there may be some amelioration, it is already clear, even without looking at the example of Germany, what the peace terms will be and we must resign ourselves beforehand to uncertain, probably \textit{giving up} a considerable number of \textit{so-called} war criminals. However, the state is now \textit{on the verge of} ruin, and it is wholly inevitable that these war criminals --3--

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must make the necessary sacrifice to save their country as truly patriotic warriors.

"I was deeply moved upon reading Your Excellency's views ---- [word missing] and I have made bold to express my humble opinions."

2. Report from Sato: The full text of Ambassador Sato's 3 August message---noted briefly in yesterday's summary---is now available and is set forth in TAB A.

In that message, Sato advises Tokyo that "in the final analysis, we will have to determine our attitude toward the Three Power Proclamation," and again urges that in seeking the "good offices" of the Russians, Japan make "concrete proposals" for ending the war. Sato also suggests in this connection that, since the report of the Potsdam Conference contains no reference to any decisions concerning Japan, "Russia's attitude would seem to be somewhat favorable to us."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

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Ref. Item 2.

3 August Message from Hato

I wish to acknowledge receipt today of your 2 August message (DS 2, 3 Aug 45).

1. I shall naturally attempt to have a conference with Molotov immediately upon his return. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult for me to feel confident that, in accordance with your instructions, I shall be able to prevail upon the Russians to receive Prince Konoye as a Special Envoy. I have from the outset expressed my heartfelt convictions in this connection and have felt that you would understand the views which I have wired as those of the Ambassador on the spot. I have thought that we must give careful attention to the behavior of the Russian Government, particularly its relations with the United States, and therefore I have telegraphed my humble opinions in outspoken terms. That is to say, so long as we propose sending a Special Envoy [to Moscow] without at the same time having a concrete plan for ending the war, I must express my doubt as to whether the Russians will politely refuse to receive the Special Envoy without further ado or else.

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having first demanded the submission of some concrete proposal as a prerequisite, will at length come around to lending their good offices. Furthermore, even if by good fortune the Russians were to receive the Special Envoy without insisting on such a condition and if we were to reach a definite decision [as to surrender terms] only in the course of the Envoy's conferences in Moscow, I am completely unable to guarantee that these negotiations would not be inconclusive or that they might not unavoidably break down mid-way.

2. The report of the Potsdam Conference, announced on the 3rd, fortunately contains no reference to any decisions concerning Japan. I therefore have the feeling that Russia, on the surface at least, is still maintaining an attitude of [word uncertain, probably "nonintervention"] in the Far Eastern War. We may speculate that, since Stalin's policy was immovable, the American and English leaders performed had to handle the problem of Japan by means of a joint declaration by the three countries concerned—namely America, England and China—thus making clear the attitude of those three countries and urging final consideration upon Japan. If this is anywhere near the truth, Russia's attitude would

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seem to be somewhat favorable toward us. Nevertheless it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our Special Envoy.

In the final analysis, we will have to determine our own attitude toward the Three Power Proclamation and then, equipped with some concrete proposal for ending the war, seek the good offices of the Russians. That is naturally the right thing to do and will surely meet with the approval of all. In obedience to the instructions contained in your various messages, I again spoke to Lozovsky on 30 July [31 Jul 45] about the mission of our Special Envoy; if we should further solicit the Russian authorities to find out what they have in mind, I think it will turn out exactly as I have indicated above.

3. As you say, the days are numbered in which we can bring the war to an end before the enemy lands on our mainland, and this causes me to feel very deeply the pressure of time. Much as I regret to say it, this is the natural conclusion we must reach, now that we have lost mastery of the air and command of the sea.

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Only two months ago, as I remember, the War Minister stated before a special meeting of the Diet that if the enemy should attempt to invade the mainland he would be utterly destroyed first on the sea and then on the land at the water's edge. This was evidently a miscalculation since the past month has clearly demonstrated that there is no longer any ground for statements of this kind. Since we are about to contend with an enemy who has accumulated a great deal of experience in landing operations, and since we have only such meager materiel with which to defend ourselves, we cannot avoid the conclusion that in the final analysis it is only a question of time until we will have to surrender after having again made innumerable sacrifices.

If things come to such a pass, it will be absolutely necessary to avoid any situation in which the ill will of the people would focus itself upon the Government and the Military and even extend its evil influence to the Imperial House. I cannot cease hoping that the Government and the Military will not neglect this crucial hour and, assuming full responsibility, will arrive at some concrete plan for ending the war and have the Special Envoy take it with him [to Moscow]. Otherwise this Special
Envoy, sent at great pains, will inevitably have to return with empty hands, and I fear that the net result will be worse than if he had not been sent at all.

4. As I now think of it, the conversations held last June between Hirota and Malik* not only failed to produce any concrete results but on the contrary may have served to obstruct the sending of a Special Envoy. In those conversations, the Russians felt that we did not mean business in our proposals and, since it comes right after those conversations, they very probably will arrive at a similar conclusion concerning the matter of the Special Envoy.

5. While I do not know how you dealt with the suggestions made in my 20 July message [In which Satō made

*During those conversations ex-Premier Hirota sub-
mitted a proposal for a treaty of non-aggression and mutual assistance in the maintenance of peace in the Far East, together with a statement of Japan’s will-
lessness to (1) conclude an agreement for the “neutraliza-
tion” of Manchukuo obligating Japan to withdraw her troops after the end of the war and prohibiting both countries from interfering with Manchukuo’s internal political situation, (2) renounce her fishing rights in return for oil, and (3) discuss any matter Russia might want to bring up (DS 9, 10 Jul 45).
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an impassioned plea to the Japanese Government to surrender provided that the Imperial House should be preserved—DS 21, 22 Jul 45— the urgency of the present crisis no longer permits delay. I therefore implore you to report this to the Throne with all the energy at your command and I will be truly grateful for your trouble. Furthermore, I also request you to permit my message to be read by the leaders of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. In this way I earnestly hope to help stimulate our Empire to reach a final determination.

—AS—

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